O 231233Z OCT 08
FM UNESCO PARIS FR
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
RUEHLB/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
RUEHKU/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT
RUEHKU/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH
RUEHCO/AMEMBASSY COTONOU
RUEHVL/AMEMBASSY VILNIUS
RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO
RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

UNCLAS PARIS FR 001944 
 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: UNESCO PREL KPAL JO IS
SUBJECT:  JERUSALEM - MUGHRABI GATE AT UNESCO'S 180TH EXECUTIVE 
BOARD SESSION 
 
REF:  AMMAN 2632 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary:  At its autumn (180th) session, UNESCO's Executive 
Board had great difficulty achieving consensus on a decision 
regarding the proposed Mughrabi ascent to Jerusalem's Temple Mount. 
For the first time Jordan and the Palestinians insisted on involving 
the Chairman of the Executive Board and his six regional Vice-Chairs 
(Norway, South Africa, India, Brazil, Egypt, and Lithuania) in 
discussion of this issue.  Jordan and the Palestinians also demanded 
that the Board express "concern" at what they claimed was Israel's 
"unilateral decision" to proceed with construction of the Mughrabi 
ascent.  Israel opposed both these procedural and substantive 
demands.  The Israeli Ambassador wanted UNESCO Deputy Director 
General (DDG) Marcio Barbosa (Brazil) to continue quiet, backstage 
mediation as he has in the past and only agreed with greatest 
reluctance to a short "information meeting" with the Chairman and 
Vice-Chairs.  The Israeli adamantly refused to agree to any proposal 
that would have had the Board express "concern" at the Mughrabi 
situation or describe the decision of the Jerusalem planning 
authority to proceed with construction of the ascent as 
"unilateral." 
¶2. (SBU) Summary Continued:  In the end, the "information meeting" 
with the Vice-Chairs contributed little but confusion, as the 
Vice-Chairpersons subsequently tried to involve themselves in the 
negotiations.  After a dramatic failure to agree on a consensus 
decision at the Board's scheduled closing session on October 17, the 
Board agreed exceptionally to suspend that session until October 21. 
 Ultimately, the Jordanian MFA's Legal Advisor flew to Paris and 
made a compromise proposal on October 20 that did not violate 
Israel's "red lines."  It was adopted without debate on October 21, 
a full four days after the Executive Board had been expected to 
adjourn(see para 12 for the final text of the decision).  End 
Summary. 
¶3. (U) Issues involving the Temple Mount (a World Heritage Site) and 
its reconstruction of the Mughrabi ascent have been a hardy 
perennial on the agenda of UNESCO's twice yearly Executive Boards. 
UNESCO has a tradition of dealing with matters by consensus and for 
several years its 58-member Executive Board has been able to 
maintain this custom with regard to issues relating to Jerusalem and 
the Temple Mount.  In recent Board meetings, DDG Barbosa has met 
behind the scenes separately and together with the Israelis, 
Jordanians, and Palestinians (none of whom are currently Board 
members) to hammer out consensus texts for presentation to the Board 
- usually late in its three week session.  These have been approved 
by the plenary rapidly and without debate.  The U.S. has strongly 
supported Barbosa while pushing to have technical issues related to 
the design the Mughrabi ascent referred to the World Heritage 
Committee, the treaty body of UNESCO's 1972 World Heritage 
Convention. 
¶4. (SBU) Negotiations, however, did not follow the usual pattern at 
the most recent Executive Board session which began on September 30 
and finally adjourned on October 21.  As foreshadowed in reftel, 
Jordan and the Palestinians took a significantly harder line.  They 
began by demanding a "new format" for negotiations, requesting the 
involvement of the Chairman of the Executive Board and the six 
regional Vice-Chairs.  (Comment:  We suspect the Jordanians and 
Palestinians felt the usual backroom talks led by Barbosa had become 
too routine and lacking in theatrics.  End Comment.)  Israel 
initially rejected the idea, preferring to rely as normal on the 
DDG's good offices .  Under great pressure from Executive Board 
Chairman Olabiyi Yai (Benin), however, Israeli Ambassador David 
Kornbluth reluctantly agreed to participate in an "information 
meeting" on the morning of Thursday, October 16, in which Israel, 
Jordan, and the Palestinians explained their points of view to the 
six Vice-Chairpersons and the ambassadors of the U.S., France 
(current European Union President), and Spain (current chair of the 
World Heritage Committee). 
¶5. (SBU) The "information meeting" meeting achieved nothing beyond 
adding confusion to an already difficult situation.  Israel, Jordan, 
 
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TAGS: UNESCO PREL KPAL JO IS
SUBJECT:  JERUSALEM - MUGHRABI GATE AT UNESCO'S 180TH EXECUTIVE 
BOARD SESSION 
 
and the Palestinians had by this point reached an impasse over the 
substance of the draft.  The Jordanians and Palestinians wanted the 
Executive Board to "express its deep concern with regard to the 
decision taken, in a unilateral way, by the Jerusalem District 
Planning and Construction Commission to approve the town planning 
scheme for the Mughrabi ascent."  This was completely unacceptable 
to the Israelis who said they would not agree to a decision that had 
the Board expressing "concern," and that characterized the Jerusalem 
planning authority's act as a "unilateral decision."  Throughout the 
day on October 16, DDG Barbosa met with the concerned delegations to 
see if he could come up with wording that would bridge the gap.  The 
U.S. stayed in close touch with the Israeli Ambassador, and the 
U.S., French, and Spanish ambassadors working together made several 
drafting suggestions to Barbosa without becoming directly involved 
in shuttling between the parties.  None of the many proposals made 
won the agreement of all, and the day ended without progress. 
¶6. (SBU) The situation became dramatic on Friday, October 17 as the 
deadline for adjournment of the Executive Board loomed.  Chairman 
Yai convened a morning meeting to discuss the situation with the 
U.S., French, and Spanish ambassadors and the four regional 
Vice-Chairpersons (Egypt, India, Brazil, and South Africa) available 
to meet on such short notice.  The French strongly criticized 
further involvement of the Vice-Chairs, and the U.S. Ambassador left 
the meeting in protest when the Chairman and Vice-Chairs began to 
consider involving themselves further in Barbosa's efforts to broker 
a deal.  Despite the meddling, Barbosa shuttled fruitlessly between 
the Israelis and Jordanians and Palestinians until the Israeli 
Ambassador left the premises at 4:00 p.m. in time to be home for the 
onset of the Jewish Sabbath.  With delegations milling about 
impatiently in the main meeting room waiting for the Board's final 
plenary session to begin, Chairman Yai convened yet another meeting 
of the Vice-Chairs and the U.S., France, and Spain. By this time, 
many delegations feared that the Arabs wanted to force a rare and 
extraordinary vote on a draft decision that would contain their 
preferred language. 
¶7. (SBU) The involvement of the Chairman and his colleagues did not 
benefit the Jordanians and Palestinians as much as they had hoped. 
After conferring, the Chairman and his Vice-Chairs summoned the 
Jordanians and Palestinians and made clear to them that UNESCO's 
tradition of consensus decision-making must be upheld and a vote 
avoided.  They attempted to convince Jordan and the Palestinians to 
agree to language that the Israeli Ambassador had said he could 
accept before his departure, but the former once again refused. 
When the Executive Board's plenary session finally resumed at 7:00 
p.m., Chairman Yai distributed a draft decision as a supposed 
chairman's text that included language Israel could accept, but 
which the Jordanians and Palestinians had already rejected.  In 
doing this, Yai broke the UNESCO custom that a chairman's text is 
always a consensus document acceptable to all parties.  The 58 
delegations present sat in stunned silence for a moment while Yai 
attempted to gavel the resolution adopted, even though delegates had 
had only a few moments to study it.  The French Ambassador, however, 
objected to immediate adoption of the text, claiming the move was 
over-hasty.  This opened the floodgates and numerous delegations 
spoke up in opposition.  Finally, the French ambassador moved that 
the meeting of the Board be adjourned until Tuesday evening October 
21 (N.B. four days after the regularly scheduled end of the Board's 
session). 
¶8. (SBU) The weekend and Monday, October 20th saw still more 
negotiations.  The Jordanian MFA Legal Advisor was dispatched to 
Paris with a new formulation for the draft decision.  Barbosa sent 
this latest text to Israel's ambassador, David Kornbluth, who by 
then was in Israel on vacation.  Kornbluth said he could accept it, 
and the text (see para 12 below) was finally adopted without debate 
and by consensus on October 21. 
¶9. (SBU) Comment:  The Jordanians and Palestinians looked pleased 
when this decision was finally adopted.  It is hard, however, to see 
how the final result is significantly better than the many formulas 
they were offered and rejected last week.  They did not succeed in 
 
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SUBJECT:  JERUSALEM - MUGHRABI GATE AT UNESCO'S 180TH EXECUTIVE 
BOARD SESSION 
 
having the Board itself express collective concern, and the balanced 
reference to unilateral action echoes the formula agreed at the July 
World Heritage Committee meeting in Quebec.  One can only speculate 
as to why the Arabs chose not seek a vote on their preferred 
language, as some had anticipated.  They may have been influenced by 
Egypt which wanted to avoid a major clash over Jerusalem at this 
Board, fearing harm to the chances of Egypt's candidate to replace 
Director General Matsuura when he retires next year.  They may also 
have been deterred by the opposition to a vote that came from India 
and other G-77 countries.  Finally, they may have calculated that a 
victorious vote might have led Israel to break off completely the 
dialogue on issues related to the Temple Mount that is effectively 
being conducted through UNESCO's good offices. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Comment continued: As satisfying as a consensus agreement 
on such an emotional issue is, we cannot become complacent.  The 
decision adopted requires the Director General to report on the 
Mughrabi ascent situation at the Executive Board's April 2009 
meeting, and this will give Jordan and the Palestinians an 
opportunity to raise their concerns again.  It will be very 
important ensure the issue is handled carefully.  DDG Barbosa has 
demonstrated talent for the patient, quiet diplomacy needed to bring 
these difficult parties together.  He does not need kibbitzing from 
delegations which may not know this issue well and may be more 
interested in posturing than in finding solutions.  We can reliably 
predict, however, that the regional Vice-Chairs, in particular 
India, will try to use what happened at this Board to claim a role 
for themselves whenever this issue comes up again.  In speeches 
given after adoption of the decision on October 21, both India and 
Brazil commended Chairman Yai for his decision to involve the 
Vice-Chairs and expressed the hope that they will be involved in the 
future.  Russia spoke up to say that it did not consider that the 
Eastern Europe Vice-Chair, Lithuania, spoke for Russia, and to ask 
that Russia be included in any succeeding negotiations on this 
topic.  This way lies danger, and we will have to be extra vigilant 
in succeeding Boards to ensure that Barbosa is left free to do his 
job without having the Vice-Chairs and others interfering.  We doubt 
in any case that Israel will be agreeable to participate in talks 
that involve the other Vice-Chairs. 
 
¶11. (SBU) Comment Continued:  Competent, even-handed leadership is 
important if UNESCO is to deal effectively with the highly sensitive 
issues that surround the Temple Mount World Heritage site.  Director 
General Matsuura and DDG Barbosa have dealt with these issues with 
professionalism and impartiality.  Matsuura and Barbosa must leave 
office, however, in the autumn of 2009.  It will be important to 
ensure that they have equally competent and impartial replacements. 
In the wrong hands, UNESCO could exacerbate the already tense 
situation in Jerusalem rather than provide a forum, as it does now, 
where Israel, the Jordanians, and Palestinians can discuss 
management of the Temple Mount site. 
 
¶12. (U) Following is the text of the decision finally adopted by the 
UNESCO Executive Board: 
 
Begin Text. 
 
The Executive Board, 
 
¶1. Having examined document 180 EX/5 Add.3 Rev., 
 
¶2. Recalling 176 EX/Special Plenary Meeting/Decision, 177 
EX/Decision 20, 179 EX/Decisions 9 and 52, 
 
¶3. Further recalling Decisions 31 COM 7A.18 and 32 COM 7A.18 adopted 
by the World Heritage Committee at its 31st (Christchurch, 2007) and 
32nd (Quebec City, 2008) sessions respectively, 
 
¶4. Also recalling the relevant provisions on the protection of 
 
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BOARD SESSION 
 
cultural heritage including, as appropriate, the four Geneva 
Conventions (1949), the Hague Convention for the Protection of 
Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict of 1954, the 
Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural 
Heritage of 1972, the inscription of the Old City of Jerusalem and 
its Walls at the request of Jordan on the World Heritage List (1981) 
and on the List of World Heritage in Danger (1982), and the 
recommendations, resolutions and decisions of UNESCO, 
 
¶5. Reaffirming the purpose and spirit of the professional encounter 
at the technical level of 13 January 2008, as well as the follow-up 
meeting of 24 February 2008, 
 
¶6. Being aware that the process for the design of the Mughrabi 
ascent, which allows for the taking into consideration of the 
proposals submitted during the professional encounter, is still 
under way, and that the World Heritage Centre is following closely 
the developments associated with this process through its Reinforced 
Monitoring Mechanism, 
 
¶7. Being aware of the deep concerns regarding the decision taken by 
the Jerusalem District Planning and Construction Commission on the 
town planning scheme for the Mughrabi ascent, 
 
¶8. Requests that, despite this decision, the process for the design 
of the Mughrabi ascent be inclusive of all concerned parties, in 
accordance with the spirit and content of previous World Heritage 
Committee decisions; 
 
¶9. Reaffirms that no measures, unilateral or otherwise, should be 
taken which will affect the authenticity and integrity of the site, 
in accordance with the Convention for the Protection of the World 
Cultural and Natural Heritage of 1972; 
 
¶10. Reiterates the request made by the World Heritage Committee at 
its 32nd session in Decision 32 COM 7A.18 that the Israeli 
authorities continue the cooperation engaged with all concerned 
parties, in particular with Jordanian and Waqf experts; 
 
¶11. Reiterates the request made by the World Heritage Committee at 
its 32nd session in Decision 32 COM 7A.18 that the World Heritage 
Centre organize a technical follow-up meeting at the site with all 
concerned parties for additional exchanges of information to enable 
all necessary inputs to be considered; 
 
¶12. Notes with satisfaction that the follow-up meeting requested by 
the World Heritage Committee at its 32nd session in Decision 32 COM 
7A.18 is tentatively scheduled for early November 2008; 
 
¶13. Expresses its thanks to the Director-General for the action he 
has taken to facilitate the dialogue and professional exchanges 
between all the concerned parties; 
 
¶14. Invites the Director-General to submit to it a progress report 
thereon at its 181st session. 
 
End text. 
 
ENGELKEN