VZCZCXRO0546
OO RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHFR #2005/01 3051812
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 311812Z OCT 08
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4729
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES  PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 002005 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/31/2018 
TAGS: PREL PGOV EUN XT XF FR EZ EG IS SW AL
SUBJECT: FLIRTING WITH DISASTER:  FRANCE PREPARES FOR THE 
FATEFUL MARSEILLE MINISTERIAL ON THE MEDITERRANEAN UNION 
 
REF: A. PARIS 1998 
     ¶B. PARIS 1997 AND PREVIOUS 
 
Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Kathy Allegrone for reasons 
 1.4. (b), (d). 
 
¶1.  (C)  As Paris moves into the weekend before the Union for 
the Mediterranean (UPM) ministerial in Marseille 3-4 
November, great uncertainty about its outcome and prospects 
for making good on the grand vision for the UPM sketched out 
in Paris last July prevail.  A senior-level contact at the 
French MFA told us October 31 that none of the key decisions, 
from the location of the UPM's secretariat to the duration of 
the "northern" co-presidency (currently held by France as EU 
president), have been decided definitively. 
 
¶2.  (C)  French President Sarkozy and Egyptian President 
Mubarak largely agreed on a way forward over the question of 
the Arab League's observer status (per ref a), according to 
the same source, but this had not yet translated into 
widespread Arab acceptance.  French FM Kouchner, he 
continued, had worked the phones with Israeli FM Tzipi Livni 
to secure her agreement (in that context, our source denied 
all claims that Kouchner or Sarkozy felt any bitterness over 
Livni's decision not to attend the Marseille ministerial, 
given the internal political situation in Israel).  The Czech 
prime minister's visit to Paris October 31 and meeting with 
Sarkozy may pave the way for a compromise on France's 
insistence that it maintain some hold on the EU part of the 
co-presidency.  Our senior MFA source indicated the French 
would press for agreement for a shared presidency among the 
EU Troika that would keep France in the picture until at 
least next July, i.e., what the French regard as the most 
critical period in the UPM's formation. 
 
¶3.  (C)  Embassy has reported in cables and Paris Points over 
the past several weeks French woes in securing agreement to 
the key decisions to be taken in Marseille and on the text of 
the final communique the ministers will issue.  The GOF's 
interministerial coordinator for the UPM Serge Telle 
confirmed to us in frank terms as early as October 14 that 
all EU attempts at working level meetings to hash things out 
had failed over Israel's adamant refusal to allow an Arab 
League observer delegation to be present and over adamant 
Arab refusal to accept its exclusion.  He and Elysee special 
adviser Henri Guaino had visited Israel and Egypt a number of 
times, in addition to tens of phone calls, to try to break 
the impasse with no effect.  France had hoped to find 
agreement along the lines of the understanding for the 
Barcelona Process, i.e. at ministerial level gatherings in a 
strict observer capacity.  Claiming to reflect the majority 
Arab view, the Egyptians insisted on participation in lower 
level meetings, including on thematic subjects.  The end 
result has been virtual paralysis, with the French having to 
circulate the draft declaration to all 43 parties and to 
synthesize all the comments in painstaking fashion. 
 
¶4.  (C)  Telle's hope that a late October water meeting in 
Amman, Jordan, would offer a last-ditch opportunity for a 
working meeting prior to the ministerial when the Jordanians 
pulled the plug on the water meeting because of the dispute 
over Arab League participation.  Even as he expressed 
frustration (and took calls from subordinates in contact with 
the different players), Telle reaffirmed Sarkozy's total 
commitment to the UPM's success.  The Marseille ministerial 
was intended to discuss the UPM's governance (including 
establishment of its secretariat), the state of efforts to 
draw up a project-specific workplan, and "the political 
situation" (the latter being a requirement Telle accepted 
with the argument that it would be "absurd" to ignore the 
Israeli/Palestinian dispute).  Telle did not know on October 
14 which of the candidates for the secretariat's location -- 
Tunis, Valletta, or Barcelona -- would win out, but the 
latest word we heard from MFA's North Africa DAS-equivalent 
Cyrille Rogeau on October 31 was that Barcelona was emerging 
as the clear favorite since most Arabs did not want the 
secretariat located anywhere that Israeli participation would 
provoke controversy. 
 
¶5.  (C)  Comment:  The French are plowing ahead with the UPM 
ministerial, despite brief hints they might cancel it at the 
last minute.  One option, suggested by Telle, would be to 
defer until 2009 many of the decisions that were supposed to 
have been decided in Marseille.  This would include the 
secretariat location, which Telle  and others have said is 
not critical until the projects under consideration or being 
implemented reaches critical mass.  If anything, however, the 
potential for a fiasco in Marseille has driven renewed 
reflection on the management structure for directing the 
French effort on behalf of the UPM.  Our senior MFA source 
acknowledged that the lack of full MFA involvement or buy-in 
 
PARIS 00002005  002 OF 002 
 
 
to the UPM project has been an ongoing problem from the 
start, given the Elysee's dominance of the process from the 
outset through to the July 2008 Paris summit.  Telle's 
status, like that of his predecessor Alain LeRoy, has been 
ambiguous and subject to being undercut by Guaino, who 
reportedly has not been disposed to coordinate his activities 
with Telle or any of his subordinates.  According to our MFA 
source, Kouchner, whose credibility is somewhat on the line 
for the success or failure at Marseille, has decided in the 
past few days that the effort needs to be fundamentally 
reorganized and intends to press the Elysee to place the 
entire operation fully under the MFA's tutelage.  That, of 
course, could depend on how well the French get through the 
Marseille ministerial next week. 
 
STAPLETON