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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 001927 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/20/2023 
TAGS: FR PREL PGOV MEPP
SUBJECT: FRANCE PREPARES TO ENGAGE NEW US ADMINISTRATION ON 
THE MIDDLE EAST 
 
Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Kathleen H. Allegrone, reas 
ons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (S/NF) Summary/comment: France's foreign policy 
establishment plans to engage the new U.S. administration as 
soon as possible (even, perhaps, before the formal 
inauguration) on a range of Middle East issues, including the 
Israeli-Palestinian peace process, Iran, and Syria/Lebanon. 
In the hope of presenting the new U.S. team with a concerted 
European position, FM Kouchner will use the November 4 
meeting of Mediterranean Foreign Ministers in Marseille to 
persuade his German, British, Italian and Spanish 
counterparts to adopt France's thinking on an expanded 
supportive role for the EU in the Israeli-Palestinian peace 
process, including possible assurances that the international 
community could offer the parties on permanent status issues; 
France will then try to enshrine those ideas in an updated 
version of the November 2007 EU Action Plan for the Middle 
East, to be blessed at the November 10-11, 2008 GAERC. 
Although the French understand U.S. and Israeli reservations 
about their proposals, President Sarkozy and FM Kouchner are 
determined to press forward with this dialogue.  During his 
Oct. 3-5 visit to Israel, FM Kouchner found the Israelis 
feeling "more threatened" by Iran and even more determined to 
do whatever it takes to prevent Tehran from building a 
nuclear bomb; Kouchner stressed that for the moment there are 
still better options than military strikes.  The French will 
seek an early signal from the new U.S. team as to their 
thinking on additional sanctions, although working level 
contacts in the MFA are not optimistic that tougher sanctions 
would prove effective.  Moreover, they fear the Iranians will 
continue enriching uranium while France waits for the new 
U.S. administration to "learn the ropes."  On Syria, France 
will undoubtedly encourage Washington to shift to a strategy 
of engagement, and will point to President Bashar al-Asad's 
recent announcement of diplomatic relations with Lebanon as 
proof that Syrian behavior is malleable and that the French 
approach is working.  The French will also want to test the 
new administration's receptivity to the idea of joint 
Franco-American sponsorship of direct Syrian-Israeli talks. 
We should begin thinking now about the timing and structure 
of a transitional dialogue with France on the Middle East, 
with an eye towards: First, channeling France's enthusiasm on 
the peace process into Quartet-endorsed projects that will 
promote trust between the parties rather than interjecting 
third-party ideas into the bilateral negotiations; second, 
reassuring the French of continuity in our Iran policy; and 
third, pressing the French to apply an objective yardstick in 
their year-end review of Syrian progress on President 
Sarkozy's benchmarks.  See extended comment in para 9.  End 
summary/comment. 
 
The MEPP: France Sees Opportunity 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C)  France's foreign policy establishment plans to engage 
the new U.S. administration as soon as possible (even, 
perhaps, before the formal inauguration) on a range of Middle 
East issues, judging by comments in recent meetings with a 
range of French MFA officials (including an Oct. 17 meeting 
with Christophe Bigot, FM Kouchner's Middle East advisor) as 
well as local UK, Egyptian and Israeli embassy contacts.  At 
the top of France's agenda is the Israeli-Palestinian peace 
process, which French officials fear will not be a priority 
for any incoming U.S. administration.  Paradoxically, the 
French also see Washington's potential benign neglect of the 
Middle East peace process (MEPP) as an opportunity for 
France, via the EU, to play a more prominent role in 
supporting the process.  "It's the same old story -- they 
want to play, not just pay," according to Israeli Political 
Counselor Daniel Halevy. 
 
¶4. (C) Specifically, the French have been working at the NEA 
A/S level within the EU Quint to reach agreement on updating 
the November 2007 EU Action Plan for the Middle East to 
include forward-leaning proposals on assurances that the 
international community could offer the parties on a variety 
of final status issues, chief of which are the status of 
Jerusalem, security (the French have publicly affirmed their 
willingness to be part of an international force of observers 
or peacekeepers to help enforce any agreement the parties 
reach), and the fate of Palestinian refugees.  Anxious to 
achieve consensus on these issues before France ends its EU 
presidency, FM Kouchner will likely raise them during a 
discussion of the future of the trans-Atlantic relationship, 
now proposed for the margins of the November 4 meeting of 
Mediterranean Union FMs in Marseille.  (Other issues slated 
for that discussion include Afghanistan/Pakistan and Russia.) 
 If that discussion goes well, the French hope the updated EU 
 
PARIS 00001927  002 OF 003 
 
 
Action Plan will be approved at the November GAERC and will 
form the basis of common talking points that EU member states 
will use when engaging the new U.S. administration on the 
MEPP.  According to UK Pol/C Hamish Cowell, the UK (which, 
along with Germany, had some initial doubts about the French 
approach) is now more or less on board with France's thinking 
-- provided that the Israelis and Palestinians agree.  "I 
don't believe there is much EU debate on it (the Action Plan) 
at the moment," said Cowell, who hinted that the Germans have 
also dropped their objections because they, like the British, 
regard the exercise as largely academic. 
 
¶4. (C)  The French are well aware of significant U.S. 
reservations regarding their approach, in part thanks to 
recent visits to Washington by MFA NEA A/S-equivalent Patrice 
Paoli and DAS-equivalent Ludovic Pouille.  They also 
recognize that the Israelis are distinctly unenthusiastic: FM 
Livni phoned Kouchner prior to the last Gymnich meeting in 
Avignon and asked him not to circulate a paper outlining 
France's proposals (Kouchner agreed, no doubt in part because 
the agenda had already been overtaken by the crisis in 
Georgia); the Israeli MFA sent a delegation to Paris to 
express its concern over France's MEPP activism; and Kouchner 
found Livni still unconvinced during his October 3-5 visit to 
Israel.  Bigot noted ruefully that Kouchner had not managed 
to develop much personal warmth with Livni, whom he found "a 
bit obstinate and confrontational," and suggested that 
Kouchner would wait until Livni had finished forming her 
government before informing her that France is pressing 
forward with its proposals. 
 
Iran: MFA Anxious to See Where Washington Goes 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶5. (S/NF) Bigot told PolMin/C that Kouchner found the 
Israelis feeling "more threatened" by Iran, and hence more 
determined than ever to doing whatever it takes to prevent 
the Iranian regime from obtaining a nuclear weapon.  In 
short, said Bigot, the Israelis were "a little bit closer to 
bombing."  In response, Kouchner stressed that for the time 
being, there are still better alternatives to military 
strikes.  In a recent meeting with DOD U/S Edelman, Strategic 
Affairs advisor P. Errera noted that the economic downturn 
seems to be haveing an impact on the way Iranian leaders 
think and act, possibly giving greater hope that the 
sanctions policy will have a positive effect. 
 
¶6. (S/NF) However, working-level diplomats at the MFA are not 
particularly optimistic about the chances for reaching a 
diplomatic solution with the Iranians, even if sanctions were 
further tightened, the P5 1 were to further sweeten their 
offer, and President Ahmadinejad were not re-elected.  "No 
one here thinks it will change anything," said Franck Gellet 
(the MFA's NEA DAS-equivalent for Iran), speaking in an Oct. 
17 meeting with NEA Watcher and visiting France Desk Officer 
Andrew Lorenz.  Gellet (who tends to believe that the issue 
will ultimately have to be resolved by force) said his 
Israeli interlocutors were concerned that the P5 1 would 
"lose a year" waiting for the new U.S. administration to 
learn the ropes, during which time the Iranian regime would 
"merrily" continue enriching uranium.  Gellet said it would 
be useful for the new U.S. administration to compare notes 
with France and like-minded EU states as early as possible, 
not least so that the Europeans can get a sense of where 
Washington would like to go with regard to sanctions and 
engagement.  In the interim, Gellet said the French would 
continue to push its EU partners to go further on sanctions, 
and would push Moscow not to sell Iran its S-300 
anti-aircraft system. 
 
Syria/Lebanon: French Will Advocate Engagement 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶7. (C) On Syria, the French are certain to encourage the new 
U.S. administration to consider a strategy of engagement. 
They will argue, on the basis of Syrian performance before 
and after President Sarkozy's visit to Damascus, that Syrian 
behavior is malleable -- and is moving in a more positive 
direction at present.  In making their case, they will point 
(with a certain amount of self-satisfaction) to what they see 
as evidence that engagement works: 
 
-- President Asad's October 14 announcement of diplomatic 
relations with Lebanon; 
-- Recent meetings of joint Syrian-Lebanese committees on 
delineating the border and returning prisoners; 
-- Bashar al-Asad's commitment to President Sarkozy to 
continue indirect contacts with Israel and his invitation for 
France and the U.S. to co-sponsor direct Israeli-Syrian talks; 
 
PARIS 00001927  003 OF 003 
 
 
-- The delivery (via the good offices of the Emir of Qatar) 
of a letter to captured Franco-Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit 
from his father; 
-- The August 14 visit of President Sleiman to Damascus; 
-- Syrian acquiescence to the election of Lebanese President 
Sleiman, and to Lebanese PM Siniora retaining his post; 
-- Syrian support of the Doha Accords; 
-- The token release of some political prisoners. 
 
The French will add that they are under no illusions about 
the nature of the Syrian regime, and have therefore been 
careful to set out meaningful benchmarks against which to 
measure Syrian progress.  The French have promised to take a 
hard look at year's end at what the Syrians have delivered 
before taking any further steps on engagement. 
 
¶8. (C) Finally, there is a remote possibility that the French 
will argue that Hizballah (which has both French and American 
blood on its hands) is simply too large and powerful to be 
ignored.  "My guess is that President Sarkozy despises 
Hizballah, but it's a major political force in Lebanon.  Yes, 
it is a terrorist group -- but it also controls a large 
number of seats in the parliament, and Israel has failed to 
destroy it in two separate wars," said DAS-equivalent for the 
Levant Ludovic Pouille, in reviewing the reasons France has 
decided to maintain a political dialogue with Hizballah. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶9. (C/NF) The French increasingly see the next U.S. 
administration as their target audience for a strategic 
conversation about the Middle East.  One unfortunate 
consequence is that they have begun politely discounting USG 
messages not to their liking (e.g., cautions that their MEPP 
final status ideas are premature).  To a certain extent, this 
is inevitable -- and should be understood less as evidence of 
France's disagreement with current USG policies than as tacit 
recognition that Washington will continue to set the 
parameters on many of these issues.  We should welcome their 
interest in having a conversation at the earliest feasible 
date, not least so that we can shape French/EU thinking. In 
particular, we might seek to channel France's enthusiasm for 
playing a larger role on the peace process into exercising 
leadership on Quartet-endorsed projects that will promote 
trust between the parties rather than interjecting 
third-party ideas into the bilateral negotiations.  In 
addition, we will want to reassure the French of continuity 
in our Iran policy and press them to apply an objective 
yardstick in their year-end review of Syrian progress on 
President Sarkozy's benchmarks.  Such a conversation could 
help to lay the foundation for continued or improved 
cooperation in each of these important domains. 
 
 
STAPLETON