VZCZCXRO2381
RR RUEHROV
DE RUEHNJ #0491/01 2971313
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 231313Z OCT 08
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6532
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 0488
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NDJAMENA 000491 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/22/2018 
TAGS: PREL UN PKO MARR PINR SU LY FR EU CD
SUBJECT: SRSG ANGELO ON MINURCAT CURRENT AND FUTURE: 
MINURCAT I ABOUT TO DEPLOY TO CAMPS; CHAD PREPARED TO 
ENGAGE ACTIVELY WITH REINFORCED MINURCAT II 
 
REF: (a) NDJAMENA 477, (b) NDJAMENA 461 
 
NDJAMENA 00000491  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Louis J. Nigro, 1.4 (b/d). 
 
-------- 
SUMMARY 
-------- 
 
¶1.  (C) UN SRSG Angelo told Ambassador October 21 that 
MINURCAT I was up to 750 of its authorized 900 
personnel; that it was about to deploy the first of 
450 Chadian police and gendarmes it has trained along 
with their UNPOL mentors 
to refugee camps in eastern Chad; and that Chadian 
President Deby had substantially approved UN plans for 
a reinforced and expanded MINURCAT II to take over the 
EUFOR role in Chad after March 2009. The GOC was 
cooperating fully in current MINURCAT effort and 
planning for MINURCAT II.  The GOC accepted some "re- 
hatting" of some EUFOR contingents in MINURCAT II but 
preferred a smaller military element (3,000 troops) 
than did the UNDPKO (6,000 troops) in MINURCAT II and 
were keen to add Formed Police Units to MINURCAT's 
toolbox, especially  from African and Middle Eastern 
countries.  Regarding the CAR, MINURCAT II should have 
some 500 UN military there, "perhaps an African 
battalion." 
 
¶2.  (C) The SRSG  continues to impress with his 
strategic approach to problems, breadth of thinking, 
and diplomatic skills, especially his adept handling 
of relations with the generally suspicious and prickly 
GOC. Deployment of an expanded and reinforced MINURCAT 
II under SRSG's effective leadership offers one of the 
best hopes for progress in eastern Chad, not only in 
the area of security, but in relation to the broader 
civilian aspects of MINURCAT's mandate -- including 
human rights, prison reform, reform of the 
administration of justice, and other non-security 
sectors.  The GOC also deserves more credit than it 
has gotten for its serious and purposeful engagement 
with both of the PKOs authorized by UNSCR 1778 in 
¶2007.  The GOC has consistently pursued a policy that 
contributed to the very rapid deployment of EUFOR in 
2007-2008 and of the more deliberate, but increasingly 
effective deployment of MINURCAT I in 2008.  SRSG 
Angelo evidently sees this GOC posture continuing and 
even improving in the future vis a vis MINURCAT II. 
THE UNSYG's October 17 report on UNAMID in Darfur 
points up just how differently the international 
community's key initiatives have been received on this 
side of the Chad/Sudan frontier than on the other. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
--------------------------------- 
SRSG UPBEAT ON MINURCAT I AND II 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C)  UN SRSG Victor Angelo told Ambassador October 
21 that MINURCAT I was up to 750 of its authorized 900 
personnel; that the UNPKO was ready to deploy the 450 
Chadian police and gendarmes it has already trained to 
refugee camps in eastern Chad; and that Chadian 
President Deby had substantially approved UN plans for 
a reinforced and expanded MINURCAT II to take over the 
EUFOR role in Chad after March 2009. Angelo described 
Deby and the GOC as "very open" and "very engaged" on 
all MINURCAT-related issues.  MINURCAT would begin 
sending the DIS personnel(the Chadian police and 
gendarmes it had trained to police the camps) to 
eastern Chad along with their UNPOL mentors (one UNPOL 
mentor per five-six DIS personnel).  The GOC was 
cooperating fully in this effort. 
 
------------------------------------------- 
GOC OPEN AND ENGAGED ON ALL MINURCAT ISSUES 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (C) SRSG Angelo emphasized that President Deby 
considered a post-EUFOR UN military presence in 
MINURCAT II "indispensable;" agreed that UN troops 
should escort, patrol, and protect refugees, IDPs, 
humanitarian workers, UNPOL and DIS personnel 
"actively;" agreed that UN military be mobile via air 
capabilities; that MINURCAT II would be politically 
"neutral;" accepted that the MINURCAT II military 
element should "react to attacks or direct threats" on 
camps and sites where humanitarians lived; and 
 
NDJAMENA 00000491  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
understood that MINURCAT II military were not there to 
defend Chadian territory against rebels.  Angelo cited 
increasingly close collaboration between MINURCAT and 
the Chad military in eastern Chad as a promising sign. 
He highlighted that the GOC was firmly in favor of 
Formed Police Units being added to MINURCAT II's 
toolkit, especially gendarme units from African, 
Middle Eastern, and South Asian countries. The GOC 
would accept some "re-hatting" of some EUFOR 
contingents in MINURCAT II.  He noted that Chad 
preferred a smaller military element (3,000 troops) 
than did the UNDPKO (6,000 troops) in MINURCAT II and 
that there were outstanding questions regarding DIS 
pay, intelligence gathering and sharing, among other 
things. 
 
------------------------ 
THE SHAPE OF MINURCAT II 
------------------------ 
 
¶5.  (C) Angelo said that MINURCAT II's position vis a 
vis the Chad rebellion would be clear.  MINURCAT II 
will tell the rebels to stay clear of MINURCAT II 
assets and the camps and towns where humanitarians 
lodged, or suffer the consequences of UN military 
response, while reporting such contacts with rebels to 
the GOC.  MINURCAT II will reiterate that rebel 
violence is "unacceptable and contrary to 
international law."  Regarding CAR, MINURCAT II should 
have some 500 UN military there, in addition to 
whatever numbers were arrived at for Chad.  He foresaw 
an African battalion presence in CAR.  Angelo said 
that to relieve pressure on Abeche town, MINURCAT II 
would seek to develop a second logistical base at Goz 
Beida or Am Timan. Angelo speculated that the French 
might agree to provide logistical support to MINURCAT 
II, much as it had to EUFOR, but this was not yet 
agreed.  EUFOR contingents that might offer a "re- 
hatting of troops" included Ireland, Poland, and 
Finland.  The Italians and Dutch were getting out. 
Norway was considering assuming the Italian medical 
role in MINRCAT II and the Libyans had agreed to 
contribute three personnel to MINURCAT II. 
 
---------------------------- 
CURRENT CHAD REBEL STRENGTH 
---------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (C) Angelo offered some impressions of current 
rebel strength.  He said that there appeared to be 
some 3,000 rebels 25 kilometers from the big Chad 
border base of Adre, and another 1,200 near the border 
town of Modeina.  No Chad rebels appeared to be inside 
Chad.  Angelo said his military advisors believed that 
the Chad military were better prepared to repulse 
rebel attacks than they had been in February and June, 
and were conducting robust training exercises along 
the border. 
 
-------- 
COMMENTS 
-------- 
 
¶7.  (C) SRSG Angelo continues to impress us with his 
strategic approach to MINURCAT issues, his breadth of 
thinking, and his diplomatic skills, especially his 
adept handling of relations between MINURCAT and the 
generally suspicious and prickly GOC. We believe that 
the deployment of an expanded and reinforced MINURCAT 
II under SRSG's effective leadership offers one of the 
best hopes for progress in eastern Chad, not only in 
the area of security, but in relation to the civilian 
aspects of MINURCAT's mandate, including human rights, 
prison reform, reform of the administration of 
justice, and other non-security sectors. 
 
¶8. (C)  The GOC also deserves more credit than it 
generally has gotten over the past year for its 
serious and purposeful engagement with both of the 
PKOs authorized by UNSCR 1778 in 2007.  The GOC has 
not exactly rolled over for EUFOR and MINURCAT II, but 
it has consistently pursued a policy that contributed 
to the very rapid deployment of EUFOR in 2007-2008 and 
of the more deliberate, but increasingly effective 
deployment of MINURCAT I in 2008.  SRSG Angelo 
evidently sees this GOC posture continuing and even 
improving in the future vis a vis MINURCAT II.  THE 
UNSYG's October 17 report on UNAMID in Darfur points 
 
NDJAMENA 00000491  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
up the vastly different kind of reception that the 
international community's key initiatives have 
received on this side of the Chad/Sudan frontier than 
on the other.  END COMMENTS. 
 
¶9. MINIMIZE CONSIDERED 
 
NIGRO