VZCZCXRO2464
OO RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHDA RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLN
RUEHLZ RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHMO #3127/01 2971355
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 231355Z OCT 08
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0492
INFO RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 003127 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O.  12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV KNDP NATO MARR PARM OREP GG IR RS
SUBJECT: HFAC CHAIRMAN BERMAN MEETS DUMA IRC CHAIRMAN KOSACHEV: 
U.S.-RUSSIA, GEORGIA, UKRAINE, NATO, POST-START, CFE, IRAN 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary:  Duma International Relations Committee Chair 
Kosachev told House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Berman 
October 14 that the difficult state of U.S.-Russian relations was 
due to Russia's "disappointment" over European security structures 
following the end of the Cold War.  He said that mistakes had been 
made "on both sides" in Georgia, but lamented that Russia continued 
to receive the bulk of the international community's condemnation. 
He claimed that Russia had had to recognize Abkhazia and South 
Ossetian independence to prevent Georgia from using military force 
to regain the two areas, and stressed that NATO membership should 
not be used as a means of conflict resolution.  He urged that the 
U.S. not make the same error with Ukraine, and called for the 
resumption of negotiations on a post-START agreement and the 
Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE).  Chairman Berman 
expressed concern about Iran's disruptive role in the Middle East 
and stressed the need for the U.S. and Russia to cooperate to 
prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons.  Kosachev said he had 
received a letter from the Iranian Embassy on the status of the 
Iran-IAEA talks.  The two Chairmen agreed to consider holding a 
joint committee meeting after the U.S. elections.  End Summary. 
 
Disappointment with West's Approach to Russia 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) During a two-hour cordial meeting in Moscow October 14, 
House Foreign Affairs Committee (HFAC) Chairman Howard Berman, the 
Ambassador and HFAC staff discussed a wide range of issues, 
including U.S.-Russia relations, Georgia, Ukraine, NATO enlargement, 
a post-START Treaty agreement, the Conventional Forces in Europe 
Treaty (CFE), and Iran, with Duma International Relations Committee 
Chair Konstantin Kosachev, First Deputy Chair Leonid Slutskiy (LDPR) 
and Duma staff.  Noting that Chairman Berman was the highest-ranking 
USG official to visit Russia since the conflict in Georgia, Kosachev 
emphasized the importance of continuing regular Duma-Congress 
discussions.  He said that current "complications" in the 
relationship were not based, as some in the U.S. believed, on Russia 
overestimating its oil- and gas-wealth-generated influence, but on 
its disappointment with global security constructs since the end of 
the Cold War.  Russia had offered to work as a partner with the 
West, withdrawing Russian bases from Cuba, Vietnam, and eastern 
Europe, fulfilling treaty commitments ("until the breakdown of 
negotiations over the CFE Treaty"), and not intervening in former 
Soviet states ("until Georgia").  In contrast, the U.S. and the West 
had enlarged NATO to Russia's borders, invaded Iraq, established 
bases in eastern Europe, and taken actions that undermined Russia's 
security.  Putin's February 2007 Munich speech had been 
misinterpreted as the "Russian empire coming back" with many in the 
West seeing it as a challenge that required opposition.  If people 
in the West continued to see Russia this way, Kosachev contended, 
there would be more conflicts between us. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Noting that following 9/11, U.S. foreign policy may have 
been more focused on the Middle East, Chairman Berman agreed it was 
important to continue the inter-parliamentary dialogue between the 
U.S. and Russia.  He suggested the global financial crisis and 
dispute over Georgia demonstrated the necessity of maintaining more 
regular communication between the U.S. and Russia at all levels. 
The two countries had fundamental concerns in common, such as 
nuclear proliferation, terrorism, energy security, and climate 
change, and would be better able to address such problems through 
cooperation.  Few people in the U.S. believed this was a uni-polar 
world in which America could achieve its goals without partners and 
allies. 
 
No New Cold War 
--------------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) Chairman Berman pushed back on reports that the U.S. wanted 
to diminish Russia's security, saying the U.S. did not want to 
return to the Cold War, but noted that some of the rhetoric in 
Russia about "spheres of influence" or "spheres of interest," seemed 
to reflect Cold War thinking. 
 
Georgia:  Mistakes Made By Both Sides 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (SBU) Kosachev said the conflict in Georgia had been in neither 
Russia nor the U.S.'s interest.  The military option had been a 
"nightmare" and "worst case scenario" for Russia, but Moscow had had 
no choice but to intervene.  He lamented that it was "unfair" that 
people in the West had blamed Russia so strongly for its 
intervention.  Russia had lost 13 peacekeepers within the first 
three days, in addition to the civilian casualties.  This fact had 
been ignored in U.S. statements, which had caused a lot of 
resentment in Russia.  "We see reports that both countries made 
mistakes, overreacted and were responsible for the conflict.  We can 
accept this," Kosachev said, but in public statements, it seemed 
that "Saakashvili was supported by the rest of the world and Russia 
was not." 
 
MOSCOW 00003127  002 OF 003 
 
 
 
¶6. (SBU) Kosachev reiterated arguments that the crisis had begun 
with Kosovo's declaration of independence in February and subsequent 
recognition by many states.  He argued that Georgia had been 
preparing to use military force well before August 7, and Russia had 
tried to warn the West that a military confrontation was possible, 
but the West had not listened.  The GOR had tried to avoid military 
confrontation until the very end, Kosachev said, by urging 
Saakashvili to sign on to a non-use of force agreement, and through 
shuttle diplomacy by Russian special envoy Popov.  But other 
countries had not supported Russia's efforts.  Stressing that he did 
not think the U.S. had "charged up" Saakashvili to start military 
operations, Kosachev said he did believe the U.S. could have done 
much more to prevent the attack, and that Saakashvili had 
misinterpreted signals from Washington.  He dismissed reports that 
Russian tanks had already moved into the Roki tunnel by August 7, 
asking if this were the case, why hadn't the Georgian military 
simply bombed the tunnel instead of Tskhinvali? 
 
Recognition Necessary to Prevent Georgian Use of Force 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) Kosachev said public statements saying Georgia's 
territorial integrity was "not an issue for discussion" continued to 
support Saakashvili.  Now, the only way of restoring Georgia's 
territorial integrity was by force.  Yet Saakashvili continued to 
press it.  Russia had had to recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetian 
independence to prevent Georgia from using military force to regain 
the two areas. 
 
NATO Not Mechanism for Conflict Resolution 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶8. (SBU) Asking whether NATO had planned to take Georgia into the 
Alliance with or without Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Kosachev 
contended that NATO membership should not be a mechanism for 
conflict resolution.  Giving Georgia "signals" on NATO membership 
had created difficult conditions to resolve the conflicts in 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia.  This was why Russia had opposed MAP for 
Georgia; not because Russia was trying to stop Georgia's path to 
democracy. 
 
LDPR Slutskiy's "We Couldn't Fight with Slingshots" 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶9. (SBU) Likening the conflict in Georgia to NATO's actions on 
Kosovo, LDPR Representative Slutskiy insisted Russia had not used 
disproportionate force in Georgia.  The GOR had had information that 
Georgia was planning a large-scale attack on Abkhazia similar to the 
operation in Tskhinvali, so the GOR had needed to respond forcefully 
to prevent another major loss of life. 
 
Congressional Reaction Restrained 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶10. (SBU) In response to Kosachev's complaint about the 
Congressional response to Russia's actions in Georgia, Chairman 
Berman said the Congress's reaction had been "relatively 
restrained."  The Congress had approved a package of economic 
assistance to help rebuild Georgia's economy and provide 
humanitarian aid, but had not approved the provision of military 
assistance to Georgia or imposed sanctions on Russia. 
 
Don't Make Same Mistake: Ukraine, NATO, START, CFE 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶11. (SBU) Kosachev insisted Russia fully recognized Ukraine's 
territorial integrity, but stressed that Crimea and the stationing 
of the Black Sea Fleet was a very difficult issue for Moscow.  He 
said Ukrainian President Yushchenko was trying to provoke more 
confrontation with Russia by limiting the teaching of Russian 
language and culture, and issuing decrees limiting the Black Sea 
Fleet's movements.  He warned that if the U.S. supported Ukraine's 
"provocations," and sped up NATO accession for Kyiv, it could lead 
to a conflict. 
 
¶12. (SBU) The best way to avoid the "mistakes" that were made in 
Georgia, Kosachev said, were to: 
-- take a pause in NATO enlargement to Georgia and Ukraine, and 
understand that if the U.S. and Europe supported a MAP, "you will 
lose Russia;" 
-- start a serious process to negotiate a post-START Treaty 
agreement before its expiration in December, 2009; and 
-- Restart discussions on the CFE Treaty.  "Whether we liked it or 
not," Kosachev said, the situation had changed with the war in 
Georgia and if the NATO countries insisted on keeping the linkage to 
Georgia and Moldova, the Treaty would die.  This was in neither 
Russia's nor the West's interests, he claimed. 
 
 
MOSCOW 00003127  003 OF 003 
 
 
Middle East, Iran and 123 Agreement 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶13. (SBU) Chairman Berman expressed concern about Iran's 
destabilizing role in the Middle East, but stressed that if Iran 
were to acquire a nuclear weapons capability, it would have much 
more far-reaching consequences.  He emphasized the importance of 
maintaining international unity against a nuclear-armed Iran, with 
Russia a key member of such a coalition.  In response to a complaint 
by Slutskiy that Congress had been opposed to the 123 Agreement, 
Berman said his Committee had approved it, subject to some concerns 
about Russian-Iranian cooperation, but said that it had been a good 
decision to withdraw it and let a new Administration re-submit it. 
 
¶14. (SBU) Kosachev said he had received a letter from the Iranian 
Embassy in Moscow regarding the status of talks between Iran and the 
IAEA.  The letter had not been translated yet, but he agreed to 
provide Chairman Berman with a copy. 
 
Inter-Parliamentary Talks 
------------------------- 
 
¶15. (SBU) Both Chairman Berman and Kosachev agreed that dialogue 
between the two committees was useful.  Kosachev proposed the 
committees meet in Moscow after the U.S. elections. "the sooner, the 
better."  Chairman Berman said he would talk to his colleagues on 
the HFAC and get back to Kosachev. 
 
¶16. (SBU) The delegation has cleared this cable. 
 
BEYRLE