O 160753Z OCT 08
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0387
INFO CIS COLLECTIVE
IRAN COLLECTIVE
MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD

UNCLAS MOSCOW 003059 
 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV KNDP PTER OREP RS GG IZ IR
 
SUBJECT: HFAC CHAIRMAN BERMAN MEETS FM LAVROV: U.S., IRAN, 
S-300S, AFGHANISTAN-PAKISTAN, SECURITY 
 
 ¶1.  (SBU)  Summary:  In an October 14 meeting with HFAC 
Chairman Berman and the Ambassador, FM Lavrov argued against 
holding U.S.-Russian relations hostage to ideology and 
politics, reaffirming the Sochi Declaration commitments.  He 
pushed hard for continued diplomacy with Iran, criticizing 
unilateral U.S. sanctions as "spoilers," warning with respect 
to Israel that any use of force would be catastrophic, and 
confirming that no decision had been made on a S-300 
transfer.  Lavrov proposed increased information-sharing on 
Pakistan, and a CSTO/NATO division of labor in 
counter-narcotics efforts in Afghanistan.  He stressed that 
Medvedev's proposed European defense treaty was not aimed at 
replacing existing institutions, but addressed the shortfalls 
of NATO-Russia Council and other architecture that did not 
provide for "indivisible" security.  Saying Russia did not 
prefer to extend START, Lavrov reprised Russian complaints on 
U.S. negotiations over post-START, missile defense, and CFE. 
Given Russian concern over U.S. intentions, Lavrov 
underscored the need for arms control and further confidence 
building measures.  End Summary 
 
U.S.-Russian Relations Hostage to Ideology 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶2.  (SBU)  In an October 14 meeting with HFAC Chairman Howard 
Berman (D, CA), HFAC staff, and the Ambassador, FM Lavrov 
welcomed regular parliamentary consultations as an important 
element of the bilateral relationship.  In response to 
Chairman Berman's assessment that Russia was an indispensable 
partner, whose significance had been overshadowed by the 
post-9/11 focus in U.S. foreign policy, Lavrov commented that 
Russia's absence from domestic U.S. political debates had not 
necessarily been bad, but acknowledged that the circumstances 
driving renewed U.S. attention were not favorable.  Russia, 
he stressed, had welcomed the April 2008 Sochi Declaration as 
an important legacy of President Bush and Putin, with its 
emphasis on mutual respect, mutual interests, and commitment 
to minimizing differences and searching for common solutions. 
 Lavrov underscored the scope of the U.S.-Russia interests, 
with issues of strategic balance (post-START, 
nonproliferation, WMD) and regional stability (Iran, DPRK, 
Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the Middle East) crowding the 
agenda.  U.S.-Russian cooperation, he argued, should not be 
"hostage to politicized and ideologized issues." 
 
Iran: Russia Prepared to Cooperate Diplomatically 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶3.  (SBU)  Saying he fully shared Chairman Berman's concern 
over Iran, Lavrov agreed that a more effective international 
coalition was required, but disagreed on whether Iran was 
intent on acquiring nuclear weapons, versus mastering the 
nuclear fuel cycle.  Lavrov argued that unilateral U.S. 
sanctions had undercut P5 1 diplomatic efforts, which should 
remain focused on supporting the IAEA presence in Iran and 
its resolution of outstanding questions related to the 
Iranian nuclear program.  Reaffirming Russian support for a 
two-track approach, with incentives for Iran to negotiate 
coupled with UNSCR sanctions to increase pressure on the 
Iranian leadership to respond, Lavrov complained that U.S. 
actions constituted "spoilers" that gave Iran a pretext to 
walk away from the table.  The U.S. continued to send a mixed 
message, allowing Iran to conclude that its real goal was the 
isolation and overthrow of the Iranian leadership.  Chairman 
Berman underscored Iran's failure to answer outstanding IAEA 
questions and the NIE's evidence of a nuclear program in 
existence until 2003.  Once Congress was confident that an 
effective international strategy was in place, Chairman 
Berman stressed, there would be no need for unilateral 
measures; instead, Iran appeared to be playing for time. 
 
¶4.  (SBU)  Referencing a "Financial Times" article, Lavrov 
expressed concern over rumors that the U.S. and UK were 
building a coalition of countries to adopt stronger sanctions 
in the energy and industrial sectors, in an effort to 
circumvent Russian and Chinese interest in a more gradual 
process.  Lavrov commented that the U.S. needed to decide 
whether it sought to circumvent Russia, or seek to work with 
it collectively; it could not do both.  Russian policy, he 
stressed, was not a function of pique over U.S. actions to 
isolate Russia after the Georgia crisis or in response to the 
U.S. cancellation of military exercises; rather, Russia 
remained opposed to Iran acquiring a nuclear bomb.  Russia 
saw no reason for precipitate action based on the last IAEA 
report, and believed diplomacy had not run its course. 
Lavrov added that the outstanding IAEA questions were derived 
from U.S. intelligence, which other analysts had found 
unpersuasive in 2005; while Russia took U.S. allegations 
seriously, the inability to provide originals of the 
documents allowed Iran to disclaim ownership or culpability. 
Lavrov conceded that the Iranians were frustrating, calling 
them tough and cagey negotiators, but reiterated Russian 
support for the IAEA-led process. 
 
¶5.  (SBU)  Asserting that Iran had been on the verge of 
coming back to the bargaining table in August, Lavrov said 
Saakashvili gave Tehran a perfect gift.  The Iranians 
hardened their position, waiting to see if Russia would split 
with Europe, or reduce pressure on Iran in "revenge" for 
European and U.S. criticism of Russian actions in Georgia. 
In order to prevent that miscalculation, Lavrov said it was 
Russia's idea for a UNSC resolution at UNGA.  Lavrov said 
Russia would remain absolutely clear about its strategic goal 
of denying Iran a nuclear weapon, but acknowledged that 
tactical differences would remain on how to move forward. 
Russia did not want "a degeneration into a repeat of Iraq" 
and, referencing on-going discussions between PM Olmert and 
Washington, warned that any use of force would be 
"catastrophic."  Gulf states, he noted, feared an Iran with a 
nuclear bomb, and an Iran bombed. 
 
¶6.  (SBU)  In response to Chairman Berman's push for tougher 
sanctions as the best option, Lavrov warned that the 
international community risked losing the IAEA "eyes and 
ears" on the ground.  While the number of centrifuges were 
increasing, they were not increasing as quickly as Iran had 
the capacity, nor were they running at optimal speed.  Some 
flexibility on the part of the U.S. would help call Iran's 
bluff; the U.S. should demonstrate the same creativity that 
it had evinced with the DPRK (even at the risk of "driving 
Japan crazy and provoking public criticism").  The lesson 
Iran learned is that it needed a nuclear bomb to be treated 
respectfully by the U.S.  The issues with Iran were so 
complex, Lavrov complained, that it was hard to explain to 
the layman; for instance, while Iran had not signed an 
Additional Protocol, it was not mandatory and in certain 
instances Iran had exceeded AP requirements. 
 
Iran: S-300 Sales 
----------------- 
 
¶7.  (SBU)  In response to Chairman Berman's strong concern 
over the possibility of a Russian transfer of S-300s to Iran, 
Lavrov stated carefully that Russia would consider any arms 
transfer on the basis of full transparency, full compliance 
with its international commitments, and in accordance with 
Russian export controls, which strictly regulated against any 
transfer that could have a destabilizing regional effect. 
The S-300s were a defensive system, albeit "efficient." 
Lavrov confirmed that no decision had been made.  In a dig at 
U.S. arms transfers to Taiwan, Lavrov offered that there 
should be a "pause" to think about arms sales in the broader 
context.  Russia did not seek the militarization of foreign 
policy and did not need a new arms race.  Mutual agreement 
and mutual restraint were the best tools for establishing 
parity, although Lavrov noted the economically beneficial 
side-effects of military investments. 
 
Afghanistan/Pakistan: More, not less, cooperation required 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
 
¶8.  (SBU)  Lavrov commented that Russia wanted international 
security forces, with NATO as its backbone, to succeed in 
Afghanistan.  Key to the effort would be combating the 
narcotics trade, and Lavrov complained about the 
unwillingness of NATO forces to strengthen their 
anti-trafficking mandate.  NATO members were reluctant to 
expand their mandate, he charged, because it was dangerous 
work.  Russia was directly affected by the increasing flows 
of narcotics through Central Asia and Russia to Europe; 
increasingly, Russia was a recipient, as well as a transit, 
state.  Lavrov reviewed Russian efforts to collaborate with 
Central Asian countries, in concert with NATO efforts inside 
Afghanistan (alluding to, but not spelling out, a division of 
labor between CSTO and NATO), and regretted that NATO had not 
responded institutionally, although individual countries 
participated in CSTO's Operation Channel. 
 
¶9.  (SBU)  Commenting that Afghanistan had to be considered 
in tandem with Pakistan, Lavrov noted Russian efforts as G8 
chair to include Afghanistan and Pakistan in a dialogue. 
While Japan had not continued the initiative, Lavrov argued 
that it was something the G8 should consider.  Lavrov 
stressed that Russia wanted to better understand the U.S. 
strategy towards Pakistan, as well as its assessment of the 
country's stability, leadership, and divisions within the 
military and intelligence communities.  Whether in existing 
dialogue formats (e.g., CTWG or intel channels) there needed 
to be better coordination.  Lavrov argued that current 
tensions should not get in the way of collective efforts to 
address challenges like Pakistan. 
 
Security: European, NATO, post-START, MD, CFE 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶10.  (SBU)  Paraphrasing Secretary Paulson's remarks on the 
financial crisis, Lavrov stressed that no country should 
secure itself at the expense of others, noting this was the 
overriding theme of President Medvedev's October 8 Evian 
speech.  Lavrov evinced frustration over western 
interpretations of Medvedev's call for a new European 
security treaty.  Medvedev, he stressed, did not seek to 
undermine or replace any existing Euro-Atlantic institution, 
whether NATO, OSCE, or the EU, nor did Russia seek to exclude 
the U.S. and Canada from this security discussion.  Instead, 
Russia sought a comprehensive review of Euro-Atlantic 
security, with all of the member states and representatives 
of the European and post-Soviet organizations (e.g. CSTO, 
CIS).  The principles of NATO and OSCE were sound, he added 
later, but were not working.  NATO had failed to uphold the 
indivisibility of security, with the NATO-Russia Council 
having evolved into 26 versus one.  While Russia had no 
ready-made solutions, it wanted to discuss specifics.  What 
Putin had expressed emotionally in Munich in February 2007, 
Medvedev had expressed diplomatically. 
 
¶11.  (SBU)  Lavrov highlighted the uncertain fate of 
post-START, arguing that the U.S. had not met its commitment 
under the Sochi Declaration to intensify a dialogue on a 
successor arms control regime.  While Russia continued to 
wait for a U.S. paper, first promised in October 2007, the 
U.S. position remained unyielding: no limits, except on 
operationally deployed warheads; unlimited stockpiles and 
launchers; and the introduction of non-nuclear warheads on 
strategic delivery systems.  While it was unrealistic to 
expect any breakthrough in the remaining weeks of the 
Administration, Lavrov did not evince interest in an 
extension of the START treaty.  Saying that he had doubts 
about the feasibility of an extension, Lavrov said Russia 
preferred to use the time remaining to negotiate differences 
in approach.  Acknowledging the challenges facing a new 
administration in confirming key officials, Lavrov 
nonetheless said that Russia "very strongly preferred to 
write something new" and noted there was "no lack of inputs" 
from former officials and the arms control community. 
 
¶12.  (SBU)  On missile defense, Lavrov expressed regret that 
the U.S. was moving forward with implementation, while 
promises to Russia were "hanging."  Lavrov said Russia 
continued to wait for answers to its questions presented in 
August, and criticized the U.S. for walking back the proposal 
of a "permanent presence" by Russian liaison officers at the 
Czech and Polish sites, which was first presented during the 
October 2007 2 2 meeting.  Russia had been told to talk 
directly with the Poles and Czechs, who offered "occasional 
visits" on a "reciprocal" basis.  Questioning the concept of 
reciprocity, Lavrov termed the debate "a mess." 
 
¶13.  (SBU)  Lavrov also complained that "interesting 
proposals" on CFE, first presented in 2007, were "modified 
and backtracked."  While the U.S. sought to keep CFE in 
bilateral negotiating channels, Lavrov questioned the halt in 
discussions post-Georgia; while Russian troops stationed in 
South Ossetia and Abkhazia made the negotiations "more 
complicated," real discussions were required.  In the current 
security environment, Russia could not ignore new "bases" in 
Romania and Bulgaria or the presence of the U.S. navy in the 
Black Sea.  In response to Chairman Berman's questioning of 
Russian threat assessments, Lavrov insisted that the Russian 
military "should be fired" if they didn't take NATO's 
expansion and U.S. unilateral actions seriously.  "Not for 
nothing" had CBMs and arms control regimes been developed in 
the past.  Lavrov emphasized that U.S. actions were viewed as 
threatening, pointing to "some in D.C." who sought to modify 
the Montreaux Convention in order to drop limits on the 
access of non-littoral states.  "Non-confidence is building 
up," he argued, adding that Russian concerns over U.S. arms 
sales to Georgia had been brushed aside, with the Secretary 
undertaking that any use of force by Saakashvili would negate 
Georgia's NATO aspirations. 
 
¶14.  (SBU)  The delegation cleared this message. 
BEYRLE 
 
 
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