VZCZCXRO9776
PP RUEHCD RUEHGD RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHRD RUEHRS RUEHTM
DE RUEHME #3102/01 2941722
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 201722Z OCT 08
FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3627
RUEHWH/WESTERN HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS DIPL POSTS
INFO RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA PRIORITY 0145
RUEHXC/ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/FBI WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MEXICO 003102 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/18/2028 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PREF KMIG KCRM CU MX
SUBJECT: CUBAN-MEXICAN MOU ON MIGRATION:  GOOD NEWS, BAD 
NEWS 
 
MEXICO 00003102  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Charles V. Barclay.  Reason 
: 1.4 (b),(d). 
 
¶1. (C) Cuban Foreign Minister Felipe Perez Roque will sign an 
MOU with Mexico today that could have Cuba taking back 
significantly greater numbers of the illegal Cubans detained 
en route to the U.S. each year by Mexican immigration 
authorities.  He will also extend an invitation to President 
Calderon to visit Cuba.  As part of the deal on migration 
issues, Mexico has agreed to join Cuba in making a joint 
declaration at today's signing ceremony placing public blame 
on U.S. unilateral policies for stimulating the flow of 
Cubans through Mexico and complicating efforts to confront 
this problem.  Mexican officials were uncomfortable with 
making this declaration on the eve of Secretary Rice's visit 
on October 22-23 and took pains to explain it intended no 
offense to the U.S.  Deputy PolCouns stressed the importance 
the U.S. attached to Mexico's addressing human rights 
concerns in its relations with Cuba including in the context 
of repatriating greater numbers of the illegal Cubans it 
detains in Mexico.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (U) The Mexican Foreign Ministry's (SRE) Deputy Director 
General for Latin America, Victor Arriaga, called Deputy 
PolCouns October 19 requesting a meeting with him, Edgar 
Aroldo Rodriguez Rudich, the Coordinator of Advisors to 
Geronimo Gutierrez Fernandez (SRE's U/S for Latin America and 
the Caribbean), and Enrique Rojo Stein, the Chief of Advisors 
to Carlos Rico (SRE's U/S for North America), to discuss the 
MOU on migration matters that Mexico planned to sign on 
October 20 with Cuba's visiting Foreign Minister Felipe Perez 
Roque. 
 
 
Leaving the Past Behind 
----------------------- 
 
¶3.  (U) To provide some context for Mexico's decision to 
normalize relations with Cuba and, in particular, pursue an 
MOU with Cuba on migration issues, Rodriguez recalled 
Mexico's strained relations with Cuba at the end of the Fox 
administration that had produced a significant drop off in 
commercial trade.  As a separate consequence, Cuba had 
provided little to no cooperation on the repatriation of 
illegal Cubans detained in Mexico.  In 2007, Cuba had taken 
back only 5 percent of the 3000 illegal Cubans detained by 
Mexican authorities; thus far in 2008 it had only taken back 
about 20 of the 1,800 Cubans detained in Mexico.  Rodriguez 
stressed GOM concern about Mexico becoming the preferred 
route for the movement of Cubans into the U.S. and the rising 
involvement of organized criminal groups in this activity. 
 
¶4.  (U) Seeking to better commercial ties and cooperation on 
a host of issues including migration, President Calderon had 
decided to pursue improved relations with Cuba leading 
directly to FM Espinosa's visit to Cuba in March.  As part of 
this process of normalization, Cuba and Mexico initiated 
talks in the context of seven of the country's ten most 
important mechanisms for cooperation including migration.  To 
the GOM's view, on the economic side, Mexico had already seen 
the fruits of this new approach with an increase in 
commercial trade by upwards of 70 percent during the period 
April to October 2008 compared to the same period last year. 
 
Tackling the Repatriation Issue 
------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (U) Mexico and Cuba commenced negotiations on migration 
issues in April focusing on three components: improving 
cooperation in combating criminal organizations trafficking 
in people, repatriation of illegal Cubans detained in Mexico, 
and facilitating travel for tourists and businessmen.  SRE's 
U/S Gutierrez led the Mexican side in the course of four 
negotiating sessions, which included GOM representatives from 
the Interior Ministry's (SEGOB) National Institute for 
Migration (INM) and National Intelligence Center (CISEN), the 
Attorney General's Office (PGR), the Public Security 
Secretariat (SSP), the Transportation and Communication 
Secretariat (SCT), the Army (SEDENA) and the Navy (SEMAR). 
 
¶6.  (U) According to Rodriguez, resolving differences over 
repatriation proved the most contentious issue in the 
negotiations given the lack of an existing legal framework. 
Further, the majority of the illegal Cubans detained in 
Mexico enter through Central America and historically Cuba 
has refused to take back Cubans entering Mexico via a "third" 
 
MEXICO 00003102  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
country ) any country other than Cuba directly. In that 
respect, Rodriguez conveyed GOM satisfaction with having 
secured from the GOC an agreement on terms for processing the 
repatriation of illegal Cubans detained in Mexico that GOM 
authorities believe could have Cuba taking back some 70 
percent of the Cubans detained by Mexican officials. 
 
What Cuba Gave Up 
------------------ 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Under the agreement, Mexico would have up to 15 
working days to notify the GOC of its detention of illegal 
Cubans and its request that Cuba agree to their repatriation. 
 Cuba, in turn would have up to 15 working days to respond. 
According to Rodriguez, the GOC has agreed to take back 
illegal Cubans in the following categories: 
 
-- those that enter Mexico illegally directly from Cuba (by 
sea); 
-- those that enter Mexico illegally via Central America and 
have been detained within 11 months (the normal time Cuba 
grants its citizens for legal travel overseas) of their 
departure from Cuba; 
-- and those that overstay their visas for travel to Mexico. 
 
Cuba apparently reserves the right to refuse Cubans it deems 
pose a "danger" to Cuba though Rodriguez remarked that the 
GOM would challenge objections to repatriation on that 
grounds.  Provided GOC approval of repatriation, the GOM is 
obligated to give the GOC at least 72 hours advance notice of 
its plans to physically repatriate the individuals in 
question. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Rodriguez was pleased the two sides were agreeable 
to sending back individuals on commercial airlines at GOM 
expense on a space available basis instead of flights 
chartered by the Mexican Federal Police which had proven 
expensive in the past.  He noted the agreement allows for 
Mexico's Navy and Cuba's Coast Guard to work out the details 
of their cooperation on dealing with the detention of Cubans 
at sea.   Rodriguez acknowledged that a MOU carries less 
legal weight than a legal agreement but suggested Mexico 
opted for the former over the latter to avoid the politically 
contentious ratification process in the Mexican Congress.  He 
acknowledged that it remains to be seen to what extent the 
GOC complies with the terms of the MOU.  He conceded that if 
the GOC does not comply with established time periods, Mexico 
will be forced to revert to its present practice ) the 
release of detainees with the payment of a $500 fine and an 
"oficio de salida" (an order to leave the country in 30 days 
which most detainees use to continue onward north to the 
U.S.) 
 
What Cuba Gets 
-------------- 
 
¶9.  (SBU) Rodriguez explained regretfully that the GOC's 
"concessions" on the question of repatriations did not come 
without a price.  Initially, the GOC had insisted on 
preambular text in the MOU that would have blamed the U.S. 
for the migration problems the two countries are seeking to 
address.  He maintained Mexico had refused on grounds it 
would be inappropriate to draw attention to a third country 
in a bilateral MOU.  As a compromise, though, Mexico had 
agreed to issue a joint declaration upon signing the 
agreement that 1) rejects U.S. unilateral policies including 
U.S. trade sanctions against Cuba and the Helms Burton Act 
and 2) blames U.S. immigration polices ) wet foot/dry foot 
policy ) for stimulating the problem the two countries face 
and complicating efforts to address it.  Rodriguez stressed 
GOM efforts to separate out these two issues noting that the 
GOM had insisted on mention of the first only in the context 
of the existing UN resolution that Mexico had always 
supported which condemns the U.S. blockade.  As the two 
foreign ministers would hold a press conference at the 
Foreign Ministry before the MOU signing and the release of 
the joint declaration at the Interior Ministry, he hoped FM 
Espinosa would be spared addressing this declaration directly 
with the press. 
 
¶10.  (SBU) Rodriguez took pains to convey the GOM's 
discomfort with making this declaration, particularly on the 
eve of Secretary Rice's visit October 22-23.  He understood 
Arturo Sarukhan, Mexico's Ambassador to the U.S., was 
reaching out to A/S Shannon to inform Washington authorities 
similarly about this declaration.  He stressed U/S Gutierrez 
 
MEXICO 00003102  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
viewed the U.S. as a "close friend" and that it was important 
for us to understand Mexico had little choice but to accept 
this declaration as a condition for getting this agreement 
with Cuba. 
 
Don't Forget Human Rights 
 
¶11.  (C) Deputy PolCouns stressed the importance the U.S. 
attached to Mexico's raising human rights concerns in its 
relations with Cuba.  This applied to Mexico's MOU with Cuba 
as well as it would be important for Mexico to take pains and 
ensure that none of those it repatriated faced potential 
political persecution.  Rodriguez assured Deputy PolCouns 
that Mexico had addressed human rights issues with Cuba last 
April in the context of its bilateral consultations but 
conceded those discussions did not/not enter into specifics 
pertaining to political prisoners.  Arriaga maintained that 
in Mexico's experience the illegal Cubans Mexico regularly 
detained were economic migrants.  Rodriguez, however, 
recognized that once Cuba started taking back greater numbers 
of detainees, more would claim potential persecution.  He 
conceded the MOU with Cuba did little to address this issue 
and that Mexico may have to look at how better to address it 
independently. 
 
¶12.  (C) Comment.  Mexico clearly views its MOU with Cuba 
establishing terms upon which Cuba would agree to take back 
significantly more illegal Cubans detained in Mexico as a 
major advance.  If Cuba complies with the agreement ) which 
remains to be seen ) the GOM hopes fewer Cubans will seek to 
use Mexico as a bridge to the U.S.  Some Mexican officials 
have expressed some skepticism the MOU will produce a 
significant increase in the repatriation of Cubans.  Mexico 
took pains to explain it was not keen to foist blame on the 
U.S. for this problem, particularly in a public forum on the 
eve of Secretary Rice's visit.  Nevertheless, it stressed its 
success in keeping this language out of the MOU and making 
the point about "unilateral" U.S. policies in the context of 
prior UN resolutions.  As Mexico looks to discourage Cubans 
from using it as a bridge to enter the U.S. in the future, we 
will need to stress the importance we attach to its 
exercising due diligence not to return detainees who risk 
facing political persecution. Roque's visit was postponed 
from earlier in the month, making the current sequence of 
events a coincidence that highlights the difficulty Mexico 
has managing its schizophrenic foreign policy with the U.S. 
and Cuba. 
 
 
 
Visit Mexico City's Classified Web Site at 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/mexicocity and the North American 
Partnership Blog at http://www.intelink.gov/communities/state/nap / 
GARZA