VZCZCXYZ0006
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHLP #2168/01 2811419
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 071419Z OCT 08
FM AMEMBASSY LA PAZ
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8755
INFO RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION PRIORITY 8420
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA PRIORITY 4332
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO PRIORITY 1401
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

S E C R E T LA PAZ 002168 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/06/2018 
TAGS: AMER ASEC AMGT PTER CASC BL
SUBJECT: EAC RECOMMENDS EXTENDING AUTHORIZED DEPARTURE 
 
REF: LA PAZ 2157 AND PREVIOUS 
 
Classified By: RSO Patrick J. Moore, reasons 1.4c,d 
 
¶1. (C) The Emergency Action Committee (EAC, consisting of 
EXEC, RSO, CONS, MGT, ECOP, DEA, NAS, DAO, MILGRP, PAS, and 
others) met October 6 to discuss the current political 
situation and security planning. EAC agreed unanimously to 
recommend extending Authorized Departure due to President Evo 
Morales' call for protests surrounding the congress the week 
of October 13 and in light of the potential for 
demonstrations during "black October", particularly on 
October 17, when the anniversary of civic unrest leading to 
some sixty deaths prior to the resignation of ex-President 
Goni Sanchez de Lozada usually includes a march on the 
Embassy. RSO distributed updated plans for safehaven housing 
and plans for the immediate reactions needed in case of a 
low-probability but high-impact event such as an action 
against President Morales. 
 
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Morales Supporters Marching to La Paz 10/13-10/20 
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¶2. (C) Negotiations between the regional opposition prefects 
and the government have ended with no agreement, as was 
expected. President Morales still plans to have his Movement 
Toward Socialism (MAS) social groups march on La Paz October 
13, for a siege of congress on October 15. EcoPol contacts 
suggest that the October 15 date may slip to October 20. 
Local sources are suggesting around 15,000 marchers. On 
October 17, a "massive rally" is planned in El Alto to 
commemorate ex-President Sanchez de Lozada's fall from power 
in 2003. Although no current intel suggests that the protests 
plan to target the Embassy, in the past the protests have 
included marches on the Embassy. 
 
¶3. (C) The September 15 protest aimed at the Embassy was 
successfully managed by the Bolivian National Police, and the 
protesters never actually reached the Embassy building. In 
anticipation of the march, Charge had met with Foreign 
Minister on September 14, using the opportunity to remind the 
Bolivian government of their Vienna Convention 
responsibilities, and Government Minister Alfredo Rada made a 
public request that the social groups not protest because the 
Ambassador had already left the country. The successful 
police intervention in the face of a large group of marchers 
made clear that, if instructed by the government, the police 
are able to control fairly sizable demonstrations. Charge 
will again remind the government of its obligations to 
protect the mission should we get word that a demonstration 
against us is planned. 
 
¶4. (C) RSO reports difficulty in arranging standard meetings 
with police contacts because of widespread fear that 
Government Minister Rada has informants in police offices; 
none wants to be perceived as being too close to Embassy 
officials. The contacts who will meet with RSO are currently 
predicting no violence aimed at the Embassy on October 17. 
 
¶5. (C) The Bolivian government's reaction to our announcement 
that ATPDEA benefits would be suspended has been mild, and so 
far the Altenos who will lose their jobs are directing their 
anger at the Morales administration.  While Morales could try 
to deflect blame towards the USG, his initial reaction has 
been to downplay the importance of ATPDEA and instead make 
promises that new markets will be explored for Bolivian 
products. 
 
¶6. (C) If October 20 passes without significant incidents 
against U.S. interests, EAC will consider whether it would be 
appropriate to ask that Authorized Departure be lifted before 
the second thirty-day period expires. 
 
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Santa Cruz Operations Update 
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¶7. (C) A few NAS officials and the Peace Corps Director 
returned to Santa Cruz via commercial flights; DEA decided 
not to return any of its personnel because of Morales' 
refusal to allow DEA aircraft to fly from La Paz to Santa 
Cruz. DEA personnel have returned to Cochabamba 
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Safehaven and Emergency Planning Update 
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¶8. (S) There is some chatter among military contacts about a 
possible coup (such chatter has been common over many 
months), although DAO reports that there have been no troop 
movements. RSO distributed an updated plan for safehaven 
housing in the event of a high-impact, low-probability event 
such as President Morales' being removed from power, at it 
would likely prompt immediate anti-U.S. protests. In the 
event of a sudden crisis, the safehaven plan will help with 
accountability of personnel and evacuation. RSO also provided 
a new "0-72 Hour" reaction plan. 
 
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EAC Recommends Extension of Authorized Departure 
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¶9. (C) The EAC unanimously recommends to the Under Secretary 
for Management that Authorized Departure be extended for an 
additional thirty-day period. Should the situation warrant it 
after October 20, EAC will review whether to request that 
Authorized Departure be lifted before second thirty-day 
period expires.  POCs are RSO Patrick Moore 
(moorepj@state.gov) and DRSO Daniel Hernandez 
(hernandezd@state.gov), IVG 547-8300. 
URS