VZCZCXYZ0002
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHBUL #2681/01 2750957
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 010957Z OCT 08
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5703
INFO RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

S E C R E T KABUL 002681 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM 
STATE PASS USAID FOR ASIA/SCAA 
NSC FOR WOOD 
OSD FOR WILKES 
CENTCOM FOR CG CSTC-A, CG CJTF-101 POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/08/2013 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER AF
SUBJECT: THE VITAL LINK - KHOST-GARDEZ ROAD IN AFGHANISTAN 
TO BIND PROVINCES AND TRADE ROUTES 
 
Classified By: Acting DCM Alan Yu for reasons 1.4(a), (b) and (d) 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1.  (C) The rugged terrain of the Khost-Gardez (K-G) Pass, 
and its legacy as a mujahedin stronghold along the southeast 
approach to Kabul, have been challenges to the completion of 
an efficient and safe road in the area.  Complex geography, 
tribal networks, and insurgent interference have also 
hindered the extension of governmental authority to the area. 
 However, a robust counterinsurgency (COIN) focus on the K-G 
Pass area has for now succeeded in reducing Anti-Afghan 
Forces (AAF) attacks and creating space for regional 
development.  Progress is being made in paving the route, 
which is expected to be complete by late 2009.  GIRoA 
outreach efforts, including a major shura dedicated to 
support the K-G road project, could lay the foundations for 
widespread regional support of the project. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
The Importance of the K-G Pass Terrain and Population 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
¶2.  (U) The significance of the K-G Pass is highlighted by 
three characteristics:  geographically, the range rises to 
12,700 feet, separating the &Khost basin8 from eastern 
Afghanistan; politically, it is dominated by the Zadran 
tribal arc; and the K-G Pass lies across the most direct 
Kabul)Karachi route )- a strategic artery linking the two 
countries.  The GIRoA,s Independent Directorate for Local 
Governance (IDLG) identified the road as one of its top two 
priorities in its proposed highway security strategy. 
Completion of the road will demonstrate GIRoA progress toward 
reconstruction and improved quality of life, greater economic 
opportunity and sustainable security throughout the region. 
 
Khost-Paktya Link 
¶3.  (C) The governors of Khost and Paktya recently reached an 
important agreement to apportion local-worker hiring, 
reflecting nearby district population and sub-tribal numbers, 
for both construction and security of the road.  The hiring 
process is still underway with local sub-contractors, and 
bears close scrutiny for its potential to upset the delicate 
tribal dynamics in the region.  Prime contractor Louis Berger 
Group must award at least 25 percent of sub-contracts to 
Afghan companies.  Upwards of 1500 workers will be employed 
on the project, of which at least 50 percent must be Afghans 
(the actual figure is expected to be about 80 percent).  Six 
roadside market centers (three in each province) will 
encourage local business development and stakeholders. 
 
The Zadran 
¶4.  (C) The K-G Pass and surrounding &Zadran tribal arc8 
have long been difficult for outsiders to control.  The 
Zadran arc stretches across the boundaries of three provinces 
- western Khost, northern Paktika, and southern Paktya - in 
districts where the Zadran form a majority or sizable 
minority.  The Zadran are a Pashtun tribe, dwelling primarily 
in Afghanistan, based in villages dotting the small, 
scattered valleys that crease the K-G massif.  The tribe is 
estimated to number 120,000, with an unknown number who may 
be long-term refugees in Pakistan.  Two notable leaders of 
the Zadran are Pacha Khan Zadran or &PKZ,8 who has 
reconciled and supports the GIRoA; and Jalaluddin Haqqani, 
chief of the Pakistan-based Haqqani network Taliban (HQN), a 
criminal-terrorist syndicate with origins in the anti-Soviet 
jihad.  HQN is one of the main sources of anti-Afghan and 
Coalition activity, aligning itself with foreign fighters and 
other militants infiltrating into Afghanistan and operating 
along its eastern border.  Haqqani declared that the new K-G 
road would never be built. 
 
¶5.  (U) The Zadran consist of numerous sub-tribes, and like 
many tribal groupings in the region, are internally 
fractious, without consistent alignments, and suspicious of 
outsiders and formal government at all levels )- significant 
obstacles to any major endeavor in this region.  Securing the 
loyalty of the Zadran region to the government and 
 
institutions of Afghanistan is thus one of the primary goals 
behind construction of the 101-kilometer, $98 million K-G 
Pass road. 
 
Premier Trade Route 
¶6.  (U) Successful paving of the K-G Pass route will reduce 
the Kabul-Karachi driving distance by about 250 miles and 
provide closer access to railheads in Pakistan.  It is also 
expected to relieve traffic on the current main 
Kabul-Jalalabad-Khyber Pass-Peshawar route.  Though the 
deeply-rutted and uneven packed-earth road is currently 
usable by trucks and cars, modern paving and widening will 
enable a higher volume of vehicles and cargo quicker and 
safer transit of the pass.  Links from the K-G road to 
secondary lines of communication in the region will better 
connect volatile tribal districts to market and governance 
centers, thus promoting their long-term integration and 
stabilization. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------------- 
Combined Operations to Extend Afghan Capability and Governance 
--------------------------------------------- --------------- 
 
¶7. (C) The K-G Pass, strategic importance has long been 
recognized; mujahedin fighters blocked it from 1979 to 1988, 
until a Soviet-led offensive briefly forced the pass open in 
November 1988.  In 2002-2003, militia loyal to PKZ extorted 
tolls on the road until PKZ,s reconciliation and the removal 
of &toll checkpoints8 in 2004.  Most recently, the byway 
has been a magnet for AAF attacks and banditry ) with more 
than 300 incidents in May 2008, including 169 improvised 
explosive device (IED)-related - which spurred Combined Task 
Force (CTF) Currahee to make this area one of its priorities 
of effort. 
 
¶8. (S) In concert with Afghan National Security Forces 
(ANSF), CTF Currahee conducted Operation Rad-u-Barq 
(&Thunder and Lightning8) V from August 19-30.  The 
operation, a combined series of kinetic and non-kinetic 
events, aimed at disrupting AAF activities, creating greater 
security in the K-G Pass area and encouraging local populace 
support for GIRoA.  This operation was built on the 
foundation of previous Rad-u-Barq campaigns and has sought to 
shape conditions to allow for a successful voter registration 
process later in the year.  As part of its COIN strategy in 
the region, CTF Currahee is also emplacing a number of joint 
combat outposts in key districts straddling the road to offer 
greater protection and deny infiltration routes to AAF. 
 
¶9. (S) As K-G road construction progresses, Afghan National 
Security Forces (ANSF) backed by Coalition forces will 
maintain a security zone around the leading edge of 
construction work.  CTF Currahee elements, as well as DoS and 
USAID reps, are working closely with road contractor Louis 
Berger Group to not only ensure that road construction plans 
are tied into the Task Force,s operations, but also to keep 
the company abreast of, and provide advice on, local 
political issues surrounding the project.  The Louis Berger 
Group maintains a security liaison at Currahee,s 
headquarters to help facilitate these activities. 
 
¶10. (C) The partnership between ANSF ) comprising the 
Afghanistan National Army (ANA), Afghan Border Police (ABP) 
and Afghan National Police (ANP) - and Coalition Forces 
remains a cornerstone of the CTF Currahee COIN strategy. 
Coalition Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) focus on 
governance and economic capacity building, development and 
rule of law in conjunction with local leaders. Coalition 
maneuver units, which also can employ Commander,s Emergency 
Response Program (CERP) funds, partner and mentor ANSF units, 
thus improving their capabilities and enhancing Afghan 
credibility with local communities.  Additional coordination 
and capacity building is achieved by implanting Coalition 
liaisons, Police Mentoring Team and Embedded Training Teams 
at all levels of the ANSF.  Successive joint U.S.-Afghan 
operations, dedicated monitoring assets, and population 
engagements contributed to reducing insurgent activity in the 
K-G Pass area by 46 percent from May to August 2008, 
including a one-third decline in IED events. 
 
------------------------------------------- 
A Super Shura to Build Support for the Road 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶11.  (C) In the latest in a series of public outreach events 
designed to garner support for the K-G road project, CTF 
Currahee lent extensive organizational and planning support 
to an August 28 &super shura.8 The event, attended by more 
than 700 Afghans, brought together the governors from Khost, 
Logar, Paktika and Paktya provinces, as well as national 
GIRoA officials, prominent tribal elders, and religious 
leaders.  Shura speakers exhorted participants to bring their 
communities behind support of the road, for its employment, 
trade, and national development benefits.  Numerous attendees 
at the shura conveyed to POLADS that they considered the 
event a great success as it provided for wide-ranging 
representation and demonstrated linkages between the national 
government, provincial leaders and local communities. 
Several key leaders at the shura observed that similar 
follow-on dialogue (though not necessarily of the same 
magnitude) would be needed to sustain support for the road 
and security in the K-G pass area.  Future events are already 
planned. 
 
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COMMMENT 
-------- 
 
¶12.  (C) After years of false-starts and unfulfilled pledges, 
it is hard to overestimate the importance of completing and 
improving this critical line of communication that will not 
only better connect Afghanistan internally, but will also 
enhance its linkages to Pakistan and global trade routes. 
CTF Currahee,s COIN strategy ) relying intrinsically on 
partnership with ANSF, increased Coalition presence in the 
K-G Pass area, intensive dialogue with governmental, tribal 
and religious leaders ) has produced demonstrable benefits 
in improved security in the region.  Sustaining these 
accomplishments, however, will require long-term investment 
in both &hard8 and &soft8 power to prevent AAF from 
regaining a foothold in this craggy landscape. 
DELL