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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 CANBERRA 001026 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR PM, NEA, SCA AND EAP 
PACOM ALSO FOR POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/14/2018 
TAGS: PREL MARR MOPS AS
SUBJECT: 2008 U.S.-AUSTRALIA POL-MIL TALKS: PART II 
(PERSIAN GULF (IRAN), NONPROLIFERATION AND DISARMAMENT, 
REGIONAL ARCHITECTURE, CHINA AND INDIA) 
 
REF: CANBERRA 1025 (PART I) 
 
Classified By: Acting Political Counselor John W. Crowley. Reasons: 1.4 
 (b)(d) 
 
¶1. (SBU) This is Part II of a three-part cable reporting on 
the annual U.S.-Australia Political Military Talks held in 
Canberra, Australia on October 9, 2008.  This section covers 
Persian Gulf security (Iran), Nonproliferation and 
Disarmament, Regional Architecture, China and India.  Part I 
(reftel) covers Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan, as well as 
providing a summary and list of participants.  Part III 
(septel) covers Southeast Asia, Trilateral Strategic 
Dialogue, Pacific Islands, Defence White Paper, Enhanced 
Defense Cooperation, and the U.S.-Australia Defense Trade 
Cooperation Treaty. 
 
PERSIAN GULF SECURITY 
--------------------- 
¶2. (S/REL AUS) A/S Kimmitt introduced a discussion of Iran's 
role and intentions in the region, including the threat posed 
by Iran's continuing nuclear activities, U.S. efforts to 
promote stability and prevent proliferation in the region, 
and the prospect and consequences of possible pre-emptive 
action by Israel against Iran's nuclear facilities. 
 
¶3. (S/REL AUS) Deputy Secretary Ritchie agreed with the U.S. 
assessment that Iran sought to assert hegemony over the 
region, and reiterated the GOA belief that Iran had made a 
strategic decision to acquire a breakout nuclear capability. 
Referring to estimates that Iran could have a nuclear 
capability by 2010, he pointed out that that was only 18 
months away.  Iran had calculated that the international 
community would react only weakly to its nuclear activities, 
and had decided it could weather imposition of sanctions, 
which were having only minimal effect in any case.  Ritchie 
said Australia planned to receive two Iranian officials soon: 
Iran's ambassador in Vienna planned to visit Australia to try 
to convince the GOA that Iran's nuclear activities posed no 
threat, and the mayor of Tehran, a presidential candidate, 
also planned to visit.  Australia acknowledged the arguments 
against meeting with Iranians, but believed that Iran would 
not get much from such meetings, which would be at junior 
levels in the GOA, and it kept international resolve on Iran 
firm by demonstrating the West's willingness to talk. 
 
ADDITIONAL AUSTRALIAN SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAN 
-------------------------------------------- 
¶4. (S/REL AUS) Deborah Stokes told A/S Kimmitt Australia 
planned to implement additional sanctions against Iran that 
Qplanned to implement additional sanctions against Iran that 
went beyond current UN Security Council resolutions.  The new 
sanctions, which would be announced by Foreign Minister Smith 
in Parliament during the week of October 13, included 
adopting EU sanctions against 20 entities, as well as adding 
Bank Saderat to the list of sanctioned entities.  Australia 
planned to encourage Japan and others to take similar steps, 
she said.  The announcement may dissuade Tehran's mayor from 
proceeding with his trip, she added. 
 
NONPROLIFERATION AND DISARMAMENT 
-------------------------------- 
¶5. (C/REL AUS David Ritchie briefed on Prime Minister Rudd's 
initiative in establishing the International Commission on 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament (ICNND), which 
 
CANBERRA 00001026  002 OF 003 
 
 
plans to hold its first meeting in Sydney October 19-21.  The 
Commission, also known as the Evans Commission after co-chair 
Gareth Evans, originally had been established to influence 
the outcome of the 2010 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) 
Review Conference (RevCon), but Evans now wanted to extend 
the mandate past the NPT RevCon to address proliferation more 
broadly, including threats posed by states that had or were 
seeking to acquire nuclear capabilities, including India, 
Pakistan, Israel, Syria, Burma, Iran and DPRK.  The 
Commission also wanted to engage more countries in 
subscribing to arms and export control regimes, and to 
address new civil/nuclear arrangements.  At its initial 
meeting, Evans hoped to achieve consensus on an extended 
mandate and on a program of work.  Ritchie stressed the 
Commission was independent from the GOA so Evans was 
conducting his own consultations in capitals.  Evans 
understood the strategic realities involved regarding 
disarmament, he added. Turning to the Proliferation Security 
Initiative (PSI), Ritchie praised the U.S. initiative and 
reaffirmed Australia's continued strong support for PSI, 
expressing hope Indonesia could be brought on board. 
 
¶6. (C/REL AUS) A/S Kimmitt thanked the GOA for having hosted 
productive nonproliferation discussions with INS Acting 
Assistant Secretary McNerney in June.  He registered U.S. 
support for ICNND's objectives, underscoring the importance 
for the Commission to strike the right balance between 
nonproliferation and disarmament. 
 
ASIA PACIFIC REGIONAL SECURITY 
 
REGIONAL ARCHITECTURE 
--------------------- 
¶7. (C/REL AUS) Hugh Borrowman, First Assistant Secretary for 
International Affairs, Department of the Prime Minister and 
Cabinet, outlined the background to PM Rudd's vision for an 
Asian-Pacific Community (APC) by 2020.  There was as yet no 
concrete plan or proposal, he said, rather the concept was 
intended to promote discussion about where the region wanted 
to be, and how to fashion a framework that included all major 
players and could address the range of economic, political 
and security issues.  The GOA had so far engaged Wellington, 
Jakarta, Singapore, Seoul and Tokyo on APC.  Borrowman 
characterized the reactions as generally "curious but 
cautious," with the exception of Singapore, which had reacted 
negatively.  Key to PM Rudd's long-term thinking on the APC 
was how to engage China across all fronts.  Rudd was 
Qwas how to engage China across all fronts.  Rudd was 
contemplating how to promote his APC vision at the 2009 APEC, 
and planned to raise the issue in visits to both Beijing and 
Washington, possibly in February 2009. 
 
CHINA 
----- 
¶8. (C/REL AUS) Graham Fletcher, First Assistant Secretary for 
North Asia, provided a political outlook for China.  The 
elite, led by Hu Jintao, likely would retain control until 
2012, when Hu would turn over the reins to one of his 
hand-picked successors.  While China might look impressive 
externally, its internal politics were characterized by 
nervousness, paranoia and uncertainty.  Nonetheless there 
were no major challenges to the ruling elite in the near 
term.  Fletcher said the chances of China either falling 
apart or improving/reforming dramatically were very small, 
forecasting little change in the political settings over the 
 
CANBERRA 00001026  003 OF 003 
 
 
next two decades. 
 
¶9. (C/REL AUS) Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East 
Asia David Sedney responded that the U.S. analysis tracked 
closely with Australia's.  He noted that the Chinese 
leadership was absorbed with domestic stability, and, while 
China had achieved success in achieving economic and 
political stability, there were cracks in the facade.  China 
appeared to be relatively insulated from the current global 
financial crisis, he noted.  DASD Sedney offered a personal 
view that, after following China closely for ten years, he 
leaned more toward the evolutionary model.  In response to 
Ritchie's question about how to harness Chinese support in 
the international community, Sedney said part of the key to 
China's influence was that they did not try to exercise it, 
citing China's investment in Pakistan as an example. 
Fletcher interjected that China did not agree with the 
premise that it should be helping us.  On China-Taiwan 
rivalry in the South Pacific, DASD Sedney said there had been 
a diplomatic truce following the election of Ma Ying-jeou. 
Ritchie responded Australia had observed a change in rhetoric 
but not in behavior.  The GOA had delivered robust demarches 
to Taiwan about bribing Pacific Island state leaders, with 
some success; China was not as involved in corruption in the 
Pacific. 
 
INDIA 
----- 
¶10. (C/REL AUS) A/S Kimmitt described U.S. military 
engagement with India, including the fighter aircraft 
competition.  He told the Australians that difficulties with 
end-use monitoring of U.S. defense equipment and technology 
sold to India could hamper progress in interoperability. 
Col. Jeffrey Arruda, Chief, South Asia/Oceania Policy 
Division, PACOM, noted that, despite India's participation in 
the Malabar 2007 exercise, India preferred bilateral 
engagement and resisted efforts to engage in multilateral 
exercises.  DASD Sedney remarked that China loomed large in 
India's world view, but India was largely absent in China's. 
Deputy Secretary Merchant noted that Australia currently had 
a modest military program with India, including exercises and 
training, but sought to expand the scope of the relationship. 
 
¶11. (U) Assistant Secretary Kimmitt has cleared this message. 
 
MCCALLUM