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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 CANBERRA 001025 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR PM, NEA, SCA AND EAP 
PACOM ALSO FOR POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/14/2018 
TAGS: PREL MARR MOPS AS
SUBJECT: 2008 U.S.-AUSTRALIA POL-MIL TALKS: PART I 
(SUMMARY, IRAQ, AFGHANISTAN, PAKISTAN, PARTICIPANTS) 
 
Classified By: Acting Political Counselor John W. Crowley. Reasons: 1.4 
(b)(d). 
 
¶1. (SBU) This is Part I of a three-part cable reporting on 
the annual U.S.-Australia Political-Military Talks held in 
Canberra, Australia on October 9, 2008.  Part I covers Iraq, 
Afghanistan and Pakistan, as well as providing a summary and 
list of participants.  Part II (septel) covers Persian Gulf 
Security (Iran), Nonproliferation and Disarmament, Regional 
Architecture, China and India.  Part III (septel) covers 
Southeast Asia, Trilateral Strategic Dialogue, Pacific 
Islands, Defence White Paper, Enhanced Defense Cooperation, 
and the U.S.-Australia Defense Trade Cooperation Treaty. 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
¶2. (S/REL AUS) PM A/S Kimmitt led a joint State-DoD 
delegation to the annual U.S. Australia Political-Military 
Talks in Canberra October 9, 2008.  The Australians 
registered concern at the rapidly diminishing timeline in 
which to meet requirements for their forces to remain in Iraq 
beyond 2008, and sought a green light from the United States 
to begin bilateral SOFA negotiations with the Iraqi 
government.  (PM Maliki plans to visit Australia on October 
23.)  On Afghanistan, the GOA reiterated its pledge to 
maintain current force levels for the indefinite future, 
despite declining public support, and reconfirmed plans to 
deploy an OMLT to Uruzgan before the end of the year. 
Foreign Minister Smith is preparing to announce additional 
sanctions on Iran that go beyond UNSC resolutions, including 
adopting EU sanctions and adding Bank Saderat to sanctioned 
entities, and will encourage Japan and others to do likewise. 
 The GOA briefed on the status of the Defence White Paper, 
disclosing its conclusion that it would purchase the Joint 
Strike Fighter and acquire 6-12 additional submarines.  In a 
discussion on regional architecture, the Australian mentioned 
that PM Rudd may seek to visit Washington in early 2009, 
perhaps in February.  A full list of participants is provided 
at para 13 below. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
STRATEGIC OVERVIEW 
------------------ 
¶3. (C/REL AUS) Assistant Secretary Kimmitt and Deputy 
Secretary Ritchie exchanged closely congruent global 
perspectives, with cautious assessments of developments and 
prospects in South Asia, particularly in Afghanistan and 
Pakistan, and the Middle East.  Ritchie said Australia was 
focused on developments in its own neighborhood - it was 
watching nervously what effects the global financial crisis 
might have on China, its largest trading partner, for example 
Qmight have on China, its largest trading partner, for example 
- but broadly supported Western interests around the world, 
such as in Zimbabwe and the Russia-Georgia conflict, and 
looked to do more to further those interests, particularly 
vis-a-vis Pakistan and Iran.  Ritchie enumerated the 
challenges facing Australia in its "troubled neighborhood," 
including an increase in illegal immigration from Indonesia, 
where Yudhoyono was facing elections; continuing political 
instability in Thailand; the "basket case" of the 
Philippines; the continuing "burden" of providing security 
and development assistance to East Timor; problems o 
f bad governance in many of the Pacific Island states; and 
illegal fishing and whaling. 
 
¶4. (C/REL AUS) Ritchie reaffirmed that Australia's alliance 
 
CANBERRA 00001025  002 OF 005 
 
 
with the United States remained the bedrock of its foreign 
and security policy, ahead of the other two pillars of its 
foreign policy: greater engagement in the Asia-Pacific region 
and increased involvement in multilateral organizations.  He 
said the Prime Minister would soon deliver Australia's first 
National Security Statement, in advance of an inaugural 
National Security Strategy, that would help inform the GOA's 
Defence White Paper.  Ritchie added Foreign Minister Smith 
would issue Australia's first Foreign Policy Annual Statement 
later in the year also. 
 
¶5. (C/REL AUS) A/S Kimmitt noted to the Australians that a 
new U.S. Administration might be preoccupied initially with 
problems in the Middle East, South Asia, Russia and South 
America, but that should not be read as a diminution of 
America's interest in the Asia-Pacific region.  He reiterated 
U.S. gratitude for Australia's strong support in addressing 
global challenges and acting as an anchor in the region. 
 
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 
 
IRAQ 
---- 
¶6. (S/REL AUS) A/S Kimmitt briefed on efforts to assist Iraq 
in modernizing its security forces, on progress in 
negotiating a status of forces agreement (SOFA), including 
options in the event a SOFA was not agreed by the end of the 
year, and U.S. thinking on overall numbers of U.S. troops 
required for Iraq. 
 
¶7. (S/REL AUS) Deputy Secretary Ritchie said the GOA was in 
the process of preparing points on Australia's role in Iraq 
to present to Iraqi Prime Minister al-Maliki, who planned to 
visit Australia on October 23.  Ritchie expressed hope that 
the U.S. could reach an agreement on a SOFA as quickly as 
possible, cautioning that Australia was running out of time 
to put in place requirements to continue its presence in Iraq 
after 2008.  At a minimum, Australia needed to have a legal 
basis to stay on, he said, stressing that the U.S. negotiated 
outcome needed to be embedded in Iraqi law. Australia hoped 
to piggy-back on the U.S. agreement, once it had reviewed the 
text.  Without proper legal protection, however, Australian 
forces in Iraq, including the security detachment guarding 
the Australian Embassy, would simply stop all activities 
after December 31.  This may force the closure of the 
Australian Embassy, he added, although the GOA was exploring 
the possibility of according diplomatic accreditation to the 
security detach 
ment personnel to avoid this outcome. 
 
¶8. (S/REL AUS) Deputy Secretary of Defence Stephen Merchant 
interjected that Australia had refrained so far from 
Qinterjected that Australia had refrained so far from 
initiating separate bilateral negotiations on a SOFA with 
Iraq, partly to avoid introducing complications into the U.S. 
negotiations but also because Australia believed it would be 
unable to negotiate more comprehensive protections than could 
the U.S.  He urged that the United States give Australia the 
green light to begin initiating its own agreement with Iraq, 
if the U.S. believed the time was right.  A/S Kimmitt took 
the request on board. 
 
AFGHANISTAN 
----------- 
¶9. (C/REL AUS) Ritchie said the Australian Cabinet had taken 
up the issue of Australia's role in Afghanistan following 
 
CANBERRA 00001025  003 OF 005 
 
 
withdrawal of the Dutch in 2010.  Australia remained strongly 
committed to Afghanistan, he said, and the GOA expected to 
maintain its current level of forces there, concentrated on 
Uruzgan Province, for the indefinite future.  Prime Minister 
Rudd was focused on successful outcomes, however, 
specifically, how to measure progress in Afghanistan, and, 
equally important, how to convince the Australian public, 
whose support for Australia's military involvement in 
Afghanistan had recently fallen below 50 percent for the 
first time, to continue to support the effort.  Regardless, 
he reiterated, Australia was committed to Afghanistan 
post-2010 for "a very long time."  The Cabinet was 
considering options, including requirements for maintaining 
its aid program that may depend on availability of U.S. 
enablers.  Ritchie thanked the United States for providing 
accommodations for Australia's diplomatic personnel i 
n Kabul following the bombing of the Serena Hotel. 
Construction of a temporary embassy co-located with the Dutch 
had encountered delays, he said, but the Australian 
government was looking for a new site on which to establish a 
permanent mission, evidence of its long-term commitment to 
Afghanistan.  Ritchie drew attention to a recent Australian 
press item that erroneously suggested Defence Minister 
Fitzgibbon had said the conflict in Afghanistan was not 
winnable, clarifying that the Minister had actually echoed 
the UK Defence Minister's comment that the conflict could not 
be won by military means alone. 
 
¶10. (C/REL AUS) Merchant reaffirmed Australia's plan to 
deploy an Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team (OMLT) in 
Afghanistan later in the year.  With the emphasis shifting to 
more training and mentoring, more enablers would be needed, 
he said.  He solicited U.S. views on the future of Regional 
Command-South.  Deborah Stokes, First Assistant Secretary for 
South and West Asia, the Middle East and Africa, observed the 
Dutch had irritated Australia by insisting on a European 
successor to preserve its legacy in Afghanistan after 2010. 
Australia needed to have a say over what country it would 
partner with after the Dutch departed, she asserted.  The 
Dutch government had publicly couched its military presence 
in Afghanistan as a "reconstruction" mission and consequently 
faced a domestic political backlash when its forces started 
to take casualties, she commented. 
 
¶11. (C/REL AUS) A/S Kimmitt briefed on the status of the U.S. 
strategic review of Afghanistan, and on gains made in 
Qstrategic review of Afghanistan, and on gains made in 
increasing the size and capacity of the Afghan National Army. 
 He expressed U.S. gratitude for Australia's contribution in 
Afghanistan, not only for the quality of its fighting force 
but also for its reconstruction efforts. 
 
PAKISTAN 
-------- 
¶12. (C/REL AUS) Assistant Secretary Kimmitt provided an 
overview of financial and political threats to Pakistan's 
stability, and the situation in the Federally-administered 
tribal areas (FATA), voicing pessimism that the GOP had 
grasped the seriousness of the threat from militant elements 
within the country, despite the recent Marriott Hotel 
bombing.  The Pakistani military did not lack the capability, 
but may lack the will to effectively confront the insurgents, 
he observed. 
 
¶13. (S/REL AUS) Deputy Secretary Ritchie echoed A/S Kimmitt's 
assessment, predicting there could be a major crisis in 
 
CANBERRA 00001025  004 OF 005 
 
 
Pakistan in one month or less.  Australia wanted to step up 
its aid to Pakistan, including providing counterinsurgency 
training.  Peter West, Assistant Secretary of Defence for the 
Americas and North and South Asia, elaborated that the 
Australian government had approached Pakistan's Directorate 
for Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) on counterinsurgency 
cooperation.  ISI had drawn a sharp distinction between al 
Qaeda, on the one hand, and the Taliban and its supporters, 
on the other, insisting COIN could not be used against the 
latter, as it would hurt development efforts in the FATA. 
Responding to the current debate in the West about whether to 
negotiate with moderate elements of the Taliban, Ritchie 
expressed GOA skepticism that such a course would be 
effective.  The GOA believed in the utility of seeking to 
induce Taliban defections but thought direct negotiations 
were dangerous. 
 
PARTICIPANTS 
------------ 
¶14. (U) Participants in the 2008 U.S.-Australia Pol-Mil Talks 
included: 
 
UNITED STATES 
--A/S Mark T. Kimmitt, PM Bureau (Head of delegation) 
--DASD David Sedney (East Asia) 
--LTC Desmond Walton, Asian & Pacific Security Affairs, OSD 
--Col. J.K. Arruda, Chief, PACOM/J53 
--LTC Rocky Carter, Joint Staff, J5, SE Asia 
--Abraham Denmark, OSD 
--David Michaels, Australia Country Director, OSD 
--Tim Liston, Political-Military Officer, PM/RSAT 
--Col. A.J. Britschgi, DATT, Embassy Canberra 
--Aleisha Woodward, Country Desk Officer, EAP/ANP 
--John Crowley, Acting POLCOUNS, Embassy Canberra (notetaker) 
 
AUSTRALIA 
--David J. Ritchie, Deputy Secretary, Department of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade (DFAT) 
--Steve Merchant, Deputy Secretary for Intelligence, Security 
and International Policy, Australian Department of Defence 
(ADOD) 
--Jennifer Rawson, First Assistant Secretary, International 
Security Division, DFAT 
--Deborah Stokes, First Assistant Secretary, South and West 
Asia, Middle East and Africa Division, DFAT 
--Graham Fletcher, First Assistant Secretary, North Asia 
Division, DFAT 
--Chris de Cure, Acting First Assistant Secretary, Americas 
Division, DFAT 
--Richard Rowe, First Assistant Secretary, Pacific Division, 
DFAT 
--Peter Woolcott, First Assistant Secretary, South-East Asia 
Division, DFAT 
--Hugh Borrowman, First Assistant Secretary, International 
Division, Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (PM&C) 
--Miles Armitage, Assistant Secretary, Asia, Americas and 
Trade Branch, International Division, PM&C 
--John Quinn, Assistant Secretary, Strategic Affairs and 
Q--John Quinn, Assistant Secretary, Strategic Affairs and 
Intelligence Branch, DFAT 
--Peter West, Assistant Secretary, Americas and North & South 
Asia Branch, International Policy Division, ADOD 
--Rodger Hodgkins, Strategic Analysis, Office of National 
Assessments 
--Beverly Mercer, U.S. Political and Strategic Section, DFAT 
--Cameron Archer, Director Defense Policy and Liaison 
 
CANBERRA 00001025  005 OF 005 
 
 
Section, DFAT (notetaker) 
--Jonathan Gilbert, Executive Officer, Defense Policy and 
Liaison Section, DFAT (Notetaker) 
 
¶15. (U) Assistant Secretary Kimmitt has cleared this message. 
 
MCCALLUM