VZCZCXRO8849
PP RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHRL #1468/01 3040841
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 300841Z OCT 08
FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2492
INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNFRG/FRG COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHDIR/IRAN RPO DUBAI PRIORITY
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BERLIN 001468 
 
SIPDIS 
TREASURY FOR BURKE AND EDDY 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/22/2018 
TAGS: EFIN PRELM IR GM
SUBJECT: READ OUT OF TREASURY U/S LEVEY'S VISIT TO GERMANY 
 
REF: BERLIN 1229 
 
BERLIN 00001468  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
Classified By: DCM John M. Koenig for reasons 1.4(b) and (d 
 
¶1. (S)  SUMMARY  During meetings with a comprehensive slate 
of senior Chancellery and Finance, Economic and Foreign 
Ministry officials on September 11, 2008, U/S Levey focused 
on three main topics: 1) The recent U.S. designation of IRISL 
as a proliferation-related entity using  deceptive financial 
and commercial conduct that has the effect of luring banks 
and other companies into illicit transactions; 2) the need to 
approach the insurance industry to discuss the potential for 
abuse of the sector by Iran,s illicit conduct (Note. As a 
financial service, insurance is covered by existing UN 
Security Council resolutions), and 3) BHF Bank's relationship 
with Iranian banks of proliferation concern. When asked about 
U.S. exports to Iran, U/S Levey pointed out that U.S. exports 
to Iran are dwarfed by German exports, and are limited to 
humanitarian items, agricultural products and medicines, as 
required by Congress. U/S Levey also discussed current U.S. 
efforts aimed at reducing the number of products from U.S. 
firms reaching Iran via third country exports.  While German 
officials welcomed the message on the promise of new, more 
robust enforcement of existing laws against U.S. companies 
whose products enter Iran, they were cool to the presentation 
on BHF Bank and non-committal on the application of insurance 
and re-insurance to existing UN sanctions.  End Summary. 
 
 
----------------------------- 
IRISL / INSURANCE 
----------------------------- 
¶2. (S)  U/S Levey also addressed the recent U.S. designation 
of the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL) and 
its related entities for facilitating shipments for 
proliferators.  He provided information illustrating how 
IRISL uses deceptive practices to mask its involvement in 
illicit conduct, which increases the risk that financial 
institutions providing services to IRISL could be 
contributing to the illicit activity.  He also stressed 
paragraph 6 of UNSCR 1737, which prohibits the provision of 
"financial resources or services" related to Iran's nuclear 
program, included providing insurance and reinsurance to 
IRISL, and possibly to any Iranian airline transporting 
proliferation-related materials.  While the primary insurers 
of IRISL vessels are British, U/S Levey invited collaboration 
from Germany to the extent their insurers or reinsurers cover 
IRISL vessels or other activities. 
 
¶3.  (S) At the Economics Ministry, Dr. Kruse stated that the 
responsibility for insurance matters is with the Finance 
Ministry and noted that sanctions against airlines or their 
insurers might be too extreme, as they would have the 
practical effect of grounding the airline.  Further, Dr. 
Ursina Krumpholz raised the possibility that insurance is 
addressed by UNSCR 1803 (paragraph 9) which urges vigilance 
over providing financial support for trade with Iran, 
including export credits, guarantees, or insurance.  U/S 
Levey responded that the language in UNSCR 1803 regarding 
export credit insurance does not exclude the prohibition of 
other forms of insurance as a financial service covered in 
paragraph 6 of UNSCR 1737.  German officials did not contest 
this point. 
 
¶4. (S) At the Finance Ministry, Dr. Wenzel asserted that the 
unique nature of many reinsurance transactions makes them a 
less than ideal tool to target specific sectors or entities. 
Wenzel also opined that, if the primary insurers comply with 
such a sanctions regime, the need to address reinsurance is 
obviated.  U/S Levey responded by asserting that specific 
policy provisions and endorsements may help this approach 
achieve its goals. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
CONCERNS REGARDING BHF BANK 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
¶5. (S) U/S Levey conveyed concerns over BHF Bank,s continued 
relationship with Iran and provided examples about how Iran 
uses deceptive practices to prevent detection and evade 
sanctions.  U/S Levey described how continuing a relationship 
under these circumstances risks providing financial services 
to UN designated entities, even if unwittingly.  In fact, U/S 
Levey shared an example of where BHF Bank was involved in a 
transaction for which Bank Sepah was a party and noted how 
this is a UNSCR violation. 
 
BERLIN 00001468  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
 
¶6. (S) The response from the various German officials with 
whom U/S Levey met was similar.  At the Economics Ministry, 
Deputy Director Dr. Michael Kruse emphasized the role of the 
German export control authority BAFA in reducing trade with 
Iran, and stated that questionable export cases go to BAFA 
for review.  U/S Levey stressed that BHF Bank's transactions 
were not/not exports, but a financial service.  Further, U/S 
Levey said that, given Iran,s ongoing illicit conduct as 
recognized by the international community, BHF should be on 
notice that documents presented by Iran in such transactions 
are not reliable and BHF Bank assumes the risk that a 
designated Iranian banks may be behind some transactions it 
processes.  Dr. Kruse promised to contact BHF personally to 
address U/S Levey's concerns. 
 
¶7. (S) During a meeting at the Finance Ministry, Director 
General Dr. Rolf Wenzel provided BHF's response to some of 
the U.S. concerns (Note. The same information had previously 
been provided to German officials and it was apparent that 
U.S. concerns were discussed with BHF prior to U/S Levey,s 
visit.  End Note.).  According to Wenzel, BHF stated they had 
no accounts for the companies specifically mentioned in the 
points passed and "did not know them."   Wenzel added that 
BHF has reduced its credit exposure in Iran from 80 million 
to 25 million Euros.  In response, U/S Levey noted that the 
risk is not their exposure but rather their provision of 
payment services to Iran. 
 
¶8. (S) At the MFA, U/S Levey stated that there is no evidence 
that BHF was aware of the involvement of designated banks in 
transactions, but he noted that BHF was possibly "willfully 
blind" to the potential involvement of such banks.  At the 
Chancellery, Vorbeck, (charged with oversight of the German 
Federal Intelligence Agency and responsible for coordination 
of information between Germany's various intelligence 
services), noted that it was difficult for his office to find 
points for intervention against BHF Bank, due to its German 
domicile.  He suggested that the Finance Ministry and 
Germany's bank regulator BaFin are better suited to press the 
urgency of this case. 
 
¶9. (S) U/S Levey explained the concerns surrounding BHF Bank 
to German Chancellor Angela Merkel's Chief Economic Advisor, 
Dr. Jens Weidmann.  Weidmann repeated information provided by 
the Finance Ministry, namely that BHF had reduced its credit 
exposure to Iran, to which U/S Levey replied that it was the 
provision of payment services, not the credit exposure, which 
was a proliferation concern.  Weidmann also repeated that BHF 
Bank asserts that they have no accounts for, or knowledge of, 
the Iranian or Malaysian companies previously discussed.  In 
response to Weidmann's inquiry about suggested next steps 
regarding BHF Bank, U/S Levey asked the Germans to talk to 
the BHF Bank and discuss next steps with the U.S. thereafter. 
 He also stressed that it is the government,s responsibility 
to adhere to UN sanctions. 
 
------------------------------------ 
U.S. PRODUCTS IN IRAN 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶10. (S) At the Finance Ministry, Wenzel and U/S Levey 
discussed exports to Iran. Wenzel asserted that German small- 
and medium-sized enterprises (the "Mittelstand") have shown 
restraint in their exports to Iran, but that they are angry 
about what they view as U.S. companies' evasion of sanctions 
and widespread trans-shipment of goods through Kuwait and the 
United Arab Emirates.  He also repeated oft-heard Mittlestand 
concerns that China and, increasingly, Russia are filling the 
gaps created by German firms reducing their exports. 
 
¶11. (S) In response, U/S Levey acknowledged that the reports 
of trans-shipments of goods from the U.S. to Iran via Dubai 
were "troubling".  He noted that he has visited Dubai nine 
times and has pushed Emirati Authorities in Dubai to improve 
their customs oversight.   The officials welcomed U/S Levey's 
news that OFAC's maximum authority to levy fines has been 
raised for such violations from USD 11,000 to USD 500,000. 
U/S Levey also promised to "make examples" of U.S. companies 
violating the law and suggested public announcements of 
prosecutions would follow soon.  He also promised to address 
any reports reaching him of U.S. companies exporting to Iran 
via foreign subsidiaries.  U/S Levey also pointed out that 
U.S. exports to Iran remain extremely low, and those goods 
directly shipped from the U.S. are limited to humanitarian 
good, medicines and agricultural products.   Wenzel concluded 
 
BERLIN 00001468  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
the meeting by stating that this new information will help 
the Finance Ministry argue its case with the Mittlestand. 
While the large companies understand the issue, Wenzel said, 
the Mittlestand feels threatened, particularly when U.S. 
companies' exports get on their radar. 
 
---------------- 
COMMENT 
---------------- 
 
¶12. (S) Germany's lukewarm response (and unwillingness as of 
yet to take action) to information provided on BHF Bank's 
Iran transactions indicates the need to keep the bank on 
senior German officials' radar.  Germany continues to prefer 
pursuing most actions within the largest possible 
multilateral framework, although policymakers agree in 
principle on the need for urgent action.  However, Germany,s 
view of targeted measures differs in that it seeks to target 
only the specific illicit activities as opposed to targeting 
activities that are being exploited for illicit purposes. 
The German government welcomed U/S Levey's information on 
OFAC's more robust prosecution abilities and demonstrated a 
willingness to consider new approaches to sector-specific 
sanctions such as marine insurance. 
 
¶13. (S) This cable has been cleared with U/S Levey's office. 
Timken Jr