VZCZCXRO5916
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #3165/01 2751045
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 011045Z OCT 08
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9724
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003165 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/01/2018 
TAGS: PGOV PINR IZ
SUBJECT: POPULAR KARBALA ISF COMMANDER SURVIVES OUSTER 
ATTEMPT 
 
REF: BAGHDAD 2967 
 
Classified By: Karbala PRT Leader Don Cooke for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
(U) This is a PRT Karbala Reporting Cable 
 
¶1. (C) Summary:  Karbala ISF commander MG Ra'ad Shaker Jawdat 
al-Hasnawi,s reassignment as security chief in Diyala 
Province was rescinded.  In response to Provincial Council 
pressure, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki reversed an earlier 
decision to transfer Ra'ad.  Ra'ad is credited with ushering 
in stability by breaking the back of the Shi'a militias.  The 
ISF commander's growing popularity, in spite of his heavy 
handed tactics, was resented by political rivals, 
particularly Da'wa Party rival Governor Aqeel Mahmoud 
al-Khazali.  The failed attempt to remove Ra'ad is a blow to 
Governor Aqeel and may have embarrassed PM Maliki.  End 
Summary. 
 
Transfer order 
-------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) On September 21, according to police contacts, 
Karbala ISF commander MG Ra'ad Shaker Jawdat al-Hasnawi was 
assigned to serve as chief of the Iraqi Police (IP) in Diyala 
Province.  On September 23, Karbala radio, quoting an unnamed 
official source, reported that Ra'ad's transfer came at the 
personal request of PM Maliki.  Other PRT contacts claim the 
transfer order was initiated by Karbala Province Governor 
Aqeel Mahmoud al-Khazali.  Abd al-Mahdi al-Karbala'i, Grand 
Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani's deputy, allegedly raised the issue 
with Maliki during the PM's visit to Karbala. 
 
Public Outcry and Order Rescinded 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) A source close to senior police officials said 
120-150 people protested in Karbala demanding Maliki reverse 
his decision to transfer Ra'ad to Diyala.  Protesters carried 
banners stating "We Want Ra'ad and No One Else" and "We Have 
Witnessed Great Stability Under Ra'ad's Leadership."  The 
Provincial Council (PC) also expressed its support for Ra'ad. 
 Deputy Chairman Hamid al-Turfi announced that the PC would 
ask Iraqi military leadership to delay implementation of the 
order for security's sake.  PM Maliki reportedly suspended 
Ra'ad's transfer to Diyala Province. 
 
Not Everyone Satisfied 
---------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) Ra'ad's tenure as ISF Commander in Karbala since April 
2007 saw a dramatic improvement in security.  Ra'ad and his 
deputy, Major Ali Hamid Hashim, have a reputation for dealing 
quickly and severely with miscreants.  The August 2007 
violence, that marred last year's Shabaniyah observances, 
gave Ra'ad and Ali the pretext to go hammer-and-tongs after 
the Shi'a militias.  Hundreds of Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) and 
Badr Corps suspects were detained, run out of town or went 
into hiding.  Ra'ad reveled in his growing popularity and 
missed few opportunities to sing his own praises. 
 
¶5. (C) Karbala's civilian leaders regard Ra'ad with a mixture 
of fear, envy and contempt.  Governor Aqeel in particular 
resents the ISF commander's popularity.  As security 
improved, citizens questioned the ISF's continued use of 
heavy-handed tactics.  The business community complains that 
ISF checkpoints strangle traffic and impede economic 
progress.  Karbala farmers from former Sadrist strongholds 
al-Husayniyah and al-Hindiyah (whence Maliki hails) often 
charge the ISF with abuse. 
 
¶6. (C) Aqeel's discontent with Ra'ad became increasingly 
apparent.  On September 10, the Governor announced that he 
would shut down 76 ISF checkpoints and 90 police watchtowers, 
stating that the province could not be held captive to 
security measures.  IP contacts informed the PRT that a 
special committee arrived from Baghdad to investigate 
allegations of police brutality.  The IP in Karbala claim 
that the committee was formed at Maliki's request and that it 
was directed to investigate leadership issues. 
 
¶7.  (C) Comment:  The attempt to transfer Ra,ad failed and 
the order transferring the ISF commander is officially on 
hold.  The order may never be formally revoked, but this is 
of little consequence.  Ra,ad himself has put on a brave 
face, even suggesting that he orchestrated the transfer order 
as a way to demonstrate his popularity and silence his 
critics.  Governor Aqeel is the loser in the affair.  Not 
only did Aqeel fail publicly, but he managed to embarrass PM 
Maliki who was surprised by Ra'ad's broad support.  Ra,ad 
has not emerged unscathed, having been saved by a group of 
politicians whom he views with contempt.  It is uncertain 
 
BAGHDAD 00003165  002 OF 002 
 
 
whether the ISF commander will retain his existing 
portfolios, such as Director General of the Police.  Both 
Aqeel and Ra,ad have national ambitions, neither of which 
are served well by this latest affair.  End Comment. 
CROCKER