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Viewing cable 08AITTAIPEI1424, MEDIA REACTION: U.S.-TAIWAN ARMS DEALS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08AITTAIPEI1424 2008-10-01 01:30 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHIN #1424/01 2750130
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 010130Z OCT 08
FM AIT TAIPEI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0038
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 8618
RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 0068
UNCLAS AIT TAIPEI 001424 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR INR/R/MR, EAP/TC, EAP/PA, EAP/PD - NIDA EMMONS 
DEPARTMENT PASS AIT/WASHINGTON 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OPRC KMDR KPAO TW
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION: U.S.-TAIWAN ARMS DEALS 
 
1. Summary:  Taiwan's major Chinese-language dailies focused news 
coverage September 27-30 on Super Typhoon Jangmi, which pounded 
Taiwan heavily Sunday and Monday, bringing massive rains and causing 
considerable damage to the island; on the House of Representatives' 
veto of the Bush Administration's Wall Street bailout package plan 
Monday; and on the Taiwan government's efforts to eliminate the 
political storm and panic around the island caused by the 
melamine-tainted dairy products from China.  In addition, almost all 
papers reported on the U.S. State Department's failure to notify 
Congress of proposed arms sales to Taiwan before the latter by 
September 26.  The pro-unification "United Daily News" front-paged a 
news story Sunday with the headline "Taiwan Misjudges the Situation, 
U.S. Arms Sales All Gone."  The same paper also ran a banner 
headline on page two Sunday reading "Arms Sales Come to Nothing, Ma 
Gets Defeated Both Internally and Externally."  The centrist, 
KMT-leaning "China Times" also ran a news story on page six Monday 
with the headline "The United States is Essentially Freezing Arms 
Sales [to Taiwan], Slapping Ma Right in the Face." 
 
2. Almost all major Chinese-language and English-language dailies 
carried editorial pieces on the failed U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. 
An editorial in the pro-independence "Liberty Times" said the defeat 
of major U.S. arms sales to Taiwan concretely and subtly reflects a 
chain reaction of the Ma Administration's alleged capitulationism, 
and should the Ma Administration continue to act "arbitrarily," 
Taiwan's future will be "inconceivable."  A separate "Liberty Times" 
op-ed said that, in addition to AIT Chairman Raymond Burghardt's 
serious warning to the Ma Administration by asserting the 'two 
noes,' the freeze of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan marks the second 
severe warning to President Ma Ying-jeou.  Columnist Antonio Chiang 
said in his column in the mass-circulation "Apple Daily" that 
Washington-Taipei ties have plunged to their lowest point, and 
Taipei had better prepare for the worst.  A "China Times" op-ed 
questioned whether Washington will be willing to help defend Taiwan 
from a Chinese attack if Taiwan spends a huge amount of money buying 
U.S. weapons.  A separate "China Times" column said that since Iran 
and North Korea now top the U.S. agenda, Taiwan's arms procurements 
have to be put on hold for a while.  A "United Daily News" op-ed 
criticized the Ma Administration for being over-confident and 
misjudging the situation, which resulted in both loss of his face 
and of substance.  A separate "United Daily News" op-ed, however, 
called on the public not to distort Taiwan-U.S. relations with the 
stalled U.S. arms sales to Taiwan.  An editorial in the 
pro-independence, English-language "Taipei Times" said the failed 
U.S. arms procurement "is a serious blow to the Ma administration's 
efforts to work with the U.S. and to Ma's national security 
strategies."  End summary. 
 
A)  "The Ma Administration's Line of Ultimate Unification [with 
China] Has Put Taiwan's Foreign Relations and Military on the Verge 
of Collapse" 
 
The pro-independence "Liberty Times" [circulation: 700,000] 
editorialized (9/29): 
 
"The U.S. State Department has failed to notify Congress of the arms 
procurements items (including the submarines) that Taiwan hoped to 
purchase before the latter went into recess.  Despite the fact that 
State Department officials reiterated that the arms deals are still 
under inter-departmental review, which will not be affected by an 
external timeline, the United States is about to hold its 
presidential election and, should the Bush Administration fail to 
deal with the arms sales to Taiwan during its lame-duck period, the 
entire case will have to be reconsidered by the new U.S. 
administration, and surely the case will become more complex and 
difficult.  It is really doubtful whether such arms deals will be 
approved, whether they will effectively fill the gap of Taiwan's 
military strength, given the postponement, and be able to help 
maintain the military balance across the Taiwan Strait should they 
be approved.  In particular, given that the Ma Ying-jeou 
Administration's self-disparagement and castration of [Taiwan's] 
sovereignty, which have resulted in Taiwan's squeezed international 
space, Taiwan has gradually tread the road to isolation.  The defeat 
of major U.S. arms sales to Taiwan has concretely and subtly 
reflected a chain effect of the Ma Administration's capitulationism. 
 If the Ma Administration continues to act arbitrarily, Taiwan's 
future will be inconceivable. ... 
 
"... Under such circumstances, the arms deals have [unexpectedly] 
failed to become a reality.  If it is not because the United States 
has seen through the Blue camp's perfunctory lip service [in 
supporting the arms deals] and simply decided to shelve the deals, 
it must be for the reason that the Ma Administration's line of 
ultimate unification has evidently raised doubts in the 
international community.  The United States, in particular, is 
worried that Taiwan has no determination to defend itself, and once 
those advanced weapons are sold to Taiwan, they may not only fail to 
be brought into full play in their function of deterring China from 
invading the island, but they might even run the risk of falling 
 
into the hands of China. ... In fact, the biggest warning signal 
sent by the stalled [U.S.] arms sales lies in the fact that Taiwan's 
independent status was strongly questioned by the international 
community after the Ma Administration came to power. ..." 
 
B) "For the Second Time the United States Has Sent a Severe Warning 
to Ma Ying-jeou" 
 
World United Formosans for Independence Deputy Secretary-General 
Chen Kuo-hsiung noted in the pro-independence "Liberty Times" 
[circulation: 700,000] (9/30): 
 
"... Despite the fact that the Bush Administration showed little 
faith in the Bian Administration in recent years, Washington still 
announced last year that it had approved the sale to Taiwan of 12 
P-3C anti-submarine aircraft and 144 SM-2 missiles.  But 
Washington's total freeze of the seven-item arms procurements 
proposed by the Ma Administration shows that it is a vote of no 
confidence against the Ma Administration.  The KMT, when previously 
serving as the opposition party, had talked glibly about its 
opposition to the overpriced arms procurements, and rumor had it 
that when the Ma Administration had just assumed office, Ma's close 
aides had told Washington that [Taiwan] would 'not buy any weapons' 
[from the United States].  Such emotional rhetoric might be the fuse 
that irritates Washington and triggers it to decide to 'freeze' the 
arms sales, but the fundamental reason is Washington's distrust of 
the Ma Administration's security strategy. ... 
 
"Even though Washington is happy to see a peaceful and stable 
cross-Strait situation, it is by no means happy to see Taiwan become 
a dependency of China.  But the Ma Administration's efforts blindly 
to tilt toward China after since assumed office have drawn great 
doubts from the United States, which thus judged that the chances 
are high for the Ma Administration to seek unification with China. 
Therefore, AIT Chairman Raymond Burghardt conveyed the 'two noes' to 
the Ma Administration in late August (Namely, there should be no 
hint that China has sovereignty over Taiwan, and that Beijing cannot 
have the final say regarding any of Taiwan's activities in the 
international community).  [Burghardt's remarks] were the United 
States' first severe warning to the Ma Administration, and the 
freeze of the seven-item arms procurements proposed by the Ma 
Administration marked as its second warning.  Should there be a 
third warning, it will be three strikes and you're out, and the Ma 
Administration has to be careful of that." 
 
C) "Consequences of Arms Sales Freeze" 
 
Columnist Antonio Chiang wrote in his column in the mass-circulation 
"Apple Daily" [circulation: 520,000] (9/30): 
 
"Taiwan's proposed arms procurements from the United States have all 
come to nothing, breaking the record set since the '817 Communique' 
in 1982.  Bush's freeze of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan marked 
Taipei-Washington ties plunging to a lowest point.  Unless major 
changes occur in Sino-American relations, given such a precedent, 
[Taipei-Washington ties] will hardly return to what they used to be, 
and Taiwan had better be prepared for the worst scenario. ... 
 
"Some people say the United States will not give up on Taiwan 
because [the Americans] do not want to see the Taiwan Strait become 
China's inland sea.  This may sound correct judging from the 
perspective of global strategy.  But the U.S. State Department may 
not hold the same view.  Besides, the host of the White House sees 
practical political interests as its top priority, and Congressional 
voices in supporting Taiwan have nearly vanished.  What is left is 
nothing but the Defense Department's concern for arms sales to 
Taiwan.  But the professional opinion provided by the Pentagon 
merely serves as a reference for the White House' decision-making. 
..." 
 
D) "[To Reach] Three Percent [of Taiwan's GDP] Just for the Sake of 
Doing It, [There We] See the Arrogant and Perfunctory [Attitude] of 
[Our] Government" 
 
C.V. Chen, President of the Red Cross Society of the Republic of 
China and former Secretary-General of Taiwan's Straits Exchange 
Foundation, wrote in a column in the centrist, KMT-leaning "China 
Times" [circulation: 220,000] (9/29): 
 
"... Those who advocate expensive arms procurements (packaged by the 
[so-called] 'reasonable arms procurements') usually cite two 
reasons:  First, [Taiwan needs sufficient] combat preparedness so as 
to stop war; and, second, [Taiwan needs to] demonstrate to the 
United States its defense determination.  A third reason that people 
believe there is no need to let others know is that it is to reduce 
the opposition parties' doubts against the Ma Administration's 
tilting toward the Beijing government. ...  There might not be zero 
chance for [Taiwan] to stop a war with sufficient combat 
preparedness.  But the question is:  What are the chances?  What is 
 
the price to pay?  Why don't [we] do the opposite by throwing [all] 
the resources into improving cross-Strait relations so as to reduce 
the possibility of war?  In other words, since cross-Strait 
relations have greatly improved under the policy of the Ma 
Administration, why doesn't [the Ma Administration] clearly tell its 
people that we are incapable, and there is no need [for Taiwan] to 
maintain a costly national defense budget that is flashy but has no 
substance? 
 
"Will costly arms procurements demonstrate Taiwan's defense 
determination to the United States?  But will the United States be 
willing to help defend Taiwan from a Chinese attack (since this is 
the only possibility under which Taiwan is capable of defending 
itself effectively against Chinese attack) after Taiwan has spent a 
huge amount of money buying weapons from the United States?  If 
Washington is interested in demonstrating its 'determination to 
defend Taiwan,' it should sign a treaty with Taiwan and be committed 
to sending troops to defend the island when Beijing uses force 
against Taiwan.  Should that be the case, this writer will consider 
supporting the arms procurements, even if the budget for U.S. arms 
sales to Taiwan doubles. 
 
"But will the United States be willing to commit itself?  Of course 
not.  That is because the United States does not want to sabotage 
its relations with Beijing, which is already a world power, for 
Taiwan's sake.  If Washington cannot possibly promise to send troops 
to help defend Taiwan now, how are we supposed to expect that it 
will do so if Beijing attacks us?  Due to its scruples against 
Beijing, the United States is not even interested in selling some 
'outdated symbolic' weapons (those that will not create threats to 
Beijing) to Taiwan, [so] how are we supposed to expect that the 
United States will send troops to help defend Taiwan when Beijing 
uses force against the island?" 
 
E) "Iran, North Korea Are Top Priority; Taiwan [Needs to] Get out of 
the Way" 
 
Deputy Editor-in-Chief Kuo Chen-lung wrote in the International 
Column of the centrist, KMT-leaning "China Times" [circulation: 
220,000] (9/30): 
 
"... Perhaps the United States is still willing to sell arms to 
Taiwan, but this [past] week was too sensitive.  Should [the U.S. 
Executive Branch] have notified Congress [last] Friday, new 
complications might have created while the proposal on Iran that is 
under negotiation rages like a fire.  Washington has also decided to 
re-start negotiations with North Korea, and Beijing's support is all 
the more key to this issue.  The climate of international politics 
has determined the progress of Taipei-Washington relations. ... 
Washington never allows other countries to intervene in its arms 
sales decisions, but since Washington and Beijing have both been 
very skilled in fighting hand-to-hand with each other, one will know 
what it really means when referring to the Taiwan issue.  It is all 
about timing when it comes to diplomacy.  Since it is now all about 
Iran and North Korea, Washington has naturally put the arms sales to 
Taiwan on hold." 
 
F) "Arms Sales Come to Nothing; Ma Ying-jeou Is Defeated Internally 
and Externally" 
 
Washington correspondent Vincent Chang and Journalist Stella Wang 
wrote in an analysis in the pro-unification "United Daily News" 
[circulation: 400,000] (9/28): 
 
"... Ma Ying-jeou has expressed his attitude several times about 
carrying out the arms procurements in an attempt to eliminate the 
Bush Administration's doubts about the new Ma Administration's 
overly tilting toward China.  But since President Bush has had a 
very poor impression of Taiwan's high-ranking politicians over these 
last few years, plus the fact that he has obtained a certain degree 
of mutual trust with the Chinese authorities over many international 
cooperation issues such as anti-terrorism and the Six-Party Talks, 
Bush has turned out in the end to be a key figure in blocking U.S. 
arms sales to Taiwan. ... 
 
"The results of the failed seven-item arms procurement should be 
able to wake up [Taiwan's] decision-makers that it has always been 
the seller that has plays an upper hand in U.S. arms sales to 
Taiwan.  Washington has no concern for Taiwan when the later boasts 
without shame about the 'yellow light' or 'green light' for the arms 
deals.  When one reflects on the national security authorities' 
attitude toward the arms procurements over the past six months, 
which went from overly underestimating to overly confident, [it is 
clear that] the authorities have been misjudging the situation all 
the time, which finally resulted in [Taiwan's] losing both its face 
and substance. ..." 
 
G) "Do Not Distort Taipei-Washington Relations Over the [Failed] 
Arms Procurements" 
 
 
Professor Chao Chun-shan of Tamkang University's Graduate Institute 
of China Studies opined in the pro-unification "United Daily News" 
[circulation: 400,000] (9/30): 
 
"... When evaluating and judging the U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, one 
must not overlook the domestic U.S. factors and the future direction 
of Washington-Beijing ties.  Arms sales have never been a simple 
military issue; they also involve economic, foreign relations, and 
domestic political aspects.  Washington's way of dealing with arms 
sales to Taiwan this time was not determined by any single factor. 
If one tries to exaggerate by saying the United States 'is giving 
the Ma Administration a lesson,' it would be akin to simplifying a 
complicated military deal and also complicating a simple 
international and U.S. political subject. ..." 
 
H) "KMT to Blame for Arms Sales Snafu" 
 
The pro-independence, English-language "Taipei Times" [circulation: 
30,000] editorialized (9/29): 
 
"President Ma Ying-jeou's administration has suffered a major 
diplomatic and national security defeat. As the US Congress 
adjourned late on Friday, it had not received notification from the 
State Department about the arms sale package for Taiwan, meaning the 
package is certain to remain stalled. ...  The [Taiwan] government 
has consistently deceived both itself and the public over the arms 
purchase. When Ma attended Armed Forces Day celebrations on Sept. 3, 
he said: 'The latest signs from the US imply that the US government 
will notify Congress that the legal procedures [for the arms sale] 
should be completed.' ...  In an interview on Sept. 9, 
Representative in Washington Jason Yuan said: 'the arms purchase has 
never been in question' and that work on the deal had never been 
stopped.  The reality, however, looks different. 
 
"Does the US government's preoccupation with the US financial crisis 
mean it isn't interested in selling arms?  Not at all. The State 
Department sent out notifications for arms deals with France, 
Pakistan, Turkey and Saudi Arabia. The Taiwanese deal has been 
discussed for seven years. It can no longer be delayed with the 
excuse that it is still under discussion.  Both houses of Congress 
have passed resolutions expressing concern over arms sales to Taiwan 
and requiring that the administration give them regular detailed 
briefings on the progress, a move that was opposed by both the State 
Justice departments. The Justice Department even said the bill 
'would infringe upon the president's right to conduct foreign 
policy.' 
 
"This makes it clear that the case is not being blocked by Congress, 
but by the State Department and the White House. This is a serious 
blow to the Ma administration's efforts to work with the US and to 
Ma's national security strategies.  The Chinese Nationalist Party 
(KMT) must assume responsibility for this result.  Pan-blue camp 
politicians boycotted what they called an overpriced arms 
procurement deal since it was announced, using it as tool in their 
political battles with former president Chen Shui-bian. To dispel 
the Bush administration's misgivings over his pro-Beijing tilt, Ma 
repeatedly said he would follow through on the arms purchase plan. 
But the White House's commitment to defending Taiwan at any expense 
has been replaced by disappointment in Taiwanese politicians. 
 
"The US needs Beijing's cooperation in fighting terror, on North 
Korea's nuclear disarmament and stabilizing the global financial 
system. Arms sales to Taiwan may disturb its relations with China. 
The Ma administration's unilateral tilt toward China has prompted 
many US politicians and think tank experts to worry that arms and 
military technology sold to Taiwan will be leaked to China.  The KMT 
and the Ma administration's misreading of the White House and the US 
Congress has caused the arms procurement effort to fail. The 
government must learn from this defeat, revise its faulty pro-China 
strategies, make personnel changes in the National Security Bureau 
and rebuild relations with the US. If it doesn't, there is a real 
risk that relations between Taiwan, the US and China will become 
dangerously imbalanced." 
 
YOUNG