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PP RUEHAST RUEHFL RUEHLA RUEHMRE RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHVEN #0221/01 2660606
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 220606Z SEP 08
FM USMISSION USOSCE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5914
INFO RUCNOSC/ORG FOR SECURITY CO OP IN EUR COLLECTIVE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0585
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 1140
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RHMFISS/CDRUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHDLCNE/CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC
RUEASWA/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC
RUESDT/DTRA-OSES DARMSTADT GE
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEKJCS/JCS WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 1080

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 07 USOSCE 000221 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR VCI/CCA, VCI/NRRC, EUR/RPM, EUR/PRA, EUR/CARC, 
SCA/CEN, SCA/RA, PM/WRA 
JCS FOR J-5 
OSD FOR ISA (PERENYI) 
NSC FOR HAYES 
USUN FOR LEGAL, POL 
EUCOM FOR J-5 
CENTCOM FOR J-5 
UNVIE FOR AC 
GENEVA FOR CD 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PARM PREL KCFE OSCE RS XG
SUBJECT: FSC SEPTEMBER 17: RUSSIA AND GEORGIA CONTINUE FEUD 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary:  At the September 17, FSC Russia and 
Georgia reprised their running feud over culpability for 
starting the August war.  Russia presented an amateurish 
video purporting to show Georgia's responsibility for 
starting the conflict and evidence of Georgian attacks on 
civilian targets.  Georgia vigorously replied, referring to 
Russian provocations leading up to the August conflict and 
accusing Russia of planning for an attack long before 
Georgia's strike on Tskhinvali.  The U.S. called for Russia 
to observe the cease-fire agreement and cooperate with the 
OSCE in restoring peace and stability to the region. 
 
¶2. (SBU) The head of security cooperation at the OSCE mission 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina briefed ongoing work there, 
including support to Dayton Article IV arms control, small 
arms and ammunition management, and defense reform. 
 
¶3. (SBU) In the working groups, Estonia agreed that a work 
shop on cyber security could usefully occur before an 
information exchange on the subject, both proposed in its 
draft decision.  Turkey and the U.S. urged avoidance of 
duplication of programs in discussing the German Food for 
Thought paper on landmines and explosive remnants of war. 
The U.S. and Azerbaijan noted they were not parties to the 
Ottawa Convention and would examine carefully any references 
to Ottawa in the paper.  The revised Code of Conduct 
Questionnaire will be discussed at an informal meeting on 
October 3.  The sponsors will then present a final version 
and push for consensus in time to adopt the revision before 
the Helsinki ministerial conference in late November. 
Washington, see para 32 guidance request.  End summary. 
 
Russia Shows Home Movies, Repeats Litany of Georgian Sins 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
 
¶4. (SBU) Russia (Ulyanov) said Georgia's "criminal 
aggression" in South Ossetia had a lasting effect on 
international relations.  Ulyanov said September 17 marked 
forty days since the conflict began: in Christian tradition 
this was the date to remember the dead.  The events of 
"08/08/08" for Russia were akin to 9/11 for the U.S. and as a 
result of them Russia had lost any illusions about the 
effectiveness of international security but would draw some 
useful lessons.  Russia was shocked, if not surprised. 
Ulyanov hoped his presentation would lead to more complete 
understanding for Russia's "partners." 
 
¶5. (SBU) Ulyanov's comments were accompanied by an awkwardly 
produced multimedia presentation that included video news 
reports from unidentified networks and what appeared to be 
footage taken from cellular telephones or other hand-held 
cameras.  He had repeated difficulties in synchronizing the 
presentation to his narrative. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Ulyanov said Georgia began planning to expel all 
South Ossetians immediately after the "Rose revolution." Many 
South Ossetians did flee to Russia.  Georgia began arming 
itself in anticipation of an attack on South Ossetia. 
Ulyanov displayed a table showing exports of tanks, APCs, 
artillery, air defense systems, and military aircraft to 
Georgia from Ukraine and the Czech Republic.  Georgia, he 
continued, has omitted from their comments details of their 
preparations for attacking South Ossetia.  These included the 
movement of shock troops, artillery, and armor to the zone of 
 
USOSCE 00000221  002 OF 007 
 
 
conflict, increased reconnaissance flights over South 
Ossetia, and finally the movement of about 12,000 troops by 
truck into the area by August 7.  Georgian peacekeeping 
troops left the Joint Peacekeeping Force headquarters just 
before the attack commenced on Tskhinvali. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Georgia hoped the opening of the Beijing Olympics 
would divert international attention from its attack on South 
Ossetia.  There was no Russian provocation of this attack and 
there was certainly no attack by Russian armored forces that 
required a Georgian "response." 
 
Georgian Atrocities 
------------------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) Russia went on to charge that Georgia deliberately 
targeted civilians and civil institutions like hospitals, 
parliament buildings, and schools in Tskhinvali.  Georgia 
destroyed most of the "old town" there, including the "Jewish 
quarter."  Georgia used multiple-launcher rocket systems 
(MLRS) with cluster munitions against civilian targets.  The 
result was a "humanitarian catastrophe" with 34,000 people 
trying to flee the war but unable to escape because Georgia 
had destroyed roads and transport facilities.  There were no 
medical facilities, food, or water because of Georgia's 
destruction of civilian infrastructure.  Ulyanov claimed the 
Georgian military called the attack on Tskhinvali "Operation 
Clear Field."  He later showed a video that he said depicted 
a Georgian armored vehicle firing on civilian dwellings in 
Tskhinvali.  The identity of the camera operator or the 
vehicle he was riding was unclear. 
 
¶9. (SBU) Georgia also attacked Russian peacekeepers in South 
Ossetia.  These attacks and other instances of unusual 
brutality, to include the mutilation of corpses, were being 
investigated by Russian criminal prosecutors. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Russia had warned it could not remain idle while 
its nationals and other civilians were attacked in South 
Ossetia.  While Georgia and the U.S. viewed Russia's warning 
as a threat, Russia's calls for an agreement to the non-use 
of force were ignored.  Russian forces were in control of the 
south end of the Roki tunnel by the morning of August 8 and 
their 58th Army Group and 135th Motorized Rifle Division 
moved into the region the same day.  Russian aircraft 
attacked Georgian radar and other military targets. 
President Medvedev explained Russia's response as 
necessitated by Georgian aggression in violation of 
international obligations, citing the UN Charter recognition 
of the right of self-defense.  Russian forces provided 
humanitarian assistance to civilians as part of their 
response to the Georgian attack. 
 
¶11. (SBU) Ulyanov noted that "our partners have reprimanded 
us for our disproportionate use of force."  This, he said, 
implied some use of force was legitimate.  But how should 
"disproportionate" be defined, e.g., in comparison with the 
NATO air campaign in Kosovo.  Russia used force with maximum 
restraint but sufficient to stop the aggressor.  Russia 
admits that some civilians suffered as a result, but blame 
for that rests with the Saakashvili regime and its "criminal 
stunt." 
 
Who Knew the Russians Watched Fox News? 
 
USOSCE 00000221  003 OF 007 
 
 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶12. (SBU) Showing satellite or aerial photographs of 
Tskhinvali and Gori, Ulyanov claimed they showed the massive 
amount of civilian infrastructure damage caused by Georgia in 
Tskhinvali and the limited damage caused by the Russians in 
Gori.  He also showed an excerpt of an interview on the 
U.S.-based Fox news network of a 12-year old American girl 
and her aunt, who were both in South Ossetia during the 
August war and praised the Russian forces for saving them 
from the Georgian attackers.  The aunt spoke English with a 
Russian accent. 
 
Russia Complains of Press Cynicism 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶13. (SBU) Ulyanov described as "cynical" a CNN report that 
was captioned "Russia invades Georgia."  He said a "code of 
conduct" was needed for media covering local conflicts to 
prevent mass disinformation. 
 
¶14. (SBU) A military officer on the Russia delegation, showed 
a power point presentation that he said had been captured 
from retreating Georgian forces.  He described the slides as 
the operational plans for the August Georgian attack on South 
Ossetia.  The captions on the slides were apparently in 
Georgian but had been transliterated into Latin script.  The 
officer claimed Georgia had begun planning for the attack in 
2006, which could in no sense be described as "spontaneous." 
 
Georgia Places the War in Context 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶15. (SBU) Georgia (Giorgadze) said it would defer a complete 
reply to Russian accusation until the September 24 FSC.  The 
Russia presentation, although carefully prepared, was 
unconvincing.  It was "disgraceful propaganda" and almost 
entirely untrue.  Russia's title, "the Events of August 
7-12," was significant as it omitted the larger context.  The 
Russian invasion of Georgia was just the tip of an iceberg. 
Russia had ignored or rejected Georgia's peace proposals from 
2004 on, including the proposal endorsed by the 2005 OSCE 
ministerial in Ljubljana.  Russia lifted the arms embargo of 
South Ossetia in March.  Russia established "illegal" links 
with South Ossetia and Abkhazia in April.  Russia shot down a 
Georgian UAV.  Assassination attempts were made against 
Georgian officials.  Russia conducted large-scale military 
exercises in July immediately adjacent to its border with 
Georgia. 
 
¶16. (SBU) Giorgadze said the separatists had rejected the 
German or "Steinmeier" peace plan.  Separatist militias had 
shelled Georgian villages and their weapons were provided 
through the Roki tunnel, including large-caliber artillery in 
violation of the 1992 peace settlement. 
 
¶17. (SBU) Georgia had called for peace negotiations on August 
5 and 7 but the Russian representative to the JCC did not 
even attend the meetings.  The separatists continued illegal 
military operations even after the cease-fire agreement. 
Ethnic cleansing of Georgians in the now-occupied areas 
continues.  Giorgadze said the "empire of evil's" actions are 
similar to those of the Soviet Union in its invasions of 
Hungary and Czechoslovakia after World War Two. 
 
USOSCE 00000221  004 OF 007 
 
 
 
Georgia Says Russia Prepared for War 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶18. (SBU) Giorgadze said Georgia made no secret of its 
rearming, required after it became truly independent with the 
"Rose revolution."  He recalled Georgia tried to bring 
international attention to new Russian and separatist 
military facilities in South Ossetia and Abkhazia.  Georgia 
has only four brigades, one of which was involved in the 
August events while two were stationed near Abkhazia and the 
fourth had been in Iraq.  While Russia comments on the 
several days needed to deploy the Georgian brigade from Gori 
to the zone of conflict, it does not explain how it was able 
to deploy an entire army group in a few days without 
extensive advanced preparation.  He referred to the media 
report of intercepted cellular telephone conversations that 
suggest a large Russian armored column had been moved through 
the Roki tunnel before August 8. 
 
¶19. (SBU) As to the "captured" operational plans in the power 
point, Giorgadze observed that military staffs are charged 
with preparing plans for all contingencies and Russia had not 
established that the plans displayed were actually those used 
by Georgia in August. 
 
EU to Send Monitors 
------------------- 
 
¶20. (SBU) France (Simonet), on behalf of the EU, welcomed 
Russia's implementation of the September 9 agreement and the 
withdrawal of its forces to their lines prior to the outbreak 
of hostilities.  The EU will send 200 observers who will 
begin deploying no later than October 1.  The EU called for a 
peaceful and lasting solution to the conflict based on 
international principles of sovereignty and territorial 
integrity.  The EU called for an inquiry into the conflict 
and has appointed an official to lead it.  The EU will donate 
500 million euros for the 2008-2010 reconstruction of the 
region. 
 
U.S. Calls Russia to Comply with Cease-fire 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶21. (SBU) The U.S. (Neighbour) called for Russia to observe 
the cease fire agreement and cooperate with the OSCE in 
restoring peace and stability to Georgia.  He described 
Russian actions after August 7 as "disproportionate." 
 
Who Armed Georgia? 
------------------ 
 
¶22. (SBU) Russia (Ulyanov), with regard to Georgia's upcoming 
presentation on September 24, said the question of who armed 
Georgia should be also discussed.  Also, why was it 
legitimate to recognize Kosovo but not South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia.  Ulyanov said Georgia's offensive was long- and 
well-prepared.  Georgia also planned to invade Abkhazia, but 
Russia was able to deter this by moving a division there. 
The support Georgia receives from others only encourages it 
to make more attacks. 
 
¶23. (SBU) The chair condemned the violence in the region and 
called for full implementation of the cease-fire.  He called 
 
USOSCE 00000221  005 OF 007 
 
 
on all sides to protect civilians, facilitate humanitarian 
assistance, and allow the return internally displaced 
persons.  The CiO (Finland) and the Council of Europe are 
assessing the state of human rights and compliance with the 
OSCE political-military acquis in the region. 
 
¶24. (SBU) Note:  Separately, the chair (Kangaste) informed 
the U.S. delegation that Russia will make a presentation on 
arms transfers to Georgia on October 1.  End note. 
 
OSCE Pol-Mil Activities in Bosnia 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶25. (SBU) Brig General (retired) Ulrich Heider (Germany), 
director of the Department of Security Cooperation at the 
OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), reported on 
current political-military activities.  Heider described the 
three main programs as support to the Dayton Article IV arms 
control implementation; elimination of excess SALW and 
ammunition and improved stockpile management; and defense 
reform, particularly through outreach and awareness-raising 
events on the democratic control of the armed forces with BiH 
parliamentarians.  Heider said surplus ammunition was an 
immediate and critical issue if BiH is to avoid further depot 
explosions.  He said efforts to control small arms in 
civilian hands were not very successful.  His department was 
assisting in the drafting of legislation to address the 
issue. 
 
¶26. (SBU) The U.S. (Neighbour) praised OSCE efforts in BiH, 
particularly in helping BiH to implement the OSCE acquis as 
found in the Code of Conduct and the Documents on SALW and 
conventional ammunition. 
 
Cyber Security 
-------------- 
 
¶27. (SBU) In the working group, Estonia (Tiigimae), sponsor 
with Lithuania of a proposal for an information exchange and 
workshop on cyber security (FSC.DEL/125/08/Rev.1), explained 
that the workshop could include a threat analysis, "good" 
practices, the roles of states and their armed forces, the 
private sector, and the individual.  Tiigimae anticipated a 
broad discussion of cyber security across all OSCE dimensions 
resulting in norm- and standard-setting in the workshop.  He 
also suggested a draft ministerial decision to endorse any 
FSC decision taken.  The questionnaire for the information 
exchange could be developed at or after the workshop. 
 
¶28. (SBU) Turkey, Germany, Denmark, and Austria supported the 
proposal and recommended the draft decision include more 
details, specifically the agenda and modalities for the 
workshop.  Luxembourg (Pilot), urging dispatch, recommended 
deleting operative paragraph 1 on the information exchange 
and calling for a workshop in the first half of 2009 vice 
"within the next twelve months."  Ireland, Switzerland, 
Slovenia, and Sweden preferred a workshop before the 
information exchange.  The chair (Kangaste), in response to 
the U.S., said a joint workshop with the Permanent Council 
(PC) was not expected but he would share information with the 
relevant PC committees. 
 
SALW 
---- 
 
USOSCE 00000221  006 OF 007 
 
 
 
¶29. (SBU) The FSC coordinator for small arms and light 
weapons (SALW), UK Colonel Steve Hartnell, described ongoing 
work in: 
 
- Tajikistan: phase 2 on physical security and related 
training will close in late 2008 or early 2009. 
 
- Belarus: the pilot phase of a joint project with UNDP to 
improve stockpile management will conclude in late 2008.  A 
donors' visit in May confirmed progress.  The next phase, to 
start in 2009, will be based on a revised implementation plan 
that reflects increased contributions from Belarus, although 
pS funding is needed.  There will be an informal meeting soon 
to discuss a donors' visit. 
 
- Kyrgyzstan: an assessment visit is planned for October in 
response to the Kyrgyz request for assistance.  Funding is 
needed. 
 
Conventional Ammunition 
----------------------- 
 
¶30. (SBU) FSC coordinator for stockpiles of conventional 
ammunition (SCA), Danish Lt Col Nils Petersen, reported on 
projects in: 
 
- Kazakhstan: an assessment visit was conducted September 
8-10, the report of which would be available soon. 
 
- Kyrgyzstan:  an assessment visit in September in response 
to the Kyrgyz 2004 request for assistance in destroying 
SALW/SCA and improving stockpile management and security 
recommended OSCE help in re-establishing the Kyrgyz 
ammunition testing laboratory.  The project is budgeted at 
200,000 euros and donors are needed. 
 
- Montenegro: a donors' visit is planned for October 21-23. 
Meetings are scheduled with the defense minister, armed 
forces chief of staff, the OSCE mission, and project sites. 
 
Code of Conduct 
--------------- 
 
¶31. (SBU) The FSC coordinator for the Code of Conduct, 
Austrian Colonel Anton Eischer, laid out the autumn plan of 
work on the revised Code Questionnaire (FSC.DEL/98/08/Rev.3): 
 
- an informal meeting on October 3 to discuss still pending 
proposals; 
 
- followed by circulation of the final revised draft, to be 
discussed at the October 15 working group A; 
 
- and subsequent distribution of a draft decision for 
approval in the working group action by the plenary before 
the ministerial conference at the end of November. 
 
¶32. (SBU) GUIDANCE REQUEST:  Mission request guidance/edits 
on the revised Code Questionnaire draft decision for use at 
the October 3 meeting.  This may be the last appropriate time 
to voice our concerns without appearing obstructionist. 
 
 
 
USOSCE 00000221  007 OF 007 
 
 
Landmine/ERW Food-for-Thought 
----------------------------- 
 
¶33. (SBU) Turkey generally supports the 
German/French/Slovenian Food-for-Thought paper on landmines 
and explosive remnants of war (ERW) (FSC.DEL/126/08) but 
wants to avoid duplication of work done by other 
organizations.  As Turkey is not a signatory to Protocol V of 
the Convention on Conventional Weapons it would to delete 
reference to it in the paper.  The U.S. and Azerbaijan noted 
they were not signatories to the Ottawa Convention.  The U.S. 
and Sweden also urged avoidance of duplication. 
 
Next Meeting 
------------ 
 
¶34. (SBU) The next FSC meeting will be on September 24.  The 
Security Dialogue will feature presentations by the Swiss 
foreign ministry on the Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence 
and Development and by Georgia on its conflict with Russia. 
FINLEY