VZCZCXYZ0010
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUNV #0523/01 2691148
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 251148Z SEP 08
FM USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8445
INFO RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL IMMEDIATE 0215
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 0103
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 0690
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 0578
RUEHCP/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN 0039
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0193
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1008
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0765
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 0301
RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO 0064
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0863
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0340
RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 0123
RUEHTC/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE 0179
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0583
RUEHVI/AMEMBASSY VIENNA 1237
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 0051
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 0242
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1331
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS

C O N F I D E N T I A L UNVIE VIENNA 000523 
 
SIPDIS 
 
ROME PASS TO FAO 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/19/2028 
TAGS: AF AS AU CA EAID FR IT KCRM NL NO PREL
PTER, SNAR, TU, UK, UN, SW, NATO 
SUBJECT: VIENNA'S FRIENDS OF AFGHANISTAN ON COMPACT AND 
WAYS FORWARD 
 
REF: A. STATE 99177 
     ¶B. UNVIE 504 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Gregory Schulte, reasons 1.4 (B) and (D). 
 
 ---------- 
SUMMARY 
------------ 
 
1.(SBU)  The Friends of Afghanistan in Vienna had a first 
meeting, chaired by Italian ambassador Gianni Ghisi, on 
September 17.  Afghan Charge Wahid Monawar gave an update on 
the 2006 Afghanistan Compact.  While citing progress, he 
pointed out challenges in transportation, energy, 
agriculture, rural development, counter-narcotics and 
anti-corruption.  UNODC Executive Director Antonio Costa 
briefed the Group on the Afghanistan opium survey, noting the 
overall rising trend of opium cultivation in the period 
2002-2008, despite a 19 percent decline in hectares 
cultivated in 2008.  He pressed for a five-pillar strategy: 
development assistance, better use of the PRTs, 
implementation of UNSC resolutions 1735, and 1822 to list 
drug traffickers (as well as Taliban and Al-Qaida supporters) 
and UNSCR 1817 to target precursor, destruction of high-value 
targets such as labs, markets and convoys, and strengthening 
trilateral cooperation (Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan). 
UNODC's Independent Evaluation Unit (IEU) chief Backson 
Sibanda briefed on the evaluation his office conducted of 
UNODC's Afghanistan operations.  In sum, the evaluation 
called for better coordination within UNODC, between UNODC 
and other UN agencies in Afghanistan, and for UNODC to find 
niches for its programs there. France noted the importance of 
implementing the precursor recommendation from the June 12 
Paris Conference on Afghanistan.  Turkey noted its 
contributions to Afghanistan in the areas of security, 
health, and education.  Sweden emphasized the importance of 
UNODC to coordinate with UN entities and with donor 
countries, and the need to work in niche areas. A number of 
countries echoed this view. 
 
¶2.  (U) Ambassador delivered Ref A points on the Compact and 
on Costa's briefing.   Ambassador offered to host the next 
meeting in mid-November, and noted precursors and the UN 
Convention against Corruption (UNCAC, also known as the 
Merida Convention) had been mentioned as possible agenda 
items.  The USG also proposed that UNODC brief on the 
implementation of the IEU evaluation.  The Friends accepted 
Ambassador's offer to host the next meeting.  END SUMMARY. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
THE AFGHAN COMPACT: PLUSES, MINUSES AND THE FUTURE 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶3.  (C) Afghan Charge Wahid Monawar began his presentation by 
saying that his government identified Pakistan as a problem 
six years ago, but "nobody" paid attention to that then. He 
described the dangers on the road from Kabul to Jalalabad, 
and the "infestation" of Farah province with Iranian 
elements.  He highlighted the successes in meeting some of 
the Compact benchmarks.  The Afghan National Army has grown 
to 63,397 men in March 2008 (against the benchmark of 
80,000).  Their operational capability has also risen, as 13 
of the 36 battalions can perform operations with the support 
of coalition forces.  There has also been progress in 
programs for the  National Assembly, health, education, and 
national solidarity.   More specifically, he cited 
reconstruction of targeted regional roads as being 52 percent 
complete, school enrollment as having risen to 75 percent for 
 
boys, and 46 percent for girls, basic health care coverage as 
having "reached 85 percent."  The Parliament passed more laws 
(18) last year, the number of lawyers doubled to 400, and the 
economy continued to grow at over 6 percent. 
 
¶4.  (SBU)  Despite these successes, he listed factors 
limiting implementation of the Compact.  These include the 
deteriorating security situation, the increasing dominance of 
the opium economy, the fragility of the licit economy, 
corruption and ineffective management of aid. He considered 
poor transportation infrastructure, low level of electric 
power, declining agriculture, ineffective alternative 
development projects as all contributing to failures to curb 
poppy cultivation.  He underscored that 80% of the Afghan 
population live in rural areas.  Yet agriculture was on the 
decline because of poor infrastructure and residual land 
mines.  He stated that 7 million Afghans are threatened by 
hunger.  He urged the international community to buy Afghan 
agricultural products.  He expressed outrage at a news report 
that $9 million of potatoes were flown into Afghanistan, a 
crop he was sure that Afghan farmers could grow.  He 
attributed the slow progress in eradication to "inadequate" 
cooperation between the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry 
of Counter-narcotics, "inadequate" equipment and funding, and 
"tentative" Afghan army protection of counter-narcotics 
efforts.  And although the first infantry unit of the Counter 
Narcotics "Kandak" (battalion) was established in March 2008 
under the Counter-Narcotics Trust Fund, the battalion had not 
accomplished more eradication. 
 
¶5.  (SBU)  Monawar underscored corruption as a "significant 
and growing problem" in Afghanistan, noting that the country 
was ranked 172nd out of 179 countries by Transparency 
International. He described progress in this area in the past 
year as "little, if any."  And despite GOA's recent 
ratification of the UN Convention against Corruption (UNCAC), 
Monawar seemed pessimistic about its implementation. He 
noted "an unclear policy and legal framework," the lack of 
political leadership, and the "lack of capacity and clarity 
of functions in the different 'integrity promotion' 
institutions."  He pointed out that the five-year Afghan 
National Development Strategy (ANDS), submitted to the 
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank in the spring, 
and presented to the international community at the June 12 
Paris Conference, includes an anti-corruption strategy. 
However, he questioned how the Strategy would address issues 
on institutional linkages, reporting lines, responsibilities 
in corruption prevention, investigation, prosecution, 
education and coordination. He said the $21 million in aid 
the donors pledged in Paris would be used to implement the 
Strategy, and that it would be done in collaboration with 
UNAMA.  He concluded his presentation by reaffirming the 
GOA's commitment to "intensify actions to combat corruption." 
 
----------------------- 
COSTA'S RECOMMENDATIONS 
----------------------- 
 
¶6. (U) UNODC Executive Director Costa was invited to speak at 
the second hour of the meeting.  He mentioned his own efforts 
to mobilize a large group of "Friends," the World Bank and 
the Asian Development Bank, as well as the media, to promote 
development in Afghanistan.  He expressed satisfaction that 
the media now cite UNODC as a source on Afghanistan 
counter-narcotics.  He also referred to his immediate trip to 
Paris to brief the French Senate on Afghanistan.  He said it 
was important for UNODC to reach beyond the executive branch 
of countries.  He briefed the Friends Group on the challenges 
 
and priorities regarding the opium situation in Afghanistan 
in 2008-2009.  His presentation was based on his earlier 
briefings to Vienna ambassadors and to NATO in Brussels.  For 
the Friends, he recommended a five-pillar strategy to fight 
narcotics in Afghanistan: 
 
(i)  development assistance 
(ii) better use of PRTs 
(iii)  implementing UN Security Council resolutions 1735 and 
1822 
(iv) destroying high-value targets such as labs, markets, and 
convoys 
(v) strengthening trilateral cooperation (Afghanistan, 
Pakistan, and Iran) 
 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
URGENT, VISIBLE, MASSIVE DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶7.  (U)  As he had previously told Ambassador (Ref B), Costa 
repeated his call for "urgent, visible, and massive" 
development assistance to poppy-free northern Afghanistan in 
order to help farmers decide against poppy planting in the 
current season that will last through November.  He 
underlined that offering the farmers one dollar of assistance 
now would be more valuable than offering them hundreds of 
dollars later (after the planting season), especially in the 
three vulnerable provinces (one of them is Nangarhar). He 
explained that development assistance to the countryside has 
come from the CNTF (Counter-Narcotics Trust Fund), GPI (Good 
Performers' Initiative), and the NSF (National Solidarity 
Fund), the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, and 
bilaterally.  He described the World Bank assistance, in 
"hundreds of millions" of dollars, as "excellent."  He also 
advocated food assistance, from the World Food Program and 
from bilateral aid, to Afghan cities, noting there were 
extended food riots in March and April. He also said it was 
important for the international community to buy wheat grown 
in Afghanistan. 
 
---------------------- 
BETTER USE OF THE PRTs 
---------------------- 
 
¶8.  (U) Costa proposed "embedding" counter-narcotics capacity 
into the PRTs.  He said that reconstruction should move away 
from social activities, and the teams should work to develop 
understanding of the narcotics situation in the provinces. 
He stated that he had made the same recommendation in his 
briefing to NATO. 
 
------------------------- 
UNSCR 1735,1822, AND 1817 
------------------------- 
 
¶9.  (U)  Costa urged the implementation of UNSCR 1735 
(December 2006), UNSCR 1822 (June 2008) and UNSCR 1817 (June 
2008). The first two resolutions encourage states to submit 
for listing names of individuals and entities that support 
Al-Qaida and the Taliban, and others who are associated with 
them through the cultivation, production and trafficking of 
narcotic drugs and their precursors. Costa lamented that not 
a single name had been added to the list, and pointed out 
that such names should not just be from Afghanistan, but also 
from neighboring countries.  Regarding UNSCR 1817 (June 2008) 
targeting precursors in Afghanistan and the region, Costa 
highlighted that Afghanistan is only seizing 20 to 25 percent 
of the precursors entering the country.  He showed 
 
photographs of border truck stops through which, for lack of 
government control, huge amounts of chemicals, fuel, and 
other goods are smuggled into the country. 
 
----------------------------- 
DESTROYING HIGH-VALUE TARGETS 
----------------------------- 
 
¶10.  (U)  As he had done previously in Vienna and Brussels, 
Costa pressed again for NATO forces to destroy high-value 
targets such as labs, markets and convoys.  He showed a photo 
of a lab operating in Pakistan within 800 meters of the 
Afghan border.  He also pointed out weapons seizures in 
border towns, implying that CN operations could help to 
uncover weapons smuggling as well. 
 
----------------------- 
TRILATERAL COOPERATION 
----------------------- 
 
¶11.  (U) Costa highlighted UNODC's Triangle Trilateral 
Initiative which calls for CN cooperation among Afghanistan, 
Iran, and Pakistan.  He described the Initiative as a way to 
strengthen cross-border cooperation in drug control, build 
confidence and increase information exchange, and build 
bridges with other relevant initiatives.  He listed a number 
of UNODC projects in the three countries, many of which are 
on border control.  (Note:  The Afghan Ministry of the 
Interior refused to participate in a trilateral meeting in 
Tehran in early May.  Earlier Afghan Charge Monawar had also 
expressed reservation about working with Pakistan and Iran. 
End Note.)  In response to Afghan charge's question about how 
to make the Initiative work, Costa claimed that the three 
countries were in agreement on CN, but not necessarily on 
cross-border cooperation for Iran-Afghanistan and 
Pakistan-Afghanistan. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
EVALUATION OF UNODC'S AFGHANISTAN PROGRAM 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶12.  (U) UNODC'S Independent Evaluation Unit (IEU), headed by 
Backson Sibanda, recently completed a detailed evaluation of 
UNODC's activities in Afghanistan.  Like Afghan Charge 
Monawar, Sibanda's evaluation took note of weak government 
capacity, widespread corruption, poor security as among the 
challenges in Afghanistan.  In addition, he pointed out the 
lack of coordination between donors, UN agencies, and 
government departments as a great challenge.  His 
presentation comprised specific recommendations in the areas 
of alternative livelihood, rule of law, law enforcement, drug 
demand reduction, and illicit crop monitoring.  Overall, he 
recommended that UNODC should partner strategically with 
UNAMA in its CN efforts, should form complementary 
partnerships with other UN entities (UN Delivering as ONE) in 
order to avoid duplication, and should look for niches where 
it can best leverage its limited resources.  Sibanda urged 
UNODC to play a greater role in research and advocacy, 
because of its experience in these areas. 
 
----------------- 
HOW TO COORDINATE 
----------------- 
 
¶13.   (C) Ambassador delivered Ref A points on the importance 
of the Compact, the cross-cutting nature of 
counter-narcotics, and the importance of incentives and 
disincentives in implementing development strategy. 
 
Referring to the IEU report, Swedish Ambassador Lundborg 
spoke about the importance of coordination, which he found 
lacking among UN entities and among the bilateral donors.  He 
also underscored the importance of coordinating with NATO, 
which in his opinion, was doing "nothing" on 
counter-narcotics.  He described UNODC as a "small player" in 
Afghanistan, and therefore it should find niches where it 
could be most effective.  He considered corruption a problem 
to be tackled "in a global sense,"  criticized the lack of 
political will, and announced that Sweden would increase its 
forces in Afghanistan.  He said he had proposed to his State 
Secretary to send such forces to the south of Afghanistan. 
Italian Ambassador Ghisi echoed this point about 
coordination. 
 
¶14.  (SBU)  Norwegian Ambassador Johansen asked how best to 
pursue coordination.  Costa expressed frustration that the 
UNODC had been promoting coordination unsuccessfully for 40 
years.  He said members of the senior executive body of the 
UN had never disagreed on coordination, but the operational 
and field-levels had always fought.  In his opinion, the 
challenge is to transmit this need for coordination to the 
junior level.  He said that the Secretary General is working 
hard on this issue.  He also noted that the Afghan government 
needs to coordinate.  He referred to the monitoring board in 
Kabul chaired by UNAMA chief Kai Eide and Afghanistan's 
Deputy President.  He described that as coordination "by 
attitude."  He highlighted the UNODC tool ADAM (Automated 
Donor Assistance Mechanism) which tracks every UNODC project 
in Afghanistan, as a practical way for donors to learn what 
UNODC is doing in-country. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
DEVELOPMENT RATHER THAN ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶15.  (U)  French ambassador Deniau asked what role Vienna 
could play in advancing alternative development in 
Afghanistan, which he said was a key issue in the June Paris 
conference.  Costa replied that he wanted to promote 
"development" rather than "alternative development," since 
the root causes for Afghanistan's problems are poverty and 
instability.  He said that UNODC could play a "coordination 
role," in raising awareness among aid institutions such as 
the World Bank, in establishing development priorities, and 
in convincing UNODC member states on the importance of 
development. 
 
------------------------------------- 
EXPANDING UNODC'S AFGHANISTAN OFFICE 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶16.  (SBU)  Costa added his thoughts on expanding the UNODC 
office in Kabul.  He said that the office chief position 
would be upgraded from a D-1 to a D-2.  He had discussed this 
with UNAMA chief Eide who, according to Costa, endorsed the 
idea, and would be willing to have his home office in New 
York, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), fund 
the new D-2 position.  Costa envisioned the incumbent as a 
special advisor to Eide, as well as a special advisor on 
counter-narcotics to President Karzai.  In addition, Costa 
plans to double the professional staff in Kabul from 6 to 12 
to increase capacity building and to increase the number of 
projects there. According to UNODC Operations Division 
Director Francis Maertens, UNODC would move six positions 
from other UNODC field office to Kabul. (Note: UNODC senior 
staff told Counselor that the D-2 position would not happen 
until summer of 2009 the earliest.  There is also some 
 
question if the existing 2008-2009 DPKO budget could 
accommodate funding a D-2 for UNODC.  End Note.)  Australia 
stressed the need to know the effectiveness of UNODC's 
projects before donors could support such expansion.  U.K. 
expressed the desire to see progress in the south, and to 
know how UNODC plans to tackle the IEU report 
 
¶17.  (U) Costa highlighted security as the major problem in 
the south, and the risk to UNODC staff, referring to his 
efforts to lobby for greater security for UNODC's small 
office in Kandahar.  He cited Samangan and another province 
with respectively less than 2000 and 3000 hectares of poppy 
cultivation, as prospective poppy-free provinces, if security 
could be strengthened. 
 
------------------------------- 
UN HAS NO ERADICATION POLICY 
------------------------------- 
 
¶18.  (SBU) In response to a question from the Netherlands on 
the mention of aerial spraying in his "El Pais" interview, 
Costa replied that UN had no eradication policy.   He was 
merely stating the facts in the interview: Colombia's success 
in having 165,000 hectares eradicated (aerially) in 2007, 
compared to 5,000 hectares (manually eradicated) in 
Afghanistan.  He reiterated the high financial and human 
costs for manual eradication in Afghanistan ($36,000 per 
hectare and one life lost).  He noted that technically, 
aerial spraying was more cost effective.  However, as long as 
the GOA opposes aerial spraying, he said, there would be no 
aerial spraying there. 
 
--------------------------- 
NEXT MEETING ON NOVEMBER 14 
--------------------------- 
 
¶19.  (U) Ambassador offered to host next Friends meeting on 
November 14.  French Ambassador Deniau suggested possible 
topics: implementation of the June 2008 Paris Conference 
decision on precursors, and the UN Convention against 
Corruption (also known as the Merida Convention).  He 
emphasized that continuity is important for the Group. 
Ambassador and his Canadian counterpart both agreed those 
could be specific issues for the Friends Groups to consider 
at the next or future meetings.  Counselor also suggested 
that UNODC could brief on its responses and actions to 
address the recommendations in the evaluation report. 
 
--------- 
Comment 
--------- 
 
¶20.  (SBU)  This initial meeting offered an opportunity for a 
fairly frank exchange of views on the situation in 
Afghanistan, as was envisioned originally by the Afghan 
Charge.  He was explicit in criticizing the weaknesses of his 
government (e.g., lack of cooperation between ministries, 
corruption).  The meeting also afforded the Friends a chance 
to do some frank questioning of UNODC's operations in 
Afghanistan.  It was Norway's suggestion to invite the 
outgoing IEU chief to brief on his evaluation of UNODC's 
Afghanistan operations.  His presentation stimulated some 
interesting remarks, and could lead to better coordination 
among the Friend's governments in their assistance to 
Afghanistan.  Our hope is that the Group could eventually 
prod some concrete actions that would benefit UNODC, 
Afghanistan, and the international donor community.  We will 
be soliciting ideas for future agenda items and would welcome 
 
any input from Washington or Embassy Kabul.  End Comment. 
SCHULTE