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DE RUEHUNV #0511/01 2601736
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O 161736Z SEP 08
FM USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8421
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE 0730
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN IMMEDIATE 0686
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 1000
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 0761
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 0857
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 1323
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY

S E C R E T UNVIE VIENNA 000511 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR ISN/RA AND IO/T 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/15/2018 
TAGS: AORC IAEA KNNP IR
SUBJECT: IAEA/IRAN: P5+1 WILL TAKE CUES FROM POLDIRS ON 
BOARD RESOLUTION 
 
REF: UNVIE 494 AND PREVIOUS 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Gregory L. Schulte for 
reasons 1.4 b and d 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1. (C) In a German-hosted P5 1 Ambassadors meeting on 
September 16, no members of the group were instructed as to a 
possible Iran resolution at next week's IAEA Board meeting, 
and all awaited the scheduled September 19 5 1 Political 
Directors meeting for guidance.  While Germany appealed for a 
Board resolution, Russia and China seemed to discount the 
possibility of such a move.  Based on this and other 
consultations, Mission sees little scope for a successful 
Board effort short of a clear pre-decision at the political 
level to produce a resolution. 
 
¶2. German Ambassador Ludeking made a valiant attempt, 
rebuffed by Russia, to find commonality among P5 1 views and 
argue for concerted Board action in support of the 
Secretariat.  Rather than the broader diplomatic context of 
P5 1 negotiations, Ludeking enjoined P5 1 Ambassadors to 
focus on the task at hand in Vienna, namely the Board's 
response to the Director General's "disappointing" report and 
how to "stimulate" Iranian cooperation.  He also provided a 
readout of FM Steinmeier's discussions the day before with 
Iranian FM Mottaki, which went nowhere on nuclear issues. 
Russian Ambassador Zmeyevsky provided a "different" reading 
of the DG's report than the EU3 1, even expressing 
"understanding" of Iran's position on the "alleged studies." 
Ambassador Schulte rebutted these arguments, but Russia 
continued to discount the weaponization issue.  Chinese 
Ambassador Tang provided a measured reaction to the DG's 
report and expressed concern about the lack of substantive 
progress on activities with military dimension.  Seeking 
common ground, Germany suggested a short technical resolution 
reflecting the report to support the Secretariat.  Russia was 
not responsive to this and other EU3 arguments in support of 
a resolution, citing the failure (for which it was largely 
responsible) of past Board efforts to agree on a resolution. 
Ambassador Schulte made a final appeal for P5 1 unity on 
Iran, which Ludeking hoped could be demonstrated in the 
Board.  End Summary. 
 
DG Reports "Dead End" 
--------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) German Ambassador Ludeking opened the P5 1 meeting by 
providing a readout of FM Steinmeier's September 15 
discussions with Iranian FM Mottaki, which he characterized 
as disappointing and having gone nowhere on nuclear issues. 
Instead, Mottaki wanted to address Georgia and investment in 
Iran.  Focusing on the task at hand in Vienna, Ludeking 
sought input on IAEA Board aspects for the P5 1 PolDir 
meeting on September 19.  He explored the potential for Board 
action in the face of a disappointing DG report and the clear 
frustration of the Secretariat having reached a "dead end 
street."  More than gridlock or a stalemate, UK Ambassador 
Smith argued that the Secretariat's unequivocal report made 
clear Iran was to blame for the lack of progress. Ambassador 
Schulte agreed that the report was universally negative on 
all aspects of Iranian cooperation and called for sending an 
unambiguous message to Iran.  The issue was not one of 
gridlock but of roadblocks set up by Iran.  For France, 
"disappointment" was an understatement, and the report fueled 
a growing sense of urgency.  Not only was there no progress 
on anything, French DCM Gross noted, the report raised new 
elements and also enumerated specific pragmatic measures Iran 
could take.  It called for "more than business as usual" by 
the Board. 
 
Russia Discounts Weaponization 
------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) Russian and Chinese Ambassadors preferred to talk 
about the broader context of negotiations and defer 
decision-making to P5 1 PolDirs.  Both provided a more 
sanguine assessment of P5 1 talks with Iran, and noted 
positive contacts with the European Commission 
(Cooper-Velyati discussions) and the IAEA Secretariat. (Note: 
The EU Commission rep in Vienna clarified that the EU was 
still awaiting Iran's reaction to the P5 1 offer. End Note.) 
China also cited Ahmadinejad's meeting with President Hu 
Jintao during the Para-Olympics, and urged resumption of 
negotiations. 
 
¶5. (C) Regarding the DG's report, Russian Ambassador 
Zmeyevsky insisted on a less negative reading and cited, as 
an example, the non-diversion of declared nuclear material. 
He noted some progress and the need to influence the process 
positively.  Russia would have preferred more progress, but 
he counseled patience and expressed "understanding" for some 
of Iran's arguments on the access to the "alleged studies" 
documents and matters of national security.  These were the 
most difficult questions, he noted, and Iran was being asked 
to prove a negative.  Russia also underlined the need for 
Board consensus and questioned whether the Secretariat sought 
the Board's support.  Chinese Ambassador Tang was more 
measured in his comments, noting that China was still 
studying the DG's report, and counseling time and patience. 
There had been contacts between the Secretariat and Iran, 
talks and quite a few visits, he observed.  However, Tang 
expressed concern about the lack of substantive progress on 
activities with a military dimension.  He also reported 
Iranian Ambassador Soltineh's views on issues beyond the work 
plan and conventional areas beyond Agency's scope. 
 
¶6. (C) Ludeking discounted calls for patience on the part of 
the P5 1, noting that he had been working on the issue since 
2002 and patience had been the hallmark of EU3 endeavors, but 
was not reciprocated by Iran.  Ambassador Schulte further 
noted that Iran had been presented with information on 
weaponization since 2005, had dragged out the process through 
the work plan, and still refused to address it using access 
to the documents as an excuse. Iran had not even tried to 
explain itself, he argued, and "contacts" (leaving inspectors 
waiting in hotel rooms) do not constitute progress.  Rather, 
Iran's strategy in the Board was to question the credibility 
of the documents, the integrity of the inspectors and the 
mandate of the Agency on weaponizaiton.  Zmeyevsky did not 
agree with the U.S. assessment insisting that Iran had been 
confronted with concrete information on weaponization not 
long ago and that these were delicate issues for states to 
address. The fact that these were "alleged" studies indicated 
that wewere on shaky ground, he added. 
 
Seeking Common Ground 
--------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) Ludeking sought to focus the discussion on Board 
action noting that the Vienna P5 1 was not a forum to 
comprehensively discuss the Iran issue.  Common ground could 
be found, he offered, on the need to "stimulate Iran's 
cooperation with the Secretariat" and "doing something that 
was conducive to a peaceful outcome" as Russia and China had 
argued.  Despite the failure of previous efforts to get a 
resolution, Board action was appropriate at this time.  There 
was nothing positive in the report, he noted, and Iran had 
done only the bare minimum on its Safeguards obligations and 
nothing to comply with Board and UNSC obligations. Another 
commonality was to support the Secretariat's work and 
mandate. Ludeking proposed a brief resolution that reflected 
the language in the summary of the DG's report.  Within the 
narrow context of Vienna, the UK added that Board pressure 
(not just incentives) was one avenue for "stimulating 
cooperation" and we should not miss this opportunity as doing 
so would be a prescription for stalemate. 
 
¶8. (C) Zmeyevsky countered that the UNSC had already 
empowered the Secretariat with all it needed to pursue the 
investigation, and took issue with EU3 1 characterizations of 
the degree of Iranian cooperation, noting again that Iran 
cannot prove a negative.  He felt that the Board "taking note 
of" the Secretariat's report would be enough but would report 
the P5 1 discussion to capital.  Zmeyevsky all but rejected 
Ludeking's suggestion of a technical resolution by which the 
Board would express itself on the report and give a boost to 
the Secretariat.  Three past efforts for a resolution had 
failed, he observed, and "we must be realistic." 
 
¶9. (C) France noted that Paris had hoped for Vienna's input 
on a Board resolution for the PolDir discussions.   Although 
the P5 1 had failed in the past, there was language 
reflecting the report that should be acceptable to the P5 1. 
French DCM Gross also reported that the DG had told EU 
Missions that a consensus Board resolution would be useful. 
Zmeyevsky retorted that this was all a repeat of last time. 
Ludeking concluded that the P5 1 Ambassadors could not make a 
recommendation to PolDirs on a resolution, due to differing 
views on what would be appropriate.  He noted some points of 
commonality, including on supporting the Secretariat. 
Ambasassador Schulte made a final pitch for P5 1 unity and 
resolve on Iran, notwithstanding disagreements on Georgia, 
which Iran hoped to exploit to keep the pressure off. 
Ludeking hoped that there could be a demonstration of such 
unity in the Board. 
 
------------------------------ 
Bilateral Meeting with Chinese 
------------------------------ 
 
¶10. (C) Following the P5 1 meeting, Ambassador Schulte met 
privately with Chinese Ambassador Tang.  Ambassador Schulte 
reviewed some of the same argumentation for a resolution just 
covered in the broader meeting, and noted especially that 
Iran will be looking for differences amongst the 5 1 to 
exploit.  It is important, therefore, that we all stay on 
message stressing that the onus is squarely on Iran to meet 
its obligations to the IAEA and UNSC.  When queried on 
China's views as how best to prompt Iran to be positive, Tang 
rehearsed the same points as earlier, stressing that we must 
keep focus on "big picture" and take no action in Vienna that 
would set back our broader diplomacy.  The one new twist Tang 
offered is that perhaps we need "new ideas" for convincing 
Iran to move forward with the Agency, and offered the idea of 
a "a new work plan" at the IAEA as one possible example.  In 
response, Ambassador Schulte walked Tang through the history 
of Iranian efforts to use the previous work plan to draw out 
the IAEA process and delay consideration of the central 
weaponization issues; unfortunately, a new work plan would 
likely not be at all helpful. 
 
------------------------------ 
Sept. 15 "Like-Minded" meeting 
------------------------------ 
 
¶11. (C) Ambassador Schulte hosted a meeting of like-minded 
counterparts (EU3, Australia, Canada, Japan, Italy and New 
Zealand) just prior to the release of the Director General's 
Iran report on September 15.  Regarding a Board resolution on 
Iran, all like-minded thought the underlying imperative and 
rationale for a resolution would only be strengthened by the 
then-pending DG's report.  However, none of the like-minded 
had instructions and all deferred any decision to the EU3 3 
Political Directors meeting scheduled for later in the week. 
Absent a high-level decision to table a resolution, France 
said it would not engage further on a Board resolution in 
Vienna.  The like-minded anticipated that Russia would not be 
keen on a resolution, with Germany cautioning that while a 
Board resolution had value, this must be weighed against the 
cost of breaking Board consensus.  UK made similar comments. 
Canada, Japan and New Zealand discounted any chance of a 
meaningful consensus resolution; Australia was also generally 
negative on the prospect for a Board resolution.  Canada and 
Italy also noted, however, that the September Board would be 
the last chance to pursue a resolution before the Board 
composition changed next month.  (Note: After the September 
General Conference, Cuba, Egypt and Malaysia will be on the 
Board. End Note.) 
 
------------- 
Arabs/Others 
------------ 
 
¶12. (C) Ambassador Schulte also hosted a separate meeting 
with Arab group and NAM Ambassadors (Albania, Algeria, Egypt, 
Iraq, Malaysia, Morocco, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia) as well as 
the UK.  Quoting from the "Financial Times" article on this 
being the "most damning" report on Iran, Ambassador Schulte 
stressed the lack of progress and Iranian cooperation on any 
front.  The UK also underlined the dissatisfaction of the 
Secretariat with Iranian cooperation and the need for serious 
consideration of the weaponization information.  The first 
question from the group was whether a Board resolution was 
contemplated.  Morocco asked about the status of the P5 1 and 
Iranian offers and noted Iran's lack of cooperation with 
Agency and the need to respect Board and UNSC decisions. 
Algerian Ambassador Feroukhi(the next Board Chair) noted that 
most of the report focused on weaponization and tried to spin 
this as proof of Iran's responsivess to IAEA questions. 
Ambassador Schulte explained that this was not the case. 
Egypt cast the report in the context of "two Middle Easts" 
and the double-standard with Israel.  Finally, Pakistan asked 
why the weaponization documents could not be shared with 
Iran.  Overall, there seemed to be little movement on the 
part of Arab group and NAM positions.  We have also learned 
separately that the NAM statement to the Board on Iran will 
quote the July Tehran Ministerial Declaration. 
 
-------------------------- 
Comment and Recommendation 
-------------------------- 
 
¶13. (C) The rationale and imperative for Board action via a 
new resolution on Iran has only deepened in light of the 
Director General's report (septel).  But it is clear that the 
content of this latest report has not changed the Vienna 
dynamic on a prospective resolution.  Per the above, there 
seems strong consensus among the like-minded in Vienna that a 
clear P5 1 decision at the political level is a necessary 
precondition for beginning negotiations on a resolution text 
here.  Absent such instructions from the political-level, we 
can put the best face on strong national statements and by 
perhaps pursuing further action at the UNSC.  We can also use 
a possible Board resolution on Libya to generate points for 
our diplomacy and press guidance that hightlight the stark 
contrast between Iranian (and Syrian) and Libyan behavior, 
noting the different outcomes to date of the IAEA 
investigation and international reaction.  But another 
successful effort to push through a resolution on Iran that 
Russia opposes would not be helpful to our goal here of 
supporting the IAEA's investigation. 
SCHULTE