VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUNV #0504/01 2561442
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 121442Z SEP 08
FM USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8399
INFO RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL IMMEDIATE 0208
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNNAR/VIENNA NARCOTICS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 0048
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE PRIORITY 0239
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1320
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L UNVIE VIENNA 000504 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/11/2018 
TAGS: SNAR PREL NATO PTER AF UN
SUBJECT: TALIBAN TO BAN OPIUM IN AFGHANISTAN?? 
 
REF: A. STATE 97065 
     ¶B. STATE 97395 
     ¶C. STATE 96741 
     ¶D. UNVIE 478 
     ¶E. USNATO 321 
     ¶F. SMITH-NEVILLE EMAIL SEPTEMBER 2 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Gregory Schulte, for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D). 
 
 
-------- 
Summary 
--------- 
 
¶1.  (C) Ambassador delivered Ref A talking points on 
eradication to UNODC Executive Director Antonio Costa on 
September 11.  He urged Costa to clarify publicly UNODC's 
continuing support for a balanced, comprehensive eradication 
policy in Afghanistan.  Ambassador also highlighted USG 
support to amend the ISAF operating plan to interdict 
narcotics production and trafficking facilities (Refs B and 
C), a step that would coincide with Costa's recent advocacy 
for such action by NATO (Refs E and F).  Costa also indicated 
privately that aerial spraying would be the most effective 
method to eradicate poppy fields that run for "miles and 
miles" in the south of Afghanistan, although he emphasized 
that he could not speak out on such support, as long as the 
Afghan government opposes it.  He expressed great concern 
about the rumored Taliban plan to ban opium in the regions it 
controls, fearing that such a ban, if successful, would 
increase Taliban prestige, as well as the value of their 
opium stockpile, while encouraging the poppy-free north to 
return to opium cultivation. Costa expressed support for the 
informal Friends of Afghanistan group which will have its 
first meeting in Vienna on September 17 (Ref D), where Costa 
has been invited to speak. End Summary. 
 
---------- 
Demarche 
---------- 
 
¶2.  (C) Ambassador met with Costa on September 11 to deliver 
Ref A points.  Ambassador urged him to find an opportunity to 
clarify publicly that, contrary to press reports, the UNODC 
had not changed its eradication policy and it continues to 
pursue a comprehensive and balanced strategy that includes 
manual eradication.  Costa described the Financial Times 
article on this issue as containing a number of factual 
errors, misquoting the numbers he used, and including 
statements he did not make. He emphasized that he was merely 
pointing out the high financial and human cost of manual 
eradication. He said that a CNN interview (and also an El 
Pais interview) with him also cited him as supporting aerial 
eradication, when in fact he only compared Afghanistan's 
large, concentrated poppy fields today, covering "miles and 
miles," to  Colombia's situation in 2001. While he privately 
believed aerial eradication was the most effective tool under 
such circumstances, he could not speak out publicly to 
support aerial spraying in Afghanistan.  He said that he was 
being criticized from both sides, admitting that a European 
government had complained about his implicit support for 
aerial eradication in the two recent interviews. 
 
¶3.  (C) In a subsequent conversation, UNODC spokesperson 
Walter Kemp, who was at the meeting between Ambassador and 
Costa, told Counselor that Costa was quite explicit on aerial 
spraying in his CNN interview, which Kemp was still trying to 
track down.  He said that two or three countries are also 
seeking to have Costa clarify his position publicly.  Kemp 
believed that Costa could do this at the September 17 Friends 
of Afghanistan meeting.  Counselor pointed out to him that 
that is a small, informal venue, and Costa's clarification 
should have as a wide, public reach as the Financial Times or 
the CNN and El Pais reports.  Kemp took Counselor's point and 
agreed to talk to Costa about it. 
 
--------------------- 
UNAMA, Karzai, UNODC 
--------------------- 
 
¶4.  (C) Referring to his late August trip to Kabul, Costa 
mentioned his meetings with UNAMA chief Kai Eide and 
President Karzai.  He was very pleased with Eide, who "got it 
right" on drugs.  According to him, Eide has a very good 
relationship with Karzai who is sufficiently comfortable with 
him to seek his views on Afghan officials.  He said UNODC was 
upgrading its presence in Afghanistan, and hoped that its 
future chief there could become a de facto advisor to Karzai 
on counternarcotics. 
 
------------------------- 
ISAF and Counternarcotics 
------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C)  Costa told Ambassador that his September 3 briefing 
to NATO in Brussels was the same as the one he gave 
ambassadors in Vienna on September 2 (Refs E and F). At both 
he proposed six steps for NATO engagement on 
counternarcotics, i.e., destroying labs, markets and convoys, 
seizing precursor chemicals, listing major traffickers under 
UNSCR 1735/1822, supporting ANA and ANP's CN efforts, 
regaining the west (Nimroz, Zabul and Day Kundi), and 
enhancing border security.  Ambassador explained to Costa 
that the USG supports greater ISAF involvement in 
interdicting narcotics production and trafficking facilities, 
and that we understand that such efforts for a more active 
counternarcotics role for ISAF were being stymied by 
opposition from NATO's Military Committee, and from a number 
of member countries (Refs B and C).  Referring to a 
conversation with the NATO SecGen, Costa insisted that the UK 
was supportive, and that the main opponents in NATO were 
Germany, Netherlands and France.  He described France as a 
"surprise" to him, saying that he would take up this issue in 
Paris when he goes there next week for a EU-Central Asia 
conference. 
 
¶6.  (SBU)  NOTE:  Counselor earlier learned that Lt. General 
Karl Eikenberry, Deputy Chairman of NATO's Military 
Committee, met Costa for the first time during the latter's 
late August visit to Kabul.  On September 9, General 
Eikenberry visited UNODC in Vienna where he was briefed by 
UNODC staff on their Afghanistan activities.  According to 
our UNODC contacts, General Eikenberry expressed specific 
interest in the location of the drug labs, the trafficking 
routes, the opium markets, and the entry and exit points of 
the drug traffic.  END NOTE. 
 
 
----------------------- 
A Taliban Ban on Opium? 
----------------------- 
 
¶7.  (C) Costa repeated the concern he expressed in Brussels, 
and earlier in Vienna (Refs E and F), about a rumored Taliban 
ban on opium. He insisted on the reliability of his "rumors," 
saying that the information came from UNODC-affiliated 
sources, who saw flyers posted in Helmand and Nangarhar 
warning farmers against poppy cultivation. He speculated on 
the real motive behind such a ban, noting that it could be a 
way for the Taliban to increase the value of their existing 
opium stockpile, free up land for much needed wheat 
cultivation in the face of rising wheat prices and food 
shortage, and to win hearts and minds. In any case, he 
believed that the ban, if successful, would be a public 
relations coup for the Taliban and legitimize their status as 
a political power. The high price for opium a result of the 
ban could also tempt the now poppy-free north of Afghanistan 
to plant poppy again.  He noted that whether the ban was 
rumor or truth would be known in the next six weeks, when 
farmers would have to make planting decisions for the next 
season.  If it turned out to be the truth, he would have to 
involve UNAMA and Eide for the next steps.  He said he had 
already discussed this with Eide in Kabul, who had heard the 
"rumor," but had not formed any ideas for next steps.  Costa, 
mentioning his conversation with the World Bank, underscored 
the importance of "solidifying" the poppy-free gains in the 
north, i.e., through "very evident," "massive" development 
assistance to the region. 
 
------------- 
Comment 
------------- 
 
¶8.  (C) Part provocateur, part visionary, and part showman, 
Costa manages frequently to draw ire from member states on 
one issue or another.  However, we are impressed by the 
information UNODC gathers in Afghanistan, including in areas 
that the USG would find hard to penetrate.  Once he is in 
possession of any information, such as this "rumor" on the 
Taliban opium ban, he is already thinking of the next steps 
to be undertaken, if the "rumor" proves true.  Neither the 
man nor his office is perfect, but he provides good value, 
and he shares our strategic objective for a stable, drug-free 
Afghanistan. We urge Washington and Kabul to think through 
the implications of a Taliban opium ban, and provide us any 
thoughts that we can share with Costa.  End Comment. 
 
SCHULTE