VZCZCXRO3076
OO RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHSM #0625 2591457
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 151457Z SEP 08
FM AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3740
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 000625 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/15/2018 
TAGS: PGOV PREL GG SE RS EUN
SUBJECT: SWEDISH RESPONSE TO SEPTEMBER 15-16 GAERC DEMARCHE 
 
REF: A. A. STATE 96598 
     ¶B. B. STATE 95724 
 
Classified By: DCM ROBERT SILVERMAN FOR REASONS 1.4 (B & D) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: Sweden thinks there is little to fear from a 
Serbian request to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) 
to review the status of Kosovo, according to Hakan Emsgard, 
Deputy Director General of the EU Department at the MFA.  The 
case would languish there for years, he asserted.  Sweden 
supports EULEX operating in all parts of Kosovo, he stated, 
but the mission should ¬ go in with too much force.8  EU 
monitors in Georgia must have access to all parts of the 
country, but EU unity on this point is fragile.  Turkey must 
do more to improve relations with Cyprus if it is to get a 
positive review in next fall,s talks with the EU.  End 
Summary. 
 
Kosovo and the ICJ 
------------------ 
 
¶2. (C) On September 11, we met with the Deputy Director 
General of the EU Department, Hakan Emsgard, and delivered 
reftel GAERC demarches.  Emsgard confirmed press reports that 
Sweden does not oppose Serbia asking the ICJ to give an 
opinion on Kosovo's independence.  The rationale behind 
Sweden's position is that because &many UN members are 
against Kosovo's independence,8 we run the risk that a UN 
resolution will emerge against Kosovo's declaration of 
independence.  Such could prevent other countries from 
recognizing Kosovo.  By sending the case to the ICJ, &we 
would buy time8--an ICJ decision would take &a few years,8 
during which Serbia would settle down and turn westward, 
focusing its attention on EU accession.  POL Counselor pushed 
back, noting that a referral to the ICJ would introduce an 
element of uncertainty and possibly prevent other nations 
from recognizing Kosovo.  Emsgard agreed with these points, 
but thought the possibility of UNGA involvement in the issue 
was a potentially larger problem. 
 
EULEX and Serbia 
---------------- 
 
¶3. (C) Emsgard said Sweden,s position is that EULEX should 
have a mandate for all of Kosovo, including the Serb 
enclaves, but that if EULEX goes in with too much force it 
would raise the risk of more incidents like the violence in 
Mitrovica last March.  Enforcing the border regime with 
Serbia should be a priority and the West should continue its 
dialogue with the Serbian government. 
 
Georgia 
------- 
 
¶4. (C) Emsgard reiterated Sweden's position that the EU must 
send monitors to Georgia as soon as possible and that they 
should have access to all parts of the nation, including 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia.  He remarked that problems within 
the EU will likely result in little will to confront Russia 
on the latter point.  &EU unity is critical,8 he said, if 
it is to have an effect on Russia.  The EU should focus on 
rebuilding Georgia and protecting Saakashvili, he added, 
instead of harming Russia )-  especially since there are few 
effective instruments available to challenge Moscow. 
 
Turkey and Cyprus 
----------------- 
 
¶5. (C) Calling Cyprus the &key to the EU-NATO 
relationship,8 Emsgard said that if Turkey does not show 
concrete improvement on its relationship with Cyprus, its 
accession to the EU will be in danger.  He stated that Ankara 
must ease access for Cypriot vessels into Turkish ports 
before next fall,s third and final review of Turkey's 
adherence to its EU accession plan.  Emsgard stated that USG 
help in getting Turkey to be more &cooperative8 was 
crucial. 
WOOD