VZCZCXRO7458
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHC #0791/01 2640336
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 200332Z SEP 08
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI IMMEDIATE 2989
INFO RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 3150

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 STATE 100791 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/18/2018 
TAGS: UNSCR PREL GG
SUBJECT: GEORGIA - DEMARCHE REQUEST - ABKHAZ AND SOUTH 
OSSETIAN PARTICIPATION IN UN DISCUSSIONS 
 
REF: A) USUN 801 B) STATE 92731 C) USUN 835 
 
Classified By: IO Acting A/S Brian Hook for reasons 1.4 (b) and 
(d). 
 
¶1. (C) THIS IS AN ACTION REQUEST.  Posts, with the exception of 
Moscow, should approach host government at Foreign Minister/NSA 
or appropriately high level immediately to urge them to oppose 
participation by separatist leaders of Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia (Georgia) in UN Security Council discussions on Georgia. 
The United States believes that the international talks to be 
held on October 15 in Geneva provide the appropriate forum in 
which to hear from such leaders.  Participation by Abkhaz and 
South Ossetian separatist leaders in UN Security Council 
discussions would only be misused to further the campaign to 
legitimize declarations of independence by Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia. 
 
¶2. (C) Objectives 
   -------------- 
 
        -- Prevent the participation by representatives of 
separatist Abkhazia and South Ossetia in any Security Council 
meeting.  We do not want to in any way provide Russia or the 
separatist regimes ammunition to legitimize these regions' 
declarations of independence and Russia's recognition of their 
status. 
 
        -- Seek the commitment of the host government to vote "no" 
if the issue of the separatist leaders participation in a 
Security Council meeting comes to a procedural vote in the 
Council. 
 
        -- Seek host government views on Russia's proposed October 
Arria-style meeting, including Russia's proposal to extend the 
UNOMIG mandate under its current name in return for allowing 
such a meeting to take place.  Note our objection to the 
attendance of South Ossetians and Abkhaz representatives in 
those type of meetings and our concerns over UNOMIG discussions. 
 
¶3. (SBU)  Post should draw on the following guidance in 
discussions with host governments: 
 
        -- The appropriate venue to hear the concerns of the 
separatist leaders is the October 15 international meeting in 
Geneva provided for in the September 8 agreement mediated by the 
EU Presidency..  Moreover, the Geneva talks would meet the 
intent and goal of point six in the President Medvedev-adopted 
August 12 agreement for the "opening of international 
discussions on security and stability modalities in Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia."  UN Security Council discussions are not the 
appropriate venue in which to hear from the Abkhaz and South 
Ossetian leaders. 
 
        -- Inviting the separatist leaders of Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia to Security Council discussions would be used by Russia 
as part of its campaign to legitimize its recognition of the 
separatist regions, which is inconsistent with numerous UN 
Security Council resolutions, including most recently UNSCR 1808 
of April 2008.  Bolstering Russia's recognition by voting to 
invite the separatist leaders to the Security Council would set 
a dangerous precedent. 
 
        -- Before, during and after Russia's invasion of Georgia, 
the separatist leaders have also been complicit in the forced 
expulsion of the ethnic Georgian population from these regions, 
which continues to take place.  The South Ossetian separatist 
leaders explicitly stated that they do not intend to allow 
ethnic Georgian internally displaced persons (IDP) to return to 
their homes.  These constitute grave human rights abuses. Abkhaz 
separatist leaders have also stated that the return of all 
Georgian IDPs to Abkhazia is 'impossible.' 
 
        -- It is inappropriate to confer any legitimacy on the 
separatist regions or the deplorable actions of their separatist 
leaders.  Allowing such representatives to participate in UN 
Security Council discussions would not only be used to confer 
legitimacy on their independence claims and actions, but could 
also encourage leaders of other separatist groups to seek 
similar participation. 
 
        -- Just as the U.S. does not support the separatist 
leaders' participation in a Council meeting, it does not think 
that a Council meeting is the appropriate venue to hear Abkhaz 
and South Ossetian IDPs, or 'governments in exile.' 
 
STATE 00100791  002 OF 002 
 
 
 
        -- The Council must maintain a unified message on 
supporting Georgia's sovereignty and territorial integrity. 
 
        -- Russia's proposed Arria-style meeting is likely a tactic 
to secure additional votes for a formal Council meeting by 
arguing that the U.S. is thwarting the desire of some Council 
members to hear from the Abkhaz and South Ossetian separatist 
leaders.  Georgia has informed the United States that it no 
longer supports an Arria-style meeting that would include Abkhaz 
and South Ossetian separatist leaders.  As stated, the United 
States believes that the appropriate venue for these separatist 
leaders to present their views is the October 15 meeting in 
Geneva, where their presence will not be used to imply some form 
of recognition or legitimization. 
 
Background 
---------- 
 
¶4. (C) On August 28, 2008, during an emergency session of the UN 
Security Council, the Council agreed that the separatist leaders 
from Abkhazia and South Ossetia should be "heard by the Council 
at some opportune moment and under a formula to be decided."  We 
are seeking to prevent their participation in a meeting of the 
Council.  Their participation in a Security Council meeting 
would add legitimacy to Russia's recognition of the independence 
of these two regions. 
 
¶5. (C) Russia has informed Security Council members that it will 
invite 'foreign ministers' of the separatist regimes for an 
Arria-style meeting (an informal, and unofficial, meeting called 
by a member of the Security Council and held outside of Council 
chambers) on October 7 or 8.  Russia has also called for their 
participation in formal Council discussions related to the 
October 15 expiration of the UN Observer Mission in Georgia 
(UNOMIG).  The United States strongly opposes participation by 
the separatist regimes in UN Security Council discussions. 
 
¶6. (C) Subsequently, on the sidelines of a meeting of a General 
Assembly Open Ended Working Group meeting on September 15, 
Russian Ambassador Churkin told Ambassador Khalilzad that the 
Russian government could support allowing an extension of the 
United Nations Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) under its current 
mandate and name (reftel C).  Churkin said that Russia would not 
insist on having a representative of Abkhazia speak at the 
Council meeting if the Security Council were to agree that 
Georgia would also not be allowed to appear.  This is 
unacceptable.  Georgia would have to be allowed to attend a 
Council session called to discuss a UN mission located in 
Georgia.  In return, Russia would want the United States to 
allow representatives of South Ossetia and Abkhazia to attend an 
Arria-format meeting in the United States on October 7, as an 
alternative to their appearance at a formal Council session.  A 
straight rollover of the UNOMIG mandate is not possible, 
however, as the current mandate of UNOMIG (set out in UN 
Security Council resolution 937) is tied to the monitoring and 
verification of implementation of the 1994 Moscow Agreement, 
which is no longer effective.  As a result, any rollover 
resolution will likely not be a "technical" rollover but will 
involve both re-negotiation of the UNOMIG mandate and language 
which underscores Georgia's sovereignty and territorial 
integrity. 
 
¶7. (C) The United States is not obligated to issue visas to the 
separatist leaders to facilitate their participation in an 
Arria-style meeting, because it is not an official UN meeting. 
Based on the information available to us to date, the United 
States would likely be obligated under the UN Headquarters 
Agreement to issue visas for participation of such leaders in an 
official Security Council meeting.  If seven or more UNSC 
members are opposed, then we can block participation by 
separatist leaders in a UNSC meeting. 
 
¶8. (C) With regard to UNOMIG, the U.S. will also likely seek to 
secure Russia's agreement to a resolution to allow UNOMIG to 
continue operating temporarily (without changing its name) in 
the Abkhaz region of Georgia.  The U.S. does not want separatist 
leaders from Abkhazia and South Ossetia to participate in UNOMIG 
discussions in any way.  The U.S. is a strong proponent of 
preserving a UN role in the international mechanism for both 
Georgia and the region; a continuation of UNOMIG's operations in 
the Abkhaz region of Georgia will allow time to develop an 
appropriate regional mechanism, while at the same time 
permitting existing monitoring work on the ground to continue. 
 
Department Point of Contact 
--------------------------- 
 
¶9. (U) Please report any response/reaction by host government AS 
SOON AS POSSIBLE to IO/UNP K.G. Moore, 202-647-0042, 
moorekg@state.gov. 
RICE