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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 RIYADH 001408 
 
SIPDIS 
 
WHITE HOUSE FOR OVP 
CENTCOM FOR POLAD, NAVCENT, J5 
DOE FOR WBRYAN 
DEPARTMENT FOR P, S/CT, AND NEA/ARP 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/11/2028 
TAGS: ECON ENRG EPET LE MARR MCAP MOPS OVP PGOV
PREL, PTER, SA, YM 
SUBJECT: MOVING FORWARD ON CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE 
PROTECTION 
 
REF: A. RIYADH 1252 B. RIYADH 1230 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Ford M. Fraker for Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D) 
 
¶1. (S)  Summary:  The Ambassador accompanied by CENTCOM J5 
met Assistant Minister for Security Affairs Prince Mohammed 
bin Naif (MBN) to discuss the next steps in implementing the 
Critical Infrastructure and Border Protection (CIP) program 
designed to safeguard Saudi Arabia's oil production and water 
desalination facilities.  MBN welcomed a visit in October by 
the Secretary for the Strategic Dialogue and for P to 
follow-up with a Joint CIP Commission meeting.  The Saudis 
are ready to begin funding the CIP program and they are eager 
to establish an Facilities Security Forces (FSF) under 
CENTCOM's guidance.  The next step is to assist the Saudis in 
drafting a Letter of Request (LOR) for the establishment of 
an Office of the Program Manager-Facilities Security Forces 
(OPM-FSF).  It was presented to the Saudis that it would be 
best for the effectiveness of CIP to only contract with U.S. 
companies.  Atmospherics were extremely positive with the 
Prince, where he welcomed the proposed next steps, offered 
full Saudi cooperation, and named working-level MOI POCs.  He 
also offered his views on regional and local threats.  End 
summary. 
 
------------------------- 
CIP Formation and Concept 
------------------------- 
 
¶2. (S)  The Ambassador accompanied by CENTCOM J5 MG John 
Allardice, DCM, GRPO, with associated staff, met Assistant 
Minister for Security Affairs Prince Mohammed bin Naif (MBN) 
on Sept. 11 in Jeddah to discuss the next steps in 
implementing the CIP program.  MBN emphasized the importance 
and urgency of CIP.  He mentioned how despite Al Qaeda in the 
Kingdom being beaten down, there are continuing threats to 
target Saudi oil facilities with the goal of destabilizing 
the region and damaging the global economy. 
 
¶3. (S)  The Ambassador informed MBN of the Secretary's 
expected visit to the Kingdom on Oct 19-20 to continue the 
U.S.-Saudi Strategic Dialogue, noting CIP would be a major 
topic.  He suggested that Under Secretary for Political 
Affairs William Burns arrive later in October to chair with 
MBN the first Joint CIP Commission meeting.  The Ambassador 
described how the Embassy established an inter-agency CIP 
Cell with the DCM as the CIP Coordinator.  The cell will 
serve as MOI's working-level partner for this project.  The 
Ambassador said the Joint CIP Commission will follow the 
JECOR (U.S.-Saudi Arabia Joint Economic Commission, Riyadh) 
model of undertaking several, simultaneous projects under a 
single USG management and funding structure.  For CIP, the 
in-country management and funding authority would rest with 
the Ambassador, who will be supported by the Coordinator and 
the CIP cell.  Overall responsibility for CIP within DOS 
rests with P, as outlined in the agreement signed by 
Secretary Rice and Minister of the Interior Naif bin 'abd 
al-'Aziz in May; P and MBN would act as Co-Chairmen of the 
Commission. 
 
¶4. (S)  The Ambassador provided MBN an outline of the seven 
Working Groups (WG) to be established under the Joint 
Commission framework.  The WGs would be based in Riyadh and 
they would include U.S. and Saudi participants designated to 
conduct the daily work of coordination, training, equipping, 
assessment, and guidance pertaining to their particular tasks: 
 
- Infrastructure WG 
- Ports/Terminal WG 
- Facilities Security Forces WG 
 
RIYADH 00001408  002 OF 004 
 
 
- Border Guard WG 
- Nuclear Security WG 
- Maritime WG 
- Internal Security WG 
 
¶5. (S)  MBN was extremely receptive to both the Secretary's 
and P's proposed visits, and he assured us of MOI's full 
cooperation with the Embassy Riyadh CIP Cell, CENTCOM, and 
all other USG agencies.  He named MG Dr. Sa'ad al-Jabri as 
the MOI's lead working level contact. 
 
------- 
OPM-FSF 
------- 
 
¶6. (S)  MG Allardice presented CENTCOM's draft proposal for 
the establishment of a CIP training organization to support 
and guide MOI's planned 35,000 man force.  This organization 
-- Office of the Program Manager, Facilities Security Force 
(OPM-FSF) -- would be modeled along the lines of OPM-Saudi 
Arabia National Guard, by which DOD has successfully 
partnered with the Saudi government in developing the Saudi 
Arabia National Guard (SANG) since 1973.  OPM-FSF essentially 
could also provide the U.S. participation for the WGs on FSF, 
Ports and Terminals, and other groups that would benefit from 
CENTCOM's assistance and expertise.  He added that the final 
report of the DOE-led vulnerability assessment of the Abqaiq 
oil facility conducted in August, with MOI and CENTCOM 
participation, would be ready by mid-October and that this 
could serve as a stepping stone for future vulnerability 
assessments.  MG Allardice advised the next step for OPM-FSF 
would be an LOR from the SAG to the USG requesting the 
establishment of  OPM-FSF, and he offered CENTCOM's 
assistance to MOI in drafting this LOR.  He recommended the 
LOR be made ready before the Joint Commission meeting in 
October. 
 
¶7. (S)  MBN was enthused by the OPM-FSF concept.  He agreed 
to draft the LOR with CENTCOM's assistance, and he eagerly 
awaited the DOE vulnerability assessment and its 
recommendations.  He mentioned there was some SAG concern 
about the pace of CIP developments since the May signing of 
the Technical Cooperation Agreement, yet he felt reassured by 
the USG's current actions.  MBN agreed to make an initial 
deposit of USD 500,000 into the CIP account established by 
the Department of the Treasury, and he gladly accepted Post's 
offer to assist in the technical process of making the first 
deposit.  He expressed appreciation for having only one point 
of contact (i.e. the CIP account) for funding, as it made it 
much simpler for MOI.  It was made clear by MBN that he was 
ready to sign any additional MOUs with us, but wanted to 
avoid bureaucracy as much as possible and to move forward as 
quickly as possible with a CIP structure based on a single 
point of contact between the USG and SAG for oversight and 
funding. 
 
¶8. (S)  MBN mentioned his desire for high-technology sensors 
to supplement border and installation security operations, 
indicating he wanted more than just trained border troops. 
He stated the Saudi border force along the Kingdom's northern 
frontier with Iraq could be manned by 2000 troops instead of 
6000, because high-technology sensors provided the same 
level, and often superior, coverage than ground forces alone. 
 MBN pointed out that over the long-run automated sensors are 
more cost effective than having to continually recruit and 
train new personnel.  Also, mechanical sensors are less 
likely than a non-local FSF trooper to inflame tribal 
sensitivities among the border population. 
 
---------------------- 
 
RIYADH 00001408  003 OF 004 
 
 
U.S.- Only Contractors 
---------------------- 
 
¶9. (S)  In a follow-on private meeting between MBN, the 
Ambassador, and DCM, the Ambassador explained that CIP would 
be most effective if only U.S. companies were utilized 
because it would facilitate inter-operability and it would 
ease working relationships with the USG-led CIP WGs.  The 
Ambassador specifically mentioned Raytheon's bid for the 
Command/Control/Communications/Computer/Intel ligence (C4I) 
contract for the Saudi Border Guard Development Program. 
(Note: Thales, Raytheon and EADS, whose respective bids are 
USD 3.6 bn, USD 3.2 bn, and USD 1.8 bn, are all in 
competition for this contract with their bid proposals 
currently awaiting the SAG's final decision).  The Ambassador 
asserted that the issue was more than simply commercial 
advocacy, and that the utilization of only U.S. companies for 
CIP was in the national security interest of both the U.S. 
and Saudi Arabia. 
 
---------------- 
Views on Threats 
---------------- 
 
¶10. (S)  Throughout the discussions MBN commented on various 
threats.  He informed us that MOI had just concluded a 
successful operation resulting in several arrests of 
terrorists in the Kingdom, mentioning that MOI remained 
active in countering cyber sites that promote terrorism and 
incite religious extremism.  He expressed concern with 
Lebanon's volatile political situation, asking for MG 
Allardice's opinion, as he made several recent trips there. 
MBN was worried about external threats to the Kingdom's oil 
facilities, as well as  internal threats.  He said he knew 
terrorists, naming both Al Qaeda and Hizbollah, wanted to 
infiltrate Saudi Aramco.  He expanded that terrorists also 
likely use the Hajj and Umrah as opportunities to enter the 
Kingdom and to then conduct terrorist operations. 
 
¶11. (S)  Additionally, MBN opined that Yemen was similar to 
lawless Afghanistan, with Al-Qaeda having relocated to Yemen, 
although terrorists were still targeting Saudi Arabia from 
their new locations.  He informed us that the Saudi-Yemen 
Commission, headed by Crown Prince Sultan bin 'abd al-'Aziz 
and Yemeni Prime Minister Ali Mohammed Mujawwar, was active 
in promoting construction projects along the mountainous 
Saudi-Yemeni border to counter Al-Qaeda.  He continued that 
to avoid corruption the SAG will use "projects instead of 
cash" as assistance to Yemen. 
 
-------- 
Comment 
-------- 
 
¶12. (S)  Comment:  MBN made clear the SAG's great interest in 
CIP and its willingness to capitalize the CIP bank account, 
while expecting the USG to act quickly and responsively.  We 
recommend the first payment of these moneys be used to pay 
DOE for the USD 355,000 cost of the Abqaiq assessment, so 
that further vulnerability assessments can be made.  The 
upcoming Strategic Dialogue followed by the Joint Commission 
are excellent venues to move forward on this project.  MBN is 
looking for the rapid establishment of OPM-FSF.  We believe 
the LOR for OPM-FSF should be drafted and prepared for 
signatures as quickly as possible.  Likewise, any MOUs that 
must be established should be prepared parallel to the 
drafting of the LOR.  The Saudis appear fully ready to 
cooperate with us on CIP, which provides us significant 
opportunities on a broad range of issues in our bilateral 
relationship, while addressing the significant vulnerability 
 
RIYADH 00001408  004 OF 004 
 
 
of the Kingdom's oil facilities, whose damage would 
jeopardize the U.S. and global economies.  End Comment. 
FRAKER