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R 251343Z SEP 08
FM AMEMBASSY PORT LOUIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4185
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0156
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0337
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PORT LOUIS 000329 
 
SIPDIS 
 
AF/E FOR MARIA BEYZEROV 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/25/2018 
TAGS: PREL MOPS MARR PGOV PTER UK MP
SUBJECT: PRIME MINISTER DISCUSSES UN VOTING AND DIEGO 
GARCIA WITH USG 
 
REF: A. PORT LOUIS 64 
     ¶B. PORT LOUIS 85 
     ¶C. PORT LOUIS 189 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Cesar B. Cabrera for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: In a September 18 meeting between Ambassador 
Cesar Cabrera and Prime Minister Ramgoolam (with POLOFF as 
note taker), Ramgoolam noted that to better reflect the true 
relationship between the U.S. and Mauritius he would like to 
increase UN voting coincidence between the two countries, and 
that he would personally review Mauritian voting practices in 
the UN.  Although acknowledging that USG refers all questions 
on Diego Garcia to HMG, Ramgoolam noted that he would like to 
"resolve the issue of Diego Garcia by signing a bilateral 
agreement."  Ramgoolam said that he would be personally 
involved in both efforts as someone who understands the 
"geopolitical" concerns of the USG and the importance of the 
"friendship" between the U.S. and Mauritius. END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (C)  The September 18 quarterly meeting between Ambassador 
Cesar Cabrera and Prime Minister Ramgoolam started with the 
Prime Minister detailing his shock at the low UN voting 
coincidence between the U.S. and Mauritius. After the 
previous June 2 meeting between Ambassador Cabrera and PM 
Ramgoolam, when the Ambassador gave Ramgoolam a detailed 
vote-by-vote spreadsheet on how Mauritius' and USG's votes 
coincided in the 62nd UNGA assembly, Ramgoolam expressed his 
"annoyance" at his Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and the 
former Minister of Foreign Affairs, whom he removed on March 
17, for not alerting him of this "surprising pattern." 
Referring to the eight percent voting coincidence in 2007 
between the two countries, Ramgoolam said that he 
"understands disagreements between friends... but not so 
many." In light of the upcoming UNGA season, Ramgoolam 
encouraged the Ambassador to "make him aware of every vote 
and not just rely on the MFA," and added that he would 
personally encourage an increase in voting coincidence with 
the U.S. 
 
¶3. (C) Using the "friendship" between the U.S. and Mauritius 
as a springboard, Ramgoolam segued into the issue of Diego 
Garcia.  He began this portion of the conversation by 
referring to his conversations with UK Prime Minister Gordon 
Brown, whom he says expresses that HMG wants to assist on the 
sovereignty issue but cannot because of the "Americans." 
Ramgoolam preempted the Ambassador by saying that he 
understands the official lines of both parties and respects 
the "geopolitics of the game," but that all Mauritius asks 
for is sovereignty of the Chagos Archipelago. He further 
noted that he wants the U.S. to keep the military base of 
Diego Garcia and is willing to sign an agreement with either 
the U.S. or the U.K., although he said he felt that Brown 
preferred the agreement be signed directly with the U.S. 
 
¶4. (C) Despite his knowledge that USG considers all Diego 
Garcia issues as sovereign issues between the U.K. and 
Mauritius, Ramgoolam kept citing his understanding and 
willingness to work with USG.  He first cited his 1995 
reversal of the 1982 ruling  of the Mouvement Militant 
Mauricien (MMM) that no US ships would be allowed in port 
unless nuclear weapons were declared.  He said his reasoning 
for reversing this rule was his understanding of geopolitics 
and the interests of his nation.  He further noted that at 
the time, he realized that US ships had to come or they would 
all go to Seychelles anyway, "which is close enough for any 
nuclear fallout to hit Mauritius,...so, why take the risk 
without the reward possibility," he said. For his second 
example, Ramgoolam drew parallels between him and his father 
by citing the political context coloring his father Sir 
Seewoosagur Ramgoolam's, Mauritius' first president, decision 
 to cede the Chagos territory to gain their independence. 
Ramgoolam suggested that his father saw the geopolitical 
importance of not only independence, but of having 
like-minded allies in a time and a region where Russia funded 
coups that destroyed democratic governments.  Ramgoolam 
concluded this anecdote by saying that "...like my father 
understood, I understand."  The Ambassador made no comment or 
commitment regarding the PM's assertions regarding Diego 
Garcia.  Instead, he merely reminded the PM that indeed any 
sovereignty issues should be taken to the HMG, not the USG. 
 
 
¶5. (C) COMMENT: Post doubts that Madan Dulloo was sacked due 
to the UN voting record, but rather due to political 
 
PORT LOUIS 00000329  002 OF 002 
 
 
infighting. Regardless of the reasons, it seems clear that 
Ramgoolam has had little respect for the MFA before and after 
the Dulloo dismissal. This is one reason Post is so pleased 
at the nomination of Arvin Boolell as the new Foreign 
Minster.  The Embassy has had a good working relationship 
with Boolell in his previous position as the Agro-Industry 
Minister, so we are cautiously optimistic about his new role 
as Foreign Minister being a positive development.  With 
regard to the UN voting, Post optimism is tempered by 
Mauritius' tendency to bloc vote with regional or ideological 
groups and Boolell's unfamiliarity with the broad issues 
dealt with at UNGA outside of agriculture.  With regard to 
the PM's proposal on Diego Garcia, Post has no plans to 
follow-up or comment on the issue with GOM.  Department 
leadership, however, should be prepared to receive similar 
talking points when they meet with GOM officials in coming 
months. END COMMENT. 
CABRERA