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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARTO 091702 
 
(Note: the unique message record number (MRN) has been modified. The original MRN was 
08PARTO 000002, which duplicates a previous PARTO telegram number.) 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/04/2018 
TAGS: OVIP RICE CONDOLEEZZA PREL PGOV ECON EI KV RU
EUN, GG 
SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH PM SOCRATES 
 
¶1.  (U) Classified by Paul Wohlers, Deputy Executive 
Secretary, S/ES, Department of State. Reason 1.4 (d) 
 
¶2.  (U)  September 4, 2008, 1930, Lisbon, Portugal. 
 
¶3.  (U) Participants: 
 
U.S. 
The Secretary 
Ambassador Thomas Stephenson 
Assistant Secretary Dan Fried 
Assistant Secretary C. David Welch 
LTG William Fraser 
David Ballard (Embassy Notetaker) 
 
Portugal 
Prime Minister Jose Socrates 
Foreign Minister Luis Amado 
PM's Chief of Staff Pedro Lourtie 
MFA Political Director Nuno Brito 
PM's Diplomatic Advisor Jorge Roza Oliveira 
Jose Frederico Ludovice (PM Notetaker) 
 
¶4. (C/NF) SUMMARY:  In a 45 minute meeting, Portuguese 
Prime Minister Jose Socrates and the Secretary discussed 
Russia and Georgia, Kosovo, and Transatlantic relations. 
On Russia, Socrates evinced great concern about the 
implications of Russia's attack on Georgia, but made clear 
that Portugal would stand under the EU umbrella in 
addressing this issue.  He expressed confidence in 
Sarkozy's handling of the crisis.  He reiterated 
the GOP's determination to recognize Kosovo, but said that 
Portugal had delayed recognition in order to "show that we 
recognize with reluctance," due mainly to concerns about 
international law.  On Transatlantic relations, Socrates 
made clear that Portugal considers a united 
European-American position, rooted in shared values, the 
key to handling emerging challenges like Russia and China. 
End Summary. 
 
Russia: Trust Sarkozy 
--------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C/NF) The Secretary began her meeting with Portuguese 
Prime Minister Socrates with a discussion of Russia 
and Georgia, saying that recent events required NATO and 
Europe to draw conclusions and, most important, respond 
with firmness.  Socrates agreed and said that it is also 
important for the EU to keep frightened members (in Central 
and Eastern Europe) confident and to allay their concerns 
about Russian aggression.  He added that the position of the 
EU is to be firm but to keep engaging with Russia. Sarkozy is 
the right person to handle this issue right now 
because he is free of the baggage of his predecessors, is 
energetic and proactive, and is the representative of a 
nation Russia has more confidence in than others. (Socrates 
repeated the mantra of trust in Sarkozy to do the right 
thing several times during the conversation.)  Sarkozy, 
moreover, is capable of taking risks, a valuable trait in 
these circumstances.  We and the European Council support 
him.  The early opinion that Georgia had rashly provoked 
Russia has faded because of Russia's failure to implement 
the 6-point ceasefire, its recognition of South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia, and its overall difficult stance.  It is 
important at this point to be firm and give confidence to 
our member states. 
 
¶6.  (C/NF) The Secretary clarified that the United States 
had made a deliberate decision not to take the lead and not 
to turn the current situation into a U.S.-Russia conflict. 
We support Sarkozy's efforts and believe he is doing a good 
job, on balance.  We need to maintain pressure on Russia to 
respect the agreement they have signed or face 
consequences.  The agreement has clear requirements and 
they are in violation of them.  It will be difficult for 
Sarkozy to go to Moscow and be firm in holding the Russians 
to what they have promised.  But he must do so.  The 
Russians must feel that what they have done has costs. 
They overplayed their hand and, in recognizing Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia, have made a mistake. 
Businesspeople and a new generation of Russians with ties 
to the West are upset.  If we are firm and continue to say 
that Russia is not living up to its obligations, we may be 
able to force a change in behavior.  Europe cannot show 
weakness.  It is time to stop them now?not (yet) through 
sanctions, but through firmness in reaction to Russia's 
actions. 
 
¶7.  (C/NF) Socrates agreed and noted that Russia had made a 
"serious mistake" in recognizing South Ossetia and Abkhazia 
as independent states.  This alarmed many European states, 
which at the Bucharest NATO summit were still more sanguine 
about dealing with Russia; recognition is a "serious step 
without return."  He asserted that he appreciated the US 
position and believed that the United States was doing a good 
job handling the crisis and making useful statements, but that 
Europe, too, has a responsibility and must support 
Sarkozy's efforts, even though the situation is risky.  In 
the end, Russia must realize that it is not in its 
interests to "have this attitude with Europe and the United 
States and that it was a mistake to increase tension." 
 
¶8.  (C/NF) The Secretary noted that Russia has generated 
other reactions, including failure to win support for its 
recognition of Georgia's provinces at the recent meeting of 
the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, China's concern (based 
somewhat on worries about Taiwan), and unrest in other regions 
of the Caucasus.  The United States did not intend any radical 
response, such as expelling Russia from the G-8, but 
stressed the importance of being firm.  She inquired how 
Sarkozy would report on his trip to Moscow.  Socrates said 
that he would do so at the Council meeting in October and 
noted that Sarkozy is confident he can manage this, but if 
he returns from Moscow "with empty hands, it will be 
difficult."  The "spirit in Europe" he continued, is one of 
dismay.  Europe has sought constructive ties with Russia, 
but every six months "it's something else that's a problem: 
Polish meat, the U.S. missile shield, Kosovo.  They seem so 
eager to 'recover pride' that they won't move in 
negotiations."  We recognize that they have a domestic 
interest in "recovering pride" and we must do our best to 
negotiate with them, but we must insist that they respect 
their word on the ceasefire agreement. 
 
¶9.  (C/NF) The Secretary asserted that she hoped that the 
message would be clear that if Russia did not live up to 
its obligations there would be an effect.  Many Russians 
want to be part of the world, and they are uncomfortable 
with those who seek "revenge" for the loss of the Cold 
War.  The initial phase of the war in Georgia might have 
stirred pride in Russians, but now many are concerned. 
When Russia pursues recognition for South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia and the only thing they get is those two 
recognizing each other, along with Hamas and Nicaragua, 
it's an embarrassment.  We can make this very costly to 
Russia.  Socrates agreed and said that a positive point was 
that the Russia of today is very different from the Russia 
of 20 years ago.  20 million Russians travel abroad every 
year, western interests are important to them, and that 
will cause pressure.  What Russia has done is "very stupid; 
they cannot think we are in their hands. If Sarkozy comes 
back with nothing, Europe has to answer with firmness." 
 
Kosovo: "Recognition with Reluctance" 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶10.  (C/NF) The Secretary queried Socrates on the status of 
Portugal's stated intention to recognize Kosovo, noting 
that what has happened in Georgia affects other "frozen 
conflicts" and that international recognition of Kosovo 
helps resolve them. 
 
¶11.  (C/NF) In response, Socrates took the unprecedented 
tack of combining all of the reasons/pretexts previously 
aired for Portugal's delay in recognition (international 
law, President Cavaco Silva's hesitancy, need to build 
domestic consensus between the two leading political 
parties, concern about offending those who might be 
offended by recognition) into a simple formula.  He said 
"We want to recognize, but I must be honest.  We have not 
yet because we want to show that we recognized with 
reluctance.  So we took time."  He went on to elaborate 
that there had been a plan to recognize before UNGA, when 
President Cavaco Silva would go to the UN, but that, for 
unspecified reasons, "we don't know if we can do it now." 
It is a question of "weeks," Socrates asserted several 
times, noting that the attitude of Russia "helps us now," 
but if it's not before UNGA it "might be after."  He 
slipped once in stating that the plan had been to recognize 
before UNGA but that the President had played a role in 
changing the plan. 
 
¶12.  (C/NF) The Secretary responded that Portugal should 
recognize Kosovo as soon as it could. 
 
Transatlantic Alliance: Are we strong enough? 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶13.  (C/NF) Socrates followed up on the discussion of Kosovo 
to note that the importance of the Transatlantic Alliance 
to Portugal could not be overstated.  Echoing comments we 
have often heard from Foreign Minister Luis Amado (who was 
present), he said, "It is clear that the alliance between 
the United States and Europe is the most important thing to 
make our common values more influential.  We face challenges 
like Russia and China, and they will become more difficult. 
But I don't know if we are strong enough." 
 
¶14.  (C/NF) The Secretary responded by stating her 
satisfaction with the state of the Alliance and 
underscoring its importance to the U.S. in resolving 
problems we face together. 
 
RICE