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RUEHTH/AMEMBASSY ATHENS 4069
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1371
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RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1223

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NICOSIA 000744 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EUR/SE, EUR/ERA, IO/UNP 
 
ANKARA PLEASE PASS TO ADANA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/16/2018 
TAGS: PREL PGOV TR CY
SUBJECT: CYPRUS: TURKISH CYPRIOT LEADER TALAT HOPEFUL ON 
UN-BROKERED NEGOTIATIONS 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Frank C. Urbancic for reasons 1.4(b) and 1.4( 
d) 
 
 
1.(C) Summary: "We are hopeful we will make a breakthrough," 
Turkish Cypriot (T/C) Leader Mehmet Ali Talat informed the 
Ambassador during his introductory call on September 12. 
Talat was pleased with the September 3 resumption of Cyprus 
negotiations that had broken a four-year stalemate.  He 
warned, however, that Greek Cypriots, protected by the 
Republic of Cyprus,s international recognition and EU 
membership, would not be inclined to compromise unless made 
explicitly aware that there will be costs for failure and, 
conversely, benefits for success.  Talat further noted that 
G/C redlines (a "no" to guarantor obligations for Turkey, for 
example) had hardened since the Greek Cypriot community's 
2004 rejection of the Annan Plan.  Talat rejected out-of-hand 
a likely Greek Cypriot demand for abrogation of the 1960 
Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance, given "the long history 
of Greek Cypriot violence against their T/C compatriots." 
Regarding Turkey, he insisted that Ankara supported a 
comprehensive solution along UN parameters.  In response, the 
Ambassador voiced continued USG support for the UN-brokered 
settlement process and solicited Talat,s opinions over what 
the US might best do to support the process.  End Summary 
 
--------------------------------------- 
"Threats and Incentives of a Solution" 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C)  Turkish Cypriot Leader Mehmet Ali Talat told the 
Ambassador in a September 12, 50-minute courtesy call that he 
was hopeful the two sides "would make a breakthrough." 
Oddly, despite public T/C pronouncements for a quick 
resolution of negotiations, Talat was non-committal over 
timing, saying only that the pace depended on the "capacity 
and willingness" of both sides to deal. 
 
¶3. (C) In an oft-repeated refrain, Talat said that the 
Turkish Cypriots needed a solution (given their precarious 
non-recognized status), while Greek Cypriots did not. G/Cs 
could live quite prosperously in its absence thanks to EU 
membership.  He added that Greek Cypriots had to be shown 
"the threats of failure's costs and the incentives of a 
solution."  Talat pointed out that the first round of RoC 
presidential elections had coincided with the Kosovar 
declaration of independence, which had "shocked" Greek 
Cypriots into rejecting the former RoC president and then 
front-runner, hard-liner Tassos Papadopoulos.  Events in 
Kosovo, he intimated, had foiled Papadopoulos' plan to drag 
out negotiations so as to link them to Turkey's EU accession 
process and wring out the maximum concessions.  G/Cs needed 
to know what was at stake, Talat continued. Should the 
process fail due to G/C intransigence, T/Cs needed to be told 
that there would be benefits to successful conclusion of the 
negotiations as well as rewards for acting in good faith if 
the G/Cs pulled the plug again. 
 
----------------------------------- 
To Counter Hardening G/C Position 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) Proof positive of the need for incentives and straight 
talk with the Greek Cypriots, according to Talat, was their 
increasingly deep red lines, especially when compared to 
positions they had staked out during the 2004 Annan Plan 
period.  G/Cs were even walking back from commitments made 
during the present process, he alleged.  Christofias had now 
stopped mentioning "two constituent states" despite the fact 
that he had agreed to just that in the May 23 Leaders' 
Agreement (Note: That agreement, among other things, states 
that a future Cyprus will consist of two politically equal 
constituent states, which responds to a key T/C demand.  End 
Note).  Talat further complained that Christofias, at their 
September 11 meeting, would not agree that residual powers 
should revert to the constituent states once federal 
responsibilities were defined, despite the leaders(he 
claimed) having previously agreed on that arrangement. 
"Christofias has 'obstacles,' in his political partners (DIKO 
and EDEK)," Talat said.  Finally, the T/C leader said that 
 
NICOSIA 00000744  002 OF 003 
 
 
the recent G/C objection to continuation in force of the 
Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance -- "even Denktas and (then 
RoC President) Clerides could agree on them," he griped -- 
was further proof of a "concerted G/C action" against a 
solution. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
"We want and need Turkish Protection" 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C)  In response to the Ambassador's question, Talat said 
that the need for Turkish protection of T/Cs on the island 
was not an Anatolian Turkish conceit.  Turkish Cypriots 
themselves want and need Turkish protection because of a real 
Greek Cypriot outrages against the smaller T/C community.  He 
said that Turkey had, in the past, had intervened only in 
direct response to G/C attacks and killings of Turkish 
Cypriots.  Not only had the Anatolians not been preemptive, 
they had always been too late.  Talat said it was an 
"invented pretext" to think that today, Turkey would 
intervene "whenever" it wanted, in the absence of a real 
life-or-death threat to the Turkish Cypriots.  Given the 
abysmal failure of both British forces and UN peacekeepers to 
protect Turkish Cypriots between 1963-74, the EU could not 
even be considered to become a replacement for Turkish 
guarantor obligations.  Talat held the door open, however, 
saying that guarantees "had to continue for some time, until 
the opposite can be proven."  (Note: Polling and discussions 
with mainstream T/C political parties indicate that the 
overwhelming majority of Turkish Cypriots support the 
continuation of Turkish guarantees and troop presence.  End 
Note) 
 
---------------------------- 
"Turkey Wants  a Solution" 
--------------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) Talat said that Turkey wants a "comprehensive solution 
along UN parameters" in which the Turkish Cypriots were equal 
partners.  In any solution, Turkey, as it had done in the 
Annan Plan,  would agree to withdraw all its troops beyond 
any mutually negotiated number.  He said that Cyprus was not 
strategically important to Turkey, but conceded that some in 
Turkey believed it was.  Talat  complained that most Greek 
Cypriots, even Christofias, openly say that the Turkish 
military calls all the shots in the "TRNC," which is not 
true.  Turkish Cypriots had deep historical and cultural ties 
with Turkey, and it was the only country that had aided the 
Turkish Cypriots when they were being slaughtered and helped 
them overcome their isolation.  Without Turkey's help, Talat 
pointed out, they could not even make telephone calls abroad, 
post letters, or fly to Europe. When asked about Ankara's 
influence over him, he said that he had a good dialogue with 
the President, PM, MFA, but that he rarely meets with senior 
TGS officers. 
 
--------------------- 
"US will be needed" 
--------------------- 
 
¶7. (C)  Talat said he was generally pleased with USG support, 
even if it was not at the "expected level" (Note: Expected 
level would be active U.S. efforts to reward the T/Cs for 
accepting the Annan Plan, including inviting Talat to the 
U.S., increasing U.S. investment in the "TRNC," or 
establishing direct flights to Ercan Airport from U.S. 
territory.  End note).  Talat said that he gave "great 
importance" to the U.S. role on the Cyprus Problem, which 
would be "needed" when the process entered "great 
difficulties."  He added that his "FM", Turgay Avci, would be 
visiting New York to attend an OIC conference held on the 
UNGA margins, and inquired as to the possibility of official 
USG meetings for Avci while in the United States, preferably 
in Washington. 
 
¶8. (C) In responding, the Ambassador stated that the 
settlement process seemed to be in a "good place" right now 
thanks to the G/C leadership taking ownership of it -- a 
noted change over 2004.  At present, the Ambassador 
continued, it would be better for the U.S. to "watch and 
 
NICOSIA 00000744  003 OF 003 
 
 
encourage," rather than to push specific policies on either 
side publicly.  He wanted to learn how to "maximize USG 
efforts without getting in the way."  That said, when 
problems arise down the line, the Ambassador said he was 
committed to trying to help after consulting with both sides. 
 He also promised to relay to Washington Talat,s request for 
meetings for Avci. 
 
¶9. (C) Comment: Talat did not venture into new territory 
during the meeting, and we have heard earlier and often from 
him the need to pressure Greek Cypriots, just as the G/Cs 
urge us to put pressure on the TGS in Ankara.  Talat is 
accurate, however, that the G/Cs publicly have walked back 
from accepting the concept of "two constituent states", which 
is vitally important to the T/Cs and to which both leaders 
agreed to on May 23.  We hope this is merely a negotiating 
tactic, not another G/C redline. This disavowal alone has 
already undermined the lukewarm support in the north for a 
comprehensive solution. 
Urbancic