VZCZCXRO2566
RR RUEHAG RUEHROV
DE RUEHNC #0731/01 2561516
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 121516Z SEP 08
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9144
INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1219

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NICOSIA 000731 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE, EUR/CARC 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/11/2018 
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNFICYP CY TU GE
SUBJECT: CYPRUS: FM KYPRIANOU DESIRES CLOSE U.S.-ROC 
RELATIONS 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Frank C. Urbancic, Reasons 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY:  "Nothing should divide us" asserted 
Republic of Cyprus Foreign Minister Markos Kyprianou at 
Ambassador Urbancic's September 10 introductory call.  The 
United States and Cyprus shared numerous interests, Kyprianou 
continued, and could cooperate in spheres ranging from 
science and technology to the Middle East peace process. 
Regarding the nascent Cyprus settlement negotiations, the 
Foreign Minister held no illusions they would prove quick or 
painless, since the Turkish- and Greek-Cypriot positions 
remained distant in many core areas.  Not unexpectedly, when 
asked where the U.S. might best assist, "in Ankara" was his 
response -- T/C leaders, he argued, had short leashes and 
zero authority to negotiate issues where Turkey had equities. 
 Kyprianou next tackled the Caucasus conflict.  Steadfast in 
its "principled" position, Cyprus would continue to demand 
respect for Georgia's territorial integrity and sovereignty, 
despite "the whole mess having started with Saakashvili." 
The RoC supported quick deployment of an EU monitoring 
mission to "Georgia proper," but continued to oppose efforts 
by harder-line states to isolate Russia.  Kyrpianou noted the 
RoC wanted the U.S. to conclude a bilateral agreement to 
govern all USAID activities, especially in the north. 
Hedging his comments somewhat, he thought the U.S. had not 
coordinated its programs with the Cypriot government.  In 
response, the Ambassador assured the FM that appropriate 
Ministry personnel had been briefed on aid program 
particulars; since the Embassy had not received a response, 
it planned to proceed with implementation.  END SUMMARY. 
 
------------------------- 
Lots of Room to Cooperate 
------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) "You have arrived at an interesting time," Kyprianou 
began, referring to the September 3 start of full-fledged 
negotiations on the island but also to improved bilateral 
relations between Cyprus and the United States.  He assessed 
that the two countries shared various interests and could 
further improve cooperation.  Of EU member states, only 
Cyprus was located in the Middle East, making it a useful 
(and willing) partner on initiatives that focused on the 
unstable region.  Kyprianou pointed to other areas of recent 
progress, such as a bilateral Science and Technology 
Agreement that the RoC's Council of Ministers had recently 
initialed (Note:  State Department officials are currently 
studying a number of Cyprus-proposed edits.  End Note.)  On 
talks geared toward extending the U.S. Visa Waiver Program to 
include Cyprus, the Minister actually accepted some 
responsibility for delays, claiming the European Union's 
desire to negotiate VWP membership for its members as a group 
-- rather than allowing them to negotiate bilaterally, as 
Cyprus recently had done with Russia -- had proven untenable. 
 Securing visa-free U.S. travel for Cypriot citizens remained 
an important RoC goal, however. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
On CyProb Talks, No Surprises:  Problem Lies in Ankara 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
¶3.  (C) Like most Greek Cypriot politicians, Kyprianou 
maintained that the Cyprus settlement effort must remain "by 
the Cypriots, for the Cypriots."  And again not deviating 
from the norm, he identified one key area where U.S. efforts 
could best help:  in pressuring Ankara to give Talat 
negotiating flexibility.  Many aspects of the process 
directly affected Turkey's perceived interests on the island, 
the FM maintained, and while the GoT did not sit at the 
table, its leadership exerted great influence over Turkish 
Cypriot leader Mehmet Ali Talat and other members of the T/C 
negotiating team.  Talat enjoyed little maneuvering room on 
most core issues, and none on issues of security, Kyprianou 
asserted.  In such a scenario, he hoped the USG might push 
Turkey to act more constructively and allow T/Cs more freedom 
for deal-making. 
 
¶4.  (C) The process would hit potholes, and leaders in both 
communities must be prepared to face them, Kyprianou 
ventured.  Breaking ranks somewhat from the G/C mainstream, 
who argue for no foreign arbitration or mediation at all, he 
envisioned the sides seeking assistance from the 
international community to break deadlocks.  Kyprianou blamed 
an incomplete preparatory phase of negotiations for what he 
expected to be a rough road ahead:  while certain working 
groups had reached convergence on multiple issues, others had 
tallied far fewer successes and some, none at all.  President 
Demetris Christofias had made a judgment call to consent to 
 
NICOSIA 00000731  002 OF 003 
 
 
the start of full-fledged negotiation.  "He really had no 
other choice," the FM believed, although the decision had 
rankled various G/C parties, including Kyprianou's DIKO. 
"And I support him in his decision." 
 
¶5.  (C) Kyprianou next outlined the short-term way forward on 
the negotiations.  Talat and Christofias had proven unable to 
commit to a firm schedule for the talks, but would continue 
meeting weekly unless developments mandated a different 
tempo.  The working groups would reconstitute in order to 
support the leaders' deliberations.  In a best-case scenario, 
Christofias and Talat would reach a tentative, basic 
agreement late in 2009, with the "gaps" to be plugged 
thereafter.  As long as the negotiations were delivering 
measurable progress, he saw no reason to push the process. 
Such a tortoise-paced approach had the benefit of not raising 
public expectations to unreal levels, a problem in prior 
negotiations, he added. 
 
------------------------------------------ 
Georgia:  Cyprus On Board for EU Observers 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶6.  (C) Dominating the Cypriots' policy formulation equation 
on Georgia was its iron-clad support for states' territorial 
inviolability and sovereignty, Kyprianou maintained.  The RoC 
had vigorously opposed Kosovo's unilateral declaration of 
independence, fearing it would unleash a domino effect across 
the globe, and with Abkhazia and South Ossetia, its fears had 
come true.  Issues of secession and independence must be 
tackled bilaterally or multilaterally via negotiation, not 
unilaterally and/or via force of arms.  Cyprus would continue 
to support measures that called on all nations to respect 
Georgia's borders, a position that had earned it Moscow's 
ire, he claimed. 
 
¶7.  (C) That said, the RoC opposed punitive measures against 
Russia.  "Active engagement, not isolation and sanctions, are 
in order," Kyprianou argued, an ironic message since the RoC 
has vigorously employed both weapons against the "Turkish 
Republic of Northern Cyprus."  He didn't expect the EU to 
harden its stance, owing to Europe and Russia's significant 
and growing interdependence.  Kyprianou stated flatly that 
Cyprus now supported an EU civilian monitoring mission for 
Georgia, despite rumors in some member states to the 
contrary.  He had first favored adding monitors to the OSCE 
mission, since establishing an autonomous European Union 
force could lead to the EU, OSCE, and UN stumbling over each 
other.  So as not to delay their deployment further, 
Kyprianou favored acceding to Russia's demands that the EU 
force limit activities to "Georgia proper" and not venture 
into the disputed territories. 
 
¶8.  (C) In a moment of candor, Kyprianou asserted that 
Georgia deserved blame for provoking the latest Caucasus 
conflict.  "They delivered a present to Russia" via their 
attack in South Ossetia.  "It would be like us attacking 
Turkish Cypriots here, and not expecting Turkey to strike 
back," he reasoned.  "Saakashvili took the bait -- what did 
he think would happen?" the Minister questioned.  Time in 
Brussels working regularly with Moscow -- Kyprianou served as 
EU Health Commissioner until early 2008 -- had shown him that 
Moscow bristled when confronted directly.  "Better to give 
them a way to save face," he concluded. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
Unspecified Concern with USAID Programs 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶9.  (C) Although admittedly shy on the details, Kyprianou 
stated that elements of the U.S. assistance program in Cyprus 
concerned some in his ministry.  "I've been told that the 
problems have been building up over many years" he explained; 
first among them was the MFA's perception that USAID 
providers were not adequately consulting their Cypriot 
interlocutors over program goals and implementation.  The 
Ministry favored a Memorandum of Understanding that 
formalized the consultative procedure, he added.  The 
Ambassador forcefully countered that U.S. assistance aimed to 
create improved conditions for the island's reunification and 
therefore benefited Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots alike. 
Embassy personnel regularly offered program briefings to 
high-level MFA staff, including details of all active and 
planned programs, but had received no response.  The U.S. 
would continue to consult, the Ambassador pledged, but would 
not seek RoC approval before funding programs.  He reminded 
Kyprianou that USAID had left a full briefing with the 
Ministry several months earlier.  Since no comments had yet 
 
NICOSIA 00000731  003 OF 003 
 
 
been received, the Embassy planned to proceed with 
implementation. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶10.  (C) We are encouraged that Kyprianou began the meeting 
by praising the Embassy's role in putting U.S.-Cyprus 
relations on an upward track since its Annan Plan-era nadir. 
Further, in arguing that "nothing should divide us" and 
voicing desires to support key U.S. policy priorities like 
Middle East peace, he has helped alleviate somewhat our fears 
that the February election of the Soviet-educated Demetris 
Christofias and elevation into power of his anti-American, 
Communist AKEL could threaten hitherto solid cooperation in 
international security and counter-terrorism.  Kyprianou's 
eventual decision not to block the EU monitoring mission -- 
possibly bucking Moscow's pressure in doing so -- shows a 
realization that Cyprus cannot cozy too close to Moscow 
without negative repercussions among the EU 27. 
 
¶11.  (C) On the Cyprus Problem, it came as no surprise that 
Minister Kyprianou, hailing from nationalist DIKO and the son 
of a hard-line former RoC president, spouted the same, "the 
problem lies with Turkey" rhetoric common in the G/C 
community.  What was most interesting, however, was his 
acknowledgment that "pressure Ankara" was not the only role 
for the international community; despite Greek Cypriots' 
desire for a "Cyprus Solution," the sides eventually will 
face deadlocks that only third-party help can resolve. 
Kyprianou also offered a realistic picture of the pace of 
negotiations and need to manage public expectations. 
Urbancic