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DE RUEHNJ #0438 2681519
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
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FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6476
INFO RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1020

C O N F I D E N T I A L NDJAMENA 000438 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/25/2010 
TAGS: PHUM PREL KPKO REFPAN PGOV UN CD
SUBJECT: GOVERNMENT OF CHAD EASTERN RELIEF EFFORTS - SMOKE, 
LITTLE FIRE, BUT SOME PROMISE 
 
REF: A. STATE 95572 B. KHARTOUM 1438 
 
Classified By: CDA RGribbin for reasons 1.4 b&c 
 
¶1. (C)  The head of Chadian relief and multinational force 
coordination for the east advised that his priorities 
included smoothing the way for MINURCAT and EUFOR, plus 
helping IDPs return home. He thought that rebel recruitment 
in the camps would diminish as MINURCAT and Chadian policemen 
deployed. He attributed eastern woes to Chadian rebels in the 
first instance and Sudanese janjaweed in the second. If/when 
tensions eased in Chad, more IDPs would leave the camps, even 
though Sudanese refugees would be long term residents. He 
accused Sudanese thieves of spiriting vehicles to Darfur for 
re-sale. End summary. 
 
¶2. (C) On September 23 Charge Gribbin called on Dr. Moctar 
Moussa Mahamat, the President's Special Representative for 
MINURCAT and EUFOR and chief of the Committee for the 
National Coordination of Support for the Deployment 
International Forces to Eastern Chad (CONAFIT).  The mouthful 
of a title notwithstanding, Dr. Mahamat said his principle 
responsibility was to act as liasion between European and UN 
forces and government officials, specifically with the 
objective of easing the way and solving problems before/as 
they arise. He said he established a solid working 
relationship with the SRSG, EUFOR and MINURCAT force 
commanders. CONAFIT had about seventy employees and 
anticipated more, once the committee became regularly 
inscribed in the national budget during the next fiscal year. 
Mahamat said that CONAFIT was most helpful in meeting with 
IDPs, local communities and traditional authorities in order 
to improve communications and the flow of information about 
safety in IDP producing regions.  He added that CONAFIT never 
urged IDPs to go home, but did assist in their assessments 
and facilitated travel as it could for spontaneous returns. 
He said that few people moved during the rainy season, but 
feelers and envoys would go out after the rains.  He opined 
that people were anxious to go home when conditions would 
permit. 
 
¶3. (C) Asked about police deployments and efforts to restrict 
rebel recruiting in refugee camps, Mahamat was firm in 
stating that recruiting, particularly by JEM, was an ongoing 
problem. He outlined the security plan for the camps, which 
will have MINURCAT/Chadian police inside the camps and in a 
10 kilometer perimeter around them. EUFOR had security 
responsibilities beyond that zone. Once the police were 
present, Dr. Mahamat expressed the conviction that 
recruitment efforts could be curtailed. In turn, we 
reiterated that illegal recruitment was an issue of USG 
concern. We noted the necessity for the GOC to promulgate the 
decree that would enable police deployments to occur. Mahamat 
nodded. 
 
¶4. (C) Discussing general insecurity in the east, Dr. Mahamat 
blamed Chadian rebels for unrest and banditry, particularly 
that which produced IDPs. He added that Sudanese janjaweed 
raiding also contributed mightily to insecurity.  Asked about 
vehicle theft (arising from Khartoum reftel), Mahamat replied 
angrily that Sudanese always accused Chadians of thefts in 
Darfur whereas thefts in Chad, and resale with impunity in 
Darfur, was a truer picture. He lamented that in olden days, 
people only stole cattle. 
 
¶5. (C) In closing Dr. Mahamat asked for USG aid in helping to 
rebuild or develop anew the local infrastructure such as 
wells, schools, clinics, etc. that would help induce IDPs to 
return to their home villages. 
 
¶6. (C) Comment.  Dr. Mahamat and his committee are high 
profile, especially in Ndjamena and Abeche. Their performance 
in the field, however, does not yet match the rhetoric, 
planning and understanding of the crucial issues evidenced by 
headquarters personnel.  SRSG Angelo characterized the 
committee as "able to block, but not unblock," indicating 
little real clout with GOC officials in the east as well as 
the lethargic pace of moving the police decree through the 
presidency.  Even so, we judge that beyond being an Ndjamena 
clearing house for multi-ministerial issues from the 
international forces, Mahamat's focus on IDPs is well merited 
and clearly an issue where Chadian leadership is essential. 
 
 
 
GRIBBIN