VZCZCXRO3170
PP RUEHROV
DE RUEHMO #2618/01 2461239
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 021239Z SEP 08
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9788
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 002618 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/02/2018 
TAGS: PGOV PREL GG RS XD XE XF
SUBJECT: RUSSIA DOWNPLAYS ISOLATION POST-SCO SUMMIT 
 
REF: A. DUSHANBE 1108 
     ¶B. MOSCOW 2600 
     ¶C. BEIJING 3335 
 
Classified By: Ambassador John R. Beyrle for reasons 1.4 (b/d). 
 
¶1. (C) Russia has used the relative silence from countries in 
Asia and the Middle East regarding events in Georgia, coupled 
with the "ambiguous" August 28 statement from the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization (SCO), to argue that its recognition 
of Abkhazia and South Ossetia has not left it isolated. 
While some analysts have acknowledged the lack of explicit 
CIS endorsements as a diplomatic failure, many contend that 
the GOR understands why governments are taking a cautious 
approach and are satisfied with the absence of explicit 
criticism, particularly from U.S-allies such as Israel, 
Turkey and Jordan.  With Moscow caught off guard by the 
ferocity of the Western response to its actions in Georgia, 
the GOR will continue to try to exploit the relative silence 
from other capitals as support for its concept of Russia 
holding a prominent position in a multipolar world.  Russian 
officials have already begun their own regional consultations 
to shore up this support.  End summary. 
 
Moscow Muddies SCO Message on Georgia 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) Medvedev and certain Russian media outlets attempted 
to claim that the SCO supported Russian actions in Georgia in 
the face of the organization's August 28 summit statement 
that expressed "deep concern" about events in Georgia while 
also approving Russian attempts to "resolve the conflict" 
(ref A).  Medvedev thanked SCO members for their 
"understanding" of Russian actions, which the daily Vremya 
Novesti declared a diplomatic victory of sorts considering 
the current international situation.  Kommersant, however, 
declared flatly that Russia had "failed to secure support" 
from the SCO.  In an August 31 interview, Medvedev noted the 
"objective" reaction by Russia's "closest neighbors" to 
recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.  FM Lavrov 
attempted to explain away Russia's failure by saying that 
"unlike some of the major Western partners, we prefer that 
each country think for itself," and accused the U.S. of 
"scurrilous behavior" by telling SCO member-states how to 
"formulate" their positions on the Georgia.  Kazakh President 
Nazarbayev's explicit criticism of Georgia for initiating the 
hostilities - and the U.S. for ignoring this fact - has been 
played up in Russian media.  Kremlin advisor Igor Yurgins 
noted to the DCM on August 29 that the Russian media 
deliberately downplayed the emphasis the SCO communique 
placed on respecting the concept of territorial integrity. 
 
Is the CIS Dead? 
---------------- 
 
¶3. (U) Even before Russia's diplomatic setback in Dushanbe, 
some Russian analysts pointed to the failure of CIS 
member-states, with the exception of a reluctant Belarus, to 
back Russian actions in Georgia as evidence of Moscow's 
isolation.  Commentator Maxim Shevchenko cited the CIS' 
failure to play any role whatsoever as a mediator in the 
Georgian conflict as evidence of the "paralysis and political 
demise" of the organization once promoted by Russia as a 
means to retain influence with the former Soviet states.  As 
a result, Moscow not only "lost the right" to claim for 
itself a special role as "watchdog" of the post-Soviet space, 
but, left with no allies, had no "vision" of its place in 
Eurasian or world affairs.  This isolated Moscow and 
increased the chances for future conflict, leading Shevchenko 
to conclude that the "end" of the CIS was "one of the most 
important and tragic consequences" of the conflict in 
Georgia.  Another minority criticism was provided by 
independent internet site Gazeta.ru, which argued that 
whereas the U.S. was able to gain political support and the 
assistance of allies for its actions in Iraq, Afghanistan and 
Serbia, Russia has not been able to present itself as an 
"example for emulation."  Gazeta.ru concluded that Russian 
isolation was the "logical conclusion" of a foreign policy of 
"total confrontation." 
 
Don't Expect the CIS or SCO to Act Like NATO 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) Nevertheless, analysts we spoke with were skeptical 
about the real level of Russia's diplomatic isolation, 
telling us that "with the exception" of the U.S. and EU 
states, many countries were not willing to damage their 
relations with Moscow over Georgia.  Alexander Belkin of the 
Council on Foreign and Defense Policy said that the leaders 
of CIS countries "don't care about Georgia" and were not 
willing to risk alienating the West by supporting Moscow, or 
 
MOSCOW 00002618  002 OF 003 
 
 
vice-versa.  He argued that the CIS leaders did not see any 
benefit to getting involved in a conflict whose outcome they 
could not influence.  Moscow understood their position, and 
was disappointed only in the lack of a response Belarus and 
Kazakhstan, although both eventually came around to provide 
some notional support. 
 
¶5. (C) Many in the analytic community have attempted to make 
a virtue of the independence of Russia's partners, while 
downplaying the importance of the CIS as an institution. 
Contrasting the CIS member-states, which did not see a need 
to come to Moscow's defense, with the response from certain 
NATO members that typically leap to support Washington, 
Belkin argued that the CIS countries were not intimidated 
from charting their own course. 
 
¶6. (C) Both Gennadi Chufrin, Deputy Director of the Institute 
of World Economy and International Relations, and Georgiy 
Mirskiy of the Institute of Higher Economics, explained that 
the Russian leadership had determined that the utility of the 
CIS had passed and Moscow would seek to influence capitals 
bilaterally on Georgia and other issues, as Medvedev 
attempted to do on the sidelines of the SCO meeting in 
Dushanbe.  Chufrin, who criticized the CIS as being "even 
less than a talking shop," advised the GOR to form a 
"regional nucleus" consisting of Russia, Belarus, and 
Kazakhstan, the two countries Russia could convince to 
support it on Georgia, while seeking to make the SCO a more 
formidable organization.  Dimitry Danilov, Head of the 
Department of European Security Studies at the Russian 
Academy of Sciences, similarly contrasted the CIS and SCO 
with NATO, telling us that neither was "a Russian monopoly" 
oriented toward Moscow the way NATO was toward Washington. 
The member-states made "pragmatic" decisions not to involve 
themselves in a conflict that was clearly shaping up to cause 
a major rupture in Russian relations with the West. 
 
¶7. (C) Whereas Russia was prepared to recognize Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia, while maintaining a "principled stand" on 
Kosovo, analysts acknowledged that fear of a Kosovo precedent 
tempered the actions of others.  Chufrin posited that what 
drove the lack of a CIS response to Georgia was the fact that 
many of the member-states faced their own separatist 
problems.  Rather than rush to support Moscow, they chose to 
"wait and see" how the situation in Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia would play out, and how the result could impact their 
own separatist regions.  China's cautious approach to the 
issue demonstrated that Beijing sought to balance its concern 
with territorial integrity with its partnership with Moscow 
(refs B and C). 
 
Russia is "Too Big" to be Isolated 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) Chufrin argued that the silence coming from Asia 
regarding the Georgian crisis demonstrated that Russia's 
relationship with key countries such as China and India would 
not suffer.  The status quo would also prevail with smaller 
countries that wanted to expand economic ties with Russia, 
which is simply "too big" to be isolated.  Yevgeniy 
Satanovskiy, President of the Institute for Middle East 
Studies, made a similar argument regarding Russian ties with 
the Middle East.  While Syria's Assad might rush to 
Medvedev's side in an attempt to reap benefits from a public 
embrace of Russian actions in Georgia, the measured response 
from Israel and silence from moderate Arab states was more 
telling about the future of Russian relations with the 
region.  When the leader of U.S. stalwart Jordan was willing 
to appear with Medvedev on the heels of Assad and make a 
token pledge of humanitarian aid to South Ossetia, it was 
clear that Russian ties would not suffer. 
 
¶9. (C) Both Chufrin and Satanovskiy pointed to Turkey's 
independence from the U.S. line on Georgia, noting that 
Ankara proposed including Russia in the new Caucasus 
Stability and Cooperation Platform while the crisis was still 
unfolding.  Chufrin went so far as to predict that Turkey, 
with its large Abkhaz population, would determine that it was 
in its own interests to recognize Abkhazia's independence. 
Mirskiy said that Moscow was confident that in the end even 
European countries would not isolate Russia for long because 
of its ability to influence energy markets. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶10. (C) Russia will continue to spin the absence of criticism 
from Asia and the Middle East as implicit support.  Russian 
sensitivity to international criticism can be seen in its 
efforts to shore up regional backing, with Putin in 
Uzbekistan, Lavrov in Turkey, and the Armenian President 
 
MOSCOW 00002618  003 OF 003 
 
 
invited to Moscow for consultations. 
BEYRLE