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Viewing cable 08MONTERREY414, KIDNAPPINGS AND ORGANIZED CRIME CHALLENGE CIVIL SOCIETY

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08MONTERREY414 2008-09-02 19:45 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Consulate Monterrey
VZCZCXRO3500
PP RUEHCD RUEHGD RUEHHO RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHRD RUEHRS RUEHTM
DE RUEHMC #0414/01 2461945
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 021945Z SEP 08
FM AMCONSUL MONTERREY
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3131
INFO RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO PRIORITY 4132
RUEHXC/ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/HQ USNORTHCOM
RHMFISS/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
RUEHMC/AMCONSUL MONTERREY 8622
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 MONTERREY 000414 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DS FOR IP /ITA AND IP/WHA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  9/2/2018 
TAGS: KCRM PINS SNAR ASEC PGOV PHUM MX
SUBJECT: KIDNAPPINGS AND ORGANIZED CRIME CHALLENGE CIVIL SOCIETY 
 
REF: MONTERREY 390 
 
MONTERREY 00000414  001.2 OF 004 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Bruce Williamson, Consul General, Monterrey, 
Foreign Service. 
REASON: 1.4 (c), (d) 
1.   (C)  Summary.   Over the past few weeks, Conoffs have 
reached out to various players within Nuevo Leon civil society 
to gauge the effect that the increase in kidnappings since the 
beginning of the year has had on local institutions.  In our 
conversations with military and police officials, mayors, the 
press, academics, security consultants, and business leaders, we 
have found a unanimous sense of gloom, most marked among those 
government officials charged with the responsibility for 
correcting the situation.  For instance, Monterrey Tec leaders 
note that applications to that university are down 20 percent, a 
fact which university officials attribute to the increasing 
violence. 
In this tense environment, the public is looking at all 
solutions (even bad ones) -- although given the drug cartel's 
penetration of state and local police none is likely to prove 
effective in the short-term.  As a result, a number of wealthy 
families are considering how they might legally relocate to the 
U.S.   End Summary. 
 
The Military 
---------------- 
2.   (C)   The Mexican army remains the tip of the spear in 
terms of the Calderon administration's attack upon the drug 
cartels.  On August 15, Consul General, visiting Embassy ATF 
Attache, and Consulate ALAT met with General Javier Real de 
Magallanes, head of Mexico's Fourth military region (which 
consists of Nuevo Leon, Coahuila, Tamaulipas, and San Luis 
Potosi).  Normally aloof and taciturn, on this occasion he was 
expressive and direct, reflecting openly upon the challenges he 
faces in combating narco-trafficking.  The military, he said, 
had been hampered by the procedural delays involved in obtaining 
search warrants and the inability of the state and local police 
to provide any useful support for such efforts.  Indeed, he 
commented, confidential information shared with those entities 
generally made its way to the traffickers, thus frustrating 
search and seizure actions.  A 47-year Army veteran, he joined 
up in 1961, Real worried that the campaign against the cartels 
would inevitably lead the public to view the military as corrupt 
as well.  (In his remarks, Real pointedly refrained from 
attributing any responsibility to the military to deal with 
kidnapping as this, he felt, was a state police function.) 
 
3.    (C)  In contrast to previous meetings in which he appeared 
to prefer a go-it-alone approach, this time General Real 
welcomed cooperation with ATF and FBI (less so, DEA) and 
Consulate law enforcement officials are following up with him. 
Nevertheless, he indicated that in his view the situation would 
get worse before it got better.  The drug traffickers had 
expanded their product range, he stated, and now engaged in the 
smuggling of weapons, people, human organs, and pirated goods. 
In local flea markets, the price of pirate CDs had doubled over 
the past year, he observed, as the trafficking cartels had 
become more efficient in taxing the vendors of such goods.  With 
his retirement imminent next year, Real said that he wished to 
do what he could, while leaving it to his successors to continue 
the fight in the medium and long-term. 
 
Security Consultants 
------------------------- 
4.   (C)   Post spoke with two separate corporate security 
experts, one in a more public environment and the other in a 
private setting.  In the first encounter, the local Overseas 
Security Advisory Council (OSAC) Director noted that while many 
were worried about the increase in kidnappings over recent 
months, no one had any accurate figures.  While corporate 
security directors pooling their information had come up with 
158 events from January to August (68 kidnappings for ransom, 66 
"levantones" of persons with organized crime connections, and 24 
disappearances), official state figures showed only 54 such 
events.  Yet clearly the number was higher, he said, as after a 
show of hands nearly one-third of the audience (8 of 25) 
revealed that they knew of a co-worker, colleague, or friend 
whose family had been victim of a kidnapping.  Indeed, the 
public's fear had created a new industry:  virtual kidnappings, 
in which a victim receives a phone call demanding that he pay 
money or else as there is an SUV filled with armed men outside 
the person's house -- and a quick check reveals that there 
actually is.  The victim usually pays. 
 
5.  (C)   The second expert we spoke with was more pessimistic. 
His view was that the various state and local police were 
infiltrated and that, as a result, local leaders were unable to 
mount a serious effort against both the traffickers and the 
kidnapping rings.  He cited a recent case involving a father and 
a son who were themselves kidnapped within state police 
headquarters while reporting an incident involving organized 
crime.  Although this episode had been covered by the local 
 
MONTERREY 00000414  002.2 OF 004 
 
 
press, our contact noted that when several police indeed tried 
to react to the intruders their unit leader received a call from 
persons unknown on his mobile radio (on state police 
frequencies) directing him to stand down.  In yet another case, 
police arrived at the scene of an organized crime 
related-shooting only to find the victim still alive and eager 
to file a complaint.  However, in transporting the victim back 
to the police station officers had not traveled four blocks when 
gunmen intercepted their vehicles and took the complainant away. 
 None of this could have taken place, our interlocutor noted, 
unless the gunmen had strong ties to the police.  However 
well-intentioned, police leaders can do little as they 
themselves are under threat.  High-level state and local law 
enforcement officials report that they regularly receive phone 
calls from cartel front-men clearly informing them of the 
red-lines they must not cross. Earlier this month, the chief of 
the state police discovered surveillance being done by the 
traffickers on his posh San Pedro home.  Several kidnap victims 
who had been ransomed later reported that their captors had 
access to state law enforcement data bases and the state's GPS 
squad car tracking system.  This problem could become even more 
acute once Nuevo Leon's new law enforcement C-4 center becomes 
operational next year as it could provide both the police (and 
organized crime) with improved monitoring capabilities. 
 
Business and Academic Community 
------------------------- 
6.   (C)   Industry leaders and civil society are up in arms 
about the ever-increasing lack of security and making their 
concerns known.  The latest sign of the decay was the first-time 
ever appearance in Monterrey August 26-27 overnight of public 
banners posted by the Gulf cartel decrying law enforcement 
complicity with its Sinaloa cartel rivals.  While previously, 
President Calderon had received high marks from local 
opinion-makers, now he is coming under mounting criticism.  Some 
say that he has too many other priorities (energy reform, 
education, etc.); others say that, unlike Colombia's President 
Uribe, he has not personally experienced the agony of having 
close family members kidnapped and executed.  Searching for a 
way to address the situation, the wealthy municipality of San 
Pedro has distributed personal security tips to its residents 
and the city's citizen advisory committee is urging victims to 
report kidnappings and extortion.  The latter may be a hard sell 
given the possibility that the victims could well be subject to 
retaliation given the suspected involvement of the police with 
organized crime. 
 
7.  (C)  While numerous business lobby groups (CANACO, COPARMEX, 
CAINTRA, etc.) have gone to the Governor demanding immediate 
action, slowly the realization is dawning that little can be 
done in the short-term as the public security apparatus has been 
compromised.  Investment in armored cars, bodyguards, security 
training, and polygraphers is booming as those who can afford it 
begin to take protective measures.  Those less well-healed, 
unfortunately, are not able to avail themselves of such 
resources and are heading north.  Inquiries regarding long-term 
investor visas to the U.S. are rising and there are anecdotal 
reports that Monterrey residents are increasingly purchasing 
homes in Texas.  Indicative of the public mood, post officers 
have heard our business contacts wonder whether Monterrey's 
large corporations will bypass the government and take direct 
action against the kidnapping rings.  (One industrialist openly 
called for a return of the "Brigadas Blancas" vigilante squads 
of the late 1970s.)   Another sought to confirm "news" that in 
Tijuana business owners had hired Israeli consultants to take 
out the kidnapping rings. 
 
8.  (C)  One businessman told us that in retrospect, the days 
when Monterrey was a peaceful haven in tumultuous Mexico may 
have only been a transitory phase, and that now the region is 
facing the same situation as much of the rest of the country. 
Monterrey Tec leaders note that applications to that university 
are down 20 percent, a fact which university officials attribute 
to the increasing violence.  Local industry leaders realize that 
Mexico is just beginning its struggle against organized crime 
and the drug cartels and frankly worry whether the government 
will given the immense resources available to the cartels. 
 
Local Government 
---------------------- 
9.   (C)   Perhaps those most under pressure are local 
government leaders.  Mayors from all over Monterrey metropolitan 
area have expressed their frustration to us.  While they face 
increased demands from their constituents, their hands are often 
tied by: 1) the inability of either the federal government to 
mount an effective response against narco-trafficking or the 
state government against kidnapping, and 2) cartel intimidation 
of their law enforcement and judicial apparatus.  The Mayor of 
 
MONTERREY 00000414  003.2 OF 004 
 
 
wealthy San Pedro told us that corrupt judges were hindering his 
ability to close down several night clubs and casinos which were 
suspected of being narco-fronts or hangouts for organized crime. 
 He recounted stories of receiving threatening phone calls for 
his efforts, which, when investigated, turned out to have 
originated from Mexican prisons. In contrast, the Mayor of 
working-class Apodaca and the Secretary of Public Security in 
nearby Santa Catarina have made it clear that given the 
inability of anyone to protect them, the best they could do was 
merely to try to keep out of organized crime's way.  The former 
floated the idea of a collective commitment on the part of 
society to refrain from paying ransom to kidnappers (very likely 
a non-starter) while the latter pointed out that during the wave 
of executions in early 2007 a number of his officers were 
targeted and that the current corps of policemen had not 
forgotten this. 
 
10.  (C)   Following on President Calderon's recent anti-crime 
package, on August 27 Nuevo Leon state government and local 
mayors agreed to raise minimum police salaries, effective 2009, 
to approximately US$1,000 per month (roughly a five to fifteen 
percent raise).  Even with this pay hike, officers remain poorly 
compensated for the risks that they face.  Indeed, this pay 
initiative could be coming much too late as once officers forge 
links to organized crime, it is nearly impossible to sever these 
links and still remain safe. Two local legislators told Poloff 
that narcotics traffickers have either intimidated or gained 
control of municipal governments in the small towns north of 
Monterrey (Cienega de Flores, Salinas Victoria, Juarez, China, 
Sabinas Hidalgo, etc.) lying along the trafficking routes to the 
United States.  They worry that drug money could easily flow 
into Nuevo Leon political campaigns, just as they say it has in 
the neighboring state of Tamaulipas. 
 
11   (C)  The problem is even more acute in smaller 
municipalities in rural areas.  On August 15, CG and EconOffs 
met with the Mayor of Juchipila, Zacatecas, a small town in the 
southern most part of Zacatecas, near the border with the state 
of Jalisco.   It appears to lie along a strategic transit route 
that is most likely used to transport narcotics from Guadalajara 
to the North.  Three other small towns near Juchipila are also 
along this transit route; Apozol, Juchipla, and Jalpa.  The 
Mayor reported that he and the three mayors of the nearby towns 
are becoming increasingly concerned over the growing presence of 
drug traffickers in their communities.  He believes that 
Southern Zacatecas is becoming a battle ground for the Gulf and 
Sinaloa cartels, which are seeking to recruit new members and 
territory.  Although there have not yet been executions in 
Juchipila or the other towns, the Mayor said that levantones 
(express kidnappings for a specific purpose) have greatly 
increased.  He believes cartel members are kidnapping members of 
the rival cartel in order to force them into joining theirs.  He 
said that there are now armed men in the town that openly walk 
around with their weapons, and who are quick to threaten anyone 
who gets in their way.  Local police are not doing anything 
about these or other narco-related crimes because they are 
either corrupt or too afraid to take action.  In fact, earlier 
in the year, several Juchipila police quit, leaving an already 
small force even more short-handed. He noted that despite the 
growing influence of drug traffickers in the area, no military 
operations have taken place there.  Given the lack of jobs and 
activities in the town, he believes that youths are even more 
susceptible to falling prey to drugs and drug dealing. 
 
12.   (C)  The Mayor reported that he and the other mayors have 
requested assistance from the state government, specifically the 
state's Secretary General Carlos Pinto Nunez, but that their 
pleas have been ignored.  Neither the state nor local 
authorities, he concluded, are equipped to deal with the growing 
power of the cartels operating in the state.  By chance, on 
August 29 post officers met Pinto, giving us a chance to hear 
his side of the story.  Pinto, a two-time former Attorney 
General for the State of Zacatecas, said that, in his view, the 
state police had not been infiltrated by the cartels, but that 
they had no capacity to react to cartel violence.  While 1,500 
of Zacatecas' 2600 state and local police had received training 
recently, he said, they neither possessed the weaponry, 
equipment, intel capacity nor the infrastructure to challenge 
organized crime.  He feared that the situation would only worsen 
as the state's security forces were clearly outmatched. 
 
The Press 
----------- 
13.   (C)    The press has come under similar assault.  Reftel 
reports upon the dilemma faced by Monterrey's prestigious daily 
"El Norte" and its publishers as they confront specific threats 
from the traffickers.  We are still trying to determine whether 
a relative of El Norte's founder was the victim in a recent 
 
MONTERREY 00000414  004.2 OF 004 
 
 
kidnapping near several Consulate residences, and, if so, 
whether the crime was connected to the previous threats. 
 
Comment. 
------------ 
14.    (C)   The next step for Nuevo Leon is not at all clear. 
Everyone agrees that the rule of law needs to be strengthened 
but no one knows how to do this in the short-term.  In addition, 
while the public has fixated on the wave of kidnappings as the 
principal threat to security, the kidnappers only operate with 
impunity because the narco-traffickers have so weakened the law 
enforcement and judicial apparatus.  With respect to the health 
of civil society, with gubernatorial and congressional elections 
upcoming in August 2009, the situation is only likely to get 
worse before it gets better.  The challenge will be to prevent 
narco-money from infiltrating into the coffers of the various 
candidates, thereby making those officials that are eventually 
elected beholden to organized crime masters. 
WILLIAMSON