O 241712Z SEP 08
FM AMEMBASSY LA PAZ
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8648
INFO AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PRIORITY 
AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES PRIORITY 
AMEMBASSY LIMA PRIORITY 
AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO PRIORITY 
CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY
NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

S E C R E T LA PAZ 002083 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/23/2018 
TAGS: AMER ASEC AMGT PTER CASC BL
SUBJECT: EMERGENCY ACTION COMMITTEE MEETING-LA PAZ 9/23 
1600 
 
REF: LA PAZ 2000 AND PREVIOUS 
 
Classified By: RSO Patrick J. Moore, reasons 1.4c,d 
 
¶1. (S/NF) Summary:  The Emergency Action Committee (EAC, 
consisting of EXEC, RSO, CONS, MGT, GSO, ECOP, DEA, NAS, 
USAID, ORA, DAO, MSG, MILGRP, IPC, MED, SSAT, and others) met 
September 23 at 1600 to discuss the current situation in 
Santa Cruz, where government supporters (some armed) have 
surrounded the city.  Some government-aligned leaders have 
announced that they will enter the city on September 24, a 
local holiday for Santa Cruz Day.  The Santa Cruz Consular 
Agency, which has been open to provide emergency American 
citizen services, will be closed on September 24 due to the 
local holiday.  Post already sent a warden message warning 
American citizens about possible violence on September 24 and 
will send another warden message alerting American citizens 
to the fact that American Airlines has canceled flights into 
Bolivia until September 29.  All official Americans have been 
relocated from Santa Cruz. NAS locally engaged staff (LES) 
assigned to do maintenance in Santa Cruz will also have 
September 24 off due to the local holiday.  NAS Amcit 
maintenance contractors are also present in Santa Cruz, 
having declined to be relocated.  End summary. 
 
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Santa Cruz Situation 
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¶2. (S/NF) On September 23, the government asked its 
supporters to temporarily suspend the siege of Santa Cruz for 
48 hours.  Contacts report that the government-aligned groups 
are letting some vehicles through blockades, but it is not 
clear if this is universal nor how long it will last.  EAC 
agreed that even should the 48 hour truce succeed, problems 
will start up again after that unless the opposition gives in 
to President Morales' demands. Sources report that both sides 
are armed with personal weapons and ready to fight, with the 
opposition-aligned Santa Cruz Youth Union and university 
students reportedly preparing a trap for the government 
forces which could lead to a bloodbath.  EAC agreed to 
closely watch the situation, since the events in Santa Cruz 
could affect Post's decisions on possible further drawdown 
and defensive posture in La Paz. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Impact of ATPDEA Announcement 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶3. (S/NF) We understand that an announcement of the decision 
to suspend ATPDEA benefits for Bolivia may come as early as 
Friday September 26.  EAC discussed possibility that this 
announcement could prompt government-aligned groups to 
protest at the Embassy: such protests are likely, especially 
if things go badly for the government forces in Santa Cruz on 
September 24.  EAC discussed the possibility of working with 
DC to delay the announcement if the situation warrants, while 
noting that the events of 2003's "Black October" make October 
a bad month for any USG actions against Bolivia.  Delaying 
the decision until October might not actually be helpful. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Possible Impact of Goni Case 
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¶4. (S/NF) EAC discussed State Department's planned amicus 
curae brief in the case against ex-President Goni Sanchez de 
Lozada (who is a much-hated figure in El Alto and among 
government supporters.)  If the amicus curae brief becomes 
public in October, this could be another goad to the 
government and increase the chance of violent protests at the 
Embassy. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Ordered Departure Conditions Not Met 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶5. (S/NF) Currently no ordered-departure tripwires have been 
passed, although EAC classified three tripwires as "still 
green but verging to amber": 
 
-international airports closed: airports are still open, but 
cancellation of American Airlines flights significantly 
decreases ability to leave via commercial means; 
 
-level of violence and threats to Amcits: level of violence 
is still minimal, but the next 48 hours in Santa Cruz could 
be critical; however, there is no current information on 
specific threats to Americans or American interests. 
 
-evidence suggesting government or military is helping 
violent groups: some unconfirmed reports suggest that the 
military has been trucking protesters to the siege blockades 
in Santa Cruz. 
 
¶6. (S/NF) Post has already taken some of the preliminary 
steps that precede an ordered departure, however: personnel 
have been drawn down via authorized departure.  Charge spoke 
with the Vice Foreign Minister to reiterate concern over 
security and the safety of our personnel.  Charge also 
explained to the Vice Foreign Minister the goals of the SSAT 
military personnel in assisting with evacuation planning; 
once the Vice Foreign Minister understood, he agreed to 
instruct his consular colleagues to issue visas to other SSAT 
team members which had been refused due to the Bolivian 
government's concerns about military personnel entering the 
country. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - 
Actions Considered 
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¶7. (S/NF) The EAC reviewed actions to take and notifications 
needed for Mission personnel and U.S. wardens. The following 
is provided: 
 
a. Sections and agencies will look at personnel and assets in 
El Alto (unmarked USAID warehouses and MILGRP facilities 
located at the Bolivian air force base at the airport), 
preparing for possible violent protests after the ATPDEA 
announcement or in conjunction with the Goni case. 
 
b. Post will follow up with Washington to find out more about 
the probable timing of the ATPDEA announcement and discuss 
modification of that timing if deemed appropriate. 
 
c. EAC will develop, with SSAT, a plan for immediate response 
in the event of a sudden emergency, i.e. a coup attempt or 
President Morales' death.  Section and agency heads will send 
inputs to RSO. 
 
d. Front office will seek Foreign Ministry assurances that 
the government will facilitate an evacuation in the event one 
is needed.  (Note: The government has consistently said it 
will honor its Vienna Convention responsibilities to protect 
the Mission, although these reassurances were undermined by 
the government's apparent role in organizing the June 9 
demonstrations at the chancery.  End note.) 
 
e. Sections and agencies will consider where they might set 
up a secondary office, should access to the Embassy or 
alternate command centers be compromised.  Additionally, EAC 
and RSO will look at the advisability of "cluster housing" 
should the mission need to go into hunker-down mode. 
 
f. USAID will be prepared to set up the alternate command 
center on September 24, if needed. 
 
g. EAC will meet again on 9/24 to assess situation in Santa 
Cruz, if needed. 
 
h. POCs are RSO Patrick Moore (moorepj@state.gov) and DRSO 
Daniel Hernandez (hernandezd@state.gov), IVG 547-8300. 
URS