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Viewing cable 08LAPAZ2052, BOLIVIA: EAC WORKING GROUP MEETING 9/19

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08LAPAZ2052 2008-09-22 21:18 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy La Paz
VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHLP #2052/01 2662118
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 222118Z SEP 08
FM AMEMBASSY LA PAZ
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8604
INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
S E C R E T LA PAZ 002052 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/16/2018 
TAGS: AMER ASEC AMGT PTER BL
SUBJECT: BOLIVIA: EAC WORKING GROUP MEETING 9/19 
 
REF: LA PAZ 2035 
 
Classified By: RSO Patrick J. Moore, reasons 1.4c,d 
 
1. (S/NF) The Emergency Action Committee Working Group 
(EACWG) met 9/19 with members of SSAT team to discuss 
contingency planning for low probability but high impact 
event: President Evo Morales removed from power either by 
death or coup.   EACWG noted that while this remains a low 
probability event, there has been increased chatter about the 
possibility in recent weeks.  A/DCM explained that Post needs 
to be fully prepared for immediate action, and requested SSAT 
assistance in updating hunker-down and evacuation plans 
compiled by Post with RST help in December 2007. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Likely Scenarios and their Implications 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
2. (S/NF) Should something befall President Morales, his 
supporters would doubtless blame the USG.  If Morales died 
and Vice President Garcia Linera took over-as is his 
constitutional responsibility-Post would anticipate a 
somewhat-permissive environment, albeit with some anti-USG 
backlash.  If a military coup took place, the coup-leaders 
would likely cooperate with Post's attempts to evacuate, but 
resistance in El Alto would be significant, resulting in a 
non-permissive environment. (Note: EACWG agreed that the 
military leadership does not seem to want the responsibility 
of toppling a popular president.  The military is also 
currently deployed around the country, and many conscripts in 
the divisions still near the capital are indigenous youth 
naturally loyal to Morales.  End note.) 
 
3. (S/NF) All present agreed that there would be very little 
time--a thirty-minute window, perhaps--to react to news of 
Evo's death or ouster before the anti-USG reaction began. 
SSAT team emphasized that a full NEO takes a minimum of two 
weeks to begin and six weeks to remove 20,000 people from the 
country (assuming a permissive environment) so it is 
essential that mission personnel and non-official Amcits be 
prepared to hunker down for a considerable period. 
 
4. (S/NF) EACWG discussed the fact that the traditional 
pattern in Bolivia was for the various opposing sides to take 
matters "to the brink" and then back down.  The pattern may 
have changed with President Evo Morales.  Whether Morales 
"wins" or "loses", the outcome is not positive for Post.  If 
Morales wins, his constitution will allow him a potential two 
more terms of five years each during which he will be free to 
further scapegoat the USG.  If Morales loses, he has declared 
multiple times that he will only leave the Palace dead, 
placing Post in one of the above contingency situations. 
Some sources suggest that Morales is planning for increased 
violence in the upcoming weeks. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - 
Logistics and Planning 
- - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
5. (S/NF) SSAT announced that it would use the weekend of 
9/20 and 9/21 to begin investigating the locations specified 
in the current evacuation plan and looking for alternate 
routes out of La Paz.  The SSAT will likely be in Bolivia for 
two weeks.  Additional military personnel may try to come to 
support, but we need to be mindful that the Foreign Ministry 
is tracking visa requests and that given the sensitivities of 
the Morales government we need to be careful about the number 
or personnel we bring in. 
 
6. (S/NF) Given the extreme logistical difficulty of an 
evacuation scenario for La Paz and Bolivia as a whole (with 
no sea access, easily-blockaded roads, altitude issues in La 
Paz, and a potentially hostile El Alto), SSAT will also look 
at the advisability having early triggers for considering 
Ordered Departure.  EACWG agreed that the Bolivian government 
would likely cooperate in a non-emergency Ordered Departure, 
since much of Morales' rhetoric has been about 'getting rid' 
of the USG presence.  Opposition forces would not be expected 
to impede an Ordered Departure or a NEO.  SSAT mentioned that 
given La Paz's challenges in an emergency, Ordered Departure 
might have to be skipped and Post might have to go directly 
from an initial hunker-down situation to a NEO.  EACWG 
welcomed any recommendations based on SSAT's experience and 
expertise and will consider them at the country team level. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Possibility of a Public Diplomacy Campaign 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
7. (S/NF) SSAT raised the possibility of a public diplomacy 
campaign emphasizing the USG's policy against coups and the 
Mission's non-involvement in any so-called "conspiracy" with 
the opposition.  EACWG will look into the possibility, but 
emphasized the fact that Evo Morales has built a cult of 
personality around himself, in large part based on demonizing 
the USG.  It is unlikely that, even given many months, a 
public diplomacy campaign could alter popular perception of 
the situation, and currently the situation does not allow 
Post that much time. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Santa Cruz, Cochabamba, and other major cities 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
8. (S/NF) Should violence intensify (after the assassination 
of an opposition prefect, for example) in areas outside of La 
Paz, fewer official Americans are currently at risk because 
of the relocation and authorized departure process of the 
past week.  However, there are still non-official Americans 
throughout the country and roughly thirteen DEA personnel 
have just returned to Cochabamba.  SSAT members pointed out 
that the DEA and NAS presence in cities outside of La Paz had 
previously been included in the plans to evacuate 
non-official Americans from these areas.  With these 
personnel removed to La Paz, the plan for evacuating 
non-official Americans in other areas must be revised. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Discretion in Contacts, Actions 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
9. (S/NF) A/DCM reminded SSAT team that Bolivia is a 
high-risk environment for human intelligence against USG 
personnel.  EACWG also asked that SSAT team use discretion in 
talking with contacts, since discussion of some of our plans 
could cause panic or re-enforce government paranoia about our 
role. 
 
- - - - - - - - - 
Follow-up Action 
- - - - - - - - - 
 
10. (S/NF) SSAT will brief the EACWG after conducting initial 
surveys.  SSAT agreed to work to develop the contingency 
plans requested by the EACWG. 
 
11. (U) POCs are RSO Patrick Moore (moorepj@state.gov) IVG 
547-8300 and EconOff Beth Mader (maderea@state.gov) IVG 
547-8052. 
URS