VZCZCXRO3061
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1336 2461113
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 021113Z SEP 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1794
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS KHARTOUM 001336 
 
DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, SE WILLIAMSON, AF/SPG 
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: MACHAR EXPECTS SEPTEMBER 6 MEETING WITH LRA 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: In an August 28 meeting with ConGen Juba, GOSS 
Vice President Riek Machar expressed his confidence that LRA Leader 
Joseph Kony would meet him in Rikwangba on September 6 to discuss 
the Juba Peace Agreement.  Machar thought it possible Kony would 
sign the agreement on that day, although he did not have Kony's 
commitment to do so.  Despite Machar's confidence, others, including 
UNMIS, tell ConGen Juba they remain skeptical an agreement will ever 
be signed by Kony. End summary. 
 
¶2. (SBU) ConGen Juba met GOSS VP and Chief Mediator for the LRA 
Peace Talks Riek Machar on August 28 to discuss the latest 
developments in the LRA peace talks.  A meeting with Kony had been 
planned in Rikwangba on August 24, and Machar explained that date 
had fallen through due to miscommunications within the SPLA.  He 
claimed that SPLA units, not properly informed of the gathering, 
opened fire on advance LRA units on August 22, and they returned 
fire.  Both sides then fell back with no reported casualties on 
either side. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Machar said that Kony was advised of the reasons for the 
misunderstanding and accepted to reset the meeting for September 6. 
 
¶4. (SBU) ConGen asked Machar if he really thought Kony would show up 
on September 6 given his failure to appear at numerous, previously 
scheduled meetings.. In addition to this, Kony's   paranoia was 
legendary and  his troops had just been in a fire fight with the 
SPLA.   In reply, Machar expressed confidence that this time Kony 
would actually come.  Asked why he was so sure, Machar answered that 
according to his sources, many northern Ugandans who had opposed the 
peace deal now understood that it was a good deal for them and were 
pressing Kony to sign.  In addition, Kony was no longer asking for 
any food or support as a precondition, and he understood the 
agreement better now that he had had time to study it for himself. 
Particularly on the issue of the ICC indictments, the recent move to 
indict GNU President Omar al Bashir had, according to Machar, caused 
Kony to realize that he was in a stronger position than Bashir to 
deal with the ICC, since the Juba Peace Agreement called for a 
deferment of his indictments so he could face justice in Uganda. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Asked who would be going to Rikwangba on September 6, 
Machar said he would, along with UN representatives (including UN 
Special Envoy Joaquim Chisanno), Government of Uganda 
representatives, and, he hoped, members of the monitoring group. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Machar admitted that currently the September 6 meeting was 
set only to discuss the Juba Peace Agreement, but he said he thought 
the chances were good that Kony would sign it. Kony  understood now 
that if he signed, an implementation period would follow in which he 
could verify that peace agreement conditions were being met before 
he would be required to lay down his arms. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Comment: September 6 is the latest in a series of proposed 
meetings with Kony dating back to April, and ConGen Juba shares 
widespread skepticism outside of VP Machar's office that the elusive 
LRA leader will finally show up.  Increasingly, those outside of 
Machar's office are talking of "Plan B," to go after Kony 
militarily.  The problem is, Kony will be a hard man to catch, even 
with the forces of South Sudan, Uganda and the DRC in combined 
pursuit.  He has a large area in which to operate and has proven 
himself adept at avoiding capture while terrorizing local 
populations and wreaking general havoc. 
 
FERNANDEZ