VZCZCXRO7610
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1332/01 2460457
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 020457Z SEP 08 ZDK CTG RUEHLG 2318 2521015
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1785
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 001332 
 
DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, SE WILLIAMSON, AF/SPG, DRL 
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: MORE OFFICIALS WITHDRAW FROM DARFUR STATE POSITIONS 
FOLLOWING ATTACK ON KALMA 
 
KHARTOUM 00001332  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
¶1. (U) SUMMARY:  On August 31, 18 SPLM officials formally withdrew 
from their posts in the state governments of North, South, and West 
Darfur in protest over the August 25 Kalma attack. Other opposition 
groups including SLM/MM may also withdraw, as Minni Minnawi vowed on 
August 30 that he will authorize the suspension of SLM/MM members 
following SPLM's decision. These moves follow the resignation of six 
NCP Fur leaders on August 27.  They later told poloff that the Kalma 
camp attack may unite Darfur's many tribes and political parties 
against the NCP.  END SUMMARY 
 
¶2.  (U) On August 30, the Minister of Agriculture for South Darfur, 
Omar Adam, contacted poloff stating that three ministers and 15 
members of parliament had formally frozen their participation in the 
North, South, and West Darfur state governments.  Adam announced 
that after days of speaking with SPLM General Secretary Pagan Amum 
and Foreign Minister Deng Alor, First Vice President Salva Kiir had 
finally approved the SPLM suspension from state government in 
Darfur. (Note:  Adam previously told the press on August 27 that he 
would soon be resigning, an announcement that was misrepresented in 
press reports as his actual resignation.  End Note.)  Adam later 
sent poloff a press release of this announcement:  "After 
consultation with the SPLM leadership in Sudan, the members of the 
SPLM participating in the Government of National Unity in the three 
Darfurian states have decided to freeze their participation and 
activity in the GNU.  This is a result of the developments in Darfur 
that are becoming more and more complicated every day.  [This 
decision has been made] after the latest events that occurred in the 
Kalma IDP camp [resulting in a large number of innocent victims 
killed and others wounded.  [This attack was carried out] without 
our knowledge or consultation as members of the state government. 
We have decided not to be a part of these criminal acts committed by 
the Government of National Unity."  (Note:  The full text of this 
document will be translated and sent to AF/SPG and the office of the 
SE.  End Note.) 
 
SPLM 
- - - 
¶3.  (SBU)  On August 28 and 29, Adam previously told poloff about 
his decision to push his SPLM leaders on this. Adam emphasized that 
the NCP continues to act without consulting their partners in the 
GNU.  Adam commented, "Anything related to security or money, they 
do in a dark secret place.  When it comes to things like arming the 
janjaweed, paying for their mercenary work, or arming other militias 
or tribes - we never know what they are doing."  Adam stated that as 
a member of the South Darfur cabinet, he previously confronted the 
Governor of South Darfur about the movement of military convoys, to 
which the Wali dismissively responded "these security issues should 
be left to NISS and the military." 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Adam labeled the South Darfur Governor's response to Kalma 
as "entirely unacceptable."  Only hours after the attack, Adam went 
to the Wali's house and asked, "Why didn't you visit the hospital?" 
After the Wali jokingly responded "I'm not a doctor," Adam reported 
that he grew very angry saying, "That is right, but you are 
responsible for the doctors and the whole hospital, and you should 
be there."  The next day, Adam again confronted the Wali, 
facetiously encouraging GoS forces to search for weapons at areas 
held by Government militias and paramilitary forces. "If you are 
going to search for weapons, you better go to Falluja (the area in 
Nyala occupied by the Border Intelligence Forces.) You'll find big 
weapons there," stated Adam. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Adam reiterated that the SPLM has not been treated as an 
equal partner in the GNU in South Darfur, something "I know better 
than anyone else, as I am the highest ranking SPLM official in this 
state."  Adam stated that although they are partners, the SPLM could 
take a more critical position of the NCP.  Adam applauded the SPLM's 
decision not to sign a statement of condemnation against the ICC. 
Adam also boasted that he refused to meet President Bashir during 
his recent visit to Nyala as "my mother still resides in an IDP 
camp, and Bashir talks about peace, stability, and development?" 
Adam remarked that he is not concerned about losing his government 
position, as "I am more than a government minister.  I am graduate 
of Al-Ahzar University, a leader of the SPLA, a Muslim, a soldier, 
and a commander." 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Adam stated that he has been in constant communication 
with SPLM leadership, along with the small Umma faction of Masar 
Abdallah Masar and the Democratic Unionist Party.  According to 
Adam, coordination between the opposition movements is required, as 
"isolated personal resignations will do nothing at this point." 
Although he respects the NCP ministers' decision to resign, he 
believes that they should have coordinated better as "it just looks 
like an ethnic thing when six members of the same party and tribe 
 
KHARTOUM 00001332  002 OF 003 
 
 
resign."  Adam ended the August 30 conversation saying, "My people 
are suffering.  I fought 21 years in the South and for what?  The 
situation is worse here than it was there." 
 
SLM/MINNAWI 
- - - - - - - 
¶7.  (SBU) On August 30, SLM/MM chairman and Senior Assistant to the 
President, Minni Minnawi, called Adam via satellite phone to discuss 
the SPLM's withdrawal.  Poloff overheard the conversation, where 
Adam made his pitch for a united opposition party suspension from 
the Darfur state governments.  Adam told Minnawi, "If people from 
the NCP are resigning over this, what are we waiting for?" Later, 
Minnawi told poloff that he will encourage his representatives to 
resign, as long as the SPLM has a clear position on the issue. 
Minnawi reiterated that there must be one position for all 
opposition movements and emphasized that "this could change things 
in Darfur."  Minnawi reiterated that things are "only secure and 
stable because the rains are limiting movement right now." (Note: 
Minnawi later told poloff that he had just received a UN delegation 
mandated by UNSC 1779 to monitor the weapons ban in Darfur. End 
Note.) 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Minnawi called poloff again on August 31 and stated that 
he had heard the news regarding the SPLM suspension in the Darfurian 
state governments, but that he was not yet able to announce a 
corresponding withdrawal of SLM/MM.  Minnawi stated that internal 
division and NCP meddling in his movement could greatly complicate 
this potential move, specifically mentioning two prominent 
dissenters Mustafa Tirab and Rayah Mahmoud.  "The SPLM is much 
better organized than we are, and I do not know if our movement can 
take this right now," stated Minnawi.  Minnawi promised to contact 
Post on September 1 with an update. 
 
PREVIOUS FUR RESIGNATIONS FROM THE NCP 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
¶9.  (SBU) On August 30, an NCP Fur leader who recently resigned from 
the NCP, Salah Fadul, explained to poloff why he resigned from the 
government. (Note:  Fadul was appointed to his position as a tribal 
leader of the Fur by the NCP in order to weaken the Fur traditional 
leadership led by his relative Ahmed Adam Rajal, the Maqdoum of the 
Fur in Nyala) .)  Fadul stated that he withdrew from the government 
along with the six others "to stand with the innocent in the face of 
this revolting incident."  He claimed that his resignation has the 
support of all the people of Darfur, and that it is "a very rare 
thing for anyone in the government to resign."  Fadul remarked that 
he expects other NCP leaders to follow his move, naming Jaafar Abd 
Al Halim, an NCP representative in the Transitional Darfur Regional 
Authority (TDRA) as one likely official who may resign.  Fadul first 
told poloff that his resignation was final, but later retreated from 
this position stating, "I could return to my post if the people of 
Kalma insist that I return." 
 
¶10.  (SBU) Fadul showed a statement to poloff with signatures of 
resignation of the six NCP Fur officials.  The statement calls for 
dialogue with the people of Kalma camp and Darfur as a whole, 
demands medical treatment for the victims, calls for an 
investigation into the incident, and declares that Darfur's tribal 
leaders will work with whatever parties seek stability, peace, and 
development in Darfur. (Note:  A translation of this document will 
be sent to AF/SPG and the office of the Special Envoy.  End Note.) 
Fadul separately stated that the wounded should also be compensated 
for their injuries, and blood money should be paid to families of 
the deceased. 
 
¶11.  (SBU) Like many other contacts, Fadul stated that the Kalma 
camp attack, should result in uniting Darfur's many tribes and 
opposition parties against the NCP.  According to Fadul, although 
the Fur suffered the most casualties, the Dajo and Bergo were also 
killed and this common loss will help unite a diversity of ethnic 
groups. 
 
COMMENT 
- - - - - 
¶12.  (SBU) Although the state governments carry little real weight 
compared to Khartoum, this is a strong symbolic move on the part of 
the SPLM and any other opposition party that may follow.  The fact 
that even some NCP collaborators resigned underscored the anger felt 
in Darfur. Whether Minnawi and his mostly Zaghawa movement will live 
up to his word and now withdraw remains to be seen but it would be 
an important step of solidarity with the victims. Most importantly, 
time will tell whether this incident will turn into the formative 
event that could unite the diverse people of Darfur.  The GNU 
recognizes that it made a mistake in Kalma but is unlikely to take 
any substantive actions to publicly address the incident (it will 
 
KHARTOUM 00001332  003 OF 003 
 
 
probably punish someone quietly at some point - too little, too 
late).  This in turn, further estranges the regime from the West and 
from an already alienated population in Darfur at a time when it 
seeks support for an Article 16 resolution in the UNSC to postpone 
ICC action against Bashir.  Unfortunately, as we have previously 
observed, the regime becomes paralyzed with indecision when it comes 
to redressing the wrongs of its security apparatus, even when it 
would be in its interest to do so. 
 
FERNANDEZ