VZCZCXRO2659
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDU RUEHKUK RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKH #1329/01 2451457
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 011457Z SEP 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1778
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001329 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR A/S FRAZER, S/E WILLIAMSON, AND AF/SPG 
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/12/2018 
TAGS: ASEC EAID KPKO PHUM PREF PREL UN AU SU
SUBJECT: REGIME INSIDER ACKNOWLEDGES KALMA CAMP MASSACRE, 
IN PRIVATE 
 
REF: A. KHARTOUM 1315 
     ¶B. STATE 93239 
     ¶C. 07 KHARTOUM 1989 
     ¶D. 07 KHARTOUM 1987 
     ¶E. 07 KHARTOUM 1795 
 
Classified By: CDA Alberto M. Fernandez, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: CDA Fernandez called on MFA Undersecretary 
Mutriff Siddiq September 1 to discuss the Kalma Camp attack. 
CDA Fernandez told Siddiq that events in Kalma camp in South 
Darfur constituted a massacre of civilians, including many 
women and children, and urged the GOS to bring the 
perpetrators to justice in a swift and transparent manner. He 
also expressed concern for the public behavior of the 
defendants and observers of the John Granville murder trial, 
and called on Siddiq to keep a close eye on proceedings as 
they unfold. Siddiq did not disagree with CDA Fernandez's 
characterization of Kalma camp, and expressed appreciation 
for the USG's restraint in reacting to the incident. He 
stated that the killings were not ordered by Khartoum, that 
security forces have been given strict orders to back off 
from the camp, and that President Bashir has ordered a 
serious investigation into Kalma, but that any fallout from 
the incident would likely occur out of the public eye. CDA 
Fernandez also urged Siddiq to allow him to travel to Kalma 
camp during the week of September 8, but Siddiq was 
non-committal. End Summary. 
 
¶2. (C) CDA Fernandez noted that the U.S. had explicitly and 
repeatedly warned the GOS in November 2007 about unilateral, 
violent action in Kalma Camp. CDA had spoken to Siddiq, to 
the South Darfur Governor and to the Humanitarian Affairs 
Commissioner at that time. Then U/S Henrietta Fore and SE 
Natsios had delivered similar messages. The regime had then 
agreed not to take such action and to coordinate its steps 
with UNAMID (AMIS at that time) and with NGOs (reftels c-e). 
Fernandez expressed grave concern about the August 25 
military incursion at Kalma camp (reftel a) describing it as 
a dangerous and foolish incident that is a setback to any 
plans to advance a dialogue with the US. He told Siddiq that 
information received by the Embassy showed that the Central 
Reserve Police had used high caliber weapons against 
defenseless civilians, and that it without a doubt 
constituted a massacre of women and children. Siddiq admitted 
this was essentially true. "I don't disagree with what you 
said," he stated, calling the Kalma incident a "stupid" act. 
He acknowledged that observers in Nyala have tied the Kalma 
camp incident to an August 8 visit there by the Ministers of 
Defense, Interior and Intelligence, but denied that Khartoum 
had played a role. Central government involvement in the 
Kalma incident was "doubtful," he said, adding "whoever 
ordered this has hurt the government" noting the strenuous 
efforts by the regime to curry favor with the international 
community since the July 14 ICC announcement on a possible 
Bashir indictment. He did not offer any speculation about who 
bore responsibility but agreed that the Wali (Governor) of 
South Darfur was weak and ineffectual. CDA noted that Central 
Reserve Police units are not controlled by local government. 
 
¶3. (C) Siddiq agreed with CDA that the incident was not only 
terribly unfortunate, but also extremely ill-timed given the 
ICC's deliberation on charges against President Bashir and 
the possibility of a resumption of bilateral talks with the 
USG. He acknowledged that the Kalma incident made favorable 
outcomes for either of these issues more difficult to achieve 
and even questioned whether someone was attempting to 
sabotage the NCP. "It's as if someone has designs on 
undermining the government," he mused. He stated that the 
President has ordered a full investigation, and noted that 
the actions taken by the Central Reserve Police in Kalma 
violated direct instructions from the President to avoid any 
activity in IDP camps without the involvement of the 
international community. "We want full transparency" in the 
camps, he said. 
 
¶4. (C) Siddiq added that one of the IDP leaders who had been 
killed had actually met with President Bashir during his 
recent Darfur trip. He said that while there were big 
problems in Kalma Camp, like weapons, criminals and drugs, 
this did not excuse civilians being killed. CDA clarified 
that the civilians were killed by government forces, "these 
units are janjaweed in uniform," and not in some crossfire. 
He added that vehicle mounted anti-aircraft machine guns 
 
KHARTOUM 00001329  002 OF 002 
 
 
(12.7 mm "Dushkas") were turned on civilians. Siddiq 
responded that "the rebels also have Dushkas," and CDA 
Fernandez agreed but noted "they don't have them in Kalma 
Camp or in (GOS-held) Nyala." CDA told Siddiq that IDPs fear 
another similar attack in the coming days. Siddiq said that 
very strong and clear orders have been given to units not to 
go into the camp again (without UNAMID coordination) and even 
to back off from some IDPs who are blocking the 
Khartoum-Nyala railroad line just outside the camp in protest. 
 
¶5. (C) Siddiq expressed appreciation for the USG's restraint 
to date in reacting to the Kalma camp incident. "The way you 
are handling this is helping, not hurting us," he said, 
describing how aggressive criticism of the regime causes it 
to cover for itself. CDA warned Siddiq that the situation may 
change when more information about the massacre becomes 
public. He told Siddiq that the only way for the NCP to get 
ahead of the story is to bring the perpetrators quickly to 
justice in a highly transparent and very public way. While 
agreeing that this was a good idea, Siddiq indicated that 
such steps are unlikely, and that any fallout from the 
incident would occur out of the public eye. CDA Fernandez 
recalled that Arab regimes often prefer to launder their 
dirty laundry in private but this is a situation where "if 
you have clean hands," the regime should act urgently and 
publicly. Siddiq ruefully admitted that "we will probably 
handle it like those regimes you describe." CDA urged Siddiq 
to allow him to travel to Kalma camp the week of September 8 
(the request had been made before the attack), but Siddiq was 
non-committal. 
 
¶6. (C) CDA also expressed concern about the conduct of some 
of those attending the trial of John Granville, which resumed 
on August 31 (septel.)  He stated that while the USG fully 
believes in due process, respects Sudanese sovereignty and is 
not seeking to interfere in any way with the conduct of the 
trial, the behavior of some of those present was extremely 
disconcerting. He noted that a number of people outside the 
courtroom had treated the defendants as heroes. He also noted 
that at least one of the  accused had spat on a western 
female correspondent covering the trial. Siddiq was receptive 
to the CDA's concerns. 
 
¶7. (C) Comment: Despite a subdued Siddiq's frank 
acknowledgment of the difficulties created by the Kalma camp 
incident, it appears there will be no effort by the NCP to 
publicly arrest and try the perpetrators, despite our urging. 
At best, there may be a shuffling of responsible officials to 
other jobs and some quick blood money paid to the families. 
It is unclear whether the incursion into Kalma was ordered by 
Khartoum although this is, once again, a situation where the 
regime bears ultimate responsibility no matter who gave a 
specific order.  In some ways it would be even more 
disturbing if a rogue unit from the Central Reserve Police 
bore responsibility without orders from Khartoum. Some of 
Central Reserve Police units in Darfur are composed of former 
janjaweed fighters (now incorporated into the Ministry of 
Interior as CRP) whom the regime believes it needs to assert 
control in the region. Thus, it is unlikely the NCP would 
take strong action against such CRP members.  This is a 
mistake because the regime needs to hold those in its ranks 
accountable (in addition to demonstrating greater command and 
control) if it has any possible chance of finding a solution 
to the Darfur conflict, not to mention making real progress 
in its already poor relationship with the West. 
FERNANDEZ