VZCZCXRO2632
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1323/01 2451246
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 011246Z SEP 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1767
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 001323 
 
DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, SE WILLIAMSON, AF/SPG 
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: GOVERNANCE CAPACITY IN SOUTHERN SUDAN 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: The Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) was 
created with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA) in 
¶2005.  No government of its kind existed before it in Southern Sudan 
-- the earlier Executive Council that resulted from the 1972 Addis 
Ababa Accords did not have anywhere near the mandate for governance 
provided for the GOSS in the CPA.  That the GOSS functions as well 
as it does is a tribute to the resilience and determination of the 
southern people.  Yet it faces enormous difficulties and suffers 
from a lack of capacity and managerial talent most outside of Sudan 
simply cannot grasp, a deficiency that explains its frequent 
missteps and reactive tendencies, often making it the pawn of events 
rather than the master of them. This often  is successfully 
exploited by its opponents/partners in the National Congress Party 
(NCP)  against the GOSS..  End Summary 
 
¶2. (SBU) After over four decades of the South's conflict with the 
government in Khartoum, it is hard for most to comprehend how  the 
South lacks the most basic physical and social infrastructure, 
including roads, schools, hospitals, and established social 
institutions other than  religious organizations  and the SPLA. 
During the almost 50 years from independence to the signing of the 
CPA in 2005, the central government in Khartoum made little to no 
investment in Southern Sudan.  Roads and other transportation 
systems deteriorated to the point where travel between cities is in 
many cases best accomplished by air, and even then many airstrips 
(which are dirt except in Juba) are unusable in the wet season. 
Public education was intentionally neglected and missionary schools 
closed or harrassed, resulting in an overall illiteracy rate in the 
South at close to 80 percent (UN sources estimate 63% illiteracy for 
men and 88% for women).  Those who do have an education got it 
almost exclusively outside the country, including in Europe and the 
US, as well as in neighboring nations.  Agriculture suffered as 
large scale farming collapsed due to the conflict, and even small 
subsistence farmers found it difficult to raise crops in an unstable 
environment that often forced them to abandon their fields.  The 
lack of even the most basic medical facilities not only means that 
large numbers of people die from normally treatable causes, but also 
that such conditions   discourage the return of educated expatriates 
who will not bring their families to an environment that cannot 
provide basic health care and educational opportunities for their 
children. 
 
¶3. (SBU) In 2005, with the creation of the semi-autonomous GOSS, 
infrastructure, social institutions and governing traditions that 
normally unite and bind a modern nation state had to be built almost 
entirely from the ground up.  Given where it started from, that the 
GOSS has come as far as it has in just three years is nothing short 
of miraculous, yet it still has barely scratched the surface of what 
needs to be accomplished. 
 
¶4. (SBU) The biggest challenge facing the GOSS is the dire shortage 
of a managerial class that can direct  the massive reconstruction 
effort needed to transform Southern Sudan into a modern state that 
can educate, care for, and develop its human and natural resources, 
but most especially its human resources.  No where else in the world 
are so few educated managers spread so thinly in both the private 
and public sectors.  ConGen Juba consistently finds itself dealing 
directly with a Minister or his or her number two on any issue of 
importance to the American government because we find that lower 
down there is a profound lack of qualified personnel capable of 
properly managing their jobs.  There is also a problem of senior 
GOSS and SPLM figures holding onto aspects of their portfolios that 
should be delegated in order to develop the second tier of 
managers/leaders. 
 
¶5. (SBU) This is true even at the most basic level of office 
management.  In one of the most influential ministries in the GOSS 
the ConGen was asked to send two important letters, which the 
minister needed right away.  The letters were delivered within 5 
hours.  Ten days later the ConGen visited a visibly agitated 
minister who complained bitterly that the letters had never been 
sent.  Informed that they had been immediately sent, he went through 
his office manager's desk and found them.  Although a minor example, 
it highlights that even at this basic support level the GOSS has 
serious operational obstacles that undermine even routine 
functions. 
 
¶6. (SBU) The GOSS management of the census crisis presents an even 
more telling example.  First, the minister in charge of negotiating 
the structure of the census for the South became overwhelmed by his 
job.  In his confusion, he agreed in writing to a seriously flawed 
census format that did not reflect the concerns of the South.  Once 
the mistake was discovered, the GOSS vacillated for months over what 
to do about it, unable to develop a clear strategy for how to 
respond to the problem.  Finally, two days before the census was to 
 
KHARTOUM 00001323  002 OF 003 
 
 
start, and after tens of millions of donor dollars had been spent 
(money that would be wasted if the census was delayed or canceled), 
the GOSS announced it would not participate because of these 
problems it had known about for months, problems that could have 
been fixed earlier if the proper amount of attention had been 
focused upon them.  Then, finally realizing that it was too late to 
back away from a project it had specifically agreed to in writing 
months before, the GOSS found itself in the embarrassing position of 
having to backtrack on its decision, allowing the NCP to gleefully 
portray  it to the international community as an unreliable and 
unpredictable partner. 
 
¶7. (SBU) The Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly (SSLA) is another 
arm of the GOSS where a glaring lack of capacity has demonstrably 
handicapped its operations.  In the last three years, the SSLA has 
only been able to pass a handful of laws.  Its members often 
complain of lacking the legal expertise to properly understand the 
legislation they are asked to consider.  There are reported to be 
only four lawyers in the whole of the legislative body.  This 
bottleneck to passing critically needed new laws, including such 
things as an anti-corruption law and a media law, means that in many 
cases the Presidency has been forced to promulgate legislation 
through executive decree, circumventing the legislature and 
potentially seriously undermining its constitutional role. 
 
¶8. (SBU) US military advisors report that in the Sudan People's 
Liberation Army (SPLA), senior generals lack staffs capable of 
properly supporting their functions.  The numbers of educated 
soldiers needed to act in that capacity simply do not exist, often 
crippling SPLA operations. One American military advisor found a 
senior general in the SPLA to be more concerned about his 
headquarters building than he was about the force structure he was 
commanding, the maintenance of his equipment or the training of his 
soldiers.  It will take a generation to fully educate the new 
upcoming lieutenants and captains in conventional warfare. Then they 
will need   to  rise to the levels of responsibility that will allow 
them to replace their aging guerrilla leaders, which is essential to 
the  SPLA's  having  the leadership capacity  needed to run a modern 
conventional army.  ConGen Juba American military advisors report 
that the very first graduate of an IMET Basic Course will have more 
operational and tactical knowledge relevant to a conventional army 
than any of the current SPLA general officers, other than those few 
who originally spent their early careers as regular officers in the 
Sudanese Armed Forces of the Government of Sudan (before the SPLA 
was formed in 1983). 
 
¶9. (SBU) Other examples abound.  The GOSS is a government in the 
making, with poor mechanisms for communicating and a lack of 
qualified support staff to implement programs. 
 
¶10. (SBU) The consequence of this is that the GOSS is severely 
handicapped in dealing with the affairs of state.  Important 
decisions are often made late because decision makers are 
overwhelmed by the demands placed upon them.  This inability to 
properly focus upon and manage its most important affairs puts the 
GOSS at a severe disadvantage when dealing with an able and ruthless 
National Congress Party (NCP) and others.  The NCP does have 
considerable human resources at its disposal, and is masterful at 
manipulating the GOSS into making mistakes - though often the GOSS 
makes the mistakes on its own.  As a result, the GOSS winds up 
almost always reacting to events on the ground rather than framing 
or steering them.  This is a problem that is sure to persist over at 
least the next few years, and has the potential to lead to conflict 
where conflict might have been avoided. 
 
¶11. (SBU) Comment: The damage done to Southern Sudan during its long 
struggle against Khartoum has cost it dearly, and it will take a 
generation or longer for the South to fully recover from these many 
years of not just neglect, but active efforts to undermine its 
development.  The GOSS will continue to suffer from a lack of 
capacity for years to come, which will make dealing with it time 
consuming and often exasperating, not because that is the way those 
running the government want it to be, but because it is going to 
lack structural coherence and capacity in the short and medium term. 
 Decision-making will continue to be disorganized and uncoordinated. 
 This can have the appearance of the GOSS saying one thing and doing 
another in an attempt to play donors off against each other, though 
in our opinion this is seldom the case.  Rather, it reflects the 
difficulty the GOSS has in reaching decisions and speaking with one 
voice because of its lack of bureaucratic coordination.  One of the 
most important things that the GOSS currently has going for it is 
the leadership of Salva Kiir. As GOSS President, he is untainted by 
corruption, his  political instincts are strong, and his e consensus 
style of governance gives hope for a democratic future for Southern 
Sudan,  Kiir  is a unifying force in a culture deeply susceptible to 
 
KHARTOUM 00001323  003 OF 003 
 
 
and threatened by tribal and ethnic divisions. 
 
¶12. (SBU) Comment Continued: If the South does vote to break away in 
2011, capacity will become an even greater issue as the GOSS becomes 
a national government that must then deal with even greater 
administrative burdens, without excuses, including such things as 
creating and managing its own currency and banking system.   Should 
the SPLM win national elections in 2009 and find itself in control 
of the National Government (Note: we view this as a long-shot, but 
it is a scenario worth considering. End note) it will also be very 
hard-pressed to find the managerial talent needed to govern all of 
Sudan, given the problems it now has in just managing its affairs in 
the South. Whatever the South does in 2011 concerning unity versus 
independence,  it will continue to need massive donor assistance for 
at least the next 15 to 25 years to help it recover from almost two 
generations of warfare.  Such aid is essential as it struggles to 
create the social and physical infrastructure needed to create good 
governance, modernize, and lift its people out of poverty.  A 
continued effort to tackle corruption is desperately needed with 
guidance and leadership from the US while other economic 
opportunities, aside from government service, develop in South 
Sudan. 
 
FERNANDEZ