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RHHJJPI/USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 JAKARTA 001743 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EAP, T, VCI, ISN, ISN/NESS (BURKART), EAP/MTS, 
EAP/MLS, EAP/RSP 
DEPT PLS PASS NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 
DEPT PLS PASS NATIONAL NUCLEAR SAFETY ADMINISTRATION 
SECDEF FOR USDP/ISA/APSA (WALTON) 
NSC FOR E.PHU 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/15/2018 
TAGS: PREL PARM TRGY ENGY PGOV ID
SUBJECT: CIVIL NUCLEAR COOPERATION:  AMB. WOLCOTT'S 
DISCUSSIONS WITH GOI 
 
JAKARTA 00001743  001.2 OF 005 
 
 
Classified By: Pol/C Joseph L. Novak, reasons 1.4(b+d). 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY:  On August 21-22, Ambassador Jackie Wolcott 
led an interagency delegation to discuss civil nuclear 
cooperation with officials from the GOI's key nuclear-related 
agencies plus the Foreign Ministry and the principal national 
nuclear laboratory.  All meetings indicated that Indonesia 
still aspires to operating its first nuclear plant around 
2017 and that its level of technical competence is 
impressive.  However, a firm commitment to nuclear power has 
eluded Indonesia since the late 1970s and will be further 
postponed until after a series of 2009 elections.  Public 
opposition to nuclear power was repeatedly raised as a 
concern. 
 
¶2.  (C) SUMMARY (Con'd):  Wolcott urged Indonesia to ratify 
the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear 
Damage (CSC, which it has already signed), along with other 
key safety and security conventions, and to participate in 
the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP), the Global 
Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GI), and the 
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).  END SUMMARY. 
 
VISIT OVERVIEW 
 
¶3.  (SBU) On August 21-22, Special Envoy for Nuclear 
Nonproliferation, Ambassador Jackie Wolcott, and an 
interagency delegation composed of policy officials and 
technical experts from the State Department and the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC) met with senior Indonesian 
officials at the Department of Foreign Affairs (DEPLU), the 
Nuclear Energy Regulatory Agency (BAPETEN), and the Nuclear 
Energy Agency (BATAN).  The principal Indonesian 
interlocutors for these three meetings were Director General 
for Multilateral Affairs Rezlan Ishar Jenie, Chairman As 
Natio Lasman, and Chairman Hudi Hastowo, respectively.  In 
addition, the delegation visited the largest of Indonesia's 
three nuclear research reactors, operated by BATAN and 
located at the Science and Technology Research Project Center 
(PUSPITEK) in Serpong, a western suburb of Jakarta.  Wolcott 
and delegation also discussed nuclear energy with a range of 
nuclear, energy and research officials and legislators over 
dinner at Ambassador Hume's residence. 
 
¶4.  (C) In each meeting, Wolcott explained that she was 
visiting to implement the Joint Declaration on Nuclear Energy 
and Nonproliferation, a Presidential initiative aimed at 
increasing access to responsible nuclear energy programs in 
countries pursuing their first nuclear power plant (NPP). 
Wolcott noted that around thirty countries were in the 
process of moving to nuclear energy and that the United 
States was experiencing a "nuclear renaissance" of its own. 
In order to help Indonesia develop the highest standards of 
safety, security and nonproliferation, the United States was 
interested in offering a diverse array of infrastructure 
development assistance, as needed.  DEPLU would study the 
Joint Declaration, Jenie said, in line with Indonesia's other 
international commitments. 
 
INDONESIA'S NUCLEAR POWER PLANS 
 
¶5.  (C) BAPETEN's Lasman explained that Indonesia had long 
been considering nuclear power.  Previous interest in nuclear 
power had been thwarted by the Three Mile Island accident 
(1979), the Chernobyl accident (1986) and the Asian economic 
crisis of the late 1990's.  Although interest in nuclear 
power had waxed and waned over several decades, Indonesia had 
 
JAKARTA 00001743  002.2 OF 005 
 
 
steadily built up a significant nuclear research capacity 
across three institutions operating three research reactors. 
DEPLU's Jenie explained that, as a result of a severe energy 
shortage and rising future demand, Indonesia was again 
considering the development of nuclear power.  This was one 
of the options that Indonesia was seriously considering, 
along with coal, geothermal, solar, and tidal energy. 
 
¶6.  (C) Lasman stated that Indonesia was now aiming to 
operate its first nuclear power plant around 2017, with a 
total of 4,000 MW of nuclear generation (equivalent to 2% of 
the country's electricity) by 2025.  A preliminary site for 
the first NPP had been chosen on the Muria Peninsula in 
Central Java.  A firm commitment could not be made, however, 
until after a series of legislative and presidential 
elections in 2009.  For its first plant, Indonesia would seek 
a standard reactor design, with a minimum of three years' 
proven operation and a capacity factor exceeding 75 percent. 
BATAN's Hastowo noted that the development of a nuclear power 
program in Indonesia would fall under the authority of the 
Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources. 
 
¶7.  (C) Jenie commented that a major concern with nuclear 
power was safety given Indonesia's high incidence of 
earthquakes.  Also, the country's largest Islamic 
organization, Nadhlatul Ulama, had issued a statement 
opposing the proposed site in Central Java for the future 
nuclear power plant.  For this reason, Lasman explained, 
BATAN was considering looking for another site.  In addition, 
the State Ministry for Research and Technology had 
established a committee for public outreach to broaden public 
acceptance of nuclear power. 
 
NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE 
 
¶8.  (C) Jenie said Indonesia had consistently defended the 
principles of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and 
would be fully transparent in developing nuclear power. 
Indonesia was not on the Board of the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA), but Indonesia was considering 
participating in the IAEA's planned multilateral fuel bank, a 
concept that Foreign Minister Wirajuda had endorsed. 
 
¶9.  (C) BATAN officials noted the importance to energy 
security of reliable long-term fuel supply contracts and said 
this would be an important consideration in Indonesia's 
choice of a reactor vendor.  Noting that a discussion was 
underway at the IAEA to develop an assurance mechanism to 
bolster the international fuel market, Alex Burkart of the 
State Department's International Security and 
Nonproliferation Bureau encouraged Indonesia to make its 
views on this known in Vienna.  Until now, he commented, 
there had been little discussion on what recipient countries 
were looking for. 
 
¶10.  (C) In all meetings, Wolcott raised the Global Nuclear 
Energy Partnership (GNEP), noting that one of GNEP's chief 
aspects was the reliable provision of fuel services.  When 
Jenie asked if membership under GNEP would require Indonesia 
to forgo its "right" to uranium enrichment, Burkart replied 
that GNEP made no mention of rights.  Although countries 
might have the right to enrichment for peaceful purposes, he 
added, it might not be in their best interest to exercise 
that right.  Wolcott noted that Indonesia had recently been 
invited to join GNEP and encouraged Indonesia to attend the 
October 1 Ministerial meeting in Paris.  DEPLU and BATAN 
officials both expressed interest in attending.  (Note: 
 
JAKARTA 00001743  003.2 OF 005 
 
 
DEPLU will coordinate the interagency decision as to whether 
Indonesia should attend and which agencies should be 
represented.) 
 
¶11.  (C) BATAN's Hastowo noted that Indonesia had opted for 
an open nuclear fuel cycle and had no plans to develop the 
capacity to reprocess spent nuclear fuel.  He expressed 
concern, however, about the inability of most fuel supplier 
states to repatriate the subsequent spent fuel.  Burkart said 
the United States could assist Indonesia with the development 
of interim storage facilities.  He noted that a solution to 
spent-fuel disposition--as, for example, through a 
multilateral arrangement--was a long-term objective of GNEP. 
 
NUCLEAR SAFETY AND REGULATION 
 
¶12.  (C) When meeting with BAPETEN officials, Burkart praised 
Indonesia for its development of very high-quality nuclear 
research and radioisotope production facilities.  He asked 
whether Indonesia planned to strengthen this good start with 
the development of an appropriate safety culture for a 
nuclear power program.  Lasman replied that Indonesia was a 
member of the ASEAN Nuclear Safety Network and the Forum on 
Nuclear Safety in Asia and was a party to the Convention on 
Nuclear Safety.  Through its association with these 
organizations, Indonesia was steadily improving its 
knowledge.  Burkart encouraged Indonesia to ratify, in 
addition, the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel 
Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management 
(which Indonesia has signed). 
 
¶13.  (C) Lasman said that, if Indonesia made a firm decision 
to pursue nuclear power and chose a U.S. reactor, BAPETEN 
would want to send a technical delegation to the United 
States for "on-the-job" training.  Steve Burns of the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission noted that this type of exchange, as 
well as one aimed at regulatory framework development, could 
be facilitated by the existing NRC-BAPETEN Information 
Exchange Arrangement.  This arrangement was currently up for 
renewal. 
 
¶14.  (C) Lasman noted that an updated draft was under 
consideration.  Other areas of regulatory cooperation, Burns 
added, included the NRC Foreign Assignee Program in which 
Indonesia had participated in the late 1990's and the 
Multinational Design Evaluation Program under which 
regulators shared experiences with reactor designs with 
foreign counterparts.  Donald Kovacic of the National Nuclear 
Safety Administration (NNSA) noted in the meeting with 
BAPETEN that NNSA had signed a technical cooperation 
agreement with BAPETEN in 2004 and that action sheets had 
been prepared outlining work in regulatory and operator 
training.  He noted that NNSA was also interested in 
establishing a relationship with BATAN, perhaps in the area 
of safeguards implementation. 
 
CONVENTION ON SUPPLEMENTARY COMPENSATION 
 
¶15.  (C) Noting that Indonesia had signed the Convention on 
Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage (CSC), Wolcott 
urged that Indonesia ratify the convention as it moved 
towards a nuclear power program.  Since numerous countries 
could not be a party to existing liability conventions 
because of national laws, this regime was designed for 
universal adherence that would benefit both suppliers and 
recipients of nuclear exports.  Wolcott noted that the United 
States had signed the CSC and had deposited its instrument of 
 
JAKARTA 00001743  004.2 OF 005 
 
 
ratification in Vienna in May.  U.S. suppliers would be 
hesitant to supply fuel or reactors to countries that did not 
have the CSC in force, she added.  DEPLU's Jenie agreed to 
raise the CSC with BATAN and BAPETEN officials. 
 
NUCLEAR POWER FINANCE 
 
¶16.  (C) BATAN's Hastowo cited NPP financing as a key concern 
and one that had been the cause of popular opposition in the 
past.  Since the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank 
currently had policies against nuclear power financing, 
financial resources were very limited.  He stressed that 
financial help would be very attractive to aspiring nuclear 
energy states.  Wolcott responded that the World Bank was 
considering a study to analyze the cost competitiveness of 
nuclear power.  Since a favorable assessment could pave the 
way for other multilateral development banks to begin 
offering nuclear financing options, Wolcott encouraged 
Indonesia to support this study.  She pointed out that some 
financial options were available via export credits though 
these could not be applied to an entire NPP. 
 
GLOBAL INITIATIVE AND PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE 
 
¶17.  (C) Wolcott noted that participation in the Global 
Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GI) and the 
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) was voluntary and 
consisted of practical measures that constituted best 
practices.  The United States urged Indonesia to join these 
initiatives as part of its broader cooperation against 
terrorism.  Jenie said Indonesia was reviewing GI and had 
ratified six of 13 existing counter-terrorism conventions. 
 
¶18.  (C) Several aspects of PSI caused problems for 
Indonesia, Jenie asserted.  Interdiction on the high seas was 
particularly problematic, as it appeared to interfere with 
freedom of navigation.  Weapons of Mass Destruction were 
controlled by several other conventions.  Further, the 
purpose of shipments of dual-use items was difficult, if not 
impossible, to determine.  Indonesia could be liable to 
damages and compensation if nothing were found or a search 
was inconclusive.  Indonesia was also concerned, Jenie 
stressed, that PSI be linked to disarmament.  Wolcott noted 
that interdiction had played a major role in intercepting 
Libyan proliferation and that Libya had ended its 
proliferation because interdiction had been effective. 
 
BATAN NUCLEAR FACILITIES 
 
¶19.  (C) The delegation toured five nuclear facilities at 
BATAN's research center located at the Science and Technology 
Research Project Center (PUSPITEK) in Serpong, a western 
suburb of Jakarta.  The five included the 30 MW German-origin 
research reactor, the spent fuel storage pool, the 
radioisotope production facility, the radiometallurgical 
facility and the fuel fabrication facility.  While Indonesia 
previously acquired enriched uranium for research reactor 
fuel from the United States, Indonesia currently obtains 
enriched uranium from the international market (namely, 
Europe).  While the IAEA lists the radiometallurgical 
facility as an "R&D facility and location associated with 
reprocessing technology," the facility consists of a number 
of large hot cells with a dearth of equipment and a mission 
apparently limited to post-irradiation examination of 
(non-U.S. origin) spent fuel.  The delegation saw no 
equipment associated with reprocessing. 
 
 
JAKARTA 00001743  005.2 OF 005 
 
 
TIMETABLE LIKELY TO SLIP 
 
¶20.  (C) Indonesia's level of technical competence is 
impressive, and Indonesia still aspires to put its first 
nuclear plant into operation around 2017.  However, a firm 
commitment to nuclear power has eluded Indonesia since the 
late 1970s, and the approval of the project will be further 
postponed at least until after a series of legislative and 
presidential elections in 2009.  This would make it 
practically impossible to hold to the current timetable. 
Public reservations about nuclear power, reflecting 
uncertainty about safety and financing, was cited as a 
concern. 
 
¶21.  (U) This message was approved by Ambassador Wolcott. 
 
HUME