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Viewing cable 08HELSINKI427, FINLAND: GEORGIA CONFLICT SPURS DEBATE ON SECURITY

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08HELSINKI427 2008-09-19 13:55 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Helsinki
VZCZCXYZ0009
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHHE #0427/01 2631355
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 191355Z SEP 08
FM AMEMBASSY HELSINKI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4548
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 4910
RUEHSI/AMEMBASSY TBILISI 0203
C O N F I D E N T I A L HELSINKI 000427 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/10/2018 
TAGS: FI PGOV PREL XZ ZB
SUBJECT: FINLAND: GEORGIA CONFLICT SPURS DEBATE ON SECURITY 
AND NATO 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Barbara Barrett for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY.  While the crisis in Georgia appears not to 
have changed public opinion about Finland's security, it has 
generated debate and discussion about security policy.  The 
consensus-based coalition government's policy on maintaining 
the "option" to join NATO remains, though the consensus 
appears stretched.  President Halonen has stated that the 
crisis will not affect the basic direction of Finland's 
security policy, which she sees as not including NATO 
membership.  Similarly, Prime Minister Vanhanen has stated 
that Russia's actions do not warrant an increase in defense 
spending or consideration of NATO membership at this time. 
However, Foreign Minister Stubb, well known for his 
Atlanticist leanings and enjoying popularity from his 
well-regarded chairmanship of the OSCE, created a stir by 
expressing his support for NATO membership in a speech to 
Finnish Ambassadors.  More recently Stubb has denied any 
shift in government policy and maintained that NATO remains 
an option. Stubb's party, which holds the Foreign Affairs and 
Defense portfolios, may well stretch the consensus on 
security and foreign policy, perhaps resulting in actions in 
line with our own policies, e.g., greater engagement in 
Afghanistan.  However, given the constitutional division of 
foreign policy between President and Cabinet, NATO membership 
remains an option to be activated, if at all, after President 
Halonen's term.  END SUMMARY. 
 
Opinion Poll: Georgia Conflict Will Not Affect Security 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
2. (SBU) According to an opinion poll taken in the second 
week of the conflict, sixty percent of Finns polled believe 
that the conflict would not affect the security situation in 
Finland.  One-third felt that the country,s security had 
been adversely impacted.  Thirty-eight percent blamed Russia 
for the conflict, while only ten percent blamed Georgia (28 
percent blamed both equally, with the rest undecided).  In a 
September 3 meeting with Embassy officials, several Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs (MFA) officials speculated about the poll 
results.  They asserted that most Finns are unfamiliar with 
Georgia - its people, its location - so the conflict was too 
distant to impact their security.  The officials noted that 
Finns might become more concerned about their security 
situation should something similar happen in Ukraine, given 
their greater familiarity from student exchanges and the 
presence of Ukrainian workers in Finland. 
 
Conflict generates debate on security and NATO 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
3. (C)  While the poll did not reflect the latest public 
attitudes towards NATO, Finnish officials have inserted NATO 
into the public sphere since the crisis began. References to 
NATO have sprung more often from the National Coalition Party 
(NCP), the center-right government coalition member that 
favors NATO membership, leaving the other parties to respond 
or ignore.  Foreign Minister Stubb (NCP) made his support for 
NATO membership well known in an August 25 speech to Finnish 
Heads of Foreign Missions.  Stubb spoke very favorably of 
NATO and said there was "reason for closer cooperation," 
e.g., participation in the NATO Response Force (NRF), though 
he added that it was not yet time for a decision on the NRF. 
President Halonen also spoke to the diplomatic corps. Though 
her speech covered Finland's defense, including the need for 
Finland to maintain its own defense and to promote security 
through international organizations, she made no mention of 
NATO.  She previously said that the crisis would not affect 
the government's current quadrennial security review (report 
due in the fall). On September 1 Vanhanen (Center Party) said 
publicly that Russia's actions did not merit raising 
Finland's defense spending or taking full NATO membership 
into serious consideration. 
 
4. (C) On September 8, visiting Ambassador Schulte asked a 
small group of Finnish officials whether Finland would be a 
NATO member in ten years.  Vanhanen's Chief of Staff Risto 
Volanen declined to answer directly, stating that it was in 
Finland's "natural national interest" to cooperate with the 
U.S. on security.  Volanen, managing to avoid even uttering 
the term "NATO," stated that it remains a "serious security 
option" for Finland.  He added that Vanhanen's references to 
membership as an "option" intentionally strikes a middle 
ground from which he can criticize others in the government 
(or in the opposition) who swing too far towards or away from 
the question of membership. Unlike Volanen, MFA State 
Secretary Teija Tiilikainen was unhesitating in stating that 
Finland would be a NATO member.  She critized as "old 
thinking" the view (described by Volanen) that Finns should 
"keep their head down" so as not to anger their Russian 
 
neighbor.  Tiilikainen believes that, with a generation 
having grown up without seeing NATO as a bulwark against the 
Soviet Union, Finns will eventually decide to join the 
alliance, and much sooner than 10 years. 
 
5. (SBU) A poll taken in mid-September by Suomen Gallup for 
the leading paper Helsingin Sanomat showed greater 
uncertainty amongst Finns on the question of NATO membership 
from last year.  One in five Finns are unsure whether Finland 
should join, up from 16 percent last year and 11 percent 18 
months ago.  The rise in uncertainty comes at the expense of 
both the "NATO-yes" and "NATO-no" groups.  The poll indicates 
that a majority still opposes membership, while over 20 
percent are in favor.  Support for membership within the NCP 
has dropped from a majority to 50 percent, with the number of 
those uncertain doubling from ten to twenty percent. 
 
Opposition leader drawn into security, NATO discussion 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
6. (SBU) Jutta Urpilainen, head of the opposition Social 
Democrats, publicly stated that neither ties to NATO nor the 
basics of Finland's security policy need to be reviewed 
following the events in Georgia. She reportedly expressed a 
willingness to forego a future referendum on NATO membership, 
stating the next parliamentary elections could be a 
replacement. (COMMENT: Urpilainen may simply be attempting to 
push the matter beyond the October municipal elections.  She 
has said little on security since assuming leadership in 
June, and only addressed the subject of security policy over 
three weeks after the crisis in Georgia started.  END 
COMMENT.) 
 
7. (C) Urpilainen also stated that Finland's non-aligned 
stance must follow the majority of the public.  Such a 
position appears at odds with history and political reality 
in Finland, where public opinion often follows government 
policy and action. At a September 3 meeting with MFA 
officials, several noted that public opinion is currently 
largely against NATO membership. They pointed to the example 
of Finland's EU accession, saying that the public did not 
support EU membership until the government undertook a public 
campaign in support of accession.  In the same way they saw 
the public eventually supporting NATO membership, but only 
after the government arrived at a consensus in favor. They 
agreed that many in the government support NATO membership, 
but said that none are willing to publicly challenge the 
consensus policy on maintaining the NATO option. 
 
Conflict Highlights Policy Differences Within Coalition 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
8. (C) While not openly challenging the current security 
policy, Stubb seems to be testing the consensus.  His August 
25 speech to the diplomatic corps caused a stir within the 
government and in the media. That speech described a 
"comeback" of "nation-states and power politics," and warned 
of the challenge to international institutions from single, 
obstructionist states (e.g., within OSCE and the UN Security 
Council) and from a possible confrontation between Russia and 
the West.  Stubb senior advisor Jori Arvonen told PolChief 
that the speech - which also called for an "intensified" 
Finnish foreign policy that does not withdraw into empty 
statements and is freed from "phobias, handicapped attitudes 
and old illusions" - reflected the NCP's view of where 
Finnish foreign policy should go, and was crafted knowing the 
reaction it could provoke. 
 
9. (SBU) The media picked up on Stubb's support for NATO.  On 
August 31 the Prime Minister, in a radio interview program, 
dismissed Stubb's comments as reflecting his party's 
position, but also obliquely chided Stubb for stating NCP 
views to a gathering of Ambassadors. One editorial asserted 
that Finns have only a vague impression about how the 
country's foreign policy is run, and by whom, and that Stubb 
has compounded the confusion by speaking simultaneously as 
the Foreign Minister, OSCE Chairman and private citizen. 
During Parliamentary debate on September 10, members of 
opposition parties questioned whether the government still 
had a common position on security.  In addressing the 
Parliament, Stubb drew directly from his August 25 speech to 
deny that his comments called into question the government's 
consensus view, and reiterated that Finland still has the 
NATO option. 
 
10. (C) COMMENT.  While Vanhanen states publicly that the 
consensus on security policy is firm, that consensus is being 
stretched.  The NCP would like to capitalize on this debate, 
for even though the government has a strong influence over 
public opinion on the question of NATO membership, the NCP 
 
needs more public support in order to head the next 
government that would take Finland into NATO.  Under the 
constitution foreign policy is divided between the Presidency 
and the Cabinet, and Halonen has said Finland will not join 
NATO on her watch.  So, while the NCP may succeed in 
stretching the consensus, with results in line with U.S. 
interests - e.g., Stubb's public call on September 13 for 
"strengthening" Finland's role in Afghanistan - the question 
of NATO membership still lies beyond the next presidential 
election.  END COMMENT. 
 
BARRETT