O 041535Z SEP 08
FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7137
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY
DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
DEPT OF AGRICULTURE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
DEPT OF HHS WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
OSD WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY

UNCLAS GENEVA 000752 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
THE HAGUE FOR CWC DEL, ALSO FOR EMBASSY 
NSC FOR CLUTES 
STATE FOR ISN, VCI, AND T 
JCS FOR J5/GSP/IND 
SECDEF FOR DASD FOR CN, CP, AND GT 
HHS FOR TLAWRENCE/JFERNANDEZ 
COMMERCE FOR DBROWN 
DOE FOR NA-243 FOR SMIRABELLO 
CIA FOR LALVARADO 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: CD PARM PREL BWC CWC CBW TBIO
 
SUBJECT: PART ONE OF TWO -- BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION: 
DETAILED READ-OUT OF EXPERTS GROUP MEETING ON BIOSAFETY, 
BIOSECURITY AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY IN THE LIFE 
SCIENCES, AUGUST 18-22, 2008 
 
REF: REF A: STATE 088219 REF B: GENEVA 719 
 
Begining of text of part one of two. 
 
¶1.  (U) This cable is sensitive but unclassified and should 
be protected accordingly. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Summary.  The second annual meeting of BWC Experts 
for the 2007-2010 Work Program, focusing on biosafety, 
biosecurity, and professional responsibility in the life 
sciences, marked progress, registered gaps, and shared ideas 
on how to move the issues forward.  The meeting was notable 
for the active participation in most sessions not only by 
States Parties, but by Observer States, Intergovernmental 
Organizations, professional associations, industry 
representatives, scientific bodies, and others from the 
private sector and civil society.  This engagement reflected 
a recognition among States Parties that the ability to 
counter the BW threat is enhanced by the active involvement 
of a coalition of those with interest in implementing the 
actions discussed in BWC fora. 
 
¶3.  (SBU)  There has been significant progress on  biosafety 
and biosecurity since the BWC held its initial meeting on the 
subject in 2003, the first of its kind focused on these 
issues.  Gaps were noted with countries such as Pakistan, 
Cameroon, and even Libya (with whom the U.S. and UK have been 
working for the past 5 years) coming forward to ask for 
assistance.  On the professional responsibility front there 
are a wealth of ideas but, with some exceptions, there has 
been less forward movement in this area, perhaps because 
movement relies more on civil society rather than mandatory 
government regulations of one kind or another.  Various 
"forcing" events may be required to push this along and Del 
recommends Washington give careful thought to what kind of 
recommendations arising from the December Meeting of States 
Parties could provide an appropriate nudge. 
 
¶4.  (SBU)  Overall the meeting was conducted in a 
professional manner and included the innovation of two 
"poster sessions", several "panel" discussions and seven 
early morning/lunchtime events hosted by civil society 
representatives.  If there were any criticism at all, it can 
be chalked up to being victims of our own success.  In their 
enthusiasm, the Chairman and his ISU team scheduled more 
guests and presentations than physical time allowed, so the 
meeting provided little time for follow-up questions and 
answers.  At the same time, the depth and breadth of 
participation provided a wealth of material on which to draw 
in moving forward. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) The U.S. and its Allies should begin to lay 
groundwork for productive results at the Meeting of States 
Parties in December 2008.  Further down the road is the 2009 
topic on international cooperation, capacity building, and 
related assistance, a NAM favorite but upon which the West 
has a good story to tell.  The WEOG provides the Chairman for 
the 2009 meetings; Canadian Amb. Grinius has the support so 
far of the non-EU members of the WEOG for the job, and we 
know some EU members have supported him as well, assuming the 
EU doesn't put forward a candidate.  The EU is meeting soon 
to discuss, after which the Canadian candidacy can be 
consulted more broadly with a view to a December 2008 
decision this matter.  Having the WEOG candidate identified 
early on will provide additional time to prepare for handling 
this challenging topic.  End Summary. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
Opening of Meeting; National Statements 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (U) The 2008 Meeting of BWC Experts opened smoothly on 
August 18, running successfully through the usual 
housekeeping items:  adoption of the agenda, an amended 
Program of Work, the Rules of Procedure, and participation in 
the meeting.  The Chairman, Ambassador Georgi Avramchev of 
the Republic of Macedonia, made introductory remarks and 
pointed to the four information papers provided by the ISU 
(Biosafety and Biosecurity; Developments in Codes of Conduct 
Since  2005; Oversight of Science; and Education, Outreach 
and Raising Awareness). 
 
¶7.  (U)   Introductory statements were made by many States 
Parties, including:   France for the EU, Cuba for the 
Non-Aligned Movement, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Japan, U.S., 
Russia, China, ROK, Indonesia, Nigeria, Libya, Iran, Peru, 
Colombia, Albania, Norway, India, Germany, and Morocco.  Key 
themes included:  BWC universalization (and welcoming THE 
UAE, Cameroon, and Morocco as new States Parties);  national 
implementation; 1540 legislative support; international 
cooperation; and implementation of BWC's Article X; 
verification protocol revival (NAM stressed the importance of 
effective verification, Russia specifically called for 
resumption of the Ad Hoc Group with its existing mandate); 
dual-use and bioterrorism threats; and the need to balance 
biosafety and biosecurity measures while avoiding obstacles 
to advances in the life sciences, as well as country-specific 
implementation on codes of conduct.  Progress made since 
consideration of both topics in 2003 and 2005, respectively, 
was cited, as well requests for assistance from some 
countries (Sudan, Libya, others).  Georgia also made an 
impassioned intervention on "ethnic cleansing" by Russian 
troops, noting that Russia has yet to withdraw and requesting 
assistance; Russia  did not rise to the bait, but rather 
insisted upon the need to stick with the agreed BWC experts 
agenda, and avoid  "artificial politicization".  The Chair 
echoed the Russian request to stay on the agreed expert's 
agenda. (Note:  The Georgian BWC Expert later told US Deloffs 
that she was under instructions to make that statement.  End 
Note.) 
 
¶8. (U) The World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) and 
seven NGO's provided presentations on relevant research and 
activities in support of the 2008 topics: international 
measures to improve biosafety and biosecurity, and the 
development of codes of conduct and educational programs to 
promote awareness on dual-use issues and the BWC.  (See 
detailed NGO presentations in the NGO Lunch Section.) 
 
----------------------------------- 
"Biosafety and Biosecurity Concepts" 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (U) At the August 19 plenary meeting, Cameroon received 
observer status.  Four International Governmental 
Organizations: the World Health Organization (WHO); the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD); 
the United Nations Environment Program/Global Environment 
Facility (UNEP/UNEF); and the European Commission (EC) gave 
presentations.  WHO,s Dr. Nicoletta Previsani detailed 
biosecurity efforts aimed at "minimization of deliberate 
release" and cited the 2001 anthrax letters and the 2003 
Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) outbreak in 
Singapore to stress that even though the event is over the 
pathogens still remains in one U.S. (USAMRIID) and three 
Singaporean laboratories.  She noted a global increase of 
biosafety level three (BSL3) labs and commented that Brazil 
had twelve BSL3 labs.  Georgia asked why Brazil needs twelve 
BSL3 labs.  Brazil responded that this wasn't enough and they 
would be building more BSL3, as well as two new BSL4 (highest 
containment level) labs.  Sudan asked for assistance in 
drafting relevant scientific/legal texts and 
train-the-trainer assistance. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Following the OECD's presentation on security 
guidelines for access to dangerous pathogens, Iran asked if 
there should be mandatory criteria for transfer of bio agents 
"outside the convention?"  OECD noted they have established 
an approach that can be used for peer review and evaluation 
for various sensitive projects and agents and their possible 
transfer. Japan stated that they are "legally obligated to 
store pathogens in four categories" and could OECD help them 
categorize their new strain of attenuated Ebola?  UNEP spoke 
to biosafety/security elements of the Cartagena Protocol on 
Biosafety in relation to living modified organisms and 
synthetic biology.  They have been working with 123 countries 
to establish biosafety policies; 103 countries are complete. 
 
¶11. (U) Returning to the States Parties presentations, South 
Africa, Argentina, Australia and Germany introduced their 
national papers.  The U.S. outlined assistance given to the 
WHO and OECD on development of pathogen security guidelines. 
Of particular note was Canada's overview of recently proposed 
legislation ("Bill C-54" under the 1994 Human Pathogens and 
Toxins Act) which will require all people working in BSL3-4 
labs to have a security clearance at the SECRET level or 
above.   The UK presented their national paper on the 2007 
Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) outbreak, summarizing the 
background and future considerations in handling animal 
pathogens, and emphasizing the similarities of human and 
animal pathogens.  (This is apparently the first time the UK 
has spoken about FMD in an international meeting, despite 
great pressure to do so, especially in the bioterrorism 
context (BTEX).  It remains a highly sensitive subject in the 
UK.)  Norway gave an extensive presentation on the EU 
"Laboratory Biorisk Management Standard"(CWA 15793) and its 
applicability under the BWC on biosafety/security.  They 
emphasized the similarities across all BSL-levels, despite 
various circumstances.  Denmark noted the significant changes 
in their legislation, particularly the establishment of the 
Center for Biosecurity and Biosafety, which provides training 
for universities, hospitals, research and private 
organizations; incorporating physical, transportation, 
information security, material controls and a threat 
assessment algorithm. 
 
¶12. (U) Nigeria focused on the extensive numbers of its 
indigenous pathogens which underscore Nigeria's need for 
biosecurity and urgent assistance in establishing a 
biosecurity program.  It has established an Office of 
National Authority (ONA) for Chemical and Biological Weapons 
Conventions implementation and developed a "Code of Conduct 
and Laboratory Manual" for scientists and is also 
establishing a "Field Laboratory Program." 
 
¶13.  (U) Cuba presented the main elements of its 1990 legal 
instrument implementing the BWC, emphasizing its ongoing 
concern about human, animal and plant toxins, especially 
modified organisms and exotic species.  It also mentioned its 
1996 legal instrument regarding lab staff members and the 
integrity of persons regarding property and information 
security; it is drafting legislation on "information 
protection" in sensitive labs. Pakistan's presentation on 
Prevention, Control and Surveillance recognized that there 
were differing opinions concerning appropriate levels of 
protection and what constitutes acceptable levels of risk. 
It is meeting in a number of working groups to address these 
differences of opinion.  It is also organizing a "National 
Plan of Conduct."  Bulgaria spoke of its efforts since 2006. 
Morocco gave a presentation on the BWC related efforts of the 
MENA region countries and emphasized their determination to 
secure life sciences research by ensuring legally binding 
measures are in place in each country. 
 
¶14. (U)  The Industry Panel Discussion had four speakers: 
Gary Burns (AstraZeneca), John Keddie (GlaxoSmithKline) 
Robert Friedman (J. Craig Venter Institute) and Shrikumar 
Suryanarayan (India; Association of Biotechnology Led 
Enterprises (ABLE).  It is significant that representatives 
from prominent industry attended not only their session but 
several days of the meeting and made well-informed points 
comparing their views to what is discussed in government/IGO 
and NGO forums.  The first two speakers represented large 
pharmaceutical firms that recognize the security concerns but 
wish to see a risk-based balance.  They noted that the 
pharmaceutical industry has very high Good Manufacturing 
Process (GMP) standards that are directly related to their 
risk.  They have been involved with Advisory Groups and other 
studies to ensure their input into the GMP standards, thus 
they have an interest in meeting the standards they helped to 
develop.  Keddie expressed concern that registration of 
dual-use equipment would have significant administrative 
burden.  He stressed the need for regulations that are simple 
and can be applicable across different areas, observing that 
"local" decisions have global impact.  Research and 
development is global, as is the industry, which needs to be 
able to move material, biological samples and agents 
globally.  Finally, referring to an earlier question about 
new delivery technologies that have a legitimate use in 
medication delivery, he expressed concern that if the 
research is restricted because of weaponization concerns, the 
benefits of these new technologies may not be available for 
medical uses. 
 
¶15.  (U) Friedman spoke about the genomics industry, DNA 
sequencing and the benefits of their synthetic biology 
program.  The panel ended with the note of caution that 
mechanisms for biosecurity may unduly interfere with 
research, biosecurity measures should not make daily business 
more difficult and controls should be proportional in 
relation to risk.  One speaker commented that we are drifting 
from the original intent of the BWC and becoming focused on 
biosecurity and synthetic biology.  Another comment was that 
the pharmaceutical industry should not be the focus of 
concern but rather Do-It-Yourself biology (DIY-Biology). 
 
------------------ 
Capacity-Building 
------------------ 
 
¶16. (U) The August 20 session began with presentation from 
professional societies.  The American Biosafety Association 
(ABSA) recognized the State Department for support of Former 
Soviet Union scientists in attending annual ABSA meetings. 
The Pacific Asia Biosafety Association (P-ABSA) requested 
regional States to step forward and support, as well as 
implement their "Biosafety Plan."  The European Biosafety 
Association (EBSA) noted concern that some States have 
legislation for biosafety/security that can cause conflicts 
with organizations who propose biosafety standards.  ABSA 
Canada recommends licensure and security clearances for 
anyone who accesses BSL-3 or 4 pathogens. 
 
¶17.  (U) The IAP, made up of nearly one hundred national 
science academies, does not have a code of conduct per se, 
but rather promotes Principles of Awareness ("Scientists have 
an obligation to do no harm"), Education, Safety and 
Security, Accountability and Oversight.  The International 
Network of Engineers and Scientists for Global Responsibility 
(INES) emphasized that the majority of scientists remain 
unaware of dual-use aspects of their work.  They believe that 
an approach to managing biorisks that is exclusively 
bottom-up in character will have little chance of success on 
its own and a top-down method is the right process, i.e. 
licensing or issuing of permits.  Licensure should not only 
include facilities, but also the work itself and also the 
principal investigators.  There must also be periodic checks 
of the licensing authority.  Brazil commented that this is 
too optimistic. 
 
¶18.  (U)  The panel discussion on Risk Management included 
speakers May Chu and Cathy Roth (WHO), Ian Gillespie (OECD), 
Keith Hamilton (World Organization for Animal Health (OIE), 
Paul Huntly (Det Norske Veritas, an accreditation body), 
Brooke Rogers (Kings College London).  Gillespie described 
Risk Management as a process and presented a "Framework for 
Governance."  He described managing risk as needing a 
proportionate response to risk; building in the human factor; 
having standards and best practices but not "recipes." The 
approach should be tQd harmonization, but not rigidity, 
and transparency through certification and accreditation. 
Keith Hamilton described "Good Risk Management Principles" as 
being flexible enough to deal with complexities of life with 
use of the best information available, making reasoned and 
logical decisions, and being objective (i.e., based on 
scientific principles.)  He said that quantitative and 
qualitative risk management strategies both have their 
places.  The qualitative approach requires a good 
understanding of the real world to include &everything8 
that contributes to the risk.  A quantitative approach allows 
comparisons, can be precise if good data is available, and 
allows comparisons after interventions but may require 
complicated modeling skills.  The WHO presentation focused on 
their plans to develop Risk Management Programs. 
 
¶19. (U) The International Center for Genetic Engineering and 
Biotechnology (ICGEB)(Decio Ripandelli) emphasized the need 
to improve laboratory skills and facilities in developing 
nations.  The UN 1540 Committee (Olivia Bosch) walked through 
the basics of UNSCR 1540 noting that implementation involves 
reporting of legislation and enforcement measures and this 
reporting is used as the baseline for risk management.  She 
emphasized that national submissions on 1540 support BWC, 
counterterrorism and larger nonproliferation obligations. 
Information from each of these areas should be used to 
complete national submissions.   When noting the 1540 staff 
could now provide direct assistance, based on the May 2008 
UNSC Resolution 1820, Japan surprisingly indicated they would 
ask for assistance with more in-depth penal legislation as 
did the Philippines.  She recommended the CWC National 
Authorities as a resource for smaller nations meet their BWC 
and 1540 requirements.  The WHO gave a presentation on the 
WHO public health mandate for biosafety and biosecurity. 
They referenced WHA 58.29, "Enhancement of Laboratory 
Biosafety," which discusses the state of laboratories in 
underdeveloped countries. 
 
¶20. (SBU) Twelve countries (France, the U.S., Japan, Nigeria, 
UK, Indonesia, Cuba, Australia, Turkey, Malaysia, Argentina, 
and Sudan) delivered statements on their efforts to improve 
biosafety and biosecurity measures and on capacity building. 
Most presentations focused on recent and upcoming workshops 
and conferences, supportive legislation, and educational 
programs.  The U.S. statement highlighted work with the UK 
and Libya efforts with the UK and Libya on promoting 
cooperative implementation of biosafety/biosecurity and 
bioethics measures, indicating the plan to table a working 
paper in December on these efforts. Japan declared its 
national goal of creating "the world's safest region when it 
comes to biosafety and security."  Indonesia detailed its 
ongoing efforts to build its first BSL 3 laboratory by 
describing the challenges it faces with finding the 
appropriate space, materials and technical know-how to build 
the laboratory.  Malaysia described its 2007 legislation, the 
"Biological Weapons Bill," which expands controls over 
transportation, use and quantity of toxics without 
justification for peaceful use, and related punitive 
measures.  Sudan, noting Art. X (assistance) obligations of 
all States Parties, indicated it is drafting national 
legislation in this area, but pointedly called for technical 
and financial assistance in promoting biosafety/security in 
its region. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
&Oversight of Science, Education and Awareness-Raising, 
Codes of Conduct8 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶21. (SBU) During the Oversight of Science discussion on 
August 21, the UK, Australia, Japan, China, Nigeria, Cuba, 
Turkey, Malaysia, Argentina and Sudan either gave 
introductions to national papers or said little of interest. 
France delivered the EU presentation on the "EU Cooperative 
Initiative to Improve Biosafety and Biosecurity," which was 
adopted in 2003 to counter the WMD threat.  The EU seeks 
partnership with BWC States to sustain the initiatives. 
France presented a paper discussing the need to "Use 
Laboratory Notebooks as a Tool for Traceability of Research 
Activities" and gave another presentation on "Biosafety Risk 
Assessment." 
 
¶22. (U) Indonesia made a presentation with Norway on a new 
BSL-3 Laboratory which the Norwegians designed and built in 
less than a year.  Canada and the Kyrgyz Republic gave a 
presentation on their cooperation under the 2002 G-8 
Kananaskis Statement on WMD and its goal of counterterrorism, 
particularly on guidelines and standards, training, biosafety 
accreditation and a new BSL-3 laboratory and repository.  A 
related treaty  was signed in August 2008 with ratification 
expected in a few months. 
 
¶23. (U) Cameroon (see details on accession para) made a 
presentation discussing their legislative efforts to modify 
their Constitution to enable their ratification of the 1925 
Geneva Protocol and accession to the BWC in the near future. 
They described their membership in the Biodiversity 
Convention (Cartagena Protocol). 
 
¶24. (U) The U.S. outlined the activities at the National 
Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB).  A question 
was raised about why the term "life science research" was 
used in the NSABB's work, rather than "activities in the life 
sciences" and whether "exploratory development" would be a 
better term?  The U.S. presenter responded that the NSABB had 
consulted with many organizations as well as industry on the 
term "life science research" and this term was chosen as most 
appropriate for describing their work and for its brevity. 
There was also a question about any interest in regulating 
genomics and the response was to make clear the NSABB is an 
advisory panel without the authority to make policy. 
 
¶25. (U) Japan made a presentation based on the experience 
with Aum Shinrikyo and how Japan approaches the challenges of 
local terrorism.  One concept that came from these challenges 
was whether a scientist with "low future potential" should be 
included in a list of possible risk factors.  They discussed 
the dual-use challenge in broad terms, describing types of 
experiments in advanced technologies.  Paradoxically, 
however, Japan had concluded that the Fink Commission 
criteria are too inclusive. 
 
¶26. (U) The International Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry 
(IUPAC) made a presentation emphasizing that education 
concerning research potential is about choices and scientists 
need to make the right choices.  The WHO's Cossivi gave a 
presentation on their Biosecurity Project and a summary of 
the related Bangkok meeting in December 2007. 
 
¶27. (U) The U.S., UK, Switzerland, France, Pakistan, Cuba, 
Brazil, Germany, the U.S. National Academy of Sciences (NAS) 
and the 1540 Committee gave presentations on oversight, 
education, raising awareness and codes of conduct.  The NAS 
stressed its role in promoting biosecurity through in-depth 
reports and workshops, and the importance of dialogue between 
policy makers and scientists.   Cuba explained its code of 
conduct as being dictated by national priorities, where there 
is national control of research, education and transfers in 
the bio sector.  This was in contrast to Germany's 
presentation which stated that the Government funds the 
majority of projects but scientists establish the priorities 
and control distribution of funds.  Germany's current 
priority is on research for pathogens and toxins. 
Switzerland distributed a fact sheet used to educate 
professional associations and academic institutions on the 
importance of codes and consequences of biological research. 
 
 
¶28. (U) A discussion panel focused on the importance of 
education with experts from ICRC (Robin Copeland), UNESCO, 
International Center for Genetic Engineering and 
Biotechnology, and the International Council for Life 
Sciences.  The panel expressed a desire for the 2011 RevCon 
to include education on the agenda by requesting countries to 
report back on developments on curriculum and training 
programs. 
 
¶29. (U) Several States Parties (Australia, Argentina, InQ 
Georgia Q Pakistan) gave presentations Friday morning on 
education and raising awareness.  Of note, India stated that 
there is national guidance on education and awareness 
training, but ultimate responsibility to ensure compliance is 
up to the industries and individual Ministries. Georgia's 
presentation recognized U.S. efforts, specifically DTRA,s 
and the $280M in funds, to help eliminate biological weapons 
and improve security and surveillance systems for dangerous 
pathogens in the region. 
 
¶30. (U) The United States, Netherlands, ROK, Sweden, Brazil, 
Bulgaria, China and Ukraine gave presentations on codes of 
conduct.  The U.S. presentation was well received with the 
ROK asking how to close the gap between codes and law.  Del 
rep replied that codes apply to all life sciences, but agreed 
that there are gaps. 
 
¶31.  (U) China, when presenting their view on codes of 
conduct, indicated that violators are to self-report 
themselves.  There was no discussion of efforts of a national 
authority ensuring the guidance.  Ukraine also stressed that 
code of conduct compliance is up to individual scientists. 
 
--------------- 
Poster Sessions 
--------------- 
 
¶32.  (U) "National, Regional and International Measures to 
Improve Biosafety and Biosecurity."  This inaugural poster 
session consisted of 16 posters from States Parties, 
professional organizations, and NGO'S on biosafety/security. 
This innovation was deemed successful with strong attendance 
and an excellent opportunity for detailed, yet informal, 
interaction with the mix of attendees.  The second poster 
session, focusing on education, awareness, and codes of 
conduct, consisted of over a dozen posters and was equally 
well-attended. 
 
----------- 
NGO Lunches 
----------- 
 
Synthetic Biology:  Engineering Life Science (Geneva Forum) 
 
¶33. (U) A presentation was given on August 18 on an 
educational seminar being developed that is geared towards 
non-scientific policymakers on the future of biological 
advances specific to genetic engineering and the dual-use 
dilemma (that peaceful scientific research may be exploited 
for malicious use due to universal materials, technology and 
expertise in the life sciences).  They posited that the use 
of synthetic biology for malicious purposes is quite 
futuristic, however, the ability of non-scientists to be able 
to use biology to manufacture genetic material and eventually 
organisms to advance fields such as alternative energy 
(biofuels) and environmental remediation is going to be 
commonplace given the advances in technology. 
 
--------------- 
Dual-Use at the Cutting Edge:  What to do about Oversight? 
--------------- 
 
¶34. (U) On August 19, there was an academic panel discussion 
moderated by Malcolm Dando (University of Bradford). BWC 
Chairman Avramchev opened the discussion by stating that "the 
BWC stands ready to ensure biopathogens are used only for 
good."  Panelists included Dr. Alexander Kelle (Bath 
University), Kathryn Nixdorff (Darmstadt University of 
Technology), Dr. David Friedman (Israeli Institute for 
National Security Studies) and Elisa Harris (Center for 
International Security Studies at Maryland).  Nixdorff 
discussed the Lemon-Relman Committee report in relationship 
to bioregulators and delivery techniques.  She specifically 
mentioned Advances in Targeted Delivery Techniques for 
vaccines, cancer therapy, immunotherapy, and viral vectors. 
She also focused on aerosols in relation to nanoparticles, 
opiates (Moscow theater incident) and oxytocin (for a false 
sense of security in humans).  Dr Kelle spoke about synthetic 
biology and the biosecurity implications of this new 
technology.  Dr. Friedman described Israel's proposed new law 
based on recommendations of the "Commission of Oversight of 
Biotech Research" which is nearing approval in the Israeli 
Parliament.  Elisa Harris made a general presentation 
concerning oversight of new technologies.  There was also 
discussion about a new Periodic Table for Biology similar to 
the Chemical Periodic Table. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
BWC Universalization (Bioweapons Prevention Project) 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
¶35.  (U) On August 20,  the BWPP roundtable included Kathryn 
McLaughlin (BWPP), Kathryn Nixdorff (Hamburg), Alan Pearson 
(Center for Nonproliferation and Arms Control), Gert Harigel 
(BWPP Board) and Amb. Sergey Batsanov (Pugwash).  Prof. 
Nixdorff made a statement that there should be benchmarks for 
the BWC and that ( How do you increase participation in 
something (the CBM) that is not mandatory and even if 
participation in the CBM is not legally binding, it should be 
politically binding. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
International Biosecurity Forum (Interacademy Panel (IAP), 
National Academies of Science (NAS)) 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶36. (U) On August 20, the Interacademy Panel (IAP) held a 
roundtable to discuss code of conducts, education and 
awareness-building.  The discussion was lead by Alastair Hay 
(University of Leeds), Ben Rusak (U.S. NAS) and Sergio 
Pastrana (IAP).  Mr. Hay stressed the importance of improving 
awareness among scientists concerning misuse of science and 
securing a culture of responsibility.  He endorses 
development of a code of conduct in the life sciences and 
urges governments to follow-up on their proposals.  Mr. Rusek 
stated that there should be no limits on research and 
progress on major research does not have dual-use potential. 
Individual awareness is critical and there should be a 
bottom-up voluntary awareness with a top-down oversight.  He 
encourages developing an on-line biosecurity advice portal. 
Mr. Pastrana emphasized building consensus in the scientific 
community to promote proper conduct and prevent hindrance of 
science.  He suggested that the UN should lead coordinating 
of activities, organizing meetings, improve networking, and 
deepen connections between the scientific community and 
policy makers.  The audience commented that the IAP should 
take the lead as they have the breadth of audience; IAP 
answered that they do not have the mandate or resources to 
accept this task. 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
National Implementation Measures for Effective Biosecurity 
and Biosafety (VERTIC) 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶37. (U) On August 22, VERTIC, the London-based NGO, briefed 
on its capabilities to provide services to countries that 
request assistance in drafting and enacting biological 
security-related legislation.  Also on the podium were UK and 
Netherlands reps who announced their financial support to 
allow VERTIC not only to analyze legislation and review draft 
bills, but also to send experts to capitals.  U.S. del rep 
expressed strong support for VERTIC's efforts and said the 
U.S. also hopes to be able to provide financial assistance in 
the near future.  He also urged Dels to consider how 
assistance could be made available for implementation and 
enforcement of legislation. 
 
End of text of part one of two. 
 
Rocca sends. 
 
STORELLA