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UNCLAS GENEVA 000751 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
THE HAGUE FOR CWC DEL, ALSO FOR EMBASSY 
NSC FOR CLUTES 
STATE FOR ISN, VCI, AND T 
JCS FOR J5/GSP/IND 
SECDEF FOR DASD FOR CN, CP, AND GT 
HHS FOR TLAWRENCE/JFERNANDEZ 
COMMERCE FOR DBROWN 
DOE FOR NA-243 FOR SMIRABELLO 
CIA FOR LALVARADO 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: CD PARM PREL BWC CWC CBW TBIO
 
SUBJECT: PART TWO OF TWO -- BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION 
DETAILS: MEETING OF EXPERTS ON BIOSAFETY, BIOSECURITY AND 
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY IN THE LIFE SCIENCES, AUGUST 
18-22, 2008 
 
REF: REF A: STATE 088219 REF B: GENEVA 719 
 
BEGINING OF TEXT OF PART TWO OF TWO 
 
---------- 
Bilaterals 
---------- 
 
¶38. (SBU) DAS Ken Staley met with Pakistani Ambassador and 
Permanent Representative to the UN in Geneva, Masood Khan, to 
discuss the Biological Weapons Convention Meeting of Experts 
and the work of States Parties.  (Ambassador Khan served as 
the Chairman of the Biological Weapons Convention Review 
Conference in 2006 and the Chairman of the Experts Meeting 
and Conference of States Parties in 2007.  Ambassador Khan 
noted the progress that had been made by States Parties over 
the past two and a half years and expressed enthusiasm for 
the Work Program and continued, increased collaboration among 
the scientific community, NGOs and States Parties.  Khan 
reiterated his own personal commitment to the BWC and noted 
that he was still involved in a process within the Pakistani 
Government to complete BWC Confidence Building Measures.  Dr. 
Staley noted that the United States is actively involved in 
helping to build biocapacity in Pakistan and has developed a 
number of successful collaborations among Pakistani-American 
and other regional scientists that are contributing to 
increased biosecurity.  Dr. Staley added that the U.S. is 
interested in further engaging with Pakistan on BWC-related 
affairs; Ambassador Khan was enthusiastic about increased 
collaboration and offered to serve as an interlocutor between 
the U.S. and Pakistan based on his previous (and some 
ongoing) work.  Ambassador Khan then added that a logical 
first step in order to facilitate a dialogue was to invite a 
delegation of key Pakistani bioscience figures to Washington 
for bilateral consultations in the near future. 
 
¶39. (SBU) China bilateral.  Alternate Del head Staley met 
with Chinese CD del deputy Li to express interest in another 
round of bilateral BWC discussions in capitals.  He thought 
that October (in Beijing) might be appropriate.  Staley said 
that we had appreciated the serious way in which China had 
approached the February 2008 bilaterals in Washington, 
including bringing experts from the health and agriculture 
ministries.  He said the U.S. would like to continue the 
comparison of legislation and regulations of both sides.  He 
also suggested that the two sides jointly develop a two-three 
hour-long education module on dual-use issues and to present 
it to the December meeting of States Parties.  Li agreed that 
the two countries should hold more bilaterals in the near 
future, the Washington discussions were very useful.  Any 
arrangements should be worked out through diplomatic channels. 
 
¶40. (SBU) U.S.-China Experts Bilaterals.  U.S. and Chinese 
experts met to discuss issues of biosafety/biosecurity, 
education and awareness-raising, and BWC and pathogen 
security legislation.  In the area of biosafety and 
biosecurity training the Chinese said that all personnel 
working with dangerous pathogens are require to pass a 
certification exam before they can work with these agents. 
Without certification they are not allowed access to the 
organisms.  The Chinese enacted a training law that ensures 
that dual-use pathogens are only used for peaceful purposes, 
that mandates a two-person rule for work with dangerous 
pathogens, and right to refuse to work with pathogens or 
procedures that require BSL-3 conditions in laboratories that 
are not certified at that level.  In 2004 the government 
passed a law that mandates education on pathogen regulations 
at all universities and laboratories that work or train with 
dangerous microorganisms.  They referred to this core 
training as "pathogen-centric."  In the area of legislation, 
the PRC has criminalized the unauthorized and uncertified 
use, transfer, or possession of highly pathogenic 
microorganisms.  On the question of high containment 
laboratories, at one point China listed over 100 BSL-3 
laboratories, however, when they instituted a process for 
certifying these labs, only 16 were licensed and the others 
were downgraded.  The Chinese experts and MFA representatives 
said there are no licensed BSL-4 labs in China. 
 
¶41. (U) Cameroon.  Having asked for assistance from the ISU 
to attend the Experts Meeting - and not receiving any - 
Cameroon, nevertheless, funded Magistrate Pauline Essome 
Siliki - who is in charge of implementing all treaty 
obligations, to participate as an observer in the full 
Experts session.  (Note:  While many Parties offer 
"assistance," paying for a non-State Party to come to Geneva 
for a week is a hard sell.  End note.)  ISU staff introduced 
Ms. Seliki to all three depositaries, the Chairman and the EU 
coordinator, as well as VERTIC, and garnered support for any 
assistance needed for accession to the BWC in short order. 
She is confident that membership in the Biodiversity 
Convention will allow for an efficient review of the BWC. 
Del member will be providing additional information and 
impetus to join soonest. 
 
¶42. (U) Libya. Deloff Crittenberger met with UK (Dr. Miller) 
and Libyan Rep (Dr. Sharif) to review the possibility of 
tabling a working paper on their trilateral work on issues of 
relevance to the Experts Meeting.  As Libya is still studying 
the draft paper, they agreed instead to give a short 
statement highlighting the cooperative efforts and signaling 
a paper would be tabled at the December meeting.  The three 
also discussed issues related to the Trilateral Steering and 
Cooperation Committee's Bio Subcommittee. 
 
¶43. (U) World Health Organization.  DAS Ken Staley and Del 
member Greg Stewart met with Drs. May Chu and Alex Ross at 
the World Health Organization (WHO) and shared observations 
regarding the BWC Experts Meeting and noted an apparent 
disconnect between States Parties offering assistance in 
biosafety and biosecurity and those who might seek 
assistance.  They asked if WHO could help to foster this 
connection in their work with developing countries. WHO 
expressed interest and noted that they have compiled an 
extensive database of country specific requirements for the 
International Health Regulations (IHR); the database includes 
laboratory capacity and biosafety/biosecurity needs.  Dr. Chu 
explained that the WHO was reorganizing the bureaucracy 
responsible for biosecurity assistance.  Starting in 
mid-September, units responsible for laboratory 
biosafety/biosecurity, health surveillance and support, and 
ports of entry would be reporting to Dr. Chu's Office 
(currently the Office of Laboratory Core Capacity, likely 
renamed when the reorganization is announced).  The groups 
reporting to Dr. Chu will share responsibility for 
implementing the 2005 International Health Regulations, with 
a particular focus on developing capacity in resource poor 
environments. 
 
¶44. (U) WHO (continued) Participants agreed that the WHO and 
BWC participants all share common interests: all want to 
increase biosafety and biosecurity; BWC participants 
primarily because of security concerns, the WHO primarily 
because of health concerns as part of a larger health agenda. 
 All agreed that cooperation between the WHO and BWC States 
Parties was possible and synergistic.  Participants agreed to 
explore ways in which to collaborate in the near-term to 
ensure that available biosecurity assistance from the U.S. 
was targeted effectively and to explore opportunities to 
provide coordinated and comprehensive biosafety/biosecurity 
and laboratory capacity-building before the December, 2008 
Meeting of States Parties. 
 
 
¶45. (U) WHO (continued) Deloff Weller met with Dr. Ali 
Mohammadi (WHO) Dr. Mohammadi had suggested the meeting in 
response to Deloff's inquiry regarding subject matter 
expertise in sheep and goatpox endemicity and preventive 
measures in the Middle East region.  Dr. Dilimi, present 
Director General of the Razi Vaccine and Serum Research 
Institute and who will be replacing Dr. Mohammadi, was also 
present. Dr. Dilimi provided a brochure describing the 
research being conducted at and biological products produced 
by the institute.  Dr. Dilimi mentioned that they have the 
capability to do large animal challenge studies in completely 
contained isolation facilities with a wide array of animal 
pathogens. (Del note: most of the agents mentioned appear on 
the USG Select Agent List and Australia Group Control List 
for Animal Pathogen. End note). 
 
-------------- 
Other Meetings 
-------------- 
 
¶46. (U) Close Allies Lunch/2009 Chairman. As has become the 
tradition, Germany hosted a political-level lunch for the 
German, French, UK and U.S. delegations on the opening day. 
The only issue discussed in detail was the Canadian candidacy 
for BWC Chairman on behalf of the Western Group. (The 
candidate, Geneva-based Canadian Amb. Grinius, is not openly 
soliciting support, preferring to maintain WEOG cohesion, 
particularly as there are no other candidates at this time.) 
All had reviewed a detailed rationale for U.S. support of 
Canada based on their extensive work, and funding, within the 
G-8 Global Partnership on bioengagement with the FSU, and in 
leading international efforts for biosafety/biosecurity 
assistance.  Canada also hosts a WHO Regional Center in 
Winnipeg which plays a key role in bringing scientists from 
many countries, such as Libya, to participate in exercises, 
etc. which allows access to Western scientists and practices 
they would not have access to otherwise. In addition, the 
Ambassador and his management in Ottawa have the interest, 
staff and demeanor to support being Chairman presiding over 
sensitive NAM issues on assistance.  Canada also established 
a consultative group composed of those countries in the WEOG 
that are not EU or nuclear (JACKSNNZ).  This group, to which 
the U.S. is invited, has proven very useful in offsetting the 
EU dominance of WEOG deliberations.  The UK is very 
supportive of a Canadian Chairmanship, Germany supports as 
well. The French will poll other EU members for an official 
response, not expecting any country to come forth with a 
candidate.  EU members realize the benefit of having our 
candidate put forth early on. 
 
¶47. (U) Coordination on BWC Legislation Efforts.   Del Rep 
Mikulak chaired a prearranged meeting with all those involved 
in providing assistance on BWC implementing legislation. 
Experts from the UK, Australia, Germany and the U.S. were 
joined by UNSCR1540, VERTIC, SIPRI, ICRC, the Asia-Pacific 
Center/Melbourne Law School and ISU staff, as well as 
consultant Ralf Trapp, to share information about ongoing and 
future efforts.  VERTIC, with four staff members, is 
undertaking very extensive efforts, having completed 45 
detailed surveys of the legislation of countries of concern. 
They intend to complete 90 more in the next year.  Priorities 
for interaction in capitals are the first 30 that have 
surveys complete; those in the Middle East; and those that 
have both a terrorist threat and a growing biotech sector. 
SIPRI is also active, focusing mainly on export controls, 
working with the State Department, in the Balkans.  They have 
been pleased with the amount of progress made in legislating 
dual-use controls based on EU standards.  They are leading EU 
pilot projects and technical assistance efforts.  They have 
also been active in providing infectious disease 
"protections" focusing on work at the bench level, principal 
investigators and management at facilities in the Stockholm 
area.  The EU is having "enormous problems" in getting member 
states to get implementation measures in place, as the U.S. 
has noted about Belgium for some years.  SIPRI is 
particularly frustrated with the lack of Customs Department 
POCS in Europe. 
 
¶48. (U) Germany has led EU Joint Action assistance visits to 
Peru and Nigeria with marked success.  Olivia Bosch repeated 
her points made in the open session about the benefits of the 
UNSRC 1810 provision that allows 1540 staff to travel to 
capitals to assist with 1540 submissions.  VERTIC will host a 
biosecurity seminar in Jordan in October where they hope to 
engage Middle Eastern officials.  The ICRC has a "BWC Model 
Law" and "Sample Act on biosafety/security" as well as Fact 
Sheets on 1540 which others have found very useful.  They 
have been working directly with Nigeria and in coordination 
with WHO in North Africa.  This informal legislation group 
will provide feedback to VERTIC on any POCs they may have in 
the nearly 50 countries they are studying.  The U.S. will 
begin an e-mail chain to allow information to be easily 
shared.  Given propriety concerns, the group will all focus 
for now on the latest information for Jordan, Libya, Morocco 
and the Philippines and thus concentrate over time on 
specific actions and not share full databases.  The group 
will met again on the margins of the December States Parties 
meeting. 
 
¶49.  (SBU) G-8 Bioterrorism Experts Group (BTEX).  Reps from 
several G-8 countries (Germany, Japan, US, UK, Canada) had a 
brief discussion, at German instigation, of future G-8 
activities on bioterrorism.  (Germans told U.S. Deloffs 
privately that they are concerned about ensuring that active 
work continue under the current Japanese G-8 chairmanship and 
subsequently under the Italians.  Neither has been very 
engaged in previous BTEX workshops.)  UK reps said that 
Britain values G-8 bioterrorism work, particularly in the 
areas of food defense, water contamination, and forensic 
epidemiology, and that on balance the work should remain 
under the Nonproliferation Directors Group (NPDG).  Others 
generally agreed, but in some cases noted ruefully that their 
counter-terrorism sections tended to be relatively 
uninterested in bioterrorism.  U.S. Deloffs also suggested 
that more attention be given in future activities to 
prevention aspects.  Dels noted that BTEX has not had a 
policy-oriented discussion to plan future work since 2005. 
In response, the Japanese del agreed to consider convening 
such a discussion in Geneva on the margins of the Meeting of 
BWC States Parties in early December. 
 
¶50. (U) CBM research project.  Filippa Lentzos (London School 
of Economics) and Reto Wollenmann (Swiss del) met with 
Deloffs to brief on their project to analyze the usefulness 
of the existing CBMs in actually building confidence in 
compliance.  The researchers acknowledged the U.S. position 
that discussion on changes in CBMs should not begin until a 
year before the 2011 BWC Review Conference and stressed that 
they are simply preparing background material for those 
eventual discussions. 
 
¶51. (SBU) Chile bilateral.  Del rep Mikulak met with Chilean 
deputy CD del head Camillo Sanhueza and General de Brigada 
Sergio Gomez, the prospective head of the planned Chilean 
National Authority for the Biological Weapons Convention. 
Gomez briefed Mikulak on the legislation under consideration 
in the Chilean parliament and asked for U.S. assistance in 
planning and holding a regional workshop on "biosecurity" in 
spring 2009.  He noted that this workshop would be much like 
the aborted workshop initially planned with help from U.S. 
experts in May 2008.  Mikulak welcomed Chilean efforts to 
enact new legislation on biological weapons activities and 
explored possible topics.  He undertook to provide a response 
as soon as possible after consulting colleagues in Washington. 
 
¶52. (SBU) U.S.-Australia-Japan Trilateral Strategic Dialogue 
on Bioterrorism.  Informal discussions were held on the 
margins of the plenary on tentative plans for the 
Bioterrorism Working Group of the U.S.-Australia-Japan 
Counterterrorism Trilateral dialogue to be held in 
Washington, October 2-3.  Australia's Department of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade (DFAT) representative, Dr. Tony Willis, 
said that Australia's goal for the meeting is two-fold: to 
build upon the Bioterrorism Regional Workshop in Kuala Lumpur 
in May, 2008, possibly with advanced biosecurity-related 
training of law enforcement personnel; and to expand the 
dialogue to chemical security and possibly all WMD issues for 
trilateral cooperation on assistance in Southeast Asia. 
Willis reiterated Australian frustration with the Japanese in 
this Bioterrorism Working Group; however, during separate 
informal discussions with Japanese delegates from the CD in 
Geneva and the Department of Science and Technology, they 
felt a discussion on how to provide biosecurity legislative 
assistance trilaterally may also be worth exploration, given 
Japan's legislative experience in dealing with bioterrorism 
issues.  Willis also expressed keen interest in formalizing 
U.S.-Australian bilateral biosecurity capacity-building 
projects in Indonesia, and possibly Pakistan; the latter due 
to the new Prime Minister Rudd's priority on expanding 
assistance beyond Southeast Asia and into South Asia. 
 
¶53. (U) Request for assistance: Dr. Eltayed A. Eltayed Ali, 
Head, Institute of Radiobiology, Sudan Atomic Energy 
Commission, spoke with Deloff Weller (whom he had previously 
met at a workshop in Amman, Jordan).  Dr. Ali said he would 
shortly provide information on Sudan,s needs for 
biosafety/security training and risk assessments.  Deloff 
said he would communicate Sudan's interest. 
 
---------------------------------- 
Conclusions and Recommendations on Biosecurity/Biosafety 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶54. (U) States Parties and other interested attendees broadly 
agreed that biosafety and biosecurity standards are important 
and should be implemented without delay. Since 2003, when 
biosafety and biosecurity were first discussed by the BWC 
Experts Meeting, considerable work has been done by 
governments, the private sector, NGOs and academia to develop 
standards and educational tools.  The U.S. has assisted the 
World Health Organization to create biosecurity standards, 
which are now available to all WHO members.  In addition, the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 
working with the U.S. Department of State, has developed 
standards for biosecurity.  Finally, numerous countries have 
passed legislation to ensure that all labs practice 
appropriate biosecurity.  Many of the presentations at the 
Expert's Meeting focused on applying rational risk analyses 
to ensure that biosecurity standards were applied 
appropriately.  While developed countries have made great 
strides to implement appropriate biosecurity measures, 
developing countries need some additional aid.  In most cases 
the aid is really a way to connect labs and scientists in 
countries with government and non-government organizations 
that might lend technical expertise. 
 
¶55.  (U) Despite the need for laboratory biosecurity in 
developing countries, existing aid funds have languished 
unused.  In 2007-8, the EU set aside monies to assist 12 
countries with biosecurity and legislation.  Only two 
countries took advantage of the offers for assistance 
funding, the additional 10 went unspent, although the EU was 
not forward-leaning in giving this assistance.  There were 
numerous States Parties at this year's Experts Meeting that, 
in good faith, requested additional information and or 
technical assistance related to biosecurity. 
 
¶56. (SBU) As a result, Del recommends that Washington 
consider the following: 
 
--Establishing a clearinghouse in the Implementation Support 
Unit for requests for technical assistance and offers to 
provide aid before the December meeting (on the basis that 
there would be no increase in U.S. costs or ISU staff); 
 
--Including a statement along the following lines n the MSP 
summary:   "We call on all countries that  seek or request 
aid to utilize the informal and confidential mechanism 
established by the Implementation Support Unit during the 
fall of 2008." 
 
-- Inviting WHO representatives to Washington to continue 
discussions on how available biosecurity assistance from the 
U.S. can be targeted effectively and coordinated with WHO's 
efforts to assist states in fulfilling the International 
Health Regulations.  The goal of the discussions should be to 
develop an approach to providing coordinated and 
comprehensive biosafety/biosecurity and laboratory 
capacity-building before the December, 2008 Meeting of States 
Parties. 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
Conclusions and Recommendations:  Oversight, Education, 
Awareness Raising, Codes of Conduct 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶57. (U) States Parties and other interested attendees 
generally agreed that awareness raising and ethical training 
in the life sciences is useful and has the potential to 
reduce the risks inherent in dual-use research.  Since 2005, 
when professional responsibility in the life sciences was 
first addressed by the BWC Experts meeting, considerable work 
has been done by governments, NGOs and academia to develop a 
rationale and training materials.  Although the value of 
education and codes of conduct is clear, life sciences 
communities have not yet been effectively engaged.  The 
burden largely falls on the scientific community but 
governments can encourage and facilitate this work.  A number 
of States Parties (including representatives of academia 
present on delegations) made clear their desire for materials 
for graduate life science training. 
 
¶58. (SBU) Although a number of efforts to develop such 
materials are underway, training efforts are scattered and 
have not yet taken hold.  To gain global acceptance, a broad 
variety of training materials will likely have to be 
developed and made available. As a result, Del recommends 
that Washington consider the following: 
 
--Jointly developing a short education module on dual-use 
issues with China for presentation to the December States 
Parties Meeting; 
 
--Supporting the South Korean, Japanese and Latin American 
request for educational materials by translating the joint 
U.S.-Chinese educational module into Korean, Japanese and 
Spanish (as well as into the other UN official languages ) 
Russian, Arabic and French); 
 
--Including a statement along the following lines in the MSP 
report in December:  "All graduate life sciences programs 
should ensure that students are made aware of the BWC and the 
potential concerns associated with dual use research." 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
Conclusions and Recommendations: Other BWC Issues 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶59. (U) The gathering of States Parties, experts and 
nongovernmental groups also provided an opportunity to 
discuss other BWC issues.  Numerous States Parties and NGOs 
referred to BWC implementing legislation in their 
presentations and these points were reinforced in a 
presentation by a 1540 staff member.  In the BWC context, 
States Parties have been encouraged to enact legislation 
criminalizing biological weapons, especially since the 
initial Work Program was initiated in 2003.  The work of the 
1540 Committee to ensure that UN members enact penal 
legislation could advance BWC implementation; similarly, the 
work of many States Parties to enact criminal legislation 
against BW would help implement 1540 requirements. 
Unfortunately, there has been little interaction between the 
efforts of the 1540 committee and those States Parties due in 
part to restrictions on data-sharing between the 1540 
Committee and UN Member States.  Additionally, there is need 
to coordinate disparate databases, encourage cross talk and 
provide the ability to match those with needs to those who 
are willing to provide assistance.  Furthermore, the most 
extensive database on legislation is held by VERTIC, a 
London-based NGO. 
 
¶60. (SBU) There is no mechanism for routine 
information-sharing or collaboration on legislation among 
like-minded countries and organizations.  As a result, Del 
recommends that Washington consider the following: 
 
-- Ensuring that Amb. Avramchev, the 2008 BWC Chairman is 
invited to participate in the September meeting of the 1540 
Committee; 
 
-- Pursuing a UN-ISU arrangement that would allow the ISU and 
the 1540 Committee to more formally share information; 
 
-- Exploring with the 1540 Committee, the ISU, VERTIC and 
others holding legislative databases ways in which the 
disparate databases on biological weapons-related legislation 
could be integrated and made available. 
 
END TEXT OF PART TWO OF TWO. 
 
ROCCA SENDS. 
STORELLA