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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 11 DOHA 000664 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/16/2018 
TAGS: PREL AMGT KSPR ECON QA
 
SUBJECT: THE NEXT 3 YEARS--AN INTERAGENCY FIELD ASSESSMENT 
OF KEY TRENDS AND STRATEGIC CHALLENGES IN QATAR 
 
REF: A. DOHA 574 
     ¶B. DOHA 558 
 
Classified By: Amb. Joseph LeBaron, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
------------ 
Introduction 
------------ 
 
-- (C) The long cable below reports the interagency consensus 
on nine key trends in Qatar over the next 36 months, forged 
in the field on September 2 during an interagency off-site 
led by the Ambassador at a CENTCOM Foreign Headquarters' SCIF. 
 
-- (C) In addition to the Embassy's Country Team members, 
participants at the off-site included representatives from 
CENTCOM J5, ARCENT, and senior representatives from the 
National Geospatial Intelligence Agency. 
 
-- (C) Next Steps: USG departments and agencies in Qatar will 
work over the coming months to systematically synchronize USG 
engagement here on eight issue areas: 
 
a) Expansion of military cooperation 
b) Further cooperation on counterterrorism 
c) Coordination on aid to struggling regional states 
d) Dialogue on Qatar's political and economic engagement with 
Iraq 
e) Information sharing on Iran 
f) Al Jazeera: editorial policy and broadcast operations 
g) Human Rights: Qatar's Tier 3 Trafficking in Persons 
ranking 
h) Deepening the commercial relationship 
 
--- (U) Specific steps on these issue areas for USG policy 
appear below in paragraph 10, "Imperatives for United States 
Policy in Qatar." 
 
End Introduction. 
 
------------------------------- 
POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC TRENDS 
------------------------------- 
 
¶1. (U) Expected trends in Qatar's internal political 
situation and foreign policy over the next 36 months include: 
 
-- (S) A continuation of a tight grip on power by the Al 
Thani family, which has controlled pre- and post-independent 
Qatar for 140 years. 
 
-- (S/NF) Within the ruling family, a continuation of the 
rule of Amir Hamad bin Khalifa, who overthrew his father in 
1995 and who appears/appears to be in no danger of being 
overthrown himself by some rival member or faction of the Al 
Thani family. (Note: That said, the USG has many intelligence 
gaps on the internal politics of the Al Thani family.  There 
are still many known unknowns. End Note.) 
 
-- (S) The twin roles that personality and risk play in the 
creation and execution of Qatar's foreign and domestic 
policies will continue to be dominant. 
 
-- (S)  The strategic risks to Qatar are as much to the 
ruling Al Thani family as they are to the State of Qatar.  In 
fact, the distinction between the State and the Al Thanis is 
thin, varying, and uncertain. 
 
-- (S)  Accordingly, the foreign policy of Qatar can be 
considered little more than Al Thani family policy, 
determined by a few Al Thanis at the very top, led by the 
Amir, Shaykh Hamad bin Khalifa, and by Shaykh Hamad bin 
Jassim, who is Prime Minister and Foreign Minister. 
 
-- (S)  To put it another way, the foreign policy of this 
micro-state is both personality-driven and the product of an 
unceasing evaluation by the Al Thanis of the domestic and 
international risks to their family's 140-year grip on power. 
 
 
-- (C) Al Jazeera television, launched more than a decade 
ago, put this small state on the map, and negatively so, in 
the eyes of regional states.  The Tunisians and Saudis, as 
examples, reduced their diplomatic representation after 
unflattering reports about those states' ruling families 
aired on the network. 
-- (C)  In late 2007, Qatar moved to repair frayed 
relationships.  As such, Saudi Arabia returned an Ambassador 
to Doha, and Tunisia has since re-opened its embassy.  The 
Qataris have given some assurances on toning down negative Al 
Jazeera coverage, but Qatar's desire to influence events 
inside and outside the region is not expected to change. 
 
-- (C) Qatar will seek to increase its influence in the 
region and in the world by leveraging its immense 
energy-based wealth.  It will continue to seek to place 
itself in a position to act as a mediator in regional 
disputes, such as the deal it recently brokered with Lebanese 
political factions.  It will do so not just for reasons of 
pride and ego, but in order to reduce instability in the 
region on the assumption that political and economic 
instability is especially threatening to tiny states such as 
Qatar. 
-- (S) Accordingly, Qatar will continue to have a working 
relationship with Iran even while it maintains a strategic 
military partnership with the United States, all in an effort 
to mitigate the strategic risk to the Al Thani family and its 
control of the state and its hydrocarbon resources. 
 
-- (C) Nothing would more please Qatar, which hosts an 
Israeli trade office and has contacts with Hamas and Iran, 
than to play a visible role alongside us in resolving the 
Palestinian conflict.  Qatari craves a role helping the U.S. 
bring about lasting peace in the region and argues that 
larger states, such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt, have been slow 
to achieve anything meaningful in partnership with us. 
 
-- (C) Qatar's tendency to bump up against initiatives of 
larger states rubs many of its neighbors the wrong way, but 
the Amir appears sincere in wanting to promote cooperation 
and resolve conflicts.  We expect Qatar's activities in this 
regard to increase as Qatar's wealth expands. 
 
-- (C) One upward trend, from the U.S. side, is to ask Qatar 
for financial support for various policies and aims around 
the world.  Unfortunately, these requests -- worthy as they 
are -- are made in generally piecemeal fashion, often leaving 
the Qataris with the impression that their bankroll is more 
valuable to us than their strategic partnership.  Frictions 
in this area can be expected to build, absent high-level 
direct engagement with Qatar's leadership on our overall 
global strategy. 
 
-- (C) On the domestic front, the Amir and a small circle of 
family members making all the major decisions in the country 
will continue their demonstrated commitment to the rule of 
law and to more participatory government.  But they will 
continue to move extremely cautiously in the holding of 
elections. 
 
-- (C) The pace of reform will depend on how Qatar deals with 
the influx of foreign workers and the societal changes caused 
by rapid progress. 
 
-- (C) Qatar will continue to rely on skilled and unskilled 
labor from abroad.  (The official population figure for Qatar 
is 1.5 million though the Embassy is told privately that it 
is closer to 1.7 million.  This is an increase of more than 
100% since 2004, and is due almost exclusively to the 
importation of foreign labor.) 
 
-- (C) There are powerful economic incentives to paying 
expatriate workers low wages and providing them with few 
services.  Influential Qataris have an economic interest in 
the existing system, and this will be difficult to reverse. 
The potential exists for tensions to erupt between Qatar and 
countries whose nationals work in Qatar over the mistreatment 
of expatriate workers in Qatar.  Many of the sending 
countries will continue to turn a blind eye to abuses, since 
their economies rely heavily on remittances from foreign 
workers. 
 
-- (C) The population increase will continue to place a great 
burden on the country's physical infrastructure, as services 
such as water and electricity must be expanded at a rate of 
10% per year. 
-- (C) The Qataris themselves will continue to experience 
alienation in the face of cascading change.  The increase in 
the Qatari population has come largely from societies with 
different religious, linguistic, and cultural norms than 
Qatar.  They tend to be Hindu or Buddhist, and few speak 
Arabic.  Gross economic disparities will lead to an increase 
in crime. 
 
-------------------------- 
TRENDS IN QATAR'S MILITARY 
-------------------------- 
 
¶2. (S) Expected trends in Qatar's military over the next 36 
months include the following: 
 
-- (S)  Qatar will continue to face a formidable challenge 
staffing its military, both in its senior and junior officer 
corps while the enlisted ranks will continue to be an 
attractive economic occupation for third country nationals. 
The Qatar Armed Forces' senior leadership is reaching 
retirement age and there is a shortage of mid-grade officers 
willing to step up to the time and energy demands placed on 
senior military leaders.  There is also a shortage of junior 
officers, as the drive to fill more private sector jobs and 
booming economy are providing them with economic incentives 
to careers outside the military. 
 
-- (S) There will be continued growth in the number of 
enlisted personnel, but this growth will be among 
third-country nationals who have no vested interest.  The 
preponderance of foreign nationals in the enlisted ranks will 
continue to be a cause for U.S. concern with the transfer of 
defense technologies to the Qatari Armed Forces.  Qatar's 
ability to absorb these advanced technologies, coupled with 
the disclosure and access concerns of foreign nationals 
working on or around U.S. weapons systems, will further 
complicate the already confusing and cumbersome FMS process 
for Qatar defense weapons purchases. 
 
-- (S) Qatar will continue to modernize its military through 
the purchase of U.S. weapons systems, with continued 
competition from French, British, Russian, and other 
international firms looking to gain a foothold in this 
expanding lucrative market.  Qatar recognizes that U.S. 
systems are the most advanced in the world and have 
confidence in the battle tested performance and quality of 
U.S. weapons and the accompanying logistics life-cycle 
support.  It is still attracted to French and British 
systems, however, due to the exigencies of the U.S. foreign 
military sales system.  As Qatar learns the U.S. foreign 
military sales system, it will buy more U.S. systems. 
 
--(S) The Qatari military works on a frugal budget, with 
national priority given to economic development.  Although 
senior military leaders understand and accept the 
subordination of defense needs to economic development, the 
inability to fund force modernization adequately and rapidly 
causes tension between the Qatari Armed Forces Services 
Chiefs and the Ministry of Finance.  The level of friction 
and frustration contributes to the desires of many senior 
leaders to expedite their exodus from the armed forces.  This 
trend of fiscal frugality with regards to defense spending 
will continue to govern the pace of weapons system 
procurement and modernization. 
 
-- (S) The Qatari leadership will seek to increase the 
prestige of its military within the GCC and the international 
arena but has no clearly defined strategy for doing so. 
Likewise, Qatar is attracted to the latest military systems, 
although its military modernization is not guided by a 
national security strategy.  The preeminence of the Qatari 
Amiri Air Force currently drives modernization efforts, and 
confidence in the Air Force senior leader corps is evident in 
their designation as procurement committee chairs for weapon 
systems across the services.  This "cart before the horse" 
trend of weapon system procurement driving Qatari national 
defense posture in lieu of national or military security 
strategy will continue.  In many regards, the recent purchase 
of strategic and tactical airlift platforms is misaligned 
with the maritime and ballistic missile threat from Iran; 
however, it does align with Qatar's desire to carve out a 
niche in the region and on the international stage as a Human 
Relief and Disaster Response force. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
TRENDS IN U.S.-QATAR MILITARY RELATIONS 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (S) Expected trends in Qatar's military relationship with 
the U.S. over the next 36 months include the following: 
-- (S) In the short term, tactical irritants will degrade a 
strong operational-level relationship.  Our military 
relationship with the Qataris is plagued with irritating 
customs and immigration issues.  The U.S. Army has considered 
moving elements currently in Qatar elsewhere in the region 
owing to the operational seaport customs difficulties. 
(Ambassador's Comment: What we, the USG, consider tactical 
and operational irritants might unfortunately be viewed by 
some Qataris as challenges to sovereignty -- irritants to us 
that rise to sovereignty challenges for them.  End Comment.) 
 
-- (S) It will remain difficult for the U.S. military to 
identify and meet the needs of the Qatari military because 
they either do not have, or have not shared with us, a 
coherent national security strategy. 
 
-- (C) In the medium term, interoperability will strengthen 
the U.S.-Qatar military relationship.  Increased foreign 
military sales, education, and training will professionalize 
the Qatari Armed Forces and strengthen our bilateral 
relationship. 
 
-- (C) In the long term, the biggest impediment to engagement 
with Qataris will remain sensitivities about their 
sovereignty faced with the enduring U.S. presence.  Qatar 
will continue to look to the U.S. military presence for 
protection.  Qatar will wish to strengthen and deepen the 
relationship with increased combined planning, exercises, 
operations, and training along the lines of the relationship 
between the U.S. Forces Korea and the Republic of Korea Armed 
Forces. 
 
-- (S) Qatar-U.S. relations at the political level will 
continue to affect the quality of our military relationship. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
COUNTERTERRORISM AND COUNTERPROLIFERATION TRENDS 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶4. (S) Expected trends in counterterrorism and counter 
proliferation over the next 36 months include: 
 
-- (S) Due to its small size and great wealth, Qatar will not 
be a major source of jihadists leaving to engage in terrorism. 
 
-- (S) Qatar's citizens can, however, support terrorism 
financially, and the capacity of the Qataris to do so may 
outstrip the ability of the government to stop it. 
 
-- (S) Qatar will continue to be an inconsistent partner in 
combating terrorist financing.  Qatar has been reluctant to 
fight terrorist financing, in part because of fear of 
embarrassment; if it acts against terrorist financing, it 
would be a tacit admission that it has a problem in this 
regard.  Qatar has also been reluctant to combat the 
financing of terrorist groups and activities because it does 
not want to invite an attack by antagonizing terrorist groups. 
 
-- (S) The emergence of Doha as a major transportation hub 
for the fast-growing Qatar Airways means that more bad actors 
will try to transit through Doha.  The Qatari authorities, 
wishing to protect Qatar Airways financial health, may wish 
to turn a blind eye to this transit instead of acting against 
it. 
 
-- (S) Doha is likewise likely to emerge as a transit point 
for illicit technology.  Those attempting to transit with 
illicit technology are likely to be non-Qatari, so the 
possibility exists that the authorities will take measures to 
stop it. 
-- (S) The American military presence in Qatar will continue 
to be a target for terrorism. 
 
---------------------- 
LAW ENFORCEMENT TRENDS 
---------------------- 
 
¶5. (S) Expected trends in law enforcement over the next 36 
month include: 
 
-- (S) Growth and societal changes in Qatar have outpaced the 
ability of the government to address effectively the 21ST 
century law enforcement challenges it faces, and this trend 
will likely continue. 
 
-- (S) Like the military, the Ministry of the Interior and 
the Internal Security Force (a semi-autonomous paramilitary 
security force which augments the MOI) will continue to face 
a formidable challenge in qualitatively staffing and 
retaining its officer corps and enlisted ranks.  The Qatar 
MOI's senior leadership is reaching retirement age; there is 
a shortage of junior officers, as the drive to fill more 
private sector jobs and booming economy is providing them 
with economic incentives to leave the public safety/security 
services. 
 
-- (C) Qatar's crime rate is among the lowest in the world, 
but there has been a 330% increase in crime across the board 
since 2005.  This trend will continue due to the increase in 
the expatriate population, rapid economic development, 
widespread use of the internet, and the MOI's slow pace to 
adapt to and implement necessary institutional changes.   The 
Qatari government will continue responding to this threat by 
adopting biometric technologies and information sharing with 
other law enforcement jurisdictions.  Improving the level and 
timeliness of that information sharing remains a top priority 
for Post's law enforcement and security representatives. 
 
-- (C) The Qatari judiciary is largely independent.  Qataris, 
not just foreigners, are prosecuted for criminal conduct 
according to the same standards as expatriates.  This 
approach represents a commitment to rule of law at the 
highest levels of the GOQ and will continue. 
 
-- (S) There is a crisis in the recruitment and retention of 
qualified law enforcement officers. The Qatari police force 
is the smallest in the Gulf.  If it is to meet this 
challenge, the force must increase officer pay and adopt an 
internationally accredited career professional development 
program. 
 
-- (C) The reliance on expatriate labor will increase the 
likelihood that criminals will relocate here.  Currently, all 
expatriates seeking residency in Qatar, to include laborers, 
must be fingerprinted by MOI in order to facilitate a 
criminal records check from their home country before 
residency status is granted.  However, the reliability of 
those checks from other countries without a centralized and 
automated criminal justice system database is suspect. 
 
-- (C) Rapid economic development is increasing the 
opportunities for money laundering and cybercrime in the 
country despite expanded GOQ efforts to combat it. 
 
-- (C) The court and prison systems are overburdened and will 
continue to be so during the next 36 months.  There is one 
courthouse for the entire country, located in Doha.  That, 
combined with a limited number of judges, has resulted in a 
significant backlog of cases going before the judiciary. 
There are plans to reduce the backlog by increasing the 
number of judges and courthouses, which will assigned to 
jurisdictions outside of Doha.  In addition, Qatar is seeking 
Post's assistance in exploring the use of alternative 
sentencing methods, to include probation and work-release 
programs. There are also plans to reduce or eliminate the 
annual judicial holiday, which currently runs from June 
through September.  Qatar only has one prison for convicted 
criminals, which stays at or near its maximum capacity of 560 
prisoners most of the year.  The only relief to overcrowding 
is through an annual amnesty program which releases 
approximately 15% of the population during Ramadan and 
International Human Rights Day. Plans are underway for the 
construction of a new and larger prison in the next three 
years. 
 
--------------------------------- 
ECONOMIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL TRENDS 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (S) Expected trends in economics and the environment over 
the next 36 month include: 
 
-- (S) The "megatrend" driving all other economic and 
environmental trends, in addition to many of the other trends 
discussed, is the growing exploitation of hydrocarbon 
resources leading to rapid increase in wealth.  In the next 
three years, Qatar will double its output of liquefied 
natural gas (LNG) to 77 million tons per annum.  In doing so, 
Qatar will run sustained major budget surpluses (USD 17 
billion in 2007).  Estimates by the IMF and the World Bank 
predict double digit economic growth until 2012.  There is an 
estimated USD 130 billion in capital investment planned for 
the next seven years.  Such a vast amount of money in the 
economy presents the risk of inflation, so Qatar will seek 
offshore investments to send the money out of the domestic 
economy, including to the U.S., via its sovereign wealth fund. 
 
-- (S) A critical dependence on foreign labor will continue. 
Qatar's economy is dependent upon both managerial/technical 
expertise and manual labor from abroad.  Although Qatar is 
engaging in educational reform which will fill some human 
resources gaps over the long-term, the ambitions of the elite 
for Qatar's future are greater than the capability of the 
local population to implement it.  Calls by the country's 
leadership for "Qatarization" - the drive to move Qataris 
into managerial and technical positions in place of foreign 
workers, will continue publicly, while genuine implementation 
will fade or not be achieved. 
 
-- (S) The financial sector will experience a qualitative and 
quantitative increase.  The Qatar Investment Authority will 
play an increasing role, as financial managers seek offshore 
investment opportunities as a place to turn current financial 
surpluses into long-term benefits.  Plans for a single, 
unified, regulator will be fulfilled.  Foreign stock 
exchanges will help develop and expand the financial market's 
offerings.  Insurance products will become increasingly 
important as a means of protecting investments.  The banking 
sector will show increasing assets, liquidity, Islamic 
options, and regional expansion.  There is likely to be a 
consolidation of local banks, and a move by the remaining 
banks from retail services to investment, trade finance, and 
wealth management. 
 
-- (S) There will be piecemeal liberalization and 
diversification.  For example, the telecommunications 
industry is gradually being opened to the private sector, and 
some economic decisions, such as patent and trademark 
regulations and standards, will be made in concert with GCC 
partners. 
 
-- (S) Qatar's role as a regional and international 
transportation hub will grow.  Doha International Airport 
will serve an estimated 10 million passengers in 2008.  This 
is a fivefold increase from a decade ago.  Phase One of the 
new airport is scheduled to open in 2010 with a passenger 
capacity of 24 million.  Qatar Airways will increase its 
route network, including its U.S. destinations.  There are 
plans for a new seaport which will increase capacity by five 
times in the first phase.  Hotel capacity will quadruple from 
the current 7000 rooms by 2012. 
 
-- (S) Qatar will continue its commitment to becoming a 
leader in science and technology.  Relaxed investment laws 
will attract more foreign participation in the science and 
technology sectors.  Internet usage has already increased to 
more than 300,000 users, an increase of 866% since 2000, and 
is expected to grow further.  Qatar has the second lowest 
rate of "brain drain" in the world behind the U.S., according 
to a World Economic Forum Executive Opinion Survey. 
 
-- (C) There will be growing concern over the environment and 
food safety, but pollution will continue.  The newly 
established Ministry for the Environment exemplifies this 
growing concern for the environment.  Energy companies in 
Qatar are increasingly aware of environmental challenges and 
will try to address them. 
 
-- (C) The rapidly increasing population will strain public 
services such as water supplies, roads, and other 
infrastructure components.  Electricity demand is expected to 
increase from 3419 megawatts in 2008 to over 10,000 megawatts 
in 2012.  Water usage will grow from 150 million gallons per 
day in 2008 to 330 million gallons per day in 2012. 
------------ 
TRADE TRENDS 
------------ 
 
¶7. (C) Expected trends in trade, particularly with the United 
States, over the next 36 months include: 
 
-- (C) Qatar will continue to seek the latest technologies. 
The Qatari leadership knows that its fossil fuels will run 
out and is determined to use its current wealth to integrate 
technology into its economy and society.  But other than the 
mere desire to acquire new technologies, there does not 
appear to be a coherent strategy that identifies Qatar's 
technology needs and how to fulfill them in a systematic way. 
 
-- (C) Qatar spends USD 180 billion combined in the following 
sectors:  oil and gas, health and medical sanitation 
projects, information communication technology, aerospace, 
architecture construction engineering, safety and security, 
franchising and education/training.   These huge expenditures 
will continue and the potential opportunities for U.S. 
exporters will grow. 
 
-- (C) Qatar will seek to become a "mega-brand" by marketing 
itself as an international destination of "global" quality. 
Qatar however lacks the services and supplies to maintain its 
brand name.  The poor quality of labor (born in part of a 
disenfranchised labor force) and sparseness of services may 
cause major bottle-necks in its infrastructure. 
 
-- (C) Qatar's pattern of "creative destruction" will 
continue its growth trend, sweeping away the old and 
replacing infrastructure with larger and more modern 
versions.  This will represent expanded opportunities for 
U.S. businesses. 
 
-- C) Qatar recognizes that the U.S. is the world's leader in 
education and training, and education and training will 
provide enormous opportunities for the U.S. 
 
-- (C) An informal quota system exists by which the Qataris 
purchase items from a variety of nations to curry favor with 
different firms and governments, but this is changing.  The 
U.S. will in any event remain the top exporter to Qatar 
bolstered by Qatar's big ticket purchases of Boeing and 
Lockheed aircraft. 
 
----------------------------- 
TRENDS IN EDUCATION AND MEDIA 
----------------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) Expected trends in Qatar's society, and educational 
and media sectors over the next 36 months include: 
 
-- (C) Despite an upcoming change in the U.S. administration, 
and regional issues such as Iraq, Iran and Palestine, trends 
in public opinion regarding the USG will continue to be 
conflicted for the next 36 months.  Qatari public opinion 
based on time-series data from polling trends since 2002 to 
2007 indicates that Qataris are split about equally on 
Qatar's relations with the United States:  60% of the Qataris 
who responded said that they were not confident about the 
USG's ability to address regional problems, yet 33% said that 
the United States is Qatar's most important ally, a number 
more than double the next runner-up, Saudi Arabia. More than 
80% of the respondents said that they appreciated the role of 
the U.S. in maintaining stability, security, trade, and 
higher education in Qatar.  Despite this, a small majority 
stated that they did not support the U.S. military's 
continued use of facilities in Qatar. 
-- (C) Al Jazeera (AJ) maintains high viewership in Qatar 
with more than 50% of the media market share.  Over the next 
36 months, there will be a steady expansion of AJ in Africa 
and Asia, and through subsidiaries into other markets, such 
as Turkey.  AJ will slowly but steadily lose market share 
within the region. 
 
-- (C) No change in local media coverage trends is foreseen 
in the next 36 months.  Newspapers in Qatar, both English and 
Arabic, will discuss certain political and economic issues 
candidly but never criticize the ruling Al Thani family or 
foreign policy.  According to several polls, about 40% of 
Qataris get information from newspapers and this high rate of 
readership is likely to continue.  The presence of 
Northwestern University's Medill School of Journalism may 
affect local media coverage, but primarily beyond the 
36-month window. 
 
-- (C) Government financial support and a desire to provide 
more Qataris with quality higher education will continue to 
fuel the education sector in Qatar.  Education City will 
attract two new schools with international reputations - 
probably from the United States - a law school and an 
institution offering an MBA. The education system will 
continue its standardization and major reform, mostly 
borrowed from Western models including the United States. 
Stated Qatari Government policy last year was that the 
Ministry of Education would soon disappear and be replaced by 
the Supreme Education Council, but that policy has been 
reversed. Government schools can be expected to exercise more 
autonomy along the lines of the independent schools formerly 
administered by the Supreme Education Council, as the 
Ministry of Education works to establish a common core 
curriculum across schools in Qatar. 
 
-- (C) Female students will continue to dominate higher 
education, as percentages of university-educated women 
continue to trend upwards and rates for men trend downwards. 
Almost 46% of Qatari women between the ages of 25 and 29 have 
acquired university level education.  Amongst Qatari men 
within the same age group, only 26% had university education. 
 This will remain the case as long as incentives remain the 
same as today, with the Government offering jobs with good 
benefits to Qataris whether or not they finish secondary 
school or pursue university studies. 
 
-- (C) Private sector employers will continue to come up 
short in finding qualified Qataris to fill jobs requiring 
technical/vocational training.  Qatar currently lacks the 
community college or vocational training system needed to 
respond to private sector needs.  The Minister of Education 
will likely adopt the Australian technical and vocational 
education model and open one or more schools, but the gap 
between the unprepared high school graduates and employers 
will only begin to close toward the end of the 36-month 
period. 
 
-------------------------- 
QATAR'S DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS 
-------------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) Expected demographic trends in Qatar over the next 36 
month include: 
 
-- (C) Qatar's population has doubled over the past five 
years.  As many as 1.6 million of the estimated 1.7 to 1.8 
million population is of foreign origin.  These numbers are 
expected to grow among every nationality and region of 
origin, checked only by Qatari security concerns about 
certain nationalities such as Pakistanis and Iranians. 
 
-- (C) Qataris constitute 8-12% of the population.  As the 
foreign population grows, Qataris will become a smaller 
minority in their own country despite a relatively high birth 
rate.  Qatar will not increase the size of its citizen 
population by easing restrictions on naturalization. 
 
-- (C) Qataris under the age of 35 will be increasingly well 
educated, urban, and wealthy.  They will possess an 
extraordinary range of opportunities distracting from the 
business of building their country.  As their wealth 
increases, Qataris are having larger families, increasing the 
chances that the Qatari population will become increasingly 
younger. 
 
-- (C) South Asians from India, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bangladesh, 
and Pakistan account for an estimated 800,000 to 900,000 of 
the expatriate population and work in a variety of sectors, 
including construction, import/export, labor, business, and 
information technology. 
 
-- (C) Several Arab countries' nationals have a major 
presence in Qatar, including Egypt, Palestine (typically 
long-term residents), Yemen, Jordan, Lebanon, Sudan, and 
Syria.  Expatriate Arabs constitute an estimate 300,000 to 
400,000 of the population.  They tend to work in engineering, 
accounting, import/export, education, energy, services, 
hotels, and beauty. 
 
-- (C) An estimated 200,000 East Asians live in Qatar.  They 
are mainly from the Philippines, Indonesia, Japan, South 
Korea, and China.  East Asians are prominent in the fields of 
mechanical technology, energy, construction, engineering, 
housekeeping, and labor. 
 
-- (C) There are an estimated 10,000 to 20,000 Iranians 
living in Qatar.  Many Iranians in Qatar are long-term 
residents.  The Qatari Shia population is estimated at 10 
percent of the Qatari national population.  Qatari women 
marry Iranian men, a rare instance of a female Qatari 
marrying a foreign husband. 
 
-- (S) There are as many as 40,000 Africans living in Qatar. 
They come from Kenya, Nigeria, Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, 
and South Africa.  African expatriates work mainly in 
construction, labor, trade, import/export, energy, and oil 
services. 
 
-- (S) Europeans account for an estimated 20,000 to 25,000 of 
the expatriate population.  They are generally citizens of 
the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Spain, and Turkey. 
Europeans work in energy, shipping, engineering, 
construction, management, education, finance, and investment. 
 
-- (S)  There are an estimated 5,000 to 12,000 expatriates 
from North and South America (excluding the U.S.) residing in 
Qatar.  They are mainly from Canada, Brazil, Venezuela, 
Mexico, and Colombia.  These individuals work in energy, 
oilfield services, education, and for Qatar Airways. 
 
-- (S) There are approximately 8,000 American citizens 
registered with the U.S. Embassy in Doha, compared with only 
1,500 in 2000.  Over 170,000 U.S. citizens transited through 
Doha in 2007, and this figure will grow as Qatar's airport 
expands and its national airline grows.  At any given time, 
the Embassy estimates that there are approximately 15,000 
American citizens present in Qatar.  American citizens are 
prominent in the energy industry, working for ExxonMobil, 
Conoco Phillips, Occidental, Chevron, and various energy 
services companies.  American citizens also work for military 
contractors, the U.S. universities at Education City, the 
American School of Doha, and a wide range of educational 
institutions in Qatar.  Continued growth in the education and 
energy sectors will bring in more American citizens over the 
next three years. 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
IMPERATIVES FOR UNITED STATES POLICY IN QATAR 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶10. (S) Emerging from these trends are certain imperatives 
for the United States in Qatar.  We identify below areas 
where U.S. policy should be focused and where we will 
synchronize interagency efforts for maximum effect.  (Note: 
These issue areas, including Qatar's regional foreign 
policies, will be examined in additional off-sites, as noted 
above.  End Note.) 
 
Qatar's National Security and Defense Strategy 
 
-- (S) The U.S. should work with Qatar to help it produce an 
overarching national security strategy, guiding its military 
development, defense purchases, cooperation with the U.S. and 
other allies.  Future off-sites will address how to bring 
this about across the Qatari interagency. 
-- (S) While the strategic military relationship with Qatar 
is sound, there are "irritants" at the operational and 
tactical level, principally with customs and immigration 
regulations and procedures.  We will address these in a 
follow-on off-site between the Embassy and CENTCOM. 
 
Regional Aid and Foreign Policy 
 
-- (S) We will engage with the GOQ on aid to struggling 
governments such as the PA, Lebanon, and Afghanistan.  On 
Iraq, we will establish a high-level dialogue on Qatar's 
diplomatic representation in Baghdad, general engagement at 
the ministerial level with Iraq's government, and forgiveness 
of Iraqi debt. 
 
Terrorist Finance 
 
 -- (S)  The intelligence on Qatar's official support for 
terrorists, particularly Hamas, is inconclusive, with 
divisions on this issue even within the U.S. intelligence 
community.  We need a more accurate picture of the role of 
the Qatari Government and its citizens in financing 
terrorism, especially funds directed towards Hamas.  This is 
a critical piece of the bilateral relationship that stands in 
the way of greater cooperation on the political level. We 
also need more cooperation on terrorist finance, more 
information sharing, more access to suspects of concern, and 
more coordinated effort to disrupt AQ-related funding and 
logistical activities in and through Qatar. 
 
-- (S) There are policy and attitudinal differences between 
the U.S. and Qatar over terrorism.  For example, Hamas is 
viewed very differently than Al-Qaida and its ilk.  Qatar's 
Central Bank currently cooperates on a range of 
anti-terrorist finance efforts.  We need to expand that 
cooperation.  Qatar has an agency charged with regulating 
foreign charitable contributions by its citizens.  We need to 
deepen our relationship with it.   As Qatar's financial 
sector expands, and the country's wealth grows, so too will 
the potential for Qatar to be a source of money from private 
Qatar citizens to terrorist groups.  Investing time and 
effort at the front end of this trend will pay high dividends 
later. 
 
Al Jazeera 
 
-- (S)  We need to address al-Jazeera's intentionally anti-US 
editorial policies and broadcasts.  We need to get al-Jazeera 
to help the War on Terror by giving more broadcast time to 
credible voices that discredit the AQ program and ideology. 
There should be less aggrandizement of those who preach 
hatred of the United States and who espouse violent 
extremism. 
 
-- (S) The USG has a strong interest in using Al Jazeera to 
reach its enormous Arabic-speaking audience.  Our objective 
is three-fold:  ensuring that U.S. officials appear on its 
broadcasts; increasing its professionalism; and mitigating 
its most egregious editorial practices.  To this end, we need 
to fully coordinate public affairs efforts throughout the 
Region to engage Al Jazeera and refute its unsubstantiated 
claims through a rapid response unit.  More polling data are 
needed to evaluate better whether our use of Al Jazeera and 
other Arabic-language media is having the desired impact. 
Hence, we need to increase our polling of Al Jazeera's 
audience.  In the longer run, Northwestern University School 
of Journalism campus in Qatar can act as resource and help 
professionalize Al Jazeera's staff. We will devote time and 
resources to help Northwestern establish a strong and lasting 
working relationship with al-Jazeera. 
 
Iran 
 
-- (S)  Qatar shares its natural gas resources with Iran, so 
it will be loathe to allow its relationship with Tehran to 
become overtly antagonistic even though most Qataris appear 
to fear and distrust Iran.  The U.S. military presence here 
is evidence of the latter.  There nevertheless continues to 
be considerable regional distrust of Qatar's position on 
Iran.  We will engage the Qatari Government and people to 
ensure that Qatar understands the threat posed by Iran and 
works with us openly and cooperatively in addressing that 
threat. We will work to heighten Qatari leadership's 
awareness of and concern about Iranian state sponsorship 
through the Quds Force and through the use of Hizballah as a 
proxy. 
 
Trafficking in Persons 
 
-- (S)  TIP remains one of the most persistent social ills in 
Qatar and a major area where the bilateral relationship can 
founder.  A major U.S. imperative in Qatar is to raise 
awareness on TIP, and human rights issues generally, and to 
find ways to affect public attitudes and government policies. 
 We have begun to set up a closer working relationship on TIP 
issues with the Qatar government and look to strengthen it 
further. Our goal: to set up an effective Embassy-GOQ 
mechanism to actively address Qatar's TIP Tier 3 Rating. 
 
Taking Advantage of the U.S. Universities in Qatar 
 
-- (S)  The presence of major U.S. universities in Qatar 
presents unusual opportunities to foster engagement with 
Qatar, not only on education, but on a whole range of issues 
including scientific research, national security, medical 
research, and law enforcement.  We will work to foster that 
engagement, and by doing so will earn the gratitude of 
ordinary Qataris, which we expect will have a positive effect 
in other policy areas. 
 
Deepening the Commercial Relationship 
 
-- (SBU)  We intend to take an already substantial U.S.-Qatar 
commercial relationship to the next level.  As a next step, 
we are working with the beleaguered American Business Council 
in country and leadership at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce in 
Washington to establish a chapter of the American Chamber of 
Commerce in Doha. 
 
-- (SBU)  The new entity would heighten the visibility of the 
U.S. commercial presence and serve as a clearing house for 
the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) on the full range of 
resident U.S. company interests.  This will complement our 
current engagement with the Qataris' expressed interest in 
negotiating a Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT). 
LeBaron