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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CARACAS 001381 
 
SIPDIS 
 
HQSOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD 
DEPARTMENT PASS TO AID/OTI (RPORTER) 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/30/2028 
TAGS: PGOV KDEM PHUM SNAR VE
SUBJECT: NOVEMBER STATE AND LOCAL ELECTIONS: WHAT'S AT STAKE 
 
CARACAS 00001381  001.3 OF 003 
 
 
Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR FRANCISCO FERNANDEZ 
REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary.  Venezuelan voters are slated to elect 22 
governors, state legislative assemblies, and 328 mayors on 
November 23.  These state and local elections will be a key 
indicator of the future of Venezuela's fragile democracy, and 
the Embassy is actively promoting free and fair elections 
through our USAID/OTI and other programs.  The opposition 
hopes to secure more political power, while President Chavez 
seeks to demonstrate renewed electoral strength before a 
possible 2009 referendum to eliminate presidential term 
limits.  If Chavista dissidents win some key offices, they 
could breathe new life into "Chavismo without Chavez."  The 
November results may also produce more state and local 
governments willing to cooperate with the USG. 
Alternatively, politicians widely perceived to be allied with 
narcotraffickers are vying for some key offices.  Chavez is 
likely to try to circumvent opposition winners and even some 
strong local leaders in his own party, setting up possible 
center-state conflicts in 2009.  Both the government and 
opposition parties are plagued by infighting and voter 
apathy, but Chavez's candidates will have far more resources 
for their campaigns than their opponents.  End Summary. 
 
---------------------------- 
Carving Out Democratic Space 
---------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) After securing only two of 23 governorships in the 
2004 state and local elections, the opposition seeks to gain 
local control over additional states.  The Podemos party 
elected two governors in 2004, but broke with Chavez in the 
run-up to the 2007 constitutional referendum.  Opposition 
leaders tell us that they believe they can win five or six 
governorship, but still hope to win as many as ten, including 
Podemos gubernatorial candidates.  They also hope to win 
between 100 and 150 of the 328 mayoral races.  They note that 
the municipalities and states they are in the best position 
to win tend to be the most populated and most important 
economically.  By winning more governorships and mayorships 
than they did in 2004, the opposition seeks to demonstrate an 
efficient and democratic alternative to Chavismo.  They also 
can be expected to tap state and local resources to try to 
strengthen their debilitated political parties. 
 
-------------------- 
Referendum Trial Run 
-------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) Perhaps as important as the state and local races 
themselves is the overall turnout for both government and 
opposition.  During the first half of 2008, President Chavez 
suggested he would put the elimination of presidential term 
limits up for another referendum in 2009.  This proposal was 
included in the constitutional reform package that voters 
narrowly defeated in the 2007 referendum.  In 2006, over 
seven million Venezuelans voted for Chavez, but only 4.5 
million voted for his failed constitutional package in 2007. 
The sum total of votes for -- and against -- President 
Chavez's state and local candidates will serve as an 
electoral measuring stick for the relative political risk 
Chavez would face in going for a referendum to eliminate 
presidential term limits in 2009.  In the wake of his first 
electoral defeat since 1998, Chavez needs to demonstrate that 
his electoral machine can mobilize a large majority of 
voters. 
 
------------ 
A Third Way? 
------------ 
 
¶4. (C) A number of President Chavez's United Socialist Party 
of Venezuela (PSUV) candidates, including his brother Adan 
Chavez, are confronted by dissident Chavistas or strong 
candidates from small pro-Chavez parties.  Most local pundits 
do not believe these candidates are likely to defeat Chavez's 
candidates, although they note that some of them represent 
legitimate electoral threats to PSUV candidates.  In races in 
which the opposition candidates are faring poorly, opposition 
leaders tell us they may quietly urge their voters to support 
dissident Chavistas in an effort to swing those races.  So 
far, former Chavistas have failed to attract many votes from 
Chavez's base or the confidence of the opposition.  Should 
they win some key races in November they could pose a new 
political threat to the Venezuelan president. 
 
 
CARACAS 00001381  002.3 OF 003 
 
 
------------- 
U.S. Partners 
------------- 
 
¶5. (C) The BRV promotes a vehemently anti-American foreign 
policy.  The BRV expelled the Ambassador September 11, 
discourages most official contact with Embassy personnel, and 
vilifies, and sometimes penalizes beneficiaries of U.S. 
pro-democracy and counternarcotics assistance as well as 
cultural exchanges.  Nevertheless, the BRV has not succeeded 
in undermining the traditionally strong ties between the 
American and Venezuela people.  Despite BRV efforts to depict 
them as American lapdogs ("pitiyanquis"), opposition and 
Podemos governors and mayors have welcomed contact with 
Embassy officials, readily accepted U.S. counternarcotics 
assistance and cultural programming, and promoted ties 
between Venezuela and the United States.  Interestingly, a 
recent USAID-funded focus group study found that most 
Venezuelans, including many Chavistas, strongly rejected the 
BRV expulsion of the U.S. ambassador.  Should the opposition 
win more governorships and mayorships, the Embassy will have 
more potential partners with which to work. 
 
--------------------- 
Center-State Conflict 
--------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) Should the opposition succeed in electing several 
governors, President Chavez is likely to try to undermine 
their authority through recently created entities.  He may 
also try to do the same for some of his own PSUV officials, 
should they prove to be too independent.  Chavez issued a 
July 31 public administration decree giving the Venezuelan 
president authority to designate regional authorities for 
planning and implementing development policies.  These 
authorities will have their own budgetary resources.  At the 
same time, the BRV announced the formation of five strategic 
military zones, each led by a three-star general.  These new 
entities can be directly funded by the Venezuelan president 
and could be to circumvent elected state and local 
authorities.  Opposition leaders tell us center-state 
conflicts are likely to break out in 2009 if Chavez tries to 
take greater control at the expense of governors and mayors. 
 
 
------------- 
NarcoPolitics 
------------- 
 
¶7. (C) Venezuela is a major drug transit country that 
generally refuses to engage in counternarcotics cooperation 
with the United States.  Narcotraffickers in Venezuela are 
increasingly gaining a stronger foothold in Venezuela and 
corrupting government officials and institutions.  They could 
have a big impact on a few key races in November.  Carabobo 
Governor Luis Acosta Carlez is widely believed to have allied 
with the narcotrafficking Makled family at Venezuela's most 
important port, Puerto Cabello.  Acosta Carlez is running for 
re-election as an independent after President Chavez declined 
to endorse his candidacy.  At the same time, Abdala Makled is 
running as an independent for mayor of Valencia, the capital 
of Carabobo State.  Opposition gubernatorial candidate and 
former two-time Carabobo governor Henrique Salas Feo told us 
in late August that he is concerned that narcotraffickers 
could try to force him out of the race.  Maracaibo mayor and 
Zulia State gubernatorial candidate Gian Carlo Di Martino is 
also widely perceived as having ties to the FARC and 
narcotraffickers. 
 
----------------------- 
USG Promoting Democracy 
----------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) Embassy Caracas continues to actively promote the 
democratic process, despite ongoing BRV efforts to impede 
Embassy operations (Septel).  USAID/OTI partners in Venezuela 
are supporting non-partisan voter education campaigns. 
President Chavez continues to try to frame these elections as 
a referendum on his administration, but educated voters are 
increasingly focusing on candidates' plans to address local 
issues, particularly crime.  USAID/OTI is also assisting with 
poll watcher training efforts for interested political 
parties.  Poll watchers are vital to preventing election day 
fraud, particularly in local races in which the margins of 
victory can be quite small.  The results of a 
USAID/OTI-funded focus group study will be shared with 
interested parties.  The program will also sponsor a 
 
CARACAS 00001381  003.3 OF 003 
 
 
non-partisan get-out-the-vote media campaign in support of 
state and local elections.  At the same time, Emboffs are 
asking hard questions of candidates who put personal 
ambitions before fostering greater democracy. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶9. (C) President Chavez has used yearly elections to help 
legitimize his increasingly authoritarian administration. 
The stunning defeat of his constitutional package in the 
December 2007 referendum, however, has put additional 
pressure on Chavez's PSUV party to demonstrate that it can 
mobilize a large majority of voters.  It has also provided 
the opposition with a real opportunity to make further, even 
if marginal, electoral gains from their dismal showing in the 
2004 state and local elections.  To date, neither the 
pro-government and opposition political parties have mounted 
impressive campaigns.  Both sides have been plagued by 
in-fighting and are as much combating abstentionism among 
their ranks as they are competing against the other side. 
That said, Chavez remains the most popular Venezuelan 
politician by far, and his candidates have considerably more 
(state) resources than their opponents. 
 
CAULFIELD