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FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3123
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2960
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 3173
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 001389 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA 
S/P FOR DAVID GORDON/ASH JAIN/JARED COHEN 
ALSO FOR INL/AAE ADAM BLOOMQUIST 
INL/FO FOR PDAS MCGLYNN, A/S JOHNSON 
P FOR DRUSSELL AND RRANGASWAMY 
NSC FOR ABRAMS/RAMCHAND/YERGER/MCDERMOTT 
USAID FOR KUNDER/LAUDATO/BEVER/SCOTT 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/21/2018 
TAGS: PREL SNAR PTER PINR EAID SOCI UNSC NAS SY LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: CHALLENGE HIZBALLAH BY FIXING THE DRUG 
PROBLEM IN BEKAA, SAYS PSP VICE PRESIDENT 
 
REF: A. BEIRUT 912 
     ¶B. BEIRUT 919 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
SUMMARY 
-------- 
 
¶1. (C) Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) Vice President 
Duraid Yaghi said September 19 one-third of the population of 
his hometown of Baalbek does not support Hizballah, although 
it is in an area of strong Hizballah influence.  However, 
according to Yaghi, continued unemployment and increased 
cultivation of illegal drugs is feeding into Hizballah's 
strength in the Bekaa region.  Yaghi, a Shia, suggested 
Lebanon donors should consider funding an illegal drug crop 
eradication and substitution program.  Furthermore, he 
admitted that the March 14 coalition had made several 
mistakes in May, but said what was more worrisome was that 
the coalition had not yet agreed on a unified electoral 
platform or even begun planning for the 2009 parliamentary 
elections.  We believe there may be an opportunity for a 
USG-sponsored crop substitution project in Baalbek and will 
explore further options.  Separately, anti-Hizballah and 
prominent Shia businessman Abdullah Bitar told the Ambassador 
he will take on Hizballah by running in the elections for a 
Nabotieh seat, and hopes to join forces with other key 
players in forming a list.  End summary. 
 
BAALBEK DOES NOT 
BELONG TO HIZBALLAH 
------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) Former Shia MP and current Progressive Socialist Party 
(PSP) Vice President Duraid Yaghi estimated to the Ambassador 
on September 19 that 30-35 percent of Baalbek's population 
does not support Hizballah.  Baalbek, situated in the heart 
of Hizballah's stronghold in the Bekaa Valley, contains 
"brave voters" who overwhelmingly supported PSP and other 
parties in the majority over Hizballah in the most recent 
municipal elections, he said.  However, Baalbek lacks any 
significant presence of state institutions, such as the 
Internal Security Services (ISF) or the Lebanese Armed Forces 
(LAF).  According to Yaghi, the state "is not there." 
Without these visible signs of state authority or other 
state-provided social services, Yaghi worried Hizballah was 
gaining greater support.  Baalbek's residents, he said, often 
"turn to Hizballah before going to the police or the courts." 
 Generally speaking, said Yaghi, Hizballah buys its loyalties 
from residents by providing them $200-$300 per month, 
offering educational scholarships, and providing health and 
social services. 
 
FIX THE DRUG PROBLEM, 
DIMINISH HIZBALLAH LEVERAGE 
--------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) According to Yaghi, the incidence of hashish and opium 
cultivation continues to rise in Baalbek.  Lack of employment 
opportunities, he believed, is driving greater numbers of 
Baalbek residents to plant the illegal drug crops.  The sale 
of the crops feed into Hizballah's weapons network, as well 
as provide valuable income to families, he said.  The drug 
problem, Yaghi said, is not new.  In May 1996, while he was 
MP, Yaghi and then-Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri drafted Decree 
8666, which allows for the creation of a government 
eradication program, with the use of international donor 
assistance, for the Bekaa region, especially in Baalbek and 
Hermel.  The decree still exists, Yaghi said, but nothing 
ever came of it.  (Note: ISF Counternarcotics Unit head has 
told Embassy INL Director that the ISF and LAF conduct 
eradication campaigns on a yearly basis, with the exception 
of 2007 when the program was not carried out because of the 
Nahr al-Barid conflict.  End Note.)  Yaghi requested 
assistance from the U.S. and other donors to revive the drug 
eradication effort, suggesting that any success with such a 
program could sway support away from Hizballah and towards 
the March 14 coalition as the 2009 parliamentary elections 
 
BEIRUT 00001389  002 OF 003 
 
 
approach.  (Note: INL funding will provide training in 
December for 50 ISF officers in counternarcotics tactics. 
The course will be taught by DEA instructors.  End Note.) 
 
MARCH 14 MADE MISTAKES; 
NOT PREPARED FOR ELECTIONS 
-------------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) Yaghi admitted that the March 14 coalition to which 
his party belongs made several mistakes in May.  First, he 
said, March 14, and specifically March 14 leader Saad 
Hariri's Future Movement miscalculated the extent of 
Hizballah reaction when Future Movement pushed the Druze 
leaders Walid Jumblatt and Marwan Hamadeh, who was minister 
of telecommunications,  to close down Hizballah's 
communication networks.  After the ensuing takeover of West 
Beirut by Hizballah, and the subsequent agreement reached in 
Doha that paved the way for election of President Sleiman, 
Yaghi believed March 14 should have publicly admitted its 
mistake, while articulating a vision.  Neither has happened, 
Yaghi said, and "we find ourselves in a bad situation." 
 
¶5. (C) Furthermore, he warned, the re-districting agreement 
reached in Doha for the 2009 parliamentary elections that 
placed Baalbek and Hermel into one district exacerbates March 
14's problems.  Baalbek by itself, he said, probably would 
produce two Sunni and two Christian candidates to counter 
Hizballah's four candidates.  However, both MP slots in 
Hermel will go to Hizballah candidates, he predicted.  As one 
district, if Hizballah wins the majority, all ten MP seats 
will go to Hizballah.  Yaghi said he planned to talk with 
Hariri "soon" about his concerns for Baalbek and to secure 
Hariri's assurances that tangible assistance would be 
forthcoming to Baalbek's voters, and not just words of 
support. 
 
¶6. (C) Yaghi was also visibly concerned about the lack of a 
unified March 14 message.  He fretted that if another two 
months pass before the platform is decided, then March 14 
should not expect favorable election results.  In Baalbek, he 
said, Hizballah has been preparing for the elections for the 
last six months, while March 14 has not started.  In 
addition, Yaghi envied the fact that Hizballah speaks "with 
one voice," while March 14 has many parties and many 
different voices, he said. 
 
¶7. (C) Yaghi did not believe the 2009 elections would be 
delayed, as "everybody thinks they will win."  He did not 
foresee Hizballah initiating any type of military action that 
could put the elections in jeopardy, and opined that 
Hizballah's backers, Iran and Syria, would not support such a 
scenario.  Yaghi supported President Sleiman's decision to 
launch the National Dialogue, but did not believe any serious 
discussion of Hizballah's weapons would occur until after the 
elections. 
 
ANTI-HIZBALLAH SHIA 
RUNNING IN ELECTIONS 
-------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) In a separate September 22 meeting with the 
Ambassador, anti-Hizballah prominent Shia businessman and 
head of the Nabatieh Traders Association and the Economists 
Union Abdullah Bitar (Ref A) stated his intentions to take on 
Hizballah and run in the elections as a candidate from his 
hometown (and current residence) in Nabatieh, a Hizballah 
stronghold in southern Lebanon.  Alone, he anticipated he 
could win approximately 5,000 votes from Nabatieh proper, and 
10,000 votes from its surrounding areas.  Believing that 
Lebanon's southern residents would be willing to vote for 
non-Hizballah candidates, said he hopes to join forces with 
anti-Hizballah figure Ahmad al-Assad (Ref B) (who Bitar noted 
had distanced himself from him in the last few months), 
Hariri, and the Communist party to offer an alternative to 
Hizballah. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
BEIRUT 00001389  003 OF 003 
 
 
 
¶9. (C) Despite losing his last contest for an MP seat, Yaghi 
remains actively involved in politics.  He is also president 
of Baalbek's Bar Association.  Independent Shia organizer 
Lokman Slim and others have encouraged Yaghi to consider 
running as a candidate in the 2009 elections, but Yaghi says 
he is reluctant due to the personal risks.  (Note:  In May, 
his house was set on fire by unknown assailants, but 
presumably the attack was politically motivated.  An 
investigation is currently underway.  End note.)  The picture 
Yaghi paints of the March 14 coalition's prospects for 
electoral success in 2009 is disheartening, but echoes the 
message we have carried to our March 14 interlocutors that a 
unified platform is very important to winning the elections. 
 
¶10. (C) Although USG projects in the Bekaa are limited, we 
believe there could be an opportunity for an USG-sponsored 
crop eradication and substitution program.  A similar project 
located along Lebanon's northern border was considered 
previously by UNDCP, but did not get off the ground. 
However, we will explore the feasibility of resurrecting such 
a project for the Bekaa.  If feasible, such a project could 
used an effective tool of the GOL to blunt expanding 
Hizballah influence in Baalbek.  End comment. 
SISON