VZCZCXRO0523
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #2935/01 2551047
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 111047Z SEP 08
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9358
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002935 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR INL/C/CP, INL/I, NEA/I AND S/I 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/11/2018 
TAGS: STATE FOR INL CP INL NEA AND
SUBJECT: FORMER TRADE MINISTRY DIRECTOR GENERAL DETAILS 
RAMPANT CORRUPTION 
 
REF: BAGHDAD 002122 
 
Classified By: Anti-Corruption Coordinator Lawrence Benedict for reason 
s 1.4(b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (S) SUMMARY:  A Director General with 34 years of 
experience at the Ministry of Trade detailed to us September 
7 allegations of widespread corruption within the Ministry of 
Trade including complicity by the Minister and the Deputy 
Inspector General.  He also described some of the schemes 
used to siphon off up to 70 percent of the value of contracts 
for wheat, tea, and rice.  While we cannot substantiate his 
allegations at this time, the DG's reluctance to approach the 
Commission of Integrity and his accusations against those 
within his ministry responsible for promoting transparency 
and accountability underscore the dearth of confidence Iraqi 
whistleblowers have in their own institutions to combat 
corruption.  END SUMMARY. 
 
DG DETAILS IMPORT SCAMS 
----------------------- 
 
¶2. (S)  Assam Muhammad Hassan (strictly protect), who was 
until two weeks ago the Director General for Financial and 
Commercial Affairs at the Ministry of Trade with 34 years of 
auditing experience, described to us in a September 7 meeting 
the rampant corruption he had uncovered at the ministry. 
Hassan told us he had received death threats because of the 
information he uncovered and that he had only very 
reluctantly returned to Iraq from Jordan to meet with U.S. 
officials.  He was nervous to meet with us and insisted on 
holding the meeting at the Embassy rather than in a public 
place.  Hassan brought with him two large folders of 
documents that he said provided proof of fraudulent 
transactions involving procurement for the Public 
Distribution System (PDS) and the complicity of high-ranking 
Iraqi officials. 
 
¶3. (S) Hassan detailed the various schemes by which the 
Ministry of Trade imports substandard goods for the PDS.  He 
said most of Iraq's tea comes from Iran after being smuggled 
through Kurdistan where the labels are switched out to 
suggest the tea had come from India.  The tea is then sold to 
the Ministry of Trade through Iraqi front companies, which 
pocket the difference between the contract price and the 
purchase price of the substandard product.  Hassan said 
government tests of the tea distributed under the PDS 
verified that the tea came from Iran and that it was below 
the standards called for under contract in terms of taste, 
color, and aroma. 
 
¶4. (S) Hassan said shipments of wheat, which were contracted 
at USD 220 per ton, actually only cost the buyers USD 65 per 
ton.  Each shipload of wheat, carrying roughly 50,000 tons, 
thus led to kickbacks of USD 7-8 million.  In other 
transactions, the quantity of wheat ultimately delivered fell 
far short of that paid for under contract.  In one example, 
he said his office had uncovered a contract for the delivery 
of 1.1 million tons of wheat that had been delivered with a 
recorded shortfall of 884,000 tons.  Hassan showed us digital 
pictures of the substandard quality of wheat (congealed in 
columns of rot) and rice (collected in the unlined holds of 
rusty ships more than 10 years past their prime and filled 
with what appeared to be scrap metal).  Hassan noted that 
with the exception of wheat contracts which use letters of 
credit, deals for other commodities purchased by the ministry 
were all done with cash, thus enabling fraudulent 
transactions. 
 
ACCUSES DEPUTY IG AND MINISTER 
------------------------------ 
 
¶5. (S)  Hassan accused Sabah Aboud, the Deputy Inspector 
General at the Ministry of Trade, of being the ringleader of 
the fraudulent wheat deals.  According to Hassan, Sabah had 
been the Director General in charge of wheat imports at the 
ministry until Hassan's investigation into questionable wheat 
imports had prompted his dismissal in June 2007.  Eight days 
later, Minister Sudani reinstated Sabah as the Deputy IG. 
Hassan uncovered further evidence of Sabah's involvement in 
wheat kickbacks but claims he was further rebuffed when he 
presented this information to the minister.  Two weeks ago, 
Sabah took over Hassan's position as DG for Financial and 
Commercial Affairs, all the while remaining as Deputy IG and 
maintaining de facto responsibility within the ministry for 
wheat imports. 
 
¶6.  (S) Hassan claimed to have proof of Trade Minister 
Sudani's involvement in fraudulent deals.  Hassan said that 
he had briefed the results of his investigations to Sudani, 
 
BAGHDAD 00002935  002 OF 002 
 
 
whose response was "why should we dig old graves?"  He said 
he had documentation outlining Sudani's personal kickbacks in 
one USD 14 million tea deal in January 2008.  He said other 
documents showed that all Iraqi wheat contracts contained the 
signature of the minister, Sabah, or one clerk who worked for 
them.  In addition, he claimed to have a letter dated July 
22, 2007 from National Security Adviser Mowaffaq Rubaie to 
the Prime Minister uncovering a USD 50 million scam involving 
170,000 tons of Iranian wheat.  Another letter dated July 30, 
2007 from Minister Sudani claimed that Iraq had never 
imported any wheat from Iran. 
 
NO FAITH IN IRAQI ANTI-CORRUPTION INSTITUTIONS 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶7. (S)  Hassan stressed that the reason he had come to us was 
because of the lack of faith he had in Iraq's anti-corruption 
agencies.  After being rebuffed by the Trade Minister, he had 
approached a member of parliament, Ali al-Sajri.  In July, 
Sajri and Hassan jointly approached Embassy Amman, which 
helped coordinate our meeting with Hassan.  Hassan and 
al-Sajri described to Embassy Amman threats to Hassan and his 
family, as well as offers of bribes, to encourage him to drop 
the matter.  They indicated a total lack of confidence in the 
Iraqi government to either investigate the matter or to 
protect Hassan and were reluctant even to discuss the idea of 
returning to Iraq.  Hassan told ACCO he wrote to the Prime 
Minister and met with Ali al-Basri in the Prime Minister's 
office in early September, who reportedly told him that he 
could not promise anything would be done.  We asked Hassan if 
he would be willing to approach the Commission of Integrity 
with his information.  Hassan replied that he did not trust 
any Iraqi institutions and that he feared for his personal 
safety in doing so. 
 
COMMENT AND NEXT STEPS 
---------------------- 
 
¶8. (S)  Hassan's reluctance to bring his case to the 
Commission of Integrity is not surprising following the poor 
reception he has faced in presenting his allegations within 
his own ministry (to an allegedly corrupt Deputy IG and 
Minister) and to the Prime Minister's office.  ACCO is 
coordinating with the FBI Major Crimes Task Force (MCTF), 
which intends to reach out to Hassan and review his 
documentation to see whether a criminal case can be made.  If 
Hassan's allegations are true, it reveals another troubling 
case -- besides that in the Ministry of Health, reported 
reftel -- of staff in an Inspector General's office who are 
charged with promoting transparent practices being among the 
worst perpetrators of corrupt acts.  Even if Hassan's 
allegations are not warranted, which we will not be able to 
fully assess until the MCTF has had a chance to follow up and 
review his documentation, the case reveals a troubling 
reluctance by Iraqi whistleblowers to use GoI institutions 
such as the Commission of Integrity to voice their concerns. 
CROCKER