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RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
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RUCNDT/US MISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ATHENS 001294 
 
 
SIPDIS 
 
CJCS FOR THE CHAIRMAN, STATE FOR P&EURSE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/10/2018 
TAGS: GR PGOV PREL
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR GENERAL GRAPSAS' VISIT TO D.C. 
SEPTEMBER 15-19 
 
Classified By: AMB DANIEL SPECKHARD.  REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1.  (C) The visit of General Demetrius Grapsas, Chief of the 
Hellenic National Defense General Staff, to Washington is an 
important opportunity to recognize Greece's support of 
multiple U.S. Navy and Air Force operations in the Eastern 
Mediterranean and the Middle East, including Iraq through 
overflights and transmissions through Souda Bay, as well as 
its ongoing contributions to Afghanistan and Kosovo. A 
pragmatic and apolitical officer, Grapsas will be receptive 
to our suggestions of ways Greece can further contribute.  He 
is keenly interested in maintaining strong U.S.-Greek 
mil-to-mil relations as we continue to have differences with 
the GOG over Macedonia and a "business as usual" approach to 
Russia.  Greece is a key buyer of U.S. military equipment, 
though recent procurement decisions tend to be based on 
political and seek a balance with the U.S., the EU, and 
Russia.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.  (S) U.S.-Greece defense cooperation has a long history 
rooted in the Marshall Plan and the Truman Doctrine. 
Currently, some of Greece's key current contributions in the 
military sphere include: 
 
-- Souda Bay: Souda Bay is the U.S. Navy's most important 
strategic location in the Eastern Mediterranean.  A large 
number of U.S. and NATO operations in the Middle East and the 
Mediterranean depend on this facility in Crete.   The Greeks 
do not place any restrictions on access, overflight, or 
deployment of even the most sensitive military assets at 
Souda Bay. 
 
-- Flight Clearances/OEF and OIF Support: Since 9/11, the 
Greek Ministry of Defense granted blanket overflight 
clearances for all U.S. military aircraft that pass through 
Greek airspace in support of operations in Afghanistan and 
Iraq. 
 
--KFOR:  Greek military forces are important contributors to 
maintaining stability in Kosovo with approximately 600 
personnel deployed in NATO's KFOR mission. 
 
--OAE:  Greece is one of the top three contributors to 
Operation Active Endeavor (OAE) - NATO's Article V 
counter-terrorist operation in the Mediterranean. 
 
--Ship visits:  The GOG has supported fully a robust 
ship-visit program allowing close to 300 U.S. naval vessels 
to visit 12 Greek ports over the last two years. 
 
¶3.  (S/NF) General Grapsas is open, but a staunch defender of 
Greece's interests.  He is positively disposed towards the 
U.S., and he has pressed the Greek military to emulate 
American planning, transformation, training, and procurement. 
He is suspicious of Russia and resisted efforts to procure 
Russian defense articles. He told the U.S. Defense Attach 
that he regrets Greece's recent purchase of Russian BMP-3's. 
Similarly, he has said he would support providing Greek 
forces for Iraq and increase Greek forces in Afghanistan, to 
include lifting the regional caveat restricting Greek 
personnel to the Kabul region. However, General Grapsas has 
little influence on defense policy and procurement decisions. 
 The Greek constitution places strong restrictions on the 
role of military officers in participating in policy 
development. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Greece has had plenty of high-level NATO visits. 
Recently, General Craddock (20-22 July), Admiral Fitzgerald 
(2-3 April), Lt Gen McFann (2 July), and LTG Eikenberry (3 
July) visited Athens and met with Grapsas. Although the 
discussions have been frank, all four visits were cordial 
resulting in agreement to continue cooperative dialogue on 
NATO issues.  Additionally, the Joint Staff Talks and the 
U.S./Greece High Level Consultative Committee (HLCC) will 
meet in D.C. October 22 and October 24. 
 
¶5.  (C) Although the broader U.S./Greece relationship is not 
always smooth, the U.S.-Greece military-to-military 
relationship is strong, and we believe it pays important 
strategic dividends to the national security of the United 
 
ATHENS 00001294  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
States.  We can advance our security agenda wit Greece 
through General Grapsas' visit and upcoming bilateral 
mil-to-mil contacts. 
 
---------- 
Key Issues 
---------- 
 
¶6.  (C) Among the key issues likely to come up are the 
following: 
 
-- Macedonia:  At the April NATO Summit, Greece blocked the 
invitation of Macedonia into the Alliance -- a top U.S. 
priority because of a lack of agreement on changing the 
country's name.  We continue to urge both Athens and Skopje 
to work rapidly for a solution.  Greek/Macedonian relations 
have been soured by a recent tart exchange of letters between 
Macedonian PM Gruevski and Greek PM Karamanlis on questions 
related to the "Macedonian minority" in Greece.  Ultimately 
Athens is insisting on a solution that would: 
-- indicate that "Macedonia" is a broader region than the 
country in question (hence Greece's support for a geographic 
qualifier such as "Northern" or "Upper" before Macedonia), 
and 
-- be used broadly for all international use. 
 
-- Greece-Turkey:  The Greek/Turkish bilateral relationship 
has improved in recent years. The GOG remains supportive of 
Turkey's EU accession. There has, however, been no angibe 
progress on long-standing diputes over ontinental shelf and 
the tatus of islands n the Aegean.  The Greeks are plased 
with he momentum on Cyprus, sending psitive signals about 
the September 3 start of UN-brokered talks, but strongly 
question Ankara's commitment to -- and potential to spoil -- 
progress on reaching a negotiated solution on Cyprus. 
 
-- Aegean Exercises:  The Greeks were deeply disappointed by 
the NATO decision not to support NOBLE ARCHER 2008.  General 
Grapsas will want to discuss how NATO might craft an exercise 
in the future that would overfly Agios Efstratios, an island 
whose status as "demilitarize" is disputed between Greece and 
Turkey.  General Grapsas feels that NATO's invocation of 
"neutrality" -- which results in a decision not/not to 
overfly any area under dispute -- always favors Turkish 
interests.  The Greeks argue that the Turkish claim that 
Agios Efstratios is demilitarized is specious and not a valid 
justification for excluding the island from NATO exercises. 
Unlike many of his predecessors, General Grapsas has not gone 
to the press. 
 
-- Russia/Georgia: PM Karamanlis has expanded Greece's 
relationship with Russia.  This is in no small measure due to 
historical and religious ties and strong domestic political 
support for strengthening relations. The Russia/Georgia 
crisis is a challenge for Greece.  The GOG supports Sarkozy's 
efforts, and FM Bakoyannis has said the right things on 
Georgian territory integrity and the withdrawal of Russian 
troops.  PM Karamanlis has also publicly stated that violence 
is not the appropriate response and has emphasized 
"territorial integrity."  Greece has pledged two monitors for 
the initial OSCE mission in Georgia and already pledged or 
delivered well over 469,500 Euros worth of in-kind and 
financial humanitarian assistance to Georgia. 
 
At the same time, Greece has pursued "business as usual" with 
Russia, with meetings with Russian defense industry officials 
and Parliamentary ratification in September of the 
Southstream gas pipeline agreement.  The Embassy has pushed 
the GoG hard to cancel or delay these ill-advised moves. 
Grapsas' visit will provide another opportunity to pass the 
message to the Karamanlis government that they need to 
actively support Georgia and avoid business as usual with 
Russia. 
 
-- Kosovo: Greece does not appear likely to recognize Kosovo 
in the immediate future, but is playing a reasonably 
constructive role behind the scenes.  Beyond its over 600 
forces in KFOR, the Greeks are providing personnel to the EU 
Rule of Law Mission (EULEX), the OSCE Mission, and the 
International Civilian Office (ICO) in Kosovo.  It has also 
been among the most active players in the EU in engaging with 
Serbia post-Kosovo independence and in encouraging Serbia's 
European and Euro-Atlantic perspective. 
 
ATHENS 00001294  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
SPECKHARD