VZCZCXRO4082
RR RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMA RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHTRO
DE RUEHAN #0591/01 2470833
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 030833Z SEP 08
FM AMEMBASSY ANTANANARIVO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1552
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ANTANANARIVO 000591 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: SPGOV PHUM PREL ECON ASEC CN
SUBJECT:  Comoran Dialogue Process Stumbles Out Of The Gate 
 
¶1. (SBU)  SUMMARY:  Following a week of intense negotiations with 
Union of the Comoros officials and other stakeholders, African Union 
Special Envoy Madeira succeeded September 1 in achieving an 
agreement in principle for modalities to set up a preparatory 
committee for the long-awaited Inter-Comoran Dialogue.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
International Partners 
- - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶2. (SBU) Members of the international community have met regularly 
in the last week to align our position regarding the Inter-Comoran 
Dialogue.  The group includes the African Union, United Nations, 
Arab League, La Francophonie, and biQteral missions of France, 
China, Libya, South Africa, Madagascar, and the United States.  The 
members adopted the principle that the Comoros must own the dialogue 
process, lest the international community do all the heavy lifting 
only to be blamed afterward.  In S/E Madeira's words, "we do not 
impose, but we are not indifferent." 
 
¶3. (SBU) The international partners' starting point is the African 
Union Inter-Ministerial Declaration of July 8-9, 2007, following 
meetings in Cape Town, Pretoria, and Addis Ababa to resolve the 
Anjouan crisis.  This document serves as a road map for the 
inter-Comoran Dialogue, with provisions for reconciliation, 
discussion of federal authorities ("competences"), the inclusion of 
stakeholders, and the rationalization of the electoral calendar. 
 
¶4. (SBU) A positive new dynamic in the international meetings is the 
presence of a member of the UN Political Department's new "Standby 
Team of Mediation Experts" who has added value in our meetings. 
With the UN expert and bilateral missions alongside the AU, it 
appears the group's legitimacy has been enhanced in the eyes of 
Comoran counterparts.  UN ResRep Opia Kumah noted that President 
Sambi's letter to the UNSYG requesting assistance led to this 
increased engagement. 
 
Union of the Comoros 
- - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶5. (SBU) In the international partners' initial meeting with Union 
of the Comoros Vice President Idi and Foreign Minister Jaffar, the 
GOC's message was clear, "President Sambi will keep his promise to 
the international community to hold the inter-Comoran dialogue." 
Reading between the lines, the GOC is proceeding reluctantly given 
their lack of popularity and weak political position.  VP Idi 
averred, "the institutions we inherited led to the current economic 
crisis." 
 
¶6. (SBU) The GOC continues to guarantee that the principles of 
rotating presidency and island autonomy will not be in play during 
the dialogue.  Interestingly, while Union Ministers met three times 
in the last week with the international partners delivering this 
kind of assurance, it has been months since they have had direct 
contact with the island executives or the national assembly on these 
issues.  After much arm-twisting by AU S/E Madeira late the evening 
of September 1, Union Ministers accepted the notion of convening a 
small, inclusive preparatory committee for the inter-Comoran 
dialogue.  This committee, composed of Union, Island, and Assembly 
members will: 
 
--  Name the meeting, (i.e. sovereign conference, dialogue, etc.); 
 
--  Draft terms of reference; 
 
--  Set an agenda; 
 
--  Consider participant lists; 
 
--  Decide where to convene the meeting; 
 
--  Decide when (the Union is aiming for first quarter, 2009); 
 
--  Financing needed; 
 
--  Format; 
 
--  Role of facilitators. 
 
 
Opposition "Coalition" 
- - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶7. (SBU) The National Assembly President invited the international 
partners to listen to an "opposition coalition" composed of the 
Assembly, political parties, local leaders, and island executives of 
Grande Comore and Moheli on August 29.  Their tone was suspicious, 
insisting the GOC's motive was to prolong Sambi's mandate.  Their 
unanimous position was to reject any discussion of constitutional 
revisions at an inter-Comoran dialogue, insisting that the 2001 
Constitution had never been implemented with the necessary 
legislation.  In their view, the constitution had nothing to do with 
 
ANTANANARI 00000591  002 OF 002 
 
 
the present crisis, instead they blamed "Union Government 
incompetence." 
 
¶8. (SBU) S/E Madeira deftly parried their refusal, gaining their 
approval to participate in the kind of "technical preparatory 
committee" outlined above.  The committee will be just small enough 
to be effective and just big enough to be legitimate. 
 
Next Steps 
- - - - - - 
 
¶9. (SBU) The compromise reached was essentially to reactivate the 
inter-Comoran committee on competences which convened briefly in 
2006 and 2007 to consider federal issues of security forces, the 
judiciary, and management of public enterprises.  During September, 
this small group of Union, island, legislative, political, and civic 
leaders will address the technical questions in para 6 above.  In 
October, they will publish their proposals to the widest group of 
Comoran stakeholders for feedback and hold a series of preparatory 
seminars.  The hope is that, with active international partner 
support, the framework for the inter-Comoran dialogue will emerge 
and be validated by the end of 2008. 
 
Comment: 
- - - - 
 
¶10. (SBU) The political will for compromise remains weak in the 
Comoros.  The continued engagement of the AU, UN, and interested 
Embassies - and the implicit threat of consequences for inaction - 
is the main element keeping this process from falling apart before 
it begins.  End Comment. 
 
MARQUARDT