VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUNV #0477/01 2401413
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 271413Z AUG 08
FM USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8351
INFO RUEHSL/AMEMBASSY BRATISLAVA PRIORITY 0080
RUEHUP/AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST PRIORITY 0093
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV PRIORITY 0039
RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO PRIORITY 0061
RUEHPG/AMEMBASSY PRAGUE PRIORITY 0061
RUEHSF/AMEMBASSY SOFIA PRIORITY 0051
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1311

C O N F I D E N T I A L UNVIE VIENNA 000477 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/20/2018 
TAGS: IAEA MNUC PARM PREL TRGY KNPP UNSC IR NO
SUBJECT: FOLLOW-UP ON IAEA-NORWAY SAFETY TRAINING PROJECT 
FOR IRAN'S BUSHEHR NUCLEAR POWER PLANT 
 
REF: A) UNVIE 377 B) UNVIE 274 C) STATE 57469 D) 
     STATE 84938 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affairs Geoff Pyatt for reasons 
1.4(c) and (e) 
 
----------- 
Summary 
----------- 
 
¶1. (U) Mission rep spoke to IAEA and delivered ref D talking 
points regarding safety concerns at Iran's Bushehr reactor on 
August 13.  Norway has agreed to the training plan and IAEA 
is moving forward with plans.  The IAEA recommends that the 
United States demarche Hungary, Bulgaria, Slovakia and the 
Ukraine, encouraging them to support this project.  Iran has 
formally asked the IAEA to perform an Integrated Regulatory 
Review Service (IRRS) mission, which is scheduled for 
November 2009.  Iran is also planning to host an 
international conference on nuclear development to be held on 
November 30, 2008; we will discourage senior-level IAEA 
participation.  End summary. 
 
---------------------------- 
Training plan moving forward 
---------------------------- 
 
¶2. (U) Mission rep delivered to IAEA's Christer Viktorsson 
the talking points contained in reftel D.  Viktorsson 
indicated he was very pleased with U.S. support and that the 
project is moving forward.  Norway has agreed to the draft 
training plan and is asking IAEA to submit the request to the 
GON formally.  Viktorsson said this would occur in the next 
two weeks.  Based on Norway's tentative approval, he is 
planning another trip to Iran to further discuss the plan, 
probably sometime in the next two months. 
 
------------- 
CZ says no 
------------- 
 
¶3. (U) So far Viktorsson has approached Finland and the Czech 
Republic to assist in the on-the-job portions of the training 
program.  Finland has agreed.  However, the Czech Republic 
has declined and stated that it is legally not allowed to 
grant Iranians access to Czech nuclear facilities.  The 
Czechs indicated they would be willing to send instructors or 
trainers to Vienna and/or Oslo to support class room 
training, however.  Viktorsson is concerned that other 
countries will respond similarly, thus leaving the IAEA short 
of sites at which to implement on-the-job training under the 
IAEA plan. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
Encouraging others to support the project 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) The IAEA has yet to approach formally Hungary, 
Bulgaria, Slovakia or the Ukraine.  However, these countries 
are aware of the program and Viktorsson lobbied for the U.S. 
to encourage these countries to support the project. 
Viktorsson suggested it would be helpful if the U.S. could 
tell these states that the safe operation of nuclear plants 
worldwide is important to the United States and therefore the 
U.S. supports the IAEA's safety program, including in Iran. 
In particular, the U.S. supports the IAEA's program to train 
the nuclear regulators in Iran and would not object to these 
states participating in a project that will provide much 
needed training and support to the Iranian regulatory body; 
training that will help improve the safety knowledge of the 
regulatory staff.  MsnOff told Viktorsson that she would 
report his request to Washington. 
 
¶5.  (C)  Mission Comment: Mission recognizes there are 
additional points the U.S. might want to present should we 
agree to signal our support for this safety program.  Mission 
assumes we would want also to explain our willingness to 
support this training despite our paramount desire to isolate 
Iran so long as it is not meeting its nonproliferation and 
Security Council obligations.  For example, in addition to 
noting the fact that these safety activities are exempt from 
UN Security Council sanctions, U.S. points might also note 
that such assistance will tangibly demonstrate that Iran 
cannot really have a fully "independent" civil nuclear 
program if it wants that program to be safe, as Iran cannot 
 
create the safety/regulatory approach it needs without the 
guidance and support of the IAEA and others.  Should the 
above states choose to help provide safety training, their 
participation might provide an opportunity to underline again 
to Tehran why it should respond favorably to the P5 1 offer. 
Such training would also provide an occassion for EU states 
to raise again their desire for Iran to join in the 
international nuclear safety convention, a step Iran has 
continued to reject.  End comment. 
 
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Fellowships 
----------- 
 
¶6. (U) With regard to the fellowships mentioned in the IAEA 
training plan, Viktorsson clarified this as a request to 
expand a current program.  There is an existing TC project to 
help the Iranian regulator review the Safety Analysis Report 
(SAR) written by the Russian operators.  Through this 
project, the IAEA is assisting in the review of specific 
portions of the report, as well as providing some fellowship 
training opportunities to help the Iranians review the SAR in 
more detail.  There are currently Iranian fellows working 
with Bulgaria and Italy.  In the proposed Norwegian training 
program, the Iranians asked to expand this fellowship program 
to allow more people to be trained in safety assessments. 
 
----------------- 
Regulatory Review 
----------------- 
 
¶7. (U) Iran has formally submitted, via e-mail, a request for 
IAEA to perform an Integrated Regulatory Review Service 
(IRRS) mission in Iran.  An IRRS is a peer review mission 
focused on the county's regulatory body.  It is organized by 
the IAEA and consists of a group of approximately 20 
high-ranking regulators from around the world.  The mission 
has two parts.  The first part is a self assessment, where 
the country itself answers a set of written questions to 
determine how well the country meets the IAEA safety 
standards.  This is followed by the peer review mission 
during which the team of 20 experts visits the regulatory 
body for approximately two weeks to review the program.  The 
result is a list of recommendations and areas of improvement. 
 Iran has asked for the IRRS mission to occur in November 
¶2009.  IAEA is setting up an IRRS planning meeting in Iran 
set tenatively for November 22-26 2008. 
 
--------------------------------- 
Conference on Nuclear Development 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) Viktorsson also stated that Iran is organizing an 
international conference on nuclear development which is set 
for November 30, 2008, presumably in Tehran.  IAEA Deputy 
Director General Taniguchi and Deputy Director General 
Sokolov were both invited.  However, Viktorson indicated that 
Director General ElBaradei has told them not to go.  DDG 
Taniguchi is appealing this decision and, if he cannot 
attend, would like one of his staff to attend.  Viktorsson 
did not have any information about other possible attendees 
or topics for discussion at the planned Iranian conference. 
Comment:  Mission strongly supports the DG's decision against 
senior IAEA participation at the Iranian conference and will 
monitor Taniguchi's appeal with an eye to minimizing the risk 
that the IAEA lend credence to a likely Iranian propaganda 
event.  End comment. 
 
-------------- 
Action Request 
-------------- 
 
¶9.  (U)  Request Washington guidance on responding to the 
IAEA regarding possible U.S. approaches to the 
above-mentioned states to encourage them to take part in the 
IAEA-sponsored safety training of Iranians, which ideally 
could occur parallel in Vienna and capitals. 
PYATT