VZCZCXYZ0001
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUNV #0454/01 2270615
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 140615Z AUG 08
FM USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8312
INFO RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA PRIORITY 0041
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 0179
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0197
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 0288

C O N F I D E N T I A L UNVIE VIENNA 000454 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR IO/T AND ISN/RA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/12/2018 
TAGS: PARM KNNP PREL AORC IAEA KZ AF SY
SUBJECT: IAEA/BOG: MESA REBUFFS KAZAKHSTAN; AFGHANISTAN 
FORGES ON 
 
REF: A) UNVIE 445 AND PREVIOUS B) 
     PAPPAS-DANIEL/VONBEHREN EMAIL 7/22/2008 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Gregory L. Schulte for reasons 1.4 b and d 
 
 Summary 
--------- 
¶1. (C) Acting on instructions, Kazakhstan sought to present 
its candidacy for the 2008-2010 open MESA seat on the Board 
of Governors to Indian MESA Chair Kumar, but was rebuffed by 
Kumar who disputed Kazakhstan's eligibility and bona fides as 
a MESA group member.  The IAEA Statute is silent on MESA 
group membership, and a 1997 list of regional groups that 
included Kazakhstan under MESA has not been formally adopted 
and will be considered only in tandem with the ratification 
of Article VI expanding the Board.  The Secretariat stands by 
this list but advises that, unless MESA accepts Kazakhstan, 
the group could challenge any Kazakh bid in the General 
Conference.  The Secretariat has advised Kazakhstan to 
request group membership, but Kumar denies he has the 
authority to propose it.  Syria would likely seek to block 
Kazakhstan's addition to MESA if it were brought to the 
group.  MESA will meet August 14 to consider Syria and 
Afghanistan's candidacies but no resolution is expected; 
another meeting is possible prior to the GC.  Afghanistan 
faces opposition from Pakistan within MESA and is actively 
campaigning beyond the group, poised for a GC vote.  Kumar 
sees no prospect of Syria withdrawing unless it can be 
convinced that it would lose in the General Conference. 
Mission recommends backing Afghanistan given the 
unlikely-to-be-resolved questions over Kazakhstan's MESA 
membership. End Summary. 
 
 
MESA Rebuffs Kazakhstan 
----------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) Kazakh Ambassador Abdrakhmanov informed Ambassador 
Schulte on August 12 that, following the Secretary's phone 
call to his Foreign Minister, he had been instructed to 
submit Kazakhstan's candidacy to the MESA group for the 
2008-2010 Board of Governors seat, which is now contested by 
Syria and Afghanistan.  However, Indian Board Chair 
Ambassador Kumar effectively rebuffed Abdrakhmanov's request 
on the premise that Kazakhstan is not recognized as a member 
of the MESA group.  In a follow up discussion with Ambassador 
Schulte on August 13, Kumar argued that Kazakhstan is 
therefore not eligible to run for the MESA seat.  He noted 
that Kazakhstan has not participated in any group 
consultations in the past and has not been invited to MESA 
meetings, including that on August 14 which will consider 
Afghanistan and Syria's candidacies.  Kumar also refused to 
countenance any request by Kazakhstan to join the MESA group, 
arguing that this was an issue for the Board or General 
Conference to decide because MESA was a "statutory area."  He 
claimed not to have the authority to consider Kazakhstan's 
application.  The IAEA Secretariat of the Policy-Making 
Organs took the opposite view, that the decision would be up 
to MESA, and has so advised Kazakhstan. 
 
¶3. (C) The IAEA Statute (Article VI) does not stipulate the 
membership of the eight regional areas represented on the 
Board of Governors.  A list of regional areas or groups was 
first developed in 1997 (GC/41/11), in the context of the 
General Conference debate on amending Article VI.  This list 
clearly shows Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan as members of the 
MESA group (and would extend to two other Central Asian 
countries that have since joined the Agency, Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan.) According to the Secretariat, the list was 
tacitly agreed at the time though it has not been formally 
adopted by the Board or General Conference.  The mechanism 
for doing so was laid out in the 1999 Amendment to Article VI 
of the Statute, to expand the Board (GC 43/RES/19.)  It 
stipulates that the Amendment would enter into force upon its 
ratification and the adoption of this list of regional groups 
by a 90 percent vote in both the Board and General 
Conference.  This provision was part of a deal brokered at 
the time that would allow Israel to be formally recognized as 
a member of MESA in exchange for agreement to expand the 
Board.  The Amendment to Article VI has not yet been ratified 
by two-thirds of the member states and thus the list has not 
been brought to the Board/GC for a vote.  Nevertheless, the 
Secretariat uses it as a reference point. (Note: Prior to the 
development of this list, group membership was "by 
tradition," as it is elsewhere in the UN system. End note.) 
 
¶4. (C) The Secretariat stands by the list, but acknowledges 
 
that as a practical matter, Kazakhstan must be accepted by 
the MESA group or face potential complications in the General 
Conference.  Under Rule 79 of the General Conference Rules of 
Procedure, election to the Board of Governors is by s-ecret 
ballot and there are no nominations (i.e. Kazakhstan cannot 
nominate itself.)  Member states can technically vote for any 
eligible member of the group (excluding those already on the 
Board or just completing their term.)  However, Rule 85 (d) 
stipulates that a vote for a country which is not a member of 
the group would be invalid.  According to the IAEA Legal 
Office, if the General Conference voted for Kazakhstan, the 
MESA group could challenge this ballot if it did not 
recognize Kazakhstan as a group member.  While Kazakhstan 
could "petition" the Board or General Conference to be 
considered a member of MESA, the MESA group could also 
challenge any Board/GC decision being imposed on the group. 
 
¶5. (C) The Secretariat has thus counseled Kazakhstan to 
approach the group and discounts Kumar's protestations that 
the Chair does not have the authority to consider a request 
for group membership.  If the Chair refuses, Kazakhstan can 
also approach other group members to make its case, the 
Secretariat advised.  However, if the group were to make a 
decision on Kazakhstan's membership, there is no guarantee 
that it would be affirmative.  Syria, hearing of Kazakhstan's 
interest, requested that the Chair provide an "official" list 
of group members.  Excluding the Central Asians, nine of the 
remaining 15 MESA members are Arab states plus Iran.  Kumar 
also tried to claim that Kazakhstan had been participating in 
Eastern Europe group consultations.  The Secretariat 
confirmed that Kazakhstan does not participate in the Eastern 
Europe group and does not appear on the rotation scheme for 
Eastern Europe Board membership for 2006-2016 (Note: Armenia 
and Azerbaijan are part of Eastern Europe. End Note). 
 
¶6. (C) Comment:  Kazakhstan is left in a statutory limbo, a 
"lacuna," as the Indian Chair called it.  If the MESA group 
does not accept it, Kazakhstan and the three other Central 
Asian IAEA-member countries, have the same status as Israel; 
excluded from any regional group and ineligible to run for 
the Board. End Comment. 
 
Go With Afghanistan 
------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) Setting aside the "weight" of the Afghan or Kazakh 
candidacies, Kumar advised Ambassador Schulte that an up or 
down vote on Syria versus Afghanistan would be more 
straightforward without the additional complication of 
determining group membership.  Afghanistan has been a MESA 
member since its inception.  Kumar also indicated that Sri 
Lanka has expressed an interest in running for the MESA seat 
but has not put forward its candidacy.  Kumar has encouraged 
the Afghan CDA's lobbying efforts, and counseled that 
Afghanistan needed to appear as a "serious candidate," not a 
last minute challenger to Syria.  Neither Kumar nor Afghan 
CDA Monawar expected the MESA group to come to any consensus 
on August 14.  Time permitting, there would probably be 
another MESA meeting before the General Conference. 
 
¶8. (C) Kumar also saw no prospect of Syria withdrawing from 
the race unless it can be convinced that it would lose a GC 
vote in an embarrassing defeat to Afghanistan.  Monawar is 
preparing for such a vote as he sees no prospect of consensus 
in MESA.  In addition to Syria and Iran, he fully expected 
Pakistan to oppose Afghanistan's candidacy and explained that 
there was a bilateral issue of Pakistan having dumped nuclear 
waste in Afghanistan during the Taliban era.  Pakistan 
circulated a dipnote on August 12 "reminding" MESA members 
that Syria had earlier put its candidacy forward and 
stipulating that Pakistan would run for the next Board, in 
accordance with its "established pattern" of serving every 
other term (i.e. since the Statute prohibits consecutive 
terms for elected members.) 
 
¶9. (C) Monawar also provided Acting Counselor more insight as 
to why Afghanistan is seeking the MESA seat.  In addition to 
5 million USD in IAEA technical cooperation projects, he sees 
Board membership as leverage over Iran and asked Mission to 
advise Washington that Afghanistan wants to position itself 
on the Board as a regional "bridge" to the West.  Monawar 
also planned to praise the India nuclear deal in the August 
14 MESA meeting as a benefit to the nonproliferation regime. 
 
 
¶10. (C) Seeing MESA as a "lost cause," Monawar has already 
approached some GRULAC members and reported that Brazil is 
 
very opposed to Syrian Board candidacy.  Acting Counselor 
encouraged him to seek African support, beginning with South 
Africa, if it comes to GC vote.  Japan also continues to be 
solicitous and helpful to Afghanistan (in part lobbying for 
Permrep Amano's DG candidacy).  Acting Counselor broached the 
issue of Afghanistan's MESA candidacy with the French EU 
Presidency on August 12.  French CDA was open to supporting 
Afghanistan as an alternative to Syria, especially if the 
Secretariat could not sort out Kazakhstan's group membership. 
 The Italian Ambassador told Ambassador Schulte that the EU 
would certainly side with Afghanistan over Syria. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶11. (C) Given the lack of clarity about Kazakhstan's group 
membership on the part of the Secretariat and MESA, Mission 
sees little prospect for Kazakhstan to have a "clean" vote in 
the General Conference.  With this question mark over 
Kazakhstan, Mission recommends fully backing Afghanistan in 
light of its eagerness to serve on the Board and pro-U.S. 
positions.  Afghanistan can rally EU, like-minded and most 
GRULAC support as an alternative to Syria and some Arab 
states may also vote for Afghanistan since this would be a 
secret ballot  (Note: The heated debate on the Arab League 
Israeli Nuclear Capabilities Resolution in the GC could, 
however, cause the Arabs to close ranks. End note.) 
Afghanistan would need to rally Africa and Asia group support 
and split the NAM.  The best case scenario would be for 
Afghanistan to garner enough support to convince Syria to 
withdraw prior to the GC.  Failing that, there can be no 
guarantee of success in a GC vote, but Afghanistan has a 
decent chance.  We can also urge Kazakhstan to clarify its 
MESA status after the GC so that it can be poised to run in 
2009 when two MESA seats will be open. 
SCHULTE