O 081349Z AUG 08
FM USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8302
DOE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L UNVIE VIENNA 000448 
 
 
IO/T, ISN/MNSA COCKERHAM, IO/UNP, ISN CTR CURRY; NA-243 
GOOREVICH, LOCKWOOD, OEHLBERT, BRUNS; NA-241 SIEMON, 
O'CONNOR, LAMONTAGNE; NRC FOR OIP - DUNN LEE, HENDERSON, 
SCHWARTZMAN; USDOC PASS NIST FOR DAVE SIMONS; AFTAC FOR 
CHARLES BRENNAN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/08/2033 
TAGS: AORC KNNP IAEA ENRG TRGY
SUBJECT: IAEA/SAL: PLUTONIUM "EXPLOSION" AT THE NUCLEAR LAB 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR GREGORY L. SCHULTE FOR 1.4 REASONS B AND D 
 
¶1.  (C)  Summary.  A contamination incident occurred at the 
IAEA's Safeguards Analytic Laboratory in Seibersdorf on 
August 3, in which five plutonium reference solution vials 
exploded due to a buildup of gases, primarily hydrogen.  The 
vials, which were 15 years old, built up gases to an 
estimated 14 atmospheres of pressure as the plutonium 
solution decayed.  SAL officials suspect that a small 
electrostatic discharge likely instigated the explosion in 
one vial, setting off the rest.  A small portion of the lab 
remains closed off and sampling efforts continue to ensure 
all contamination is contained, particularly to ensure the 
Clean Laboratory at Seibersdorf is not contaminated. 
Operations at the laboratory continue uninterrupted for the 
time being, although we expect delays in the near future as 
the room of the incident is closed and unable to receive 
nuclear samples.  Contrary to news reports, the incident was 
not caused by "aging infrastructure," although the 
Secretariat indicates that the poor layout of the nuclear 
laboratory will magnify the risks of cross-contamination. 
End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (C) On August 3 at 2:30 AM, a continuous air monitoring 
(CAM) alarm was set off at the Nuclear Material Laboratory in 
Seibersdorf.  This laboratory is part of the Safeguards 
Analytic Laboratories.  The alarm was located on the ground 
floor in the "Plutonium Stores Room," which holds plutonium 
reference materials and high-activity waste that is staged 
for disposal.  This multi-purpose room also receives nuclear 
samples, not by design but by lack of space in the nuclear 
material laboratory.  Shortly after the first alarm, four 
additional CAM alarms went off in the Plutonium Laboratory on 
the second floor. 
 
¶3.  (C)  Emergency responders arrived on site shortly after 
the alarm, including health physicists, to evaluate the 
situation.  The Plutonium Stores room houses three shielded 
safes that hold the radioactive material.  The responders 
opened Safe #3 first, as this was the last safe accessed on 
Friday, August 1.  Steel drawers were deformed, showing 
evidence of an explosion.  The responders took photographs of 
the area and quickly shut the safe to control the spread of 
contamination.  The safe remains unopened as of August 3. 
 
¶4.  (C)  Using the photographs, SAL officials have been able 
to reconstruct the events on Sunday morning.  The explosion 
resulted from five plutonium solution standards that were 
contained in sealed glass vials.  The 50 milliliter (mL) 
capacity vials contained 20 mL of nitric acid (1.5 molar 
concentration) solution with 8 mg/mL of plutonium-240 that 
was 99-percent pure.  The samples were 15 years old as they 
were prepared in 1993 in Russia for SAL.  SAL received the 
samples in 1997.  The glass vials were wrapped in two layers 
of heavy duty plastic.  (Note: Plutonium-240 is an unstable 
isotope (alpha-emitter) with a short half-life.)  According 
to SAL officials, gases built up over the years inside the 
vials, primarily hydrogen.  Based on their estimates, the 
pressure built up by the decaying Pu-240 was approximately 14 
atmospheres, releasing about 3.5 kilojoules (kJ) of energy. 
One SAL official noted that a small electrostatic discharge 
likely instigated the explosion in one vial, setting off the 
other vials given the intense pressure. 
 
¶5. (C)  The four additional CAM alarms that went off were 
located in the Plutonium Laboratory on the second floor.  CAM 
filters on the second floor picked up contamination at lower 
activity levels than the CAM filter in the Plutonium Stores 
room on the first floor, however, no further contamination 
was found in the second floor laboratory.  The incident in 
the Plutonium Stores room exposed a vulnerability to the 
Nuclear Material Lab, that the sinks in both rooms shared a 
common drain that is now unused.  No other rooms in the 
Nuclear Material Lab picked up any contamination, although 
the IAEA continues its evaluation of swipes in the laboratory. 
 
¶6.  (C)  SAL is taking steps to ensure there is no 
cross-contamination of nuclear material in other rooms in the 
nuclear lab, with the primary concern being contamination 
reaching the SAL's Clean Laboratory in Seibersdorf.  Another 
concern is contamination to the environment.  The filter on 
the ventilation system for the building did not show signs of 
contamination, which is a positive sign that contamination 
did not make it outside the building.  The IAEA continues to 
take environmental samples of the surrounding area.  While 
the incident did not result from "aging infrastructure" as 
reported in the news, the cross-contamination concerns are 
magnified by the poor layout of the Nuclear Materials Lab, 
resulting from space restrictions.  SAL awaits bio-assay 
results to ensure personnel are not contaminated. 
 
¶7.  (C) Operations at the Nuclear Materials Laboratory 
continue uninterrupted although delays in operation will 
almost certainly occur as the Stores room is unable to 
receive samples.  In the meantime, the IAEA is working with 
the Austrian Ministry to approve another room for receiving 
samples.  In addition, SAL is not able to stage high-activity 
waste or retrieve samples from the Stores room. 
 
¶8.  (C)  IAEA informed its sister-laboratories in the Network 
of Analytic Laboratories (NWAL) about the incident on August 
7 to provide a lesson-learned and warn of the potential risk. 
 The IAEA expects it will need outside help in the near 
future for containment and clean-up of the contamination. 
According to a senior SAL official, a Canadian company has 
already offered its services to the Director General, 
although the official said that Los Alamos National 
Laboratory may have some of the needed radiolysis expertise. 
 
¶9.  (C)  Comment:  UNVIE will continue to monitor the 
investigation of this event to determine if safety issues are 
being adequately reviewed and addressed. 
 
 
SCHULTE