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C O N F I D E N T I A L UNVIE VIENNA 000445 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR ISN, IO, SCA, P AND T 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/06/2018 
TAGS: PARM KNNP PREL AORC IAEA KZ AF SY
SUBJECT: IAEA/SYRIA: AS KAZAKHS DAWDLE, AFGHANISTAN 
ANNOUNCES CANDIDACY FOR MESA BOARD SEAT 
 
REF: UNVIE 385 AND PREVIOUS 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Gregory L. Schulte for reasons 1.4 b and d 
 
 Summary and Comment 
  ------------------- 
 
¶1. (C) Kazakhstan is still not prepared to challenge Syria's 
candidacy for the open MESA seat on the Board of Governors 
(2008-2010) absent a "100 percent" guarantee of victory, 
Kazakh Ambassador Abdrakhmanov told Ambassador Schulte August 
¶6.  He continued to stress Arab support for Syria, despite 
assurances from Mission to the contrary.  Ambassador Schulte 
asked him to keep his options open, but Abdrakhmanov 
indicated that Kazakhstan would prefer to wait until next 
year to run for the Board.  Also on August 6, Afghanistan 
formally presented its candidacy for the MESA Seat to the 
Indian Chair, who was less than enthusiastic.  The Indian 
Chair advised that Syria called daily to confirm there was no 
other candidate.  He also requested that the U.S. not 
campaign openly against Syria during MESA deliberations. 
India has now called a MESA meeting for August 14 to discuss 
the open seat.  While Afghanistan may not be an important 
nuclear player, it is an alternative to Syria and is excited 
about the prospect of serving on the Board. Mission 
recommends approaches to sympathetic Arab states and other 
MESA group members to exert their influence within MESA to 
support Afghanistan and persuade Syria to withdraw. 
Department may also wish to consider a call by Undersecretary 
Burns to Foreign Secretary Menon to encourage more active 
engagement by the Indian Chair, who is clearly reluctant to 
play anything but a purely "neutral" role.  It would be far 
better to settle this matter within MESA rather than the 
General Conference, where we already face a politically 
charged debate on Middle East safeguards with the Arab 
League.  Director General ElBaradei downplayed the 
significance of Syria serving on the Board and privately 
warned Ambassador Schulte that the U.S. would lose a showdown 
in the GC on this issue.  End Summary and Comment. 
 
Kazakhstan Still Dithering 
-------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) In an August 6 meeting with Ambassador Schulte Kazakh 
Ambassador Abdrakhmanov reiterated essentially the same 
stance he had relayed on a prospective Board candidacy in 
their July 7 meeting (reftel).  Syria was by all accounts not 
prepared to withdraw and Kazakhstan would not compete with 
Syria absent a "100 percent guarantee" that it would not 
suffer an embarrassing defeat.  Abdrakhmanov continued to 
take for granted solid Arab League support for Syria, though 
Ambassador Schulte assured him that this was not the case. 
Ambassador Schulte noted that Kazakhstan would be "natural" 
for the Board and its candidacy would unnerve Syria; Syria 
would only potentially back down if another candidate 
presented itself and there was no "loss of face" in doing so. 
 Sympathetic Arab states could persuade Syria to withdraw in 
the face of Kazakh candidacy.  There were no guarantees, but 
Kazakhstan stood a good chance against Syria, he offered. 
 
¶3. (C) Abdrakhmanov insisted that Kazakhstan could not risk 
its important and sensitive relations with the Arab World and 
OIC.  He did not believe Kazakhstan had sufficient support in 
MESA -- the Indian Chair was neutral; Afghanistan, he 
mistakenly claimed, supported Syria; and even among the 
Central Asians, Uzbekistan could be a problem.  Abdrakhmanov 
further cited Syria's engagement in the Euro-Med partnership 
and indirect talks with Israel as reasons unnamed others 
might not want to brook Syrian isolation by opposing its 
Board candidacy.  Syria was an important player in the 
region, he concluded, and Kazakhstan was not inclined to take 
them on. 
 
¶4. (C) Several times during the discussion, Abdrakhmanov 
noted that Kazakhstan would be in a much better starting 
position if it were to hold off until next year (Note: Two 
MESA Board seats will be vacated in 2009; one of which 
Pakistan will undoubtedly seek. End note.) Abdrakhmanov was 
discouraging but did not rule out a Kazakh bid this year, if 
for example, there was any indication Syria would withdraw. 
He noted that there was still time and no formal deadline in 
MESA though the Indian Chair would like to conclude this 
process.  Ambassador Schulte urged Abdrakhmanov to keep his 
options open and to talk to the Indian Chair.  However, 
Indian Chair Ambassador Kumar advised Ambassador Schulte on 
August 7 that Abdrakhmanov had told him that Kazakhstan 
decided against presenting its candidacy. (Note:  The Indians 
have also not been enthusiastic about the prospect of a 
Kazakh candidacy. Separately, Indian DCM cautioned Acting 
Counselor that Arab states could challenge Kazakhstan's bona 
fides as a MESA group member. End note). 
 
Afghanistan Throws Its Hat in the Ring 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) Afghanistan formally submitted to the Indian MESA 
Chairman its candidacy for the Board of Governors (2008-2010) 
MESA seat sought by Syria on August 6.  Afghan CDA Wahid 
Manowar advised Ambassador Schulte on August 5 that he had 
received instructions to do so after consulting with his 
National Security Advisor.  Manowar was excited about the 
prospect of serving on the Board, which Afghanistan has not 
done since 1963-1965.  (Note: Afghanistan is not a major 
player in the IAEA but participates in an array of national 
and regional technical cooperation projects primarily on 
human health and development. End note.)  Manowar was 
optimistic about Afghanistan's support in the MESA group and 
planned to approach friendly Arab states including Lebanon, 
Qatar and Saudi Arabia.  He would also reach out to Central 
Asians states and expected that only Pakistan and Iran not to 
be supportive.  (Note: We have also heard that Japan has 
offered to help Afghanistan with its Board duties should it 
secure a seat.  End note.) 
 
¶6. (C) Ambassador Schulte observed that the Arab League 
decision to back Syria had been taken before Syria's 
clandestine nuclear activities had come to light and a number 
of Arab states had qualms about Syria's candidacy.  He hoped 
that they could influence Syria to withdraw now that there 
would be an alternative.  Ambassador Schulte also hoped that 
 
the issue would be solved within the MESA group, in which the 
Indian Chair would play a key role, but left open the 
possibility of a GC vote if Syria persisted.  Manowar asked 
if he should meet with the Syrian Ambassador.  Ambassador 
Schulte advised that Afghanistan not portray its candidacy as 
anti-Syrian but as a matter of equity since Syria had served 
on the Board as recently as 2005-2007. 
 
Indians Studiously Neutral 
-------------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) Manowar called Acting Counselor on August 6 to provide 
a readout of his meeting with the Indian Chair.  He was 
disappointed by Kumar's lukewarm reaction to Afghanistan's 
candidacy.  Kumar cautioned him that Syria was not prepared 
to withdraw and had been calling every day to ensure that no 
other country had put forward its candidacy.  Kumar expected 
that the MESA group would be unable to come to consensus and 
anticipated a GC vote.  Manowar saw Kumar as hiding behind 
his mantle of neutrality as MESA Chair, and in that capacity, 
not wanting to see the group torn in too many directions. 
Manowar was riled by this reaction and affirmed that it was 
Afghanistan's sovereign right to put itself forward. 
 
¶8. (C) Kumar told Ambassador Schulte on August 7 that he 
would call a MESA meeting next week (now confirmed for August 
14) to discuss the Board seat.  Kumar was not pleased that 
the Afghan CDA "sprung" the Board candidacy on him while 
meeting on other business.  He also confirmed that the Syrian 
Ambassador was calling every day for a status report.  Kumar 
asked that as long as the issue was before MESA that the U.S. 
not openly campaign against Syria.  He sought to maintain his 
neutrality as Chair and did not want to seem as beholden to 
the U.S. just after Board approval of the India Safeguards 
Agreement.  Ambassador Schulte noted that the U.S. would not 
openly intervene in MESA matters, but urged Kumar to play a 
more active role in getting Syria to withdraw and suggested 
that he speak to the Saudis.  Ambassador Schulte noted that 
Kumar, as Chairman, could approach this as an equity issue 
giving a MESA country that had not been on the Board for 
decades a chance to serve. 
 
DG Unhelpful 
------------ 
 
9.(C) Ambassador Schulte also raised Syria's MESA candidacy 
in an August 1 meeting with DG ElBaradei.  He advised that 
having Syria on the Board while under investigation would 
undermine the credibility of the IAEA.  ElBaradei was 
unreceptive and downplayed Syria's influence as one of 35 
countries on the Board.  He enjoined the U.S. to "forget this 
issue" as it would lead to an embarrassing defeat in the 
General Conference if we called a vote.  ElBaradei agreed 
that a country such as Kazakhstan, which had never served on 
the Board, would be a better candidate, but rejected 
Ambassador Schulte's suggestion that he privately encourage 
Syria to step down.  He warned that a public U.S. campaign 
against Syria's Board candidacy would backfire. 
SCHULTE