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C O N F I D E N T I A L TASHKENT 000891 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR PM; EUR/ACE FOR GERRY OBERNDORFER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/01/2018 
TAGS: PGOV PREL SOCI PHUM KCOR MARR PINR UZ
SUBJECT: DAS KROL'S MEETING WITH UZBEK NATIONAL SECURITY 
COUNCIL SECRETARY ATAEV 
 
REF: A. TASHKENT 860 
     ¶B. TASHKENT 879 
 
Classified By: Political Officer Tim Buckley for reasons 1.4 (B,D) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary:  On July 25 visiting Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of State for South and Central Asia George Krol met 
with National Security Council (NSC) Secretary Murod Ataev in 
Tashkent.  Ataev spoke at length about the recent munitions 
depot explosion in Kagan, thanking the U.S. government for 
preparing a military assistance package while politely 
declining offers of humanitarian aid.  He also discussed 
Uzbek concerns about Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Afghanistan. 
 He emphasized that intelligence cooperation was very 
productive in the pre-Andijon days and he called for renewed 
cooperation now that the "dark days" of Andijon are in the 
past.  Ataev also raised concerns about potential sanctions 
due to Uzbekistan's anti-money laundering regime, stating 
that the Uzbek side is open to meeting with U.S. and other 
officials to assuage concerns.  DAS Krol conveyed that the 
U.S. wants to take pragmatic steps to engage across the 
board, but that Uzbekistan needs to move beyond words to 
concrete actions to help overcome its image problem in 
Washington.  The tone and substance of Ataev's comments 
indicates that Uzbekistan is receptive to moving forward on 
security cooperation with the U.S., and our challenge will be 
to encourage progress in all spheres of our relationship. 
End summary. 
 
Kagan Disaster 
-------------- 
 
¶2. (C) The explosions at the munitions depot in Kagan 
(Bukhara Province) were the first issue raised by Ataev.  He 
characterized this as an emergency situation and "a strong 
blow," though he clarified that it was purely accidental and 
not a terrorist act.  In particular, he said an electrical 
fire was the root cause of the blaze, which then spread with 
strong winds that were reportedly blowing in the early 
morning hours of July 10.  He conceded that there were some 
roofs and windows damaged as a result of the blasts, but 
insisted that property damage was not widespread.  Ataev 
added that everything is back to normal in Bukhara City.  He 
thanked DAS Krol for the U.S. Government's willingness to 
organize a military assistance package, but he politely 
declined offers of humanitarian assistance, and he stated 
that resources and facilities in Bukhara have been mobilized 
to assist displaced or injured victims.  (Note:  Ataev's 
accounts of the situation in Kagan, including damage reports, 
were consistent with what our Defense Attache reported after 
his visit to the site on July 18.  End note.) 
 
¶3. (C) Ataev noted that Russian officials have told him that 
the Kagan facility was the largest depot of its kind still 
remaining anywhere in the former Soviet Union, including in 
Russia.  Ataev said the Government of Uzbekistan had managed 
to eliminate 190 tons of ordnance in the past three years, 
but "we were physically unable to liquidate it all." 
 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan 
------------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) DAS Krol asked for Ataev's thoughts on the possibility 
of another severe winter in neighboring Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan and, like the Foreign Minister in a separate July 
25 meeting (septel), Ataev cited corruption as the major 
reason for acute problems next door.  "They do not think 
about the future," he commented, and noted "there are 
well-developed family clans" in the corrupt government 
structure.  "And they say they want investment...in what? 
Why would anyone invest there?" he asked rhetorically. 
 
 
¶5. (C) Again mirroring Foreign Minister Norov, he said "we 
end up being villains for closing our border, but it cannot 
be otherwise" due to the flow of narcotics.  He noted that 
725 kilograms was seized just in the past month at road and 
rail links on the Tajik border.  He added vindictively that 
terrorists have entered Uzbek territory in the past with the 
help of complicit Tajik officers.  He mentioned that 
Tajikistan also does not inform the Uzbeks when they do 
military maneuvers, forcing Uzbeks to scramble troops; this 
contributes to heightened tensions.  Ataev said 
Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HT) is active in the region, and Uzbekistan 
remains concerned about terrorist elements crossing from the 
neighboring republics.  He defended Uzbekistan's tough stance 
on border issues, noting that "problems like Nagorno-Karabakh 
never happened here." 
 
Afghanistan 
----------- 
 
¶6. (C) Ataev noted "the tough situation" in Afghanistan, but 
he said Uzbekistan will continue to work with Afghanistan 
"even though there are many former Taliban and communist 
elements in the government."  He recognized Uzbekistan can 
play a role in "developing a corridor" which can help promote 
Afghanistan's stability and lead to mutually beneficial trade 
links.  Ataev cited Karimov's July 22 meeting with the 
Ambassador, saying "we're ready" to cooperate, and he pointed 
 
to the Termez Air Bridge as a tangible example of 
Uzbekistan's support for our goals in Afghanistan.  Yet, he 
cautioned that "we do not want a repeat of the mistakes of 
the USSR."  Ataev said Uzbekistan is not ready to help train 
any Afghans, as the last time they did so the soldiers ended 
up fighting for the mudjaheddin. 
 
Intelligence Cooperation 
------------------------ 
 
¶7. (C) Ataev noted that previous cooperation with the CIA in 
the pre-Andijon days was very productive, and that "exchange 
of operational intelligence was very useful during a very 
tough period when the Taliban were near our border."  He also 
mentioned that equipment such as drones were used very 
effectively to guarantee Uzbekistan's security, which he 
appreciated.  He described Andijon as a "tragedy" and "a dark 
event" that hurt cooperation, but added that it is now part 
of Uzbekistan's history and that it is important not to 
repeat it.  He suggested that renewed cooperation was welcome 
because "there are people on our territory who want 
instability," including HT. 
 
Money Laundering 
---------------- 
 
¶8. (C) At the end of the meeting, Ataev raised the issue of 
international pressure on Uzbekistan regarding its anti-money 
laundering regime.  He expressed surprise by the Financial 
Action Task Force (FATF) advisory and said Uzbekistan is 
prepared to invite experts to discuss the issue and do 
whatever it takes to avoid sanctions.  Significantly, he 
acknowledged that changes to the law seemed to hurt, and then 
he reiterated the standard excuse that people in Uzbekistan 
do not trust banks and suspending the law until 2013 will 
allow time to build confidence and fine-tune the monitoring 
systems so scrutiny does not slow down the economy. 
(Comment:  It is a good sign that the issue was raised at 
this level by the Uzbeks, which demonstrates that it is 
firmly on their radar screen.  End comment.) 
 
DAS Krol on Engagement 
---------------------- 
 
 
¶9. (C) As was the case during a separate meeting with Foreign 
Minister Norov (ref B), DAS Krol conveyed the message to 
Ataev that the U.S. wants to engage Uzbek society and 
government across the board -- security, economic, 
governance, and human rights issues -- but that we need to 
move past words to concrete actions.  DAS Krol noted this was 
especially true given Uzbekistan's image problem in 
Washington stemming from the Andijon incidents; nonetheless, 
he emphasized that although we do not see eye-to-eye on all 
issues we do have many common interests to pursue. 
 
Comment: 
-------- 
 
¶10. (C) This meeting, three days after President Karimov's 
well-publicized July 22 meeting with the Ambassador, was an 
opportunity for Ataev to press home the message that 
Uzbekistan is open to rebuilding cooperation with the United 
States in many spheres.  Yet, there are still elements within 
the Government of Uzbekistan that want to restrict such 
cooperation, as evidenced by the reluctance of some circles 
of the GOU to allow the Drug Enforcement Administration to 
resume activities.  Providing military assistance in the 
aftermath of the Kagan disaster offers us a chance to take a 
major step in building bridges, and if we play our cards 
right it could help open up more cooperative endeavors that 
meet our national security interests.  However, the 
Government of Uzbekistan will remain adamant that there are 
no problems with corruption or weak anti-money laundering 
policies here, so we will need to push for progress in all 
spheres of our relationship. 
 
¶11. (U) This telegram has been cleared by DAS Krol. 
 
BUTCHER