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OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUL #1527/01 2140810
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 010810Z AUG 08
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1082
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 4579
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 4704
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CHJUSMAGK SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COMUSFK SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J5 SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J-5// PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//OSD/ISA/EAP// PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 001527 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/31/2018 
TAGS: PBTS PREL PGOV MARR KS KN JA
SUBJECT: FM YU PLEASED WITH SUMMIT PREP, SAYS "ALL'S WELL 
THAT ENDS WELL" ON LIANCOURT ROCKS 
 
Classified By: AMB. ALEXANDER VERSHBOW.  REASONS 1.4 (b/d). 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1. (C)  On July 31 Ambassador Vershbow paid an office call on 
Foreign Minister Yu Myung-hwan to confer on preparations for 
President Bush's August 5-6 visit to the Republic of Korea 
(ROK).  During their meeting they agreed that plans for the 
visit were proceeding smoothly and reviewed the most likely 
topics of discussion by the two presidents -- North Korea, 
FTA, Iraq and Afghanistan.  Yu said he anticipated no 
problems on the North Korea message, said he had urged the 
ruling Grand National Party's (GNP) chief policymaker to move 
FTA ratification forward in the National Assembly without 
linking it to U.S. Congressional action, and revealed that an 
extension of ROK forces in Iraq could be possible because of 
the GNP's large majority.  Yu predicted that some protests 
would occur during the President's visit, but assured the 
Ambassador they would be relatively small and manageable. 
 
¶2. (C)  In front of the press, the Ambassador expressed 
satisfaction that the controversial change to the website of 
the U.S. Board on Geographic Names (BGN) had been reversed at 
President Bush's direction, and noted our regret at the 
misunderstanding it had caused even though U.S. policy on the 
Liancourt Rocks had not changed.  After the departure of the 
press, the Ambassador urged MOFAT to caution the Korean media 
against over-interpreting the U.S. action as recognition of 
Korea's sovereignty claim.  Yu welcomed the BGN's actions to 
restore the previous wording on its website, but requested 
that the site's map of the islands also be changed back to 
listing all three names -- Dokdo, Takeshima and Liancourt 
Rocks.  With obviously relief, Minister Yu summed up the 
issue by saying: "All's well that ends well."  (Privately, he 
told the Ambassador that he was no longer expected to be 
fired over the website imbroglio). 
 
¶3. (C)  When the Ambassador mentioned the U.S. planned to 
include reference to a new U.S. embassy in the summit Joint 
Statement, FM Yu replied that he truly believed the Camp 
Coiner site would turn out to be an ideal location for the 
NEC and promised he would personally speak to the Culture 
Minister about our concerns regarding the cultural properties 
survey process.  END SUMMARY. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
ROK Government Pleased With Summit Preparations 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶4. (C)  Ambassador Vershbow paid a call on Foreign Minister 
Yu Myung-hwan on July 31 to confer on preparations for 
President Bush's August 5-6 visit to Korea.  The Ambassador 
and FM Yu both agreed that plans for the visit were 
proceeding smoothly.  Asked about the prospects for protests 
during the President's visit, FM Yu explained that one of the 
now weekly anti-U.S. beef protests was scheduled to take 
place on August 2, before the President arrived, and that 
another planned demonstration would be held during the visit 
on August 5.  However he assured the Ambassador that both 
were expected to draw smaller numbers than had been the case 
earlier in the summer.  He said it was also possible that 
even smaller numbers of demonstrators would gather near the 
K-16 air field and the Hyatt Hotel during the President's 
arrival, but that a pro-U.S. counter demonstration was also 
being planned to welcome President Bush to Korea.  With a 
smile, he suggested the Ambassador tell the President that 
such demonstrations were a sign of the ROK's vibrant 
democracy. 
 
----------------------------- 
Review of Likely Agenda Items 
----------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C)  The Ambassador and FM Yu verbally went over the 
points contained in the latest draft of the Joint Statement 
for the August 5 summit with no serious conflicting views on 
the content.  They also reviewed the most likely topics for 
the summit meeting. 
 
-- North Korea:  The Ambassador said he expected there would 
be considerable discussion of the North Korean nuclear issue, 
given the approaching August 11 deadline for the verification 
protocol and the need to move ahead with phase three 
dismantlement.  Agreeing that verification of the North 
Korean declaration was now the key area of focus, Yu stressed 
that he had twice made that point to DPRK Foreign Minister 
Pak at the Six-Party Foreign Minister's meeting, but that he 
did not think that Pak truly understood what was required of 
North Korea.  Asked if perhaps Minister Pak had deliberately 
played dumb by stressing the DPRK's call for inspections of 
all Six-Party member states, FM Yu that he was sincerely 
worried that Pak really didn't understand that verification 
meant verification of the North Korean declaration, and not 
verification of any other facilities outside of the DPRK. 
 
-- FTA:  FM Yu and the Ambassador agreed it would be useful 
for President Bush and President Lee to compare strategies 
for achieving ratification of the FTA.  Yu said he had met 
earlier in the day with the ruling Grand National Party (GNP) 
chief policymaker Lim Tae-hee, and had told him that the GNP 
should move forward on ratification of the FTA by the 
National Assembly without linking it to U.S. Congressional 
action. 
 
-- Iraq and Afghanistan:  The Ambassador said that we did not 
see the summit as the time for any discussions on Iraq or 
Afghanistan, but that the President would likely be 
interested to hear President Lee's thoughts on the prospects 
for additional ROK involvement in those countries.  FM Yu 
replied that thought that the ROKG and GNP could work out an 
extension of the ROK troop presence in Iraq later this year, 
provided Washington and other coalition partners believed 
there was still a need for the troops.  He said the Foreign 
Ministry was also working to expand ROK vocational training 
activities in Afghanistan, but when asked about sending 
police trainers, FM Yu repeated MOFAT's preference to conduct 
the police training in Seoul.  He revealed that one of the 
reasons for the ROK position on this was that the Taliban had 
sent MOFAT a threatening message stating that if the ROK sent 
uniformed police trainers to Afghanistan, they would be in 
violation of the agreement they had reached during last 
summer's Korean hostage crisis, and Koreans would therefore 
be targeted.  The Ambassador noted the drawbacks of training 
outside Afghanistan, and suggested the ROK consider employing 
civilian or retired police personnel for the job. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
All's Well That Ends Well on Liancourt Rocks 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (C)  The Ambassador used the first part of the meeting 
with the Foreign Minister to address the issue that had 
arisen over the past week regarding the Dokdo/Takeshima 
(Liancourt Rocks) island dispute.  With the media present, 
the Ambassador expressed satisfaction that the controversial 
change to the website of the U.S. Board on Geographic Names 
(BGN) had been reversed at President Bush's direction, and 
noted our regret at the misunderstanding it had caused even 
though U.S. policy on the Liancourt Rocks had not changed. 
Following the departure of the media, the Ambassador said the 
BGN would undertake a comprehensive review of the website in 
order to standardize, correct and provide additional needed 
information on all the disputed territories it lists around 
the world.  He assured the Foreign Minister that the problem 
had been caused by a technical mistake that did not in fact 
represent a change in U.S. policy.  FM Yu thanked the 
Ambassador for the news.  He described his days as "grueling" 
because of the issue, noting that it had caught him by 
surprise.  He said that the ROK Ambassador to the United 
States had likewise been put in a very awkward position.  Yu 
said he had quickly recognized it was a technical problem, 
rather than a policy change, but that it had been very hard 
for him to explain to the Korean press why the change in the 
website had only been made with regard to Korea's territorial 
dispute with Japan, and why that change had been made at that 
particular time.  He noted that one additional correction was 
needed.  He showed the Ambassador a printout of a map from 
the BGN website that showed the islands as having two 
alternate names -- Takeshima and Liancourt Rocks -- but that 
it no longer showed the Korean alternate name of Dokdo (or 
Tokdo) as it previously had.  The Ambassador assured him that 
he would convey the minister's request to Washington that the 
BGN immediately restore the Korean name to that map. 
 
¶7. (C)  The Ambassador expressed serious concern that Yonhap 
and other Korean media outlets had misrepresented the 
corrective actions being taken by the BGN as acknowledgment 
by the USG of South Korea's claims of sovereignty over the 
islands.  Noting that even the content of Blue House 
statements were being mis-reported by Yonhap, he urged that 
MOFAT explain to the press that the U.S. policy stance on the 
sovereignty issue remained the same as it has been since 
¶1952.  He also pointed out that the content of other Korean 
news stories and editorials that claimed the U.S. had ordered 
the BGN to make the change in its website as retaliation for 
opposition to U.S. beef imports to Korea, or because the 
Japanese Government had asked us to do so, were nothing more 
than conspiracy theories entirely without merit.   Yu replied 
that the Ambassador was right and promised that MOFAT would 
address those points with the Korean media.  He was, however, 
unwilling to entirely discount Japan's influence on the 
matter, claiming he knew that the Japanese Government had 
been in contact with the BGN to try and get them to change 
"East Sea" to "Sea of Japan." 
 
¶8. (C)  At the conclusion of their discussion, Yu thanked the 
Ambassador for his help, commenting that he was very pleased 
that the problem had been resolved, adding the phrase: "All's 
Well That Ends Well."  The Ambassador stated that he hoped 
that resolution of the problem would help to clear the way 
for a good summit meeting between President Bush and 
President Lee on August 6, a view the Foreign Minister 
clearly shared.  After the meeting, the Ambassador asked FM 
Yu, who was reportedly slated to be fired because of the 
website imbroglio, whether he was now likely to survive and 
Yu responded affirmatively. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
Promise to Speed Up New U.S. Embassy Project 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (C)  When the Ambassador mentioned that the U.S. wanted to 
include mention of a new U.S. embassy in the summit Joint 
Statement, FM Yu replied that he truly believed the Camp 
Coiner site would turn out to be an ideal location because 
the Seoul City Government planned to significantly upgrade 
the surrounding area.  Informed of our concern that the ROKG 
request to survey the site for cultural properties might once 
again thwart our efforts to secure a new facility if 
something of historic value were to be found, Yu said that he 
would work to speed up the survey process and that he would 
personally discuss ways to alleviate our concern with the 
Minister of Culture. 
VERSHBOW